Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.-This is an appeal against the Judgment of Balakrishna Ayyar, J., in S.A. No. 57 of 1947 filed by reason of the leave granted by the learned Judge under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The appellants in this Letters Patent Appeal, were the defendants in the suit O.S. No. 497 of 1944 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court of Tirunelveli filed by the respondents for the recovery of the value of articles supplied to the defendants between 27th October, 1941 and 19th January, 1942. The plaintiffs were the partners of a firm which was carrying on business in Burma under the trade name of “V.O.A. Alliar & Sons” which was registered under the law for the registration of partnerships in force in Burma. It was with this firm that the defendants-appellants had dealings as a result of which a sum of Rs. 1,657-9-0 became due to the plaintiffs firm. When Burma was overrun by the Japanese both the partners of the firm “V.P.A. Alliar & Sons” as well as defendants-appellants came over to their native places in Madras State. On 26th October, 1944, a suit was instituted for the recovery of this sum by the respondents in the name of “V.O.A. Alliar & Sons”through one of the partners “V.O.A. Mohamed”. When notice was served upon the defendants they objected to the maintainability of this suit because under the terms of Order 30, rule 8, Civil Procedure Code, it is only the firm carrying on business in India that could take advantage of the provisions of this order. As the plaintiffs were admittedly carrying on business only in Burma the defendants objected that the suit as framed did not lie. In view of this objection an application I.A. No. 1037 of 1945 was filed on 5th September, 1945, to amend the plaint by the substitution of the names of the three partners of the firm “V.O.A. Alliar & Sons” in the place and instead of the name of the firm. This application was allowed by the learned District Munsif and the plaint was amended as prayed for in December, 1945. Out of the defences raised to the suit the only one that remains is that of limitation. This application was allowed by the learned District Munsif and the plaint was amended as prayed for in December, 1945. Out of the defences raised to the suit the only one that remains is that of limitation. The point raised was that the plaintiff in the suit as originally instituted was a non-existing person or entity, that the plaint became effective only when the three partners were brought on record as plaintiffs in December, 1945 and that by this date the claim was barred by limitation. It will be seen that this raised for consideration the question as to whether section 22 of the Indian Limitation Act applied so as to render the impleading of the three partners a substitution or addition of a new plaintiff within the meaning of that section. The learned District Munsif held that there was no addition or substitution of a new plaintiff but there was merely a correction of a misdescription and on this ground held the suit to be in time and a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiffs. The defendants took the matter on appeal to the District Court of Tirunelveli in A.S. No. 101 of 1946 and the learned District Judge differing from the trial Court held that the suit was out of time. The plaintiffs filed a Second Appeal to this Court in S.A. No. 57 of 1947 which came on for hearing before Balakrishna Ayyar, J. and the learned Judge reversed the decision of the learned District Judge by holding, that the suit was. in time and granted a decree to the plaintiffs. In view however of the conflict in the authorities which was noticed in his judgment, the learned Judge granted leave to appeal from his judgment in pursuance of which this Letters Patent Appeal is filed. Having considered the numerous authorities that there are on the point we are clearly of the opinion that the learned Judge is right in his view that section 22 of the Limitation Act is not attracted to the present case. We are fortified in this conclusion by reference to certain English decisions to which we shall be adverting in our discussion of the matter. The sole question for consideration in this case is whether by reason of the amendment above referred to a new party is brought on record. We are fortified in this conclusion by reference to certain English decisions to which we shall be adverting in our discussion of the matter. The sole question for consideration in this case is whether by reason of the amendment above referred to a new party is brought on record. If it is, section 22 of the Limitation Act is attracted and the plaint must be treated as having been instituted on the date when by reason of the amendment he was made a party. If on the other hand the proper view to take of the amendment is that the party who was subsequently impleaded was even at the inception intended to be the plaintiff but that by reason either of misnomer or mis-description he was imperfectly indicated the correction of this mistake would not introduce a party but would merely describe properly that individual who always intended to assert his rights in the suit. The earliest case on the point to which it is necessary to refer is a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in Kasturchand Bahiravdas v. Sagarmal Shriram1. This case was decided in 1892 before