Judgment The appellant is the mortgagee of the suit properties under a deed of usufructuary mortgage, dated 4th July, 1953, for Rs. 6,750. Respondents 1 and 2 being entitled to a one-third right in the equity of redemption instituted O.S. No. 269 of 1943 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Tiruchirappalli for redemption of their one-third right on payment of the sum of Rs. 2,250. By consent a preliminary decree for redemption was passed on 13th July, 1944, under which the plaintiffs were directed to pay into Court a sum of Rs. 2,600, the time for payment being fixed as 10th April, 1945. The plaintiffs did not make the payment within the time specified in the decree and an application taken out for extension of time was dismissed. After the Amending Act (XXIII of 1948) introducing section 9-A to the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (IV of 1938) came into force, the plaintiffs respondents 1 and 2 filed I.A. No. 841 of 1949 for scaling down the decree amount under section 9-A of the Act. The mortgagee opposed the scaling down on the ground that the decree for redemption was not for repayment of a debt and that in any event the time fixed for payment having expired and the application for extension of time having also been dismissed, the preliminary decree ceased to be one for payment of money and could not therefore be scaled down. The trial Court dismissed the application for scaling down, but in appeal the learned Subordinate Judge of Tiruchirappalli allowed the application and scaled down the decree. The priliminary question that arises for determination is whether a preliminary decree in a suit for redemption could be considered to be a decree for repayment of the debt to entitle the respondents 1 and 2 to apply under section 19 for scaling down of the decree. Clause 1 of the preliminary decree directs respondents 1 and 2 to pay into Court on or before 10th April, 1945 or any later date up to which the time for payment may be extended by the Court the sum of Rs. 2,600. Clause 2 provides that on such payment the mortgagee should bring into Court all the documents and deliver quiet and peaceable possession of the properties. 2,600. Clause 2 provides that on such payment the mortgagee should bring into Court all the documents and deliver quiet and peaceable possession of the properties. It is further provided that on payment, respondents 1 and 2 might apply to the Court for a final decree for redemption under Order 34, Rule 8, Civil Procedure Code. There could therefore be no doubt that the decree is one for repayment of the debt and the respondents 1 and 2 can maintain an application under section 19 for scaling down of the decree. “Debt” is defined in section 3, clause (iii) of the Act as any “liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from an agriculturist, whether payable under a decree or order of a civil or revenue Court or otherwise.” But the contention that is urged is that though the decree might direct the 1st and 2nd respondents to pay into Court a certain sum of money being the repayment of the debt due to the mortgagee, to bring it within the definition of the “debt” it is not sufficient if there is only a liability, but the liability must be capable of being enforced and the decree in the present case does not contain a clause entitling the mortgagee to apply for a sale of the mortgaged properties in default of payment of the amount. In order to bring it within the definition of the ‘debt’, the decree must be one not merely declaring the existence of a liability by one or other of the parties but must be capable of being executed or enforced by process of law. Reliance is placed on the decision in Sattiraju v. Venkatasatyam1. In that case in a suit between partners for accounts of a partnership, a preliminary decree was passed and, when the matter was in the hands of the Commissioner, who has to take the accounts and also work out the individual debts of the partners, the partners claimed to be agriculturists and sought the application of the Madras Agriculturists’ Relief Act (IV of 1938). It was held by Horwill, J., that since an advance made by a partner to the partnership does not entail a liability by the partners to repay that advance, but a mere right in equity to have a claim on the assets to the extent of the advance at the time of the dissolution of the partnership, it could not be considered to be a liability in the sense of a legal liability and a liability enforceable at law, and therefore not a “debt” within the meaning of the Act. The other case relied upon is Subbaraya Goundan v. Nachimuthu Mudaliar2, where the purchasers of the equity of redemption from the mortgagors, against whom the personal remedy had become barred before Act IV of 1938 camento force, claimed the benefits of the Act. It was held that the Act could not apply as there was no enforceable debt at the commencement of the Act, and that the mere existence of a right on the part of the mortgagor to redeem after the personal remedy against him had become barred would not involve the consequence of deeming him to be under a liability to pay that debt. The preliminary decreets passed under Order 34, rule 7, Civil Procedure Code, not only declaring the amount due but directing under rule 7, sub-rule (1)(c)(i) the mortgagors to pay the amount into Court and directing the mortgagee on such payment to put the mortgagors into possession of the property. Rule 7, sub-rule (1)(c)(ii) provides that if the