Judgment.- This appeal, which is brought by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 17 of 1948 against the decree and judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Kurnool, relates only to items 3 to 8, 17, 19, 20 and 25. He brought the suit out of which this appeal arises, for a declaration that he is the nearest reversioner of one Butchi Reddy who died possessed of the suit properties and for recovering possession thereof. Butchi Reddy the last male-holder died in or about the year 1878 issueless leaving behind him his widow, Chinnakka. She died in October, 1943. It is the plaintiff’s case that during her lifetime, Chinnakka sold all the properties of her husband in collusion with her brothers and near relatives for no legal necessity, and that these alienations are not binding upon the reversioners. For the purpose of this appeal, it is sufficient to say that the defendants concerned with the properties involved in this appeal, except the 5th defendant, contested the suit mainly on the ground that the last male-holder had no title to the lands In their possession. The 3rd defendant who is in possession of portions of items 3 to 6 remained ex parte throughout. The defence of the 5th defendant who claimed title to item 8 was that it was sold by the widow for discharging the debts incurred by her husband and that, in any event, the plaintiff and his father having consented to the sale effected in favour of his predecessor-in-title could not impeach that alienation. The trial Court dismissed the suit as against the other defendants on the ground that the last male-holder did not die possessed of the properties in question excepting item 8. As regards item 8 the finding is that the alienation could not be impeached by the plaintiff for the reason that the transaction in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the 5th defendant amounted to settlement of bona fide disputes, the plaintiff and his father also having had some benefit, thereunder. It was also found that there was no evidence that item 8 originally belonged to late Butchi Reddy. This view of the Subordinate Judge is assailed in this appeal by the aggrieved plaintiff. It was also found that there was no evidence that item 8 originally belonged to late Butchi Reddy. This view of the Subordinate Judge is assailed in this appeal by the aggrieved plaintiff. It may be mentioned at the outset that the appeal in respect of items 17, 25 and 20 was not pressed as there is absolutely no evidence that these properties ever belonged to the last male-holder. On the other hand, Exhibit B-30, dated 6th June, 1921, establishes that item 20 belonged to someone else. With regard to item 19, it was argued on behalf of the appellant that the finding of the lower Court that the last male-holder had no title to the property is vitiated by its failure, to consider Exhibit A-12, a sale deed executed by the original owner of this property, one Kataru Venkatigadu on 29th July, 1881. This document which was executed in favour of Chinnakka recites that an extent of acre 7-69 belonging to the vendor was conveyed to her to discharge a debt of Rs. 50 due to Butchi Reddy under an earlier mortgage deed. It is contended that this document negatives the contention of the defendants 24 and 25 that it was not the property of the last male-holder. Exhibit A-12 is an unregistered document and no one connected with it was examined to prove the due execution thereof. The plaintiff himself could not speak about it as he was born long after the document is alleged to have come into existence. In fact, he stated that he did not know anything about the execution of that document. Being an ancient document section 90 of the Evidence Act can be invoked in aid of its admissibility if it should come from proper custody. As regards custody, plaintiff’s evidence is that he came into possession of this document after the institution of the suit and that it was given to him by one Lakshmamma, wife of Tulasireddy. He did not know how Tulasireddy came into possession of this document. Further, any documents of title would have been delivered by the vendor to the vendee and there is no reason why these documents could have passed into the hands of any person other than the alienee. He did not know how Tulasireddy came into possession of this document. Further, any documents of title would have been delivered by the vendor to the vendee and there is no reason why these documents could have passed into the hands of any person other than the alienee. I am not therefore satisfied that the document relied upon has come from proper custody to enable the plaintiff to have .recourse to section 90 of the Evidence Act. If this is excluded there is no evidence that the property formed part of the last male-holder’s estate. It means the claim of the plaintiff to this item of property as belonging to the last male-holder has to be negatived and the finding of the trial Court confirmed. I will now turn to items 3 to 6 which are in the possession of the 3rd defendant and who has remained ex parte throughout. In regard to these items also, the trial Court found that the title of Butchi Reddy has not been made out. While this conclusion is not challenged, it is urged that as the concerned defendant did not file a written statement disputing the claim of the plaintiff to these properties, a decree should have been given to the appellant for these properties. I do not think the plaintiff is entitled to a decree solely by the reason of failure of the defendant to contest his claim by filing written statement and by adducing, evidence to disprove the plaintiff’s claim. It is well-accepted principle of law that the plaintiff must establish the facts on proof of which he can succeed in a suit. Can this principle be departed from in a case where the defendant does not contest the suit? Does Order 8, rule 5, Civil Procedure Code which is relied on by the plaintiff make an exception to the rule stated above? Order 8, rule 5 recites that " Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability, provided that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. It was argued that the doctrine of non-traverse embodied in this rule, applied even to a case where no written statement had been filed. The basis of this argument is a ruling of the Bombay High Court in Shriram Surajmal v. Shriram jhunjhunwalla1. Beaumont, C.T., delivering the opinion of the Bench stated that if there was no pleading of the defendant, it was obvious that it could contain no denial or non-admission which was tantamount to admission within the meaning of Order 8, rule 5, Civil Procedure Code. A different note is struck bv a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Ross & Co. v. Scriven and others2. It was decided there that the rule did not apply to a case where no written statement was put in. This was followed by various High Courts. In Narinder Singh v. C. M. King3, a Bench of the Lahore High Court accepted the principle enunciated in Ross & Co. v. Scriven and others2 Relying on this Calcutta case, a Bench of the Patna High Court in Sonabah Kumari v. Kirty Anand Singh4 held that a mere omission to put in a written statement did not amount to an admission of the facts stated in the plaint. Another Bench of the same Court in Rameshwar-Raiv. Harakhlal1 took the same view, following Ross & Co.v. Scriven and others2. In this case, the decision in Shriram Surajmalv. Shriram Jhunjhunwalla3 was referred to but the learned Judges preferred to follow the Calcutta case. Reference was also made to Gobind Gorkiv. Baldeo Ram4, where it has been laid down that the purpose of Order 8, rule 5, is that a defendant when’he does make a written defence shalL be compelled to make his defence specific and it has no application when no written statement is filed. In Mt. Havav. Lokmul5, the view of the Calcutta High Court was preferred to the opposite opinion contained in Shriram Surajmal v. Shriram Jhunjhunwalla3. I express my respectful accord with the reasoning adopted in Ross & Co.v. Scriven and others2 and respectfully dissent from the opinion of Beaumont, C.J., in Shriram Surajmalv. Shriram Jhunjhunwalla3. Order 8, rule 5 is a rule of construction of pleadings and it requires the defendant to traverse the averments in the plaint and in the absence of a specific denial, a material averment in the plaint will be taken to be admitted. Shriram Jhunjhunwalla3. Order 8, rule 5 is a rule of construction of pleadings and it requires the defendant to traverse the averments in the plaint and in the absence of a specific denial, a material averment in the plaint will be taken to be admitted. As pointed by Woodroffe, J., in Ross & Co.v. Scriven and others2 ‘‘ The law says as a rule of construction, that if there is a written statement and the fact as alleged in the plaint is not denied, then the written statement must be so construed as to be taken to have admitted such allegation." It looks to me that the principles enunciated in Ross & Co.v. Scriven and others2 and that line of cases is in accordance with the scheme of Order 8. Rule 1 of that order does not compel a defendant to file a written statement. It only lays down that he may present a written statement of his defence, unless he is required to do so by Court and therefore failure to present a written statement does not entail the penal consequence of a decree being passed against him on that ground alone.. That it is not obligatory on a defendant to file a statement under Order 1, rule 8, except when called upon to do so is also seen from Ramrakhanv. Govind Das6. I am. not concerned here with the question as to the effect of non-compliance with the direction by a Court for the filing of a written statement as it is nobody’s case that this defendant was required by Court to present a written statement. The power to give a judgment against a party for failure to present a written statement is conferred only under rule 10 of that order which lays down " where any party from whom a written statement is so required fails to present the same within the time fixed by the Court, the Court may pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit." It is thus seen that the penalty prescribed in the rule applies only when a statement is required to be presented by the Court. It is not now necessary for me to decide whether this applies only to subsequent pleadings mentioned in rule 9 having regard to the juxtaposition of the expression "so required" in rule 10 as laid down in Nagaiatnam v. Kamalathammal7 or whether it governs equally rule 1 as decided in some other cases. There is no other provision of law in the Civil Procedure Code which enjoins upon a Court to give a judgment against the defendant without any material in support of the plaintiff’s case, mainly for the reason, that the defendant has not chosen to file a written statement. Hence the plaintiff was not absolved from proving his case that the last male-holder died possessed of these items of property. If he had let in some evidence in support of his claim, it may be argued in the absence of any evidence contra, his evidence must be accepted. But he cannot ask for a decree merely on the ground that a defendant had not contested the suit. It was alternatively argued that there are two documents of the years 1874 and 1887 which, according to the appellants, would establish the title of the last male-holder to these properties. These documents admittedly were not filed into Court and a petition was put in for admission thereof as additional evidence in the course of the arguments in the appeal. Apart from this application coming in at a very late stage, the requirements of Order 41, rule 27, are not satisfied. The admission of these documents was not sought either under sub-rule(1)(a) of Order 41, rule 27 or sub-rule(1)(b) under which it should be shown that these documents were not within the knowledge of the plaintiff or could not be produced by him at or, before the time when the case was pending in the trial Court notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence. There is not even an allegation to that effect. But the appellant invokes clause(1)(c) of Order 41, rule 27, alleging that these documents are essential to enable the Court to pronounce judgment with respect to these items. I do not think that this subsection can help the appellant. That will come into play only when the Court is unable to decide without further documents. Thus the requirements must be of the Court and not of the parties. I do not think that this subsection can help the appellant. That will come into play only when the Court is unable to decide without further documents. Thus the requirements must be of the Court and not of the parties. The intendment of this sub-rule is not to help a party who, through negligence or over-confidence, fails to produce sufficient evidence in support of his case in the trial Court. I cannot say that without that evidence it is not possible for me to give any decision. The trial Court has come to the proper conclusion that, in the absence of evidence in proof of the title of the last male holder, the claim has to be rejected and there is no difficulty in accepting that finding. Nor do I think that it can come under the expression, “substantial cause” within the meaning of sub-section(c). In my view, the cause must be analogous to or of the same category as mentioned in clauses(a)(b) and (c). This petition cannot therefore be allowed, especially as it was filed at a very late stage of the proceedings. It follows that the decision of the trial Court with regard to these items also has to be confirmed. The last item to be dealt with in this appeal is item 8. It cons1sts of Ac. 2-73 cents and it was conveyed to the predecessor-in-title of the 5th defendant under Exhibit B-2, dated 12th March, 1917, for a consideration of Rs. 100. This document is impugned as not binding on the reversion as the sale was not effected for legal necessity. There is no recital in the document as regards any legal necessity. But it is stated there that a portion of the sale consideration was paid to the plaintiff’s father and plaintiff who were then the prospective reversioners. This statement is borne out by Exhibit B-1, dated 11th March, 1917. This document shows that the sum of Rs. 70 was paid to plaintiff and his father Butchi Reddy. The relevant terms of that document are: “You saying that you want to sell that land to others and that you would pay me some money, required us to execute and give you a deed of relinquishment of rights. Therefore, as has been advised by mediators, we received from you a sum of Rs. The relevant terms of that document are: “You saying that you want to sell that land to others and that you would pay me some money, required us to execute and give you a deed of relinquishment of rights. Therefore, as has been advised by mediators, we received from you a sum of Rs. 70 and have relinquished to yourself the rights which we have in respect of the land described in the schedule hereunder.” It is seen from this document that the major portion of the sale consideration was. received by the plaintiff and his father. The learned Judge thought that these two documents evidence a bona fide settlement of disputes and therefore the sale was valid and binding on the plaintiff. This view of the learned Judge is assailed in this appeal. It is argued in support of the appeal concerning this item, that Exhibit B-1 is a deed of relinquishment of the right of the plaintiff and his father, and this right being only a spes successionis, it offends against the provisions of section 6 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act. At the time when Exhibit B-1 was executed the plaintiff or his father having no interest in praesenti in the properties left by Butchi Reddy, his widow being alive then, they could not in law deal with them and so they are not bound by such transactions when they actually became entitled to the properties after the succession opened out. I do not think I can accept this contention. In my opinion, this is not a case of relinquishment or assignment of a spes successionis. The two documents should be regarded as forming parts of one and the same transaction and not as evidencing independent and separate transactions. They together constitute an alienation by the widow with the consent of the presumptive reversioners. Though the sale deed purports to have been executed a day later than the so-called relinquishment deed, it is clear from the recitals in Exhibit B-1 that the sale was pre-arranged and both the documents formed integral parts of one transaction. The right of a reversioner to impeach an alienation by a widow, with the consent of presumptive reversioner, has been the constant theme of judicial discussion both by the Privy Council and the various Courts in India. The right of a reversioner to impeach an alienation by a widow, with the consent of presumptive reversioner, has been the constant theme of judicial discussion both by the Privy Council and the various Courts in India. As far back as 1861, the Privy Council had occasion to deal with this question in The Collector of Masuli-palam v. Cavaly Vencatanarrainapah1, and Lald down inter alia that the alienation by the widow which would not otherwise be legitimate, might become valid if made with the consent of her husband’s kindred, as such a consent would give rise to a presumption that the purpose for which the alienation was made, must be a proper one. However, it is not necessary for me to trace the growth of law on this subject from the early times. The law governing widow’s alienation with the consent of reversioners has been well settled. The leading case on the subject is Rangaswami Goundan v. Nachiappa Gounden2. In that case one Marakammal who succeeded to the estate on the death of her childless son executed a conveyance of a part of the estate in favour of the then reversionary heir to her son, and entitled to succeed on her death by name Ramaswami. The transferee, enjoyed the properties till his death when they passed to his heirs. Another person who was in the same degree of relationship to the last male-holder, as the heirs of the transferee, purchased from one of these heirs two items of such property and also advanced some money on the mortgage of these and two small properties of the mortgagor. After the death of Marakammal, one of the reversioners entitled to the estate and who entered into the transactions referred to above, filed a suit asserting his claim to half the estate as reversioner and impeaching the validity of the deed of transfer executed by Marakammal. The question arose, whether the plaintiff was estopped from disputing the validity of the alienation for the reason that he had taken the conveyance and the mortgage above set forth. The Privy Council disallowed the plea of estoppel as the plaintiff had not consented to the deed executed by the widow nor claimed through Ramaswamy. The question arose, whether the plaintiff was estopped from disputing the validity of the alienation for the reason that he had taken the conveyance and the mortgage above set forth. The Privy Council disallowed the plea of estoppel as the plaintiff had not consented to the deed executed by the widow nor claimed through Ramaswamy. Their Lordships held that the plaintiff was not barred from asserting his own title merely because the mortgage taken by him included some property alienated by the widow or he purchased two small pieces of ground. Lord Dunedin who gave the judgment of the Board stated the principles in these terms: “No doubt there is another view which is not estoppel, but is expressed by one learned Judge as ratification. It is scarcely that, though it might be hypercriticism to object to the use of the word. What it is based on is this. An alienation by a widow is not a void contract, it is only voidable. Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi3. Now in all cases of voidable contracts there is a general equitable doctrine common to all systems that he who has the right to compLaln must do so when the right of action is properly open to him and he knows the facts. If, therefore, a reversioner, after he became in titulo to reduce the estate to possession and knew of the alienation, did something which showed that he treated the alienation as good he would lose his right of complaint. This may be spoken of, though scarcely accurately, as ratification. In some cases it has been expressed as an election to hold the deed good Modho Sudan Singh v. Rooka4. But it is well settled that though he who may be termed a presumptive reversionary heir has a title to challenge an alienation at its inception, he need not do so, but is entitled to wait till the death of the widow has affirmed his character, a character which up to that date might be defeatd by birth or adoption. The present plaintiff raised these proceedings immediately after his title was confirmed. The present plaintiff raised these proceedings immediately after his title was confirmed. Of course something might be done even before that time which amounted to an actual election to hold the deed good’.” It is clear from this passage that the equitable doctrine of election or ratification applies to an alienation by a widow, if a reversioner does something to show that he regarded the alienation as good and that the reversioner need not wait to indicate his election or ratification, till he actually succeeds to the estate and that it can be done even during the life-time of the widow. The effect of consent of a presumptive reversioner to an alienation by a widow is stated by his Lordship at page 536 thus: “When an alienation of the whole or part of the estate is to be supported on the ground of necessity, then if such necessity is not proved aliunde and the alienee does not prove inquiry on his part and honest belief in the necessity, the consent of such reversioners as might fairly be expected to be interested to quarrel with the transaction will be held to afford a presumptive proof which if not rebutted by contrary proof, will validate the transaction as a right and proper one”. These observations can have reference only to a case where the actual reversioner is other than the one that was a party to and benefited by the transaction. The law is stated in practically the same terms as in the passage quoted above by the Supreme Court recently in Kali Shankar Das v. Dhirendra Nath Patra1. The principles enunciated in Rangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden2, were re-affirmed by the Privy Council in Ramagouda Annagouda v. Bhausaheb3. There in a suit instituted by a reversioner to recover possession of certain houses and lands from an alienee, the question arose whether the consent given by the father of the plaintiff, to an alienation by the widow, precluded the plaintiff from questioning the sales. The property in suit originally belonged to one Akkagouda. He died in 1846 leaving behind him two widows, Lingava and Tayava and a daughter. The second widow survived her husband for more than 60 years and in 1868 she had alienated nearly the whole property by three documents executed and reg1stered on the same day. The property in suit originally belonged to one Akkagouda. He died in 1846 leaving behind him two widows, Lingava and Tayava and a daughter. The second widow survived her husband for more than 60 years and in 1868 she had alienated nearly the whole property by three documents executed