Subba Rao, J.- This appeal is directed against the decree, and judgment of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Ottapalam in O.S. No.85 of 1944, a suit filed by the appellants for partition and for delivery of possession to the plaintiffs and their mother, the 14th defendant of their 7/20 share in the tarwad properties described in the plaint B schedule. Before us, the learned counsel appearing for the parties did not cover the entire field of disputes occupied in the Court below. It would, therefore, be sufficient if the necessary facts relevant to the questions raised were stated. Defendants 1, 2, 6, 9 and 12 to 14 are the children of Kunhikutti Kolpad and her husband Kunhan Nedungadi. Plaintiffs are the children of the 14th defendant. The other defendants are the children of defendants 2, 6 and 9. Originally, Kunhikutti Kolpad and her children were members of a tarwad called Mandilakkottil. In 1914, there was a partition among the members of the tarwad, and Kunhikutti Kolpad and her children separated themselves and constituted a different tarwad. Kunhan, the husband of Kunhikutti Kolpad, was also in affluent circumstances. The B schedule properties were his self-acquisitions. Though this fact was disputed in the Court below, it is conceded before us. He purchased the Kanom right in items 1 to 47 of the plaint B schedule excluding items 16 to 21, in the. name of his wife Kunhikutti Kolpad, items 16 to 21 in the name of his two children, defendants 1 and 14, and the leasehold interest in items 51 to 53 in the names of his wife Kunhikutti Kolpad and four of her children. He acquired the jam right in items 48 to 50 in his own name under Exhibit B-8. Kunhikutti Kolpad died in 1919, and Kunhan died in 1932. Long before his death, on 15th November, 1923, Kunhan executed a will Exhibit N-23 bequeathing to his seven children all the properties belonging to him exclusively. On the same day, he and his seven children executed a settlement deed, Exhibit B-24, in regard to items 1 to 47. After the death of Kunhan in the year 1934, his children defendants 1, 2, 6, 9 and 12 to 14 partitioned the properties they got from their father, under Exhibit B-31 on stirpital basis. On the same day, he and his seven children executed a settlement deed, Exhibit B-24, in regard to items 1 to 47. After the death of Kunhan in the year 1934, his children defendants 1, 2, 6, 9 and 12 to 14 partitioned the properties they got from their father, under Exhibit B-31 on stirpital basis. As regards the properties belonging to their tarwad, the 14th defendant and her children instituted O.S. No.72 of 1938 on the file of the Walluvanad District Munsif’s Court. Pending the suit, the parties settled their dispute by executing the partition deed Exhibit B-72 The suit was dismissed. At the time Exhibit B-31 was executed, the plaintiff 1 to 4 were minors and the plaintiffs 5 and 6 were not born. After two of the plaintiffs became majors, they filed O.S. No.85 of 1944 for partition of the B Schedule properties on per capita basis. Their case is that the B schedule properties belong to their tavazhi and the partition under Exhibit B-1 effected during their minority as per stirpital basis is illegal and would not bind them. The learned Subordinate Judge held that under Exhibits B-23 and B-24, defendants 1, 2, 6, 9 and 12 to 14 took the properties as tenants-in-common and, therefore, the plaintiffs have no right to reopen the partition on that basis. On that finding he dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs preferred the above appeal. The main question raised in the appeal by the learned Counsel for the appellants turns upon the construction to be put on Exhibits B-23 and B-24 dated 15th November, 1923. Before we advert to the question raised, it would be convenient to clear the ground by disposing of some of the incidental questions argued in the case. One of the points urged by the respondents is that section 48 of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act (Act XXII of 1933) would govern the construction of the documents before us. Before we advert to the question raised, it would be convenient to clear the ground by disposing of some of the incidental questions argued in the case. One of the points urged by the respondents is that section 48 of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act (Act XXII of 1933) would govern the construction of the documents before us. Section 48 reads:- “Where a person bequeaths or makes a gift of any property to, or purchases any property in the name of his wife alone or his wife and one or more of his children by such wife together, such property shall, unless a contrary intention appears from the will or deed of gift or purchase or from the conduct of the parties, be taken as tavazhi property by the wife, her sons and daughters by such person and the lineal descendants of such daughters in the female line: Provided that in the event of partition of the property taking place under Chapter VI, the property shall be divided on the stirpital principle, the wife being entitled to a share equal to that of a son or daughter”. In Krishnan v. Tala1, a Division Bench of this Court held that there is nothing in the language of section 48 of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act, which by necessary implication, shows that the section must be applied retrospectively. There the learned Judges held that the right to partition provided therein cannot be claimed by a person in whose name the other party to the union died before the Act came into force and there was no legalised marriage. In Thatha Amma v. Thankappa2 a Division Bench of this Court, consisting of Somayya and Yahya Ali, JJ., held that the Madras Marumakkattayam Act applies only to transