Judgment.- This Second Appeal is filed against the judgment and decree of the Court of the District Judge of Chittoor confirming that of the District Munsif in O.S. No. 599 of 1947, a suit filed by the respondent for a declaration of the title of the joint family, of which he is the manager, to the suit properties and for possession. The plaintiff’s case may be briefly stated. His paternal uncle Chengalraya Reddi purchased the suit properties in the name of his wife Sayamma under a duly reg1stered sale deed dated 27th June, 1938, for a sum of Rs. 300. After the purchase, as he settled down in Sumatra Island for the purpose of trade, he entrusted the management of the suit lands to the defendants, who are the brothers and mother of Sayamma. Sayamma and Chengalraya Reddi died in the year 1945 and 1946 childless. At the time of his death, Chengalraya Reddi had two brothers Veera-swami Reddi and Munuswami Reddi. Munuswami Reddi died in 1946 leaving him surviving his only son, the plaintiff. On those allegations, the plaintiff claimed that he and the members of his joint family including Veeraswami Reddi have become solely entitled to the suit properties. The suit was filed for possession as defendants refused to deliver possession. Defendants 1 to 3 claimed that the suit property was purchased benami in the name of Sayamma for their family. They stated that they have been in possession in their own right. Even if Sayamma was held to be the owner, they pleaded that they would be her heirs in preference to the plaintiff. The learned District Munsif held, on the evidence that the sale deed, dated 27th June, 1938, in favour of Sayamma was not benami for defendants .1 to 3. He did not think it was necessary to consider whether the said sale deed was benami for her husband Chengalraya Reddi, as in his view, it did not make any difference in the matter of succession. He found that there was no evidence that the marriage was in Asura form and on that finding, gave a decree to the plaintiff and his family as prayed for. On appeal the learned District Judge accepted the findings of the trial Court. He found that there was no evidence that the marriage was in Asura form and on that finding, gave a decree to the plaintiff and his family as prayed for. On appeal the learned District Judge accepted the findings of the trial Court. When it was contended before him that the suit was filed by the plaintiff as manager of his family and that no decree could be given for the entire property as Veeraswami Reddi, the owner of the other half, was not a member of the plaintiff’s family, the learned Judge held that the property was held in co-ownership by the plaintiff’s family of which the plaintiff was the manager and Veeraswami Reddi was a co-owner and, therefore, the suit by one of the co-owners against a trespasser would lie. In the result, he confirmed the decree. Hence, the appeal. Mr. Ramachandra Reddi, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that the property was given to Sayamma as sulka, that to such property the defendants have preferential right to succeed to that of the plaintiff and that the burden lies upon the plaintiff to establish that Sayamma’s property is not sulka but her ordinary stridhanam in which case alone they would be entitled to succeed. It may be pointed out that this question has not been specifically raised in the pleadings. Though in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the written statement, it was stated that the position of law stated in paragraph 7 of the plaint was incorrect, and that, even if Sayamma should be deemed to be the real owner, defendants 1 to 3 being the brothers of Sayamma would be her nearer heirs. That the property was given as sulka to Sayamma was not raised for the simple reason that the defendants’ contention throughout was that the purchase was benami for them. There was a suggestion in the first Court that the marriage was in Asura form. But that was rejected as there was no evidence to that effect. In the appeal, the learned Judge said that the plaintiff was a heir to the stridhanam property as there was no evidence to show that it was sulka stridhanam. There was a suggestion in the first Court that the marriage was in Asura form. But that was rejected as there was no evidence to that effect. In the appeal, the learned Judge said that the plaintiff was a heir to the stridhanam property as there was no evidence to show that it was sulka stridhanam. If the defendants intended to set up an alternative plea that the property was given as sulka to Sayamma, they should have set up that plea in more specific terms so that the plaintiff could have adduced evidence to establish that it was not sulka but only the usual kind of stridhanam. The learned District Judge is not justified in allowing the appellants to raise the plea that the property was given as sulka for that question could only be decided on fresh evidence adduced. As the question was argued, I think it is advisable to express my view. The meaning of sulka is gratuity or fees. Trevelyan in his treatise on Hindu Law says at page 436 that “it was originally paid to the father as the price of the bride but, when that was forbidden the father received it for the bride and it became her property as her dowry. According to the Viramitrodaya sulka is what is received by the bride or a married woman as a price of household furniture, conveyance, milch-cattle and ornaments.” In the Mitakshara, it is stated that the fee or sulka is that which, having been taken the bride is given in marriage. It is clear that, if the view of Virmitrodaya or of Mitakshara be accepted, it partakes of the character of price for the bride, though in the origin it was paid to the father, subsequently it meant only the fees taken by the father for the benefit of the daughter. Gopalachandra Sarkar Sastri in his book on Hindu Law gives the reason for the different rule of succession in the case of sulka at page 644 as follows: “The sulka or bride’s price however, goes to a woman’s uterine brother in preference to her own issue ; but if there be the mother she is to be preferred to the brother. The reason