Judgment The disputed property was the self-acquisition of one Muthuveera who died some years ago leaving behind him his widow the first defendant and a daughter, the second defendant. It is alleged that after the death of Muthu-veera the first defendant married one Palaniyandi and their son is the third defendant, the fourth defendant being the wife of the third defendant. The plaintiffs are the minor sons of the second defendant and they are suing for a declaration that the settlement deed, Exhibit B-1, dated 14th April, 1937, executed by the third defendant in favour of the fourth defendant is not valid and binding on the plaintiffs after the death of defendants 1 and 2. The plaintiffs are the nearest reversioners to the estate of Muthuveera being his daughter’s sons and entitled to succeed to the property on the death of the first and the second defendants. The Court of first instance held that Exhibit B-1 will not be binding on the plaintiffs and also the suit property belonged to the estate of Mutheveera. It further held that the plaintiffs are entitled to the property as presumptive reversioners to the estate of Muthuveera after the death of defendants 1 and 2. The appeal to the lower Appellate Court by the third defendant did not meet with any success and hence the Second Appeal by the third defendant. Mr. G.R. Jagadeesa Iyer for the appellant does not seriously contest the finding of the lower Courts that the property in question was the absolute property of Muthuveera but his main argument is that the suit as framed is not maintainable. A feeble attempt was made to contend that there was no clear finding by the lower appellate Court regarding the re-marriage of the first defendant with Palaniyandi after the death of Muthuveera and if there was really a valid marriage, then the question whether the first defendant would forfeit her rights to the property should also be considered; but when once the question of the ownership of the property is decided, it is absolutely irrelevant as to whether there was really a valid marriage between Palaniyandi and the first defendant after the death of Muthuveera. In any event on the finding that the property is at present in the possession of the third defendant in whom there is no valid title, what has to be decided is whether the suit as framed is maintainable or not. After the filing of the Second Appeal the first defendant died and the second defendant as the daugther of Muthuveera will be entitled to have a life estate in the properties in question. Under Article 141 of the Limitation Act a period of twelve years after the death of the last female holder is prescribed for filing a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property. This article was introduced for the first time in the Act IX of 1871 laying down that for bringing a suit the reversionary heir was allowed a period of 12 years after the death of the widow. For the purpose of the present suit Article 141 of the Limitation Act may be said to lay down the same thing though by the amendment of this article in 1908 it was made applicable both to Hindus and Mohammadans. Mr. Jagadeesa Iyer contends that prior to 1871 if a trespasser got into possession of the property adversely to the widow and he continued to hold on for a period of more than 12 years, then the reversioner would have lost all his right to the property even though the reversionary heir had no right to possession during the lifetime of the widow. It is to remedy this defect that a new article was introduced in the Limitation Act for the first time in 1871 and therefore after that introduction the reversioner can wait for a period of twelve years for filing a suit against the trespasser who had entered into possession of the property adversely to the widow. In these circumstances it is urged that a suit for declaration is not maintainable because the plaintiffs have a right to recover possession of the property within 12 years of the death of the second defendant. It being now established that the property was the self acquisition of Muthuveera the third defendant, son of the first defendant by the second husband has no claim whatever to the suit properties, and his possession would therefore be nothing more than that of an absolute stranger. It being now established that the property was the self acquisition of Muthuveera the third defendant, son of the first defendant by the second husband has no claim whatever to the suit properties, and his possession would therefore be nothing more than that of an absolute stranger. When, therefore there is no danger to the inheritance of the plaintiffs a suit for a declaration like the one now filed is unsustainable and the reliefs given would be absolute surplusage. Learned counsel further relies upon the observations of the Judicial Committee in Janaki Ammal v. Narayanaswami Iyer1, in support of his contention that a declaration that a person is entitled to suceed to the estate after the death of the life estate holder is not sustainable. My attention was also invited to a very early case of the Calcutta High Court, dated 6th June, 1871, reported in Sooruj Bunsee Koonwar v. Moheeput Singh2, where the learned Judges held that a mere execution and registration of a deed as between strangers, without any ulterior act directed against a Hindu widow in possession or against the reversionary heir or his possession cannot give the latter any cause of action or entitle him to ask for a declaratory decree. What happened in that case was that the plaintiff claiming to be the nearest reversioner of the widow of one Nund Lall sued for a declaration of his title and for setting aside a deed between two persons. The plaintiff admitted that the executants of the document had no possession. On this ground the learned Judges held that there was no alienation or waste by the widow herself affecting the plaintiff’s right as reversioner and the mere execution of a deed or registration of it as between strangers without any ulterior