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1954 DIGILAW 441 (MAD)

Srungaram Appanna v. Kadagala Venkanna

1954-10-12

K.SUBBA RAO

body1954
Judgment.- The only question in this second appeal is, what is the effect of the provisions of section 4 of the Madras Act XXX of 1947 (The Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act. 1947) on the rights of parties in a suit for recovery of rent under section 77 of the Madras Estates Land Act. The facts are:The plaintiff is the landholder of the inam village of Bhyri-puram. The defendant is a tenant under her. The plaintiff filed a suit, S.S. No. 770 of 1948 on the file of the Special Deputy Collector’s Court, Vizianagaram, against the defendant for recovery of a sum of Rs. 198, being the rent alleged to be due to her as per the conditions of the muchilika, Exhibit P-1, dated 25th September, 1943, executed by him in the plaintiff’s favour. The defendant admitted the rent of 18 putties of paddy, but pleaded discharge of 10 putties and disputed the money value at which the rent was claimed. The Special Deputy Collector rejected the plea of discharge and decreed the full quantum of rent in kind. He calculated the price on the basis of the rate at which the Central Co-operative Stores, Ltd., Vizianagaram, acquired the second rate paddy from the defendant. In the result, he gave a decree for a sum of Rs. 154-2-0 and costs of the suit. The plaintiff preferred an appeal to the District Judge of Visakhapatnam claiming that the rate should have been fixed at Rs. 11 per putti instead of at Rs. 8-9-0. The defendant preferred a memorandum of cross-objections in so far as the decree of the Special Deputy Collector went against him. The learned District Judge accepted the findings of the Special Deputy Collector. But, on the basis of the provisions of Act XXX of 1947, reducing the rent to 1/11th of the ex1sting rate, he gave a decree only for a sum of Rs. 14-0-2. Hence the above second appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Dikshitulu, contends that the provisions of Act XXX of 1947 have no application to a case where a suit has already been filed for recovery of rent, or, in any view, to a case where a decree has been obtained in respect of the rent claimed. 14-0-2. Hence the above second appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Dikshitulu, contends that the provisions of Act XXX of 1947 have no application to a case where a suit has already been filed for recovery of rent, or, in any view, to a case where a decree has been obtained in respect of the rent claimed. The relevant provisions of the Act may now be read: Section 3 (2): “After considering the recommendations of the Special Officer and the remarks of the Board of Revenue thereon, the Provincial Government shall, by order published in the Fort St. George Gazette, fix the rates of rent payable in respect of each class of ryoti land in each village in the estate.” Section 3 (3): “An order under sub-section (a) shall take effect from the commencement of the fasli year 1357.” Section 4: “Where an order is published under section 3, sub-section (2) in respect of any estate or portion of an estate, a ryot shall not be bound to pay rent for any ryoti land held by him in such estate or portion at a rate exceeding that fixed in the order, notwithstanding anything contained in the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908.” A combined reading of the aforesaid provisions leads to this position. After the Government fixes the rates of rent in the manner prescribed, the rents so fixed shall take effect from the commencement of the fasli year 1357. Thereafter, a ryot shall not be bound to pay any rent exceeding that fixed by the Government. Therefore, whenever a question arises as regards the liability of a ryot to pay rent after the date so fixed, his liability is regulated by the provisions of the said Act. In the present case, the landholder filed a suit for recovery of rent on the basis of the preex1sting rate prevalent in his village. Pending those proceedings on nth October, 1949, the Government issued a notification fixing rents at 1/11th of the ex1sting rates. The rent in question relates to the fasli 1357. The question which the learned District Judge had to decide was, what is the rate of rent the ryot is bound to pay to the landholder for the fasli 1357. The learned District Judge, relying upon section 4 of the Act, held that the ryot was bound to pay only 1/11th of the pre-ex1sting rate. The question which the learned District Judge had to decide was, what is the rate of rent the ryot is bound to pay to the landholder for the fasli 1357. The learned District Judge, relying upon section 4 of the Act, held that the ryot was bound to pay only 1/11th of the pre-ex1sting rate. So stated, the legal position is clear and beyond any reasonable doubt. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned District Judge erred in applying section 4 to the instant case. It is a well-settled principle of law that an appeal is a continuation of the suit. When an appeal is filed, die finality of the decree is suspended. The rights of the parties thereafter have to be regulated on the basis that the entire proceedings are open, subject no doubt to the well-known procedural limitations. I cannot, therefore, agree with the learned counsel, when he stated that the liability of the defendant to pay rent at the pre-ex1sting rate was finally and conclusively decided by the Special Deputy Collector, and there was a final decree in respect of the amount claimed in the plaint. But the plaintiff and the defendant have preferred appeals against the decree of the Special Deputy Collector, the plaintiff claiming that the’ decree should have been for the entire amount claimed and the defendant contending that the rent claimed was to a large extent discharged. The rights of both the parties were, therefore, pending decision before the learned District Judge. The provisions of section 4 are clearly invoked and it is the duty of the Court to hold that the defendant is not bound to pay rent in excess of the amount fixed under section 3 of the Act. It is not necessary to express my opinion on the question, viz., what would have been the legal position if there was a final decree for rent. In the result, I agree with the conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate Court. The second Appeal, fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. D.L.N. ------ Appeal dismissed.