Order 30 had been introduced in the Civil Procedure Code, at a time when any suit by a partnership had to be properly brought only in the names of the partners of the firm. It arose out of a suit to recover a debt due to the firm of Kondammal Sagarmal and the plaintiff was originally described as “the firm of Kondammal Sagarmal by its manager Sagarmal.” The firm of Kondammal Sagarmal was composed of Sagarmal Shriram and one Malamchand. The defendants objected to the frame of the action on the ground that Malamchand had not been indicated in the plaint as a plaintiff. The Subordinate Judge upholding the objections of the defendants dismissed the suit without going into the merits of the case on the ground that all the plaintiffs were not properly described in the plaint. On appeal the District Judge reversed the decree and ordered a remand being of the opinion that if Sagarmal was not entitled to sue for the firm, Malamchand should be added as a party and the suit proceeded with. There was an appeal to the High Court from this order of remand which was dismissed. On appeal the District Judge reversed the decree and ordered a remand being of the opinion that if Sagarmal was not entitled to sue for the firm, Malamchand should be added as a party and the suit proceeded with. There was an appeal to the High Court from this order of remand which was dismissed. Subsequently Malamchand was added as a co-plaintiff and the suit proceeded on the merits, the defendants raising the contention that the suit was time-barred on the date of the addition. The suit was decreed, the objection of the defendants based on section 22 of the Limitation Act being overruled. Candy, J., dismissed the Second Appeal stating that “the present was a case of misdescription not of non-joinder”. This decision was followed in this Court by Seshagiri Ayyar, J., in a case reported in Maryya Chetty v. Sami Chetty2 decided in 1915. There was a sum of money due upon dealing to the plaintiff-firm and the suit was filed by one of the partners prefixing the initials of the firm to his own name. The defendant contested the suit upon the ground that the suit was bad for nonjoinder of the other partners. The District Munsif dismissed the suit holding that if the other partners were added as they ought to be the suit would become barred under section 22 of the Limitation Act. Against this dismissal the plaintiff preferred a revision petition under section 25 of Small Cause Courts Act. The revision petition was allowed the learned Judge stating “I must regard the suit as one brought on behalf of the firm by one of its members as its agent. In this view, I cannot agree with the District Munsif in the conclusion that if other partners are vadded as co-plaintiffs the suit will be barred by limitation”. Reference was then made to Kasturchand Bahiravdas v. Sagarmal Shriram1 which was followed. A similar decision was rendered by Page, J., in a case reported in Seodoyal Khemka v. Joharmull Manmull3. Dealing with the objection as raised in the present case the learned Judge said at page 558: “The firm is an entity ; it is merely a collective name for the individuals who are members of the partnership. It is neither a legal entity nor is it a person.....A firm name, in truth, is merely a description of the individuals who compose the firm. It is neither a legal entity nor is it a person.....A firm name, in truth, is merely a description of the individuals who compose the firm. It is that, and it is nothing more.” Based on this reasoning the learned Judge held that if an amendment were effected by which the names of the individual partners were set out in a plaint replacing the firm name no new party would be added but it would be amendment merely for the purpose of more clearly describing the parties who are already before the Court. The matter came up again in Bombay and was the subject of a decision reported in Ramprasad v. Shrinivas1. A suit was instituted by the plaintiff against the defendants described as “Shivlal Ramprasad, a firm doing business as merchants at Ahmedabad”. After the institution of the suit it was discovered that Shivlal Ramprasad was not a partnership but was merely a name in which a Hindu joint family was doing business and to which obviously the provisions of Order 30, Civil Procedure Code, would not apply. An application was then made for amending the description of the defendants by substituting the names of the members of the family for the original description of “Shivlal Ramprasad”. The defendants then raised an objection based on section 22 of the Limitation Act. Macleod, C.J., and Coyajee, J., affirmed the decision of the learned trial Judge who held that the amendment corrected the misdescription and there was no addition of a new party. The authorities up to this stage are all in one way so far as this topic is concerned.. But a departure was made in a decision rendered by Blackwell, J., in Vyankatesh Oil Mill Co. v. Velmahomed2. The original plaintiffs were described as the Vyankatesh Oil Mill Co. They were carrying on business at Sangli outside British India and the suit was on dealings had by this firm with the defendants. The defendants raised an objection to the frame of the action since on the terms of Order 30, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, it was only the firm carrying on business in British India that was entitled to avail itself of the