act directed against the plaintiff or his possession or against the widow and her possession can in no way give the plaintiff a cause of action at the time the suit was filed. I do not think that this decision can in any way help the appellant. If two strangers enter into a transaction without in any way interfering with the possession of the widow or the rights of the reversioners how a suit for a mere declaration that such a document is invalid is maintainable is not understandable. I do not think that this decision can in any way help the appellant. If two strangers enter into a transaction without in any way interfering with the possession of the widow or the rights of the reversioners how a suit for a mere declaration that such a document is invalid is maintainable is not understandable. Learned counsel for the appellant states that the statement in the first paragraph of the decree of the Court of first instance, namely that the settlement deed, dated 14th April, 1947, executed by the third defendant in favour of the fourth defendant shall not be binding on the plaintiffs, is a declaration similar to the one which the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court refused in Sooruj Bunsee Koonwar v. Moheeput Singh2, but the difference between the two declarations is very material. Whereas in the Calcutta case there was no attempt made to interfere with the possession of the widow or in any way tarnish or throw a cloud on the title of the reversioner so far as the present suit is concerned the third defendant claims the property as the owner and it was on that footing that the settlement was made. In such circumstances I do not see any comparison between the facts of the Calcutta case and those of the present case. Another decision on which Mr. Jagadeesa Ayyar relied is Munnulal v. Raja Ram3where two Judges of the Allahabad High Court held that a declaratory suit by a reversioner during the life-time of the widow that he will be entitled to get the property on her death is not maintainable. On a perusal of that report it is found that what was discountenanced by the learned Judges was a mere declaration that a person is entitled to succeed as reversioner to the estate of another when the same is field by the widow as a life estate holder. How this decision applies to the facts of the present case has not been properly explained. In Ramaswami Naik v. Thayammal4the facts show that the property in dispute belonged to the last male-holder whose widow ought to have been in possession of the same but did not get it and that it had been in the occupation of the defendants as trespassers. In Ramaswami Naik v. Thayammal4the facts show that the property in dispute belonged to the last male-holder whose widow ought to have been in possession of the same but did not get it and that it had been in the occupation of the defendants as trespassers. The plaintiffs as reversioners sued for a declaration that the alienation of the property was not binding on them after the death of the widow, the life tenant. Though the suit as framed was for a declaration that the alienation is not binding, the finding was that there was no alienation but that the defendants were occupying the property as trespassers. On these facts the question that arose for consideration was whether a suit for declaration was maintainable or not. Benson and Bhashyam Ayyangar, JJ., assumed that a suit can be laid but they were of the opinion that a suit for declaration brought more than six years after the death of the last male-holder was barred by limitation. It is difficult to see how the point that came up for decision in that judgment can be applied to the facts of the present case. All that the learned Judges decided was that a suit for a mere declaration brought more than six years after the cause of action had accrued was barred by limitation. In my view Mr. Jagadeesa Ayyar’s contention does not derive any support, from this decision also. It has, therefore, to be seen what are the basic principle’s on which a suit for a declaration may be filed by a reversioner during the life-time of the widow. In Mayne’s "Hindu Law" (11th Edn.) in paragraphs 678 and 680 the learned author discusses the various kinds of declaratory suits. During that discussion the following passage is seen: "During the life of the limited owner the reversioner can sue to remove that which would be a bar to his title when it vested in possession. The commonest suits which are brought by reversioners are suits for a declaration that an alienation or surrender made by the limited owner is invalid or that an adoption which is set up is invalid or never in fact took place. The next reversioner can either institute such a declaratory suit or wait till the widow’s death and sue for the recovery of the property." But Mr. The next reversioner can either institute such a declaratory suit or wait till the widow’s death and sue for the recovery of the property." But Mr. Jagadeesa Ayyar contends that in the present case there is no alienation by the widow or her daughter but that a stranger has trespassed into the property: but whatever be the cause of action to the presumptive reversionery heir the point seems to be somewhat bereft of authority. There are certain observations in cases and in text-books which would show that it is open to a presumptive reversioner to file a suit for a declaration in cases when the trespasser against the widow is not entitled to hold possession of the property. In the text-book on "Principles of Hindu Law" by J.C. Ghose (3rd Edn. Volume No. 1, at page 281) the learned author observes as follows: "The reversioner may sue the widow and a third party who has dispossessed her for restoration of the property to the widow." The authority cited is Shamsundaree Chowdhrain v. Jumoona Chowdhrain1. In Shankar Bhai v. Bai Shiv2Marten, C.J., cites the authority of Mulla’s "Hindu Law", 6th edition, page 217, for a similar proposition. The statement in Mulla’s "Hindu Law" is