and reg1stered on the same day. Under one document she gave one property to her brother ; and under another, she sold half of certain other lands to Annagouda and the other half was sold to her son-in-law by a third deed. The signature on each of the deeds was attested by the two alienees. Annagouda who survived the widow for some years did not take any action to avoid the other two alienations. After his death, his son and grandsons instituted the suit as stated above. When the matter went up in appeal ultimately to the Privy Council, their Lordships decided against the plaintiffs on the ground that the three deeds were to be regarded, not as independent and separate ones, but as parts of the same transaction, entered into by all the persons interested in the properties and that the plaintiff who claimed under or through Annagouda who had been benefited by these transactions could not challenge the alienations. The contention that the action of Annagouda amounted to a dealing with spes successionis was repelled in the following words at page 7.- “It was argued that Annagouda’s contingent interest as a remote reversioner could not be validly sold by him, as it was a mere spes successionis, and an agreement to sell such interst would also be void in law. It is not necessary to consider that question, because he did not in fact either sell or agree to sell his reversionary interest. It is settled law that an alienation by a widow in excess of her powers is not altogether void but only voidable by the reversioners, who may either singly or as a body be precluded from exercising their right to avoid it either by express ratification or by acts which treat it as valid or binding.” The present case undoubtedly falls within the principle of that ruling. Now to turn to some of the leading cases in the Indian High Courts, the principle in Rangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden2, was expounded and applied by the Madras High Court in Rama Kotayya v. Viraraghavayya4. Now to turn to some of the leading cases in the Indian High Courts, the principle in Rangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden2, was expounded and applied by the Madras High Court in Rama Kotayya v. Viraraghavayya4. In that case a Hindu by name Subbayya died leaving him surviving a widow Seethamma and his mother Bapamma in the year 1909. In October, 1918, Seethamma executed a deed of gift conveying a portion of the properties in her possession, then as the heiress of her husband to her brother Veeraraghavayya. A few days later, the then prospective reversioner executed a document relinquishing all his rights in property as prospective reversioner and purporting to give consent to the alienation. On the death of the widow and after his rights as a reversioner became concrete, he disputed the transaction. A Full Bench cons1sting of Coutts-Trotter, C.J., and Madhavan Nair and Jackson, JJ., decided that he was precluded from doing so by reason of his action. The learned Judges thought that although there was no scope for the applicability of the rule of estoppel, the plaintiff could not call in question the alienation having manifested his intention to abide by the alienation of the widow. In the opinion of the learned Judges, the plaintiff would not come within the meaning of the strict doctrine of election since no pecuniary benefit was received by him. Nevertheless, as he had agreed to abide by the act of the widow, his action amounted to ratification. This is how the learned Judges sum up the position: — ‘ But there is a third doctrine of equity, an obviously indispensable one which has received. various legal labels, sometimes being sopken of as election and sometimes as ratification. Its most authoritative exposition for an Indian Court is to be found in the Judgment of the Board in Ranga-swami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden1". The learned Judges cited with approval a Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court (five Judges) in Fateh Singh v. Thakur Rukmini Ramanji Maharaj2 and another of the Bombay High Court in Akkawa v. Sayadkhan Mithekhan3. Its most authoritative exposition for an Indian Court is to be found in the Judgment of the Board in Ranga-swami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden1". The learned Judges cited with approval a Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court (five Judges) in Fateh Singh v. Thakur Rukmini Ramanji Maharaj2 and another of the Bombay High Court in Akkawa v. Sayadkhan Mithekhan3. Before dealing with the two last mentioned cases, I will refer to a passage in the leading case of Streatfield v. Streatfield4, which stated the equitable doctrine of election, in the following words: "Election is the obligation imposed upon a party by Courts of equity to choose between two incons1stent or alternative rights or claims in cases where there is a clear intention of the person from whom he derives one that he should not enjoy both. Every case of election, therefore presupposes a plurality of gifts or rights, with an intention, express or implied, of the party who has a right to-control one or both that one should be a substitute for the other. The party who is to take has a choice, but he cannot enjoy the benefit of both." In Akkawa v. Sayadkhan Mithekhan3, a Hindu widow sold a portion of her husband’s estate without legal necessity but with the consent of the next reversioner. On the death of the widow the consenting reversioner brought a suit to avoid the alienation. It was held by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court that the plaintiff could not avoid the transaction as she had testified her election " by actual joinder in a deed of alienation " which was " at least as good as any act of ratification or sanction given after the deed of alienation ". Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Fateh Singh v. Thakur Rukmini Ramanji Maharaj2. The facts there are these: One Tulsi Ram died leaving behind him his widow Musammat Munian and a son Daulat Ram. The latter died childless and was succeeded in the possession of the property first by his own widow and afterwards by his mother. Mussamat Munian made a gift on 19th April, 1905, of certain immovable properties, in favour of the family idol. On 12th May, 1905. The latter died childless and was succeeded in the possession of the property first by his own widow and afterwards by his mother. Mussamat Munian made a gift on 19th April, 1905, of certain immovable properties, in favour of the family idol. On 12th May, 1905. two of" the presumptive reversioners, by name Fateh Singh and Sundar, executed a document which was styled a deed of relinquishment. After the death of Mussamat Munian, Fateh Singh filed a suit for recovering the property conveyed on 19th April, 1905, by Mussamat Munian. The suit was res1sted, inter alia, on the ground that the plaintiff was bound by the deed of relinquishment and hence barred from contesting the validity of that alienation. The learned Judges constituting the Full Bench decided that the plaintiff could not successfully impugn the alienation to which he gave his unqualified assent. The reason of the rule is given thus: " Whether his action be spoken of as a ratification of the transfer, or as an election to hold" good the deed of the 19th April, 1905, we are satisfied that it is binding upon Fateh Singh so that: he personally is not permitted to challenge its effect ". In support of this conclusion reliance was placed, among others, upon the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Rangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden1. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that since he had no right in the properties of Butchi Reddy, during the lifetime of the latter’s widow, any dealingwith by him of such rights could only amount to a tranfer of spes successionis which is prohibited under section 6 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, and therefore this present case is not governed by the above cited authorities but by the principle enunciated in Amrit Narayan Singh v. Goya Singh1. In that case one Jhamman Singh, a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law, died leaving behind him a. widow, Radha Koer, a daughter, Kar Koer and a daughter’s son, Amrit Narayan Singh, then a minor. On the death of the widow, disputes arose between the agnates of Jhamman Singh as to the right of the daughter to succeed to the property. The matter was referred to arbitration. On the death of the widow, disputes arose between the agnates of Jhamman Singh as to the right of the daughter to succeed to the property. The matter was referred to arbitration. But before the arbitrators had taken any action, a compromise was entered into by Rajendar Singh, the husband of Kar Koer purporting to act on behalf of his wife and the minor son, the effect of which was to completely extinguish the reversionary interest of his minor son to Jhamman Singh’s estate. The arbitrators made an award in accordance with the terms of the compromise. Not only was there no evidence that Kar Koer had any knowledge of the proceedings before the arbitrators but it also appeared that she did not accept the award and in spite of her opposition, a decree was passed on the basis of this award, on the application of the agnates and the "latter were put in possession of the property. After the death of Kar Koer, Amrit Narayan Singh, the maternal grandson of the last male-holder brought a suit to set aside the arbitration proceedings as being fraudulent and without the knowledge or the authority of his mother and for a declaration that he was not bound by them. In upholding the claim of the plaintiff, the Privy Council stated thus: " With respect, in proceedings to consider whether Rajendar Singh, the plaintiff’s father, had power to refer the matter on behalf of his minor son to arbitration, they seem to have misconceived the legal position of the infant under the Hindu Law. Evidently they thought he had a right which could form the subject of bargain. This is an obvious m1stake ; a Hindu reversioner has no right or interest in praesenti in the property which the female owner holds for her life. Until it vests in him on her death, should he survive her, he has nothing to assign or to relinqiuish, or even to transmit to his heirs. His right becomes concrete only on her demise ; until then it is mere spes successionis. His guardian if he happens to be a minor, cannot bargain with it on his behalf or bind him by any contractual engagement in respect thereto. Rajendar’s action, therefore, in referring to arbitration any matter connected with his son’s reversionary interest was null and void ". His guardian if he happens to be a minor, cannot bargain with it on his behalf or bind him by any contractual engagement in respect thereto. Rajendar’s action, therefore, in referring to arbitration any matter connected with his son’s reversionary interest was null and void ". I am unable to see how this case affords any analogy to the present one. The case under citation only gave effect to the rule contained in section 6 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act and reaffirmed the well-established principles of Hindu Law. That was an instance of a minor’s guardian bargaining away the prospective right of a minor reversioner. That was not a case of alienation with the consent of the reversioner and there was no question of any estoppel, election or ratification nor have their Lordships made any observations touching the question involved in the present case. Learned Counsel next called in aid the Judgment of Umamaheswaram, J., in Second Appeal No. 574 of 19502. In that case a Hindu died leaving behind him a widow, Konamma, some daughters, one