provisions enacted by this order. The defendants raised an objection to the frame of the action since on the terms of Order 30, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, it was only the firm carrying on business in British India that was entitled to avail itself of the provisions enacted by this order. The plaintiffs thereupon applied for leave to amend the plaint by substituting the names of the individual partners for that of the plaint firm under Order 1, rule 20, Civil Procedure Code and in the amendment petition a prayer was added that the amendment should be treated as following upon a misdescription of the plaintiff and not a substitution of the plaintiffs. The learned Judge ruled that the amendment asked for could not be treated as an amendment following upon a mere misdescription and must be treated as an application for the substitution as plaintiffs of the individual persons who composed an entity which the law did not recognise. Apparently there was no question of the suit being barred by limitation on the date of the amendment and the learned Judge allowed it on certain terms as to costs to which it is unnecessary to refer. The decision in Kasturchand Bahiravdas v. Sagarmal Shrirarn3 was distinguished by the learned Judge as a case which was decided previous to the enactment of Order 30, Civil Procedure Code. The decision in Seodoyal Khemka v. Joharmull Manmull4 was not referred to and that in Ramprasad v. Shrinivas1 was distinguished as a case relating to a joint family and also on the ground that it had relied upon the decision in Kasturchand Bahiravdas v. Sagarmal Shriram3 which was inapplicable after the amendment of the Civil Procedure Code. With great respect to the learned Judge we are unable to perceive how far the present enactment of Order 30, rule 1, makes any difference for the decision. The provision is an enabling one. If a firm satisfies its conditions it is entitled to utilise this machinery. The fact however that Order 30, rule 1, is inapplicable to a particular case does not by itself render the designation of individual partners an addition of new parties merely because Order 30, is inapplicable to a suit by these individuals. The provision is an enabling one. If a firm satisfies its conditions it is entitled to utilise this machinery. The fact however that Order 30, rule 1, is inapplicable to a particular case does not by itself render the designation of individual partners an addition of new parties merely because Order 30, is inapplicable to a suit by these individuals. In our opinion the correct position in law is that which is to be found in the observations of Page, J., in the decision reported in Seodoyal Khemka v. Joharmull Manmull4, which we have already extracted. We are unable to agree with Blackwell, J., in his view that a foreign firm not being, a legal entity which could as such file a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, by itself determines the question whether the impleading of the members of that firm is the addition of a new party. The vie.w of Blackwell, J., appears to have been concurrred in by two decisions reported in Neogi Ghose &38; Co. v. Nehall Singh1 and L.N. Chettyar Firm v. M.P.R. M. Firm2 but we are unable to agree with the soundness of the reasoning in these decisions either of which do not furnish any further reasons in support of the view of Blackwell, J. On the other hand, there is a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in Amulakchand v. Babulal3, where Beaumont, C.J., and Rangnekar, J., in effect dissented from the decision of Blackwell, J., in Vyankatesh Oil Mill Co. v. Velmahomed4. The learned Chief Justice followed the decision in Kasturchand Bahiravdas v. Sagarmat Shriram5. Dealing with the view of Blackwell, J., that the introduction of Order 30 into the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 rendered Kasturchand Bahiravdas v. Sagarmal Shriram5 inapplicable to cases arising thereafter the learned Chief Justice said (at page 205). “But I do not see how Order 30 can affect the question of fact whether a suit brought in the name of a firm in a case not within Order 30 is in fact a case of misdescription of existing persons or a case of a suit brought by a non-existent entity. That question, as I say, is one of fact, and in the present case it is proved on the evidence that the firm in whose name the suit was originally brought does not describe certain existing persons”. That question, as I say, is one of fact, and in the present case it is proved on the evidence that the firm in whose name the suit was originally brought does not describe certain existing persons”. We regard this as the correct view to take of the provision in Order 1, rule 10, read with Order 30, Civil Procedure Code. There are a few later decisions but it is unnecessary to refer to them as we are in entire agreement with the view of Beaumont, C.J. We share with Beaumont, C.J., his difficulty in understanding what connection the terms of Order 30, Civil Procedure Code, have on the question as to whether the description of the plaintiff originally is or is not a misnomer which is wholly a question of fact. We shall refer to the decisions of the Courts in England where a similar result has been reached. The corresponding provisions in the Rules of the Supreme Court are identical with those in India and in fact while Order 1, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, is