to this effect: "In the case, however, of a trespasser the next reversioner would at once be entitled to sue if the widow did not take any steps to recover possession." In Mayne’s "Hindu Law", nth edition, at page 806, the learned author observes: "In one case the widow had given up the estate to a third party, under threat of legal proceedings and refused to have anything to do with the assets. It was held that the reversioners might sue the widow and the third party to have the possession restored to proper custody, and that a manager should be appointed to collect, account for, and pay into Court, the assets to be held for the ultimate benefit of the heirs who should be entitled to succeed at the death of the widow." The authority cited for this proposition is Shama Sundaree Chowdhrain v. Jumoona Chowdhrain1; reference is also made to the decision in Venkanna v. Narasimham3and Shankar Bhai v. Bai Shiv2. Mr. Mr. Jagadeesa Ayyar contends that the right of the reversioner to sue for such a declaration and for possession to be given to the widow would have been justified before the introduction of Article 141 of the Limitation Act, but subsequent to that, such a suit cannot lie. It seems to me that this argument is unacceptable. In Venkanna v. Narasimham3Wallis, C.J., referred to the decision in Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Issur Chunder Chuckerbutty4and to the later decision in Radha Mohan v. Ram Das Dey5and observed as follows: "On the authority of this case it was held in Rada Mohan v. Ram Das Dey5, before the enactment of the present article 141 that the next reversioners were entitled to have the immovable property of the estate abandoned by the widow reduced into possession and to put a manager in charge of them. This case is authority for the proposition that as regards the immoveable corpus of the estate also, it is open to the reversioners to file a suit praying that such movable corpus may be so reduced into possession and handed over to a receiver appointed in the suit subject to any question of limitation; transferees from the widow without consideration may be made to replace any part of the moveable corpus of the estate of the last male-holder which ean l?e traced to their hands on the equitable principle recently applied in Sinclair v. Brougham1which imposes upon people into whose hands the property of other persons has come without consideration, the duty of accounting for it and restoring it." It is therefore, clear that Radha Mohun v. Ram Doss2should not be restricted to the facts and circumstances which arose before the enactment of Article 141 of the Limitation Act. For the respondents Mr. For the respondents Mr. T.S. Vaidyanatha Iyer referred to various passages in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Natvarlal Punjabi v. Dadu Bhai Manu Bhai3, where their Lordships agreeing with the Calcutta decisions and disagreeing with the Madras cases held that when a Hindu widow surrenders her life-estate it is not really an act of alienation by her of her rights in favour of the reversioner because the reversioner does not derive his title from her but derives his title from the last male-holder as his successor-in-law and therefore the reversioner can immediately bring in a suit for recovery of possession of the property illegally alienated by the widow without waiting for the death of the widow. The trend of the Madras decisions had been to the effect that if the widow alienates the properties and then surrenders her estate the alienee is entitled to continue to remain in possession of the property until the death of the widow and that the reversioner can claim the same only after her death. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that this view is unsustainable. There are also observations in the judgments to the effect that the rights acquired by adverse possession by the trespasser against the widow are available only against the widow and not against the reversioners. I am of the opinion that the observations in this case do not render any assistance for decision on the question whether a suit for a declaration will lie or not. The other decision which has been brought to my notice is Desu Reddiar v. Srinivasa Reddi4where it was held that in dealing with suits by reversioners a distinction has to be drawn between reliefs in respect of the individual or personal title of the particular reversioner (plaintiff) and reliefs claimed for the benefit of the body of reversioners represented by the presumptive reversioner. It has been pointed out that reliefs of the former kind have generally been refused on the ground that an anticipatory declaration of the kind might be rendered valueless and nugatory by future events but reliefs of the latter kind are not open to the same objection and they are allowed. It has been pointed out that reliefs of the former kind have generally been refused on the ground that an anticipatory declaration of the kind might be rendered valueless and nugatory by future events but reliefs of the latter kind are not open to the same objection and they are allowed. In the instant case the relief sought for should be of the latter kind because what is asked for is a declaration that the property belongs to the estate of Muthuveera and that the settlement deed executed by the third defendant unauthorisedly in favour of the fourth defendant is invalid. The finding by the lower Courts is that the property belongs to Muthuveera and that the third defendant is holding it adversely to the widow. The decision in Janaki Ammal v. Narayanaswami Iyer5cannot stand in the way of the grant of a declaration as prayed for by the plaintiffs. As I do not find anything illegal in the declaration given by the lower Courts and as the same was intended to prevent illegal acts of the widow likely to cause jeopardy to the estate by imperilling the reversionery rights of the plaintiffs the suit as framed is maintainable. The Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.