of whom was Subbamma and a daughter’s son, Govinda Reddy. Konamma executed a document called dakhal deed in favour of Subbamma with the recitals that the donee, after the death of her father, got into possession of the land that fell to her share, but, as there was no document evidencing it, the deed questioned was being executed and from that day onwards the donee could enjoy the property from son to grandson with powers of sale, gift and mortgage. This document was attested by Govinda Reddy. In a suit brought by Govinda Reddy, as reversioner to the estate of the last male-holder, he was sought to be non-suited by the defendant who claimed title to this property under a settlement deed executed by Subbamma, inter alia, on the plea that the plaintiff was debarred from recovering the property by reason of his assenting to the gift deed in favour of Subbamma. This defence was negatived by the Courts below. This defence was negatived by the Courts below. When the matter came to this Court in S.A. No. 574 of 19502, the learned Judge, in view of the decision in Veerayya v. Bapayya3, construed that document in question as conveying only the widow’s estate of the donor and that it did not purport to transfer any absolute interest in the properties to the donee and that therefore, evert if the plaintiff had assented to that dakhal deed, he was not precluded from recovering the properties of the last male-holder. The learned Judge has also expressed the opinion that a presumptive reversioner, who had given consent to an alienation is not bound by that alienation,, apart from the doctrine of estoppel or election and there was no legal basis for the Full Bench decisions of Allahabad, Bombay, and Madras High Courts which rest on the interpretation of a passage in Rangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden1 and that the passage relied on did not warrant the interpretation put by those Full Bench decisions. It was also thought that the following observations of Mukher-jea, J., in Kalishankardas v. Dhirendra Math Patra2, throw light on this question: It is true that there is a passage at the end of the judgment in Manokarnika’s case3, which lends some apparent support to the contention of the learned counsel. The concluding words in the judgment stand as follows: “The appellants who claim through Matadin Singh and Baijnat Singh must be held bound by the consent of their fathers.‘ But the true import of this passage was discussed by the Privy Council in their later pronouncement in Rangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden1 and it was held that the words referred to above should not be construed to lay down the proposition that such consent on the part of the father would operate propria vigore and would be binding on the sons. This proposition, their Lordships observed was opposed both to principle and authority, it being a settled doctrine of Hindu Law that nobody has a vested right so long as the widow is alive and the eventual reversioner does not claim through any one who went before him. As the sons of Ram Narayan claim as heirs of Haripada and not of their father, the admissions, if any, made by the latter could not in any way bind them”. As the sons of Ram Narayan claim as heirs of Haripada and not of their father, the admissions, if any, made by the latter could not in any way bind them”. In the case before the Supreme Court, the reversioner impeaching the alienation was not a consenting party nor did he claim through such a person. It is also evident from the judgment that the situation would be different if the plaintiff assented to the transaction or claimed through any one who consented to the alienation-It is therefore clear that the remarks of the Supreme Court are not very helpful in the case of a plaintiff who was a party to the transaction or who expressed his-announcement to treat the alienation as good. The learned Judge, Umamaheswaram, J., thought that a presumptive reversioner has only expectancy and has not a vested interest in the estate of a last male-holder and cannot therefore alienate it and it is only on the basis of estoppel or election that a reversioner can be precluded from suing for the recovery of the properties, i.e., when he receives some benefit. If the basis of this rule is that during the lifetime of the widow the reversioner has only a chance of succession or a mere hope or expectation which cannot form the subject of transfer, it must equally apply even to a case where some benefit was: received by the reversioner. Then there will be no scope for the application of the doctrine of estoppel. If the crucial time is the opening of the succession for purposes of ratification, it should be so even for election or estoppel. It is a cardinal maxim of law that there can be no estoppel against a statute. These equitable doctrines cannot be invoked so as to validate what is prohibited by an enactment on grounds of public policy. So, if the conduct of a reversioner prior to his rights become concrete, is not material, the same should be the case even if he had some benefit under the transaction. If the act of the prospective reversioner is viewed as a transfer, of a mere expectancy, it is hit by section 6 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, whether the consenting reversioner was benefited by the transaction or not. If the act of the prospective reversioner is viewed as a transfer, of a mere expectancy, it is hit by section 6 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, whether the consenting reversioner was benefited by the transaction or not. But an alienation of a widow with the assent of a prospective reversioner cannot be regarded as a transfer of a chance of heir-apparent succeeding to an estate within the meaning of section 6 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, as is evident from the passage in the judgment of Lord