a reproduction of Order 16, rule 2 of the Rules of Supreme Court, Order 30, Civil Procedure Code, is practically a reproduction of Order 48-A of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Only one further fact has to be mentioned, that is, though section 22 of the Indian Limitation Act does not exist in England in the form of a statutory provision the principle of that provision has been applied by the decisions in allowing applications for amendments. For this purpose it is sufficient to refer to the decision of the Court of Appeal reported in Mabro v. Eagle Star and British Dominions Insurance Co., Ltd.6 where the substitution of a plaintiff was refused on the ground that such an addition would adversely affect the defendant by preventing, him from raising a question of limitation. The provisions in England being in pari materia with those in the Civil Procedure-Code we will now proceed to consider the relevant decisions. The first case to which it is necessary to refer is one of Farwell, J., reported in Noble Lowndes and Partners (A Firm) v. Hadfields Ltd. Same v. Same7, in which the facts were peculiar and serve to show that there could be no legal basis for the reasoning of Blackwell, J., in Vyankatesh Oil Mill Co. The first case to which it is necessary to refer is one of Farwell, J., reported in Noble Lowndes and Partners (A Firm) v. Hadfields Ltd. Same v. Same7, in which the facts were peculiar and serve to show that there could be no legal basis for the reasoning of Blackwell, J., in Vyankatesh Oil Mill Co. v. Velmahomed4, to which we have already referred. In the plaint as originally filed the plaintiff was described as “Noble Lowndes and Partners (A Firm)” and prayed for reliefs against the defendants by way of damages for depriving the plaintiffs of their commissions. The defendants denied the contract. Before the trial of the action the defendants discovered that there was no such firm as “Noble Lowndes and Partners (A firm)” to institute the suit. It appeared that there were some arrangements between Mr. Lowndes and certain others but the result of the arrangements did not create a partnership. The defendants immediately took out an application to have the statement of claim struck out, the ground being that the plaintiff was a non-existence person. Lowndes. there upon applied by summons to be substituted as the sole plaintiff. The question which the Court had to consider was whether the amendment could be permitted under the rules it being conceded that there was no partnership as such that filed the suit and Order 48-A corresponding to Order 30, Civil Procedure Code, being obviously inapplicable. This depended upon whether the terms of Order 16, rule 2, of the Rules of Supreme Court, corresponding to Order 1, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, were satisfied or not. This, provision is in these terms: “Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks fit." Two questions therefore arose for consideration. The first was whether the mistake of the plaintiff was bona fide and secondly whether really the plaint had been instituted in the name of a wrong person. The first was whether the mistake of the plaintiff was bona fide and secondly whether really the plaint had been instituted in the name of a wrong person. Farwell, J., held that he was satisfied that the mistake on the part of the plaintiff Lowndes was a bona fide one. The next question was whether the original plaintiff was really non-existent and consequently whether the principle that a living person could not be substituted for a non-existent entity could be invoked to deny to the plaintiff the relief by way of amendment. Dealing with this objection Farwell, J., said: "Order 48-A enables persons carrying on business in partnership to sue or be sued in the firm name, but that is a rule made for convenience, and an action by or against a firm notwithstanding the rale remains an action by or against the individual members of the firm...... Such an action remains therefore an action by or against individuals, and consequently I am not being asked to substitute a living person for a non-existent entity but I am being asked to strike out the names of all the plaintiffs except one and leave that one as the sole plaintiff. This decision was approved and followed by the Court of Appeal in W. Hill &38; Son v. Tannerhill1. Walter Hill was carrying on business solely without any partners under the trade name of “W. Hill &38; Son” and he filed an action in his trade name. Under Order 48-A, rule 1 (corresponding to Order 30, rule 10 and just like it) though an individual trader carrying on business in a name other than his own might be sued in his trade name he cannot file any suit in such name. A plaint was filed by W. Hill &38; Son on 21st April, 1943, in respect of damages for negligence arising out of an accident on 24th April, 1942. Section 21 of the Limitation Act of 1939 provided a period of one year for suits in respect of such causes of action with the result that by 24th April, 1943. the period of limitation prescribed by the statute elapsed. Section 21 of the Limitation Act of 1939 provided a period of one year for suits in respect of such causes of action with the result that by 24th April, 1943. the period of limitation prescribed by the statute elapsed. On 22nd November, 1943, the plaintiff Hill being advised about