Order.- The petitioner was convicted under rule 29 read with the rule 28-E of the Rules framed under section 20 of the Madras Prevention of Adulteration Act, and setenced to a fine of Rs. 100. The case against him was that he was found to be in possession of 50 bags of Lak Dhall Flour, which is a prohibited article, when the Health Officer and the Sanitary Inspector of Cuddapah raided his shop on 16th April, 1953. The prosecution examined the Sanitary Inspector who raided the shop and two others in proof of its case. The opinion of the Government Analyst was that the stuff seized contained artificial water soluble yellow colouring matter derived from coaltar, which is injurious to public health. The defence raised three contentions: (1) That the charge-sheet was filed by P.W.1, the Sanitary Inspector and that vitiated all the proceedings; (2) that the prosecution failed to prove that the bags were for sale, and (3) that the procedure laid down under rule 2-A of the Rules framed under section 20(1) for taking samples and testing was not strictly followed. The Courts below rejected the pleas raised on behalf of the petitioner and convicted him, as in their opinion, it was abundantly proved that the petitioner was in possession of 50 bags of lak dhall flour for sale, and thereby committed an offence under rule 29 read with rule 28-E. In this revision petition against the conviction of the petitioner the same points are urged by Mr. Ramamohana Rao. It is first argued by him that the proceedings against his client were vitiated by the complaint having been filed by the Sanitary Inspector and not by the Executive Officer. According to him, section 18 prohibits the filing of a complaint by the Sanitary Inspector and that it is only the Executive Officer that could file it and that the Sanitary Inspector is not authorised to do so. There is absolutely no force in this argument and has to be rejected as it is opposed to the terms of section 18. Section 18 recites that “No prosecution under this Act shall be instituted except on the complaint of the purchaser or with the consent in writing of the local executive officer”. It is clear therefore that either a purchaser or some one with the consent of the Executive Officer could file a complaint. Section 18 recites that “No prosecution under this Act shall be instituted except on the complaint of the purchaser or with the consent in writing of the local executive officer”. It is clear therefore that either a purchaser or some one with the consent of the Executive Officer could file a complaint. It was alternatively contended that it is only a purchaser that could file the complaint either with or without the consent of the local Executive Officer. This contention lacks substance. The section contemplates the initiation of the prosecution either on the complaint of a purchaser, or with the consent in writing of the local Executive Officer. Latter clause can only mean that a person other than a purchaser can file a complaint with the consent of the Executive Officer concerned. If the argument of Mr. Ramamohana Rao is to be accepted, no meaning is given to the expression “or with the consent in writing of the Local Executive Officer”, because under the first part of the section, the purchaser himself can start prosecution by his complaint. If so, the consent in writing of the Executive Officer is absolutely unnecessary. Therefore the construction sought to be placed on behalf of the appellant makes the latter part of the section meaningless. In construing a statute effect should be given to every part of it. The Legislature cannot be assumed to have used words without any purpose or by way of redundancy. In this case, there can be no doubt about the intendment of the section viz., that the prosecution may be started either on the complaint of the purchaser, or by someone who is authorised by the local Executive Officer. Further, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant overlooks the working of rule 28-E which prohibits not only the sale or offer or exposure for sale of Lak Dhall but also the possession for purposes of sale. A contravention of this rule is made punishable under rule 29. If the argument of the learned counsel is to be accepted, there could be no prosecution except when there is a sale. It will be anomalous to hold that while possession of a thing is an offence punishable under an enactment there can be no prosecution in respect thereof. An offender cannot be punished without being prosecuted. If the argument of the learned counsel is to be accepted, there could be no prosecution except when there is a sale. It will be anomalous to hold that while possession of a thing is an offence punishable under an enactment there can be no prosecution in respect thereof. An offender cannot be punished without being prosecuted. Viewed thus, rule 28-E read with rule 29 cannot be reconciled with section 18. Incons1stency cannot be attributed to Legislature unless it appears on the very face of it. In my opinion, rule 28-E read with rule 29 is quite cons1stent with section 18. Giving the plaln meaning to the language of the section 18, purchaser as well as any other person with the consent of the Executive Officer can take action against any person that violates rule 28-E. Coming to the second argument viz., that the prosecution has not established that the Lak Dhall Flour in the possession of the petitioner was for sale, the counsel for the petitioner has not fared better. There is abundant evidence on record which has been accepted by the Courts below that the bags were there for sale. Further, in the examination under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code the petitioner did admit that he had 50 bags of lak Dhall flour for sale. This contention also fails. Lastly it was urged by Mr. Ramamohana Rao that the procedure lald down in rule 2-A was not followed by the prosecution and this has affected all the proceedings. There is no force in this argument either. It is true that according to the procedure prescribed in rule 2-A, if the food required to be analysed cons1sts of 50 or more packages, contents of not less than 5 such packages forming part of the same consignment should be analysed. There is no force in this argument either. It is true that according to the procedure prescribed in rule 2-A, if the food required to be analysed cons1sts of 50 or more packages, contents of not less than 5 such packages forming part of the same consignment should be analysed. It is urged that admittedly in this case samples were taken only from one bag and this violates rule 2-A. Rule 2-A runs: “Where the contents of not less than two receptacles or packages forming part of the same consign ment of an article of food containing less than fifty receptacles or packages, or of not less than five receptacles or packages have been analysed and found to be adulterated or other than what they purport or are represented to be, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the article of food contained in the other receptacles or packages of the same consignment also is adulterated or other than what it purports, or is represented to be”. “Explanation.-For the purposes of this rule receptacles or packages having similar appearance and marking found in a place shall unless at the time of taking samples for analysis the owner or his representative declares otherwise be deemed to be part of the same consignment.” A reading of the rule along with the Explanation makes it clear that it would apply only when the prosecution has to rely upon a presumption, and does not come into play where there is an admission by the accused person that the receptacles do contain the prohibited article. It will be unnecessary to rely upon the presumption which can arise only when at least two receptacles or packages are analysed where the consignment cons1sts of less than 50 packages and 5 or more if the consignment exceeds 50, if there is an admission by the asccused that all the bags contained the prohibited articles. In this case, there is the admission of the accused in the examination under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code apart from the evidence of P.W.1 that at the time of the raid, it was stated by the petitioner that all the bags contained lak dhall flour. There is therefore no basis for this argument also. In this case, there is the admission of the accused in the examination under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code apart from the evidence of P.W.1 that at the time of the raid, it was stated by the petitioner that all the bags contained lak dhall flour. There is therefore no basis for this argument also. It follows that the petitioner was rightly convicted under rule 29 read with rule 28-E of the rules framed under the Madras Prevention of Adulteration Act, and the setence cannot be said to be excessive. The petition is therefore dismissed. The order as to destruction will also stand. V.P.S. ----- Petition dismissed.