payment of the amount is not made on the due date, the defendant, that is the mortgagee, shall be entitled to apply for a final decree-(a) in the case of a mortgage other than a usufructuary mortgage, a mortgage by conditional sale, or an anomalous mortgage the terms of which provide for foreclosure only and not for sale, that the mortgaged property be sold, or (b) in the case of a mortgage by conditional sale or such an anomalous mortgage as aforesaid, that the plaintiff be debarred from all right to redeem the property. The mortgage being a usufructuary mortgage, there is no provision enabling the mortgagee to apply for sale for recovery of the mortgage money. The mortgage being a usufructuary mortgage, there is no provision enabling the mortgagee to apply for sale for recovery of the mortgage money. It is therefore urged that the decree for repayment of the debt cannot be enforced in execution, as there is no provision embodied in the decree in the present case enabling the mortgagee to apply for a final decree for sale. The mortgagee in a usufructuary mortgage is not entitled to apply for a final decree and the mortgagor alone can apply to the Court for passing a final decree, on payment of the amount due under the preliminary decree, ordering the mortgagee to put him in possession of the mortgaged property. But would fact that the mortgagee being a usufructuary mortgagee would not be entitled to a final decree for sale of the mortgaged property render the preliminary decree as one not for the repayment of the debt, or would such a decree cease to be so by reason of the time provided under the decree having expired and the application for extension of time being dismissed? Notwithstanding the expiry of the time and the failure on the part of the mortgagor to secure an extension of time for payment from Court, the right of the mortgagor in a usufructuary mortgage to make the payment in pursuance of the preliminary decree and apply for a final decree would be still kept open. In Angammal v. Muhammad Sulaiman Lebbai1, a preliminary decree for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage was passed on the 15th October, 1935 and the time fixed for payment was 15th January, 1936. The mortgagor did not deposit the amount by the date fixed, nor did she ask for extension of time under Order 34, rule 7 (2), Civil Procedure Code, but deposited the amount towards the end of 1942 and then applied under Order 34, rule 8, asking the Court to pass a final decree with a direction to the defendant to deliver the mortgaged property to her. It was held that the mortgagor was entitled to the remedy asked for and that the outer limit beyond which payment under rule 8, sub-rule (1) cannot be made, is the passing of the final decree debarring the plaintiff from all right to redeem the mortgaged property or the confirmation of a sale held under rule 8 (3) of Order 34 of the Code. The Patna High Court took a similar view in Muhammad Azim v. Muhammad Sultan2. It was pointed out in that decision that the provisions of sub-rule (2) of rule 7 of Order 34, providing for extension of time fixed for payment by the preliminary decree, apply only to cases of mortgage for foreclosure or sale, that in the case of a usufructuary mortgage, the mortgagor need not ask for extension of time and that the mortgagor’s right to redeem the mortgaged property subsists until a final decree debars the mortgagor from all right to redeem. The position therefore of a mortgagor, who has obtained a preliminary decree for redemption in a suit on a usufructuary mortgage, is that he can always apply for a final decree on payment of the amount declared in the preliminary decree so long as the right to redeem is not barred by limitation. There is no necessity to bring a fresh suit for redemption and he can always rely on the decree to pay the amount due thereunder and ask for possession to be delivered over to him. Being a usufructuary mortgage the mortgagee defendant cannot enforce the repayment of the amounts specified in the decree by applying for a final decree for foreclosure or sale, which remedy is open to an anomalous mortgagee or a mortgagee by conditional sale. There is no remedy provided for enforcement of the decree for recovery of the amount, which the mortgagee might avail himself of. Section 19 provides for an application for scaling down of the decree for repayment of a debt. So long as a decree is alive in the sense that it is capable of being enforced not necessarily by the mortgagee in this case but by the mortgagor, it continues to be a decree for repayment of a debt, since the liability under the mortgage is still outstanding, which liability is incorporated in the decree. In that view the preliminary decree for redemption passed in a suit on a usufructuary mortgage is one for the repayment of a debt, which can be scaled down under the provisions of Act IV of 1938. In Subbaraya Goundan v. Nachimuthu Mudaliar3, the personal remedy had become barred and the mortgagor was no longer liable to pay the debt. But, in the present case. the liability continues and the debt subsists and the decree on the debt also subsists. In Subbaraya Goundan v. Nachimuthu Mudaliar3, the personal remedy had become barred and the mortgagor was no longer liable to pay the debt. But, in the present case. the liability continues and the debt subsists and the decree on the debt also subsists. The other question that requires to be determined is, since it is a decree passed after the commencement of the Act, whether the Act could apply to this decree by virtue of section 16 of the Amending Act XXIII of 1948. Section 16 provides for the retrospective operation of the provisions of the Amending Act XXIII of 1948, which introduced section 9-A for scaling down of a usufructuary mortgage debt. The amended Act applied to (i) all suits and proceedings instituted after the commencement of the Act; (ii) all suits and proceedings instituted before the commencement of the Act, in which no decree or order has been passed, or in which the decree or order passed has not become final, before such commencement; (iii) all suits and proceeding’s in which the decree or order passed has not been executed or satisfied in full before the commencement of this Act." The learned Subordinate Judge took the view that since In this case the decree has not been executed by the appellant-mortgagee, section 9-A which has been introduced by the Amending Act by virtue of clause (iii) of section 16 is applicable for scaling down. It is contended that the decree being, a preliminary decree for redemption in a suit on a usufructuary mortgage, the mortgagee cannot enforce it and so there is no question of execution by the mortgagee and as such cannot be brought under clause (iii) of section 16. It might be urged with some force that so long as the decree has not been satisfied in full before the commencement of the Amending Act, section 9-A of the Act would be applicable. But, in my opinion, the application of the Amending Act could be supported on a stronger basis. This decree in this case by bringing it under section 16, clause (11) could very well be urged to be one which has not become final and therefore could be brought within clause (ii) of section 16 of the Amending Act XXIII of 1948. This decree in this case by bringing it under section 16, clause (11) could very well be urged to be one which has not become final and therefore could be brought within clause (ii) of section 16 of the Amending Act XXIII of 1948. The question is whether a preliminary decree for redemption in a suit on a usufructuary mortgage could be held to have not become final until the passing of the final decree. In the Civil Procedure Code, "decree" is defined as: "the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final." The Explanation says: "A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit . It may be partly preliminary and partly final". It is urged that the finality that is contemplated in section 16 (ii) of the Amending Act is the finality that is obtained after any review of the decree or after the result of the ultimate appeal against the decree and would not include cases where a final decree remains to be passed after a preliminary decree. The preliminary decree in so far as it determines the rights of the parties is final in the sense that an appeal lies against that decree and by itself is capable of enforcement in so far as the matters that are concluded by it are concerned. But the finality of the decree in the sense of ultimate conclusiveness established to the suit is only by the final decree passed in suits, where the nature of the suit admits of a preliminary and a final decree, such as suits for partition, suits for accounts and suits on mortgages. Until the final decree is passed, it cannot be said that the suit itself has been disposed of. It is the final decree that completely disposes of the suit and finality is therefore reached only after the passing of the final decree. In that view, until the final decree is passed the suit must be considered to be pending. Until the final decree is passed, it cannot be said that the suit itself has been disposed of. It is the final decree that completely disposes of the suit and finality is therefore reached only after the passing of the final decree. In that view, until the final decree is passed the suit must be considered to be pending. A preliminary decree cannot be said to dispose of the action effectively and there is no effective and complete disposal until the passing of the final decree. That a mortgage suit continues to be pending until the final decree is passed and the relationship of a mortgagor and mortgagee continues until then is the view taken in Satyanarayana v. Suryanarayana1. In the present case the final decree still remains to be passed. The object of section 16 of the Amending Act is to render the application of the amendment to a wide range of suits, both to suits instituted before and after the commencement of the Act, and to such suits in which the decrees have not only not become final but have not been executed or satisfied, and so long as something remains to be done put of the decree, the Act could be made applicable. Since the benefit conferred under the Act is extended to all suits before decree and after decree until after execution and satisfaction, the fact that a preliminary decree, which only marks a particular stage in the suit, has been passed without the suit itself not being finally disposed of could not take away the application of the amending Act. The result of holding a contrary view would be virtually limiting the scope of the Act whereas the language of section 16 and the object of the Amending Act was to extend its scope to all pending suits and decrees passed which remain to be executed or satisfied. The Act is therefore applicable to the present case, and the appeal is dismissed with costs. No leave. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.