the description in the pleading being defective took out a summons in which he prayed for an order for the substitution as plaintiff in the action “Walter Hill trading as W. Hill &38; Son”. The defendant opposed the application on the ground that by the date the claim was barred by limitation. But an order was made in favour of the plaintiff by the Master which was affirmed by Stable, J., on appeal. The defendants thereupon filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal. The argument before that Court was that the plaint as originally instituted should be treated as a nullity and as not disclosing any cause of action because the real plaintiff was not described and based on this reasoning he relied upon the decision in Mabro v. Eagle Star, etc., Insurance Co., Ltd.,2 for the position that as the amendment would deprive the defendant of the valuable plea of limitation it ought not to be allowed. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that the order to amend did not bring any new party but was merely a case of a correction of a misdescription which did not involve any real substitution. Scott, L.J., stated: “When the writ was issued in the name of”W. Hill &38; Sons“there was an individual person in fact interested in the claim. His description as”W. Hill &38; Sons“was a mistake by a clerk. The question is whether that mistake is more than a mistake in form. In my opinion it is not”. The learned Judges both Scott, L.J., as well as Du Parcq, L.J., make it clear that they are not departing from the rule laid down by Scrutton, L.J., in Mabro v. Eagle Star, etc. Insurance Co., Ltd.,2 which was relied on by the defendants’ counsel. In my opinion it is not”. The learned Judges both Scott, L.J., as well as Du Parcq, L.J., make it clear that they are not departing from the rule laid down by Scrutton, L.J., in Mabro v. Eagle Star, etc. Insurance Co., Ltd.,2 which was relied on by the defendants’ counsel. The next case where the matter was considered is a decision of the Court of Appeal in Belgian Economic Mission v. A.P. &38; E. Singer, Ltd.,1 An action was commenced by the plaintiffs described as "Belgian Economic Mission." This Mission it was proved in evidence were merely the agents through which the Belgian State were making the contract with the defendants. A defence was raised that the "Economic Commission" was not a corporation and did not exist as a firm and consequently the plaintiffs were not entitled to institute the action. The plaintiffs thereupon took out a summons for the amendment of the writ by substituting as plaintiffs " Paul Van Zeeland in his capacity as Minister for Foreign affairs " and suing on behalf of the Kingdom of Belgium. Devlin, J., allowed the application for amendment. The defendants filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal which confirmed the judgment of the learned judge on the ground that the description of the plaintiffs as "Belgian Economic Commission" was merely a misnomer intended to describe the principal under the contract and that the plaintiffs had a right to have the correct description of the party in accordance with the decisions of the Court. The last case to be noticed is a decision of Sellers, J., and is found reported in Eslablissement Baudelot v. R.S. Graham and Co., Ltd2. The plaintiffs in the action were originally described as "Establissement Baudelot" who were carrying on business in France. The action was for the price of goods sold and delivered. The evidence in the case disclosed that though in the plaint, " Establissement Baudelot " was described as a company incorporated according to the law of France, it was not in fact a corporate body but was merely a name under which three individuals carried on business in France and under which they contracted. Defendants applied for the name of the plaintiffs being struck on the ground that they were a non-existing person. Defendants applied for the name of the plaintiffs being struck on the ground that they were a non-existing person. The plaintiffs thereupon took out a summons under Order 16, rule 2, Rules of Supreme Court, corresponding to Order 1, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, asking that the names of the individuals carrying on the business be added to the name of the plaintiffs on the writ. Sellers, J., allowed the application of the plaintiffs for amendment. Dealing with the argument that the "Establissement Baudelot " was a non-existent person or entity and the name was analogous to that of a dead person, the learned Judge said: "In these circumstances it seems a little odd to compare it to a dead man and say that it has no existence at all. If it trades in the name ‘Establissement Baudelot’ and contracts and is taxed in that name, it seems to me a considerable departure from a man who is dead". Then dealing with what the name indicated the learned Judge stated: "What, then, is this name? That it is not the name of a corporate body in France does not make it in any sense that of a non-existent party, but it seems to me only to emphasize what it is. It is the way in which these three people describe themselves for the purpose of the trade......... In those circumstances, the action has always been one brought by and on behalf of the three people who are so concerned." The learned Judge concluded his judgment in these terms: "I think that this application on behalf of the defendants to strike out the proceedings as being in the name of a non-existent plaintiff is misconceived; the only error that exists is one of misnomer. The partnership of these three individuals is not in a position to sue under the name "Establissement Baudelot", but must sue in the name of the individual partners. I therefore dismiss the summons of the defendants." The learned Judge granted the application of the plaintiffs for substituting the names of the three individuals for the entity designated as "Establissement Baudelot." In our opinion the quotations set out correctly express the law in India also. I therefore dismiss the summons of the defendants." The learned Judge granted the application of the plaintiffs for substituting the names of the three individuals for the entity designated as "Establissement Baudelot." In our opinion the quotations set out correctly express the law in India also. If however imperfectly and incorrectly a party is designated in a plaint the correction of the error is not the addition or substitution of a party but merely clarifies and makes apparent what was previously shrouded in obscurity by reason of the error or mistake. The question in such a case is one of intention of the party and if the Court is able to discover the person or persons intended to sue or to be sued a mere misdescription of such a party can always be corrected provided the mistake was bona fide. Vide Order 1, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code. Such an amendment does not involve the addition of a party so as to attract section 22(1) of the Indian Limitation Act. Suits by or on behalf of dead persons stand in a different category. The principle that a misdescription could be corrected by amendment could not obviously be applied to such a case but this is far from saying that merely because the law does not recognise the firm as being a legal entity, the firm name could not indicate or designate the individuals composing the firm. To sum up, the situation is analogous to a case where an individual who has an alias or an abbreviated name by which he is sometimes called initially describes himself in that name but subsequently applies to have it rectified so as to describe in the manner in which he is most usually known. There cannot be any doubt that by the correction in the name, a new plaintiff is not added so as to attract section 22(1) of the Limitation Act. A trade name either of a person or a group of individuals carrying on business in partnership is in truth an alias for the person or the group. There cannot be any doubt that by the correction in the name, a new plaintiff is not added so as to attract section 22(1) of the Limitation Act. A trade name either of a person or a group of individuals carrying on business in partnership is in truth an alias for the person or the group. In cases where the law permits the person or persons to sue or be sued in such trade name, the proceedings could rightfully be conducted with such designation; but the fact that the provisions of the procedural law do not enable a party to sue or be sued in such a name has no relevance to the question as to the persons designated by such description. Under the terms of Order 7, rule 1, the name and description of each party has to be set out in the plaint and as abbreviations are not permissible in the absence of special statutory provisions like Order 30, Civil Procedure Code, the full names and addresses of the parties designated by such description have to be set out. When by an amendment the correction is effected, it is clear that there is no addition of a patty but merely a clarification of the individuals already on record but described in a manner not permitted by the law. Learned counsel for the appellant suggested that a suit by a foreign firm in its trade name was analogous to suits on behalf of dead persons which have been held to be nullities on the ground that the name of the foreign firm designates a nonexistent legal entity. We are however unable to accept the argument. When a suit is filed purporting to be on behalf of a person who is dead on the date of the institution, there is no question of misdescription at all. The name does signify and identify a person only he does not exist on the date of the suit. Such a name cannot be treated as a misdescription of the legal representatives. On the other hand in the case of the firm even though not carrying on business in Indisignify and designate the individuals constituting the firm as much as in the case of firms carrying on business in India. Such a name cannot be treated as a misdescription of the legal representatives. On the other hand in the case of the firm even though not carrying on business in Indisignify and designate the individuals constituting the firm as much as in the case of firms carrying on business in India. The fact that by the terms of Order 30, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, the former category of firms are not enabled to avail themselves of the provisions of this order, makes no difference as to the trade name designating the individual partners. We are unable to agree with the reasoning of Blackwell, J., in Vyankatesh Oil Mill, Co. v. Velmahomed1, and hold that the correct view is as stated earlier. The judgment appealed from is in our opinion clearly correct and the Letters Patent Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.