is that originally it belonged to the parents ; but later on it was declared to become the bride’s stridhana and this rule of succession appears to be a compromise between the original and the later views.” Dealing with the mode of proof in such cases, the learned author says: “In order to apply the special rule of succession to sulka, it must be d1stinctly alleged and proved by cogent evidence that the property given to a girl was of that character, the gift having been prompted by a desire to confer pecuniary benefit, immediate or ultimate, on the parents who have been induced to give her in marriage. In the present advanced stage of society, every ante-nuptial settlement or gift cannot be classed as sulka.” Mayne in his treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, 11 th edition, states the law on the subject at page 743 as follows: “The sulka in the older sense of bride price, ultimately received by the bride herself is obsolete ; where it is now paid to the parents or the brother in the Asura marriage, it does not raise any question of succession to her stridhana. Where it is paid to the bride herself, either as the price of ornaments or household furnishings or as a complimentary present, it would be her ordinary stridhana ; for there is no reason why any dowry given to the wife by the husband in modern times should be treated as attracting a special order of succession which was applied to some obscure form of the ancient bride price, which really belonged to the father but which he may have handed back to his daughter.” Horwill, J., in Surayya v. Balakrishnayya1 noticed the differences in the definition of sulka laid down in the Mitakshara and in the Smritichandrika and attempted to reconcile both the definitions. At page 497 the learned Judge observed: “It seems clear that even though we take the definition of sulka given in the Smritichandrika, we must still read it with the definition given in the Mitakshara and must regard as sulka the classifications given in the Smritichandrika only if there is attached to the gift some idea of a bride price. At page 497 the learned Judge observed: “It seems clear that even though we take the definition of sulka given in the Smritichandrika, we must still read it with the definition given in the Mitakshara and must regard as sulka the classifications given in the Smritichandrika only if there is attached to the gift some idea of a bride price. If the present is given to the girl or to the father of the girl for the primary purpose of purchasing a bride or securing the marriage, then it would come within the definition of sulka ; but these same classes of gifts, if not tainted with the idea of purchase, being simple gifts to a prospective bride, would not fall within the definition of sulka.” The learned Judge also quoted the above said passage from Mayne’s Hindu Law and approved of it. It is, therefore, clear that sulka is a gratuity for the receipt of which a girl is given in marriage. Whether the gift was made in the limited sense as defined in the Mitakshara, or in a wider sense as including gifts of household furniture, conveyance, milch-cattle and ornaments as defined in Smritichandrika, in either case, it should be a gift to the bride in the nature of a bride’s price but this form of stridhana has become obsolete. In modern society, it is not possible to assume that every gift made to a bride, either before or after the marriage for the aforesaid purpose is sulka. Such gifts would be her stridhanam property and a party, seeking to divert succession, must set up a definite case and establish by clear evidence that a particular gift is sulka within the meaning of the text books. In the instant case, as I have already stated, the defendants did not specifically plead in the written statement that the property was given to Sayamma as sulka nor did they adduce any evidence to establish that fact. The lower Court is clearly right in holding that the property is not sulka and, therefore, the plaintiff is the preferential heir to Sayamma. It is then contended that the learned Judge was wrong in giving a decree to the plaintiff on a basis totally different from that with which he came to Court. The lower Court is clearly right in holding that the property is not sulka and, therefore, the plaintiff is the preferential heir to Sayamma. It is then contended that the learned Judge was wrong in giving a decree to the plaintiff on a basis totally different from that with which he came to Court. It is pointed out, that in the plaint, the plaintiff claimed to be the manager of the joint family and that, in that capacity, he asked for possession, whereas the learned Judge gave the relief on the basis that the plaintiff as manager is a co-owner with Veeraswami Reddi. In the plaint there are clear allegations that the plaintiff and the members of the joint family including Veeraswami Reddi have solely become entitled to the suit property and that the suit was filed on behalf of the entire family. But it has transpired that Veeraswami Reddi had become divided from the plaintiff’s father, and, therefore, the plaintiff could not be the manager of Veeraswami Reddi’s branch. But on the death of Chengalraya Reddi, Veeraswami Reddi, and Munuswami Reddi took his property as co-owners and after the death of Munuswami Reddi, the plaintiff’s family members were co-owners, with Veeraswami Reddi. It is settled law that a co-owner can file a suit for recovery of the property from a trespasser on behalf of all the co-owners. That suit was framed by the plaintiff as manager of his family and it could not have prejudiced the defendants, for as pointed out, the plaint discloses that the plaintiff’s branch as well as Veeraswami Reddi’s branch were entitled to the entire property. Whatever defences the defendants could have raised if the suit was filed on the basis of co-ownership, they could also have been raised in the suit as framed. When the learned District Judge, rejecting the technical plea, gave a decree, I do not think I am justified in interfering with it. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. D.L.N. ------- Appeal dismissed.