Sinha in ‘Ramagouda Annagouda v. Bhausaheb1, which has already been extracted. Regarded in that light, there can be no difficulty in invoking the doctrine of ratification. It is not of essence of ratification that it should be done after the death of the widow. It is open to a reversioner to decide to abide by the alienation even during the lifetime of the widow. The character he holds at the relevant time does not destroy the nature of the act be it election or ratification. There is foundation for this proposition in Ramaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden2 and Ramagouda Annagouda v. Bhausaheb1. No new-doctrine was formulated by the Full Bench in Rama Kotayya v. Viraraghavayva3. In my opinion, if the reversioner impeaching the alienation is the one who had assented to it, he will be precluded from doing it on the principle of ratification independent of the theory of estoppel or election. The Full Bench judgment in Rama Kotayya v. Viraragavayya3, had stood die-test of time for over a quarter of a century and referred to in a number of subsequent decisions including the one in Veerayya v. Bapayya4, without any doubt being cast on the correctness of the rule stated therein. To doubt the authority of such a decision which will result in d1sturbing titles acquired under various transactions, there should be very weighty reasons. As far as possible titles have to be quieted. Justice Umamaheswaram further observed that “that the observations or Lord Dunedin should not be strictly construed and if they are susceptible of that construction, as Lald down by the Full Benches, I wish to respectfully differ from them” as he is not bound by the decisions of the Privy Council after India became Sovereign Democratic Republic. Justice Umamaheswaram further observed that “that the observations or Lord Dunedin should not be strictly construed and if they are susceptible of that construction, as Lald down by the Full Benches, I wish to respectfully differ from them” as he is not bound by the decisions of the Privy Council after India became Sovereign Democratic Republic. Whether there is room for disagreement with the lucid observations of Lord Dunedin or not, Justice Mukherjea in Kali Shankar Das v. Direndranath Patra5, has accepted as correct the principles of law laid down by Lord Dunedin as appears from the passage extracted above. For these reasons with great respect to the learned Judge, I am unable to agree with his view as regards the soundness of the Full Bench judgments. Further, this ruling does not help the appellant here as he had received benefit for giving assent to the transaction and that d1stinguishes the present case from the Second Appeal cited. In S.A. No. 145 of 19506 the learned Chief Justice has citec with approval Rama Kotayya v. Viraraghavayya3 and upheld an alienation similar to the one in the present case. With respect, I am in agreement with that decision. The principles that emerge from the authorities cited and the above discussion are these. An assignment or transfer by a reversioner of his chance of succession to an estate is a nullity as it is not a right in ex1stence, and therefore cannot be validly transferred. But a consent given by a prospective reversioner to a widow’s alienation is not governed by this rule. A reversioner who has consented to the alienation by a widow will be estopped from impugning the validity thereof after he becomes the actual reversioner if he had induced the alienee to act on the faith of representations made by him and is thereby damnified. Even apart from this principle, he is precluded from disputing the validity of the transaction on the doctrine of election if he had received some benefit. There is also the third doctrine, namely, ratification, where no benefit was received by the consenting reversioner and yet he chose to do something which amounts to an announcement that he was abiding by the alienation. Either to elect to abide by the alienation or to ratify it, it is. There is also the third doctrine, namely, ratification, where no benefit was received by the consenting reversioner and yet he chose to do something which amounts to an announcement that he was abiding by the alienation. Either to elect to abide by the alienation or to ratify it, it is. not necessary that the prospective reversioner should do something “after he became in titulo to reduce the estate to possession and knew of the alienation” to borrow the words of Lord Dunedin and that could be indicated by doing something even before the death of the widow, amounting to an election or ratification. But if the consent was given by a reversioner, other than the actual reversioner, it does not operate propria vigore, but only it furnishes a presumptive or prima facie evidence of legal necessity. The reversioner who has succeeded to the estate can rebut this presumption. The basis of this presumption is that a person would not acquiesce in a transaction so as to prejudice his own interest if it is not for a proper purpose. Applying these principles, I must hold that the plaintiff who was a party to and benefited by the alienation in question cannot be permitted to dispute its validity. As I have already remarked, having regard to the recitals and the contents of Exhibits B-1 and B-2, they should be read as forming part of the same transaction, namely, the alienation was effected with the consent of the plaintiff and his father. Exhibit B-1 labelled incorrectly as a deed of relinquishment is more in the nature of a deed of consent and should not be regarded as an independent and separate transaction. Both Exhibits B-1 and B-2 are connected in such a way that they should be considered as a whole. The claim of the plaintiff appellant will have to be repelled and the suit dismissed as regards item 8 also. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. A.S.R. -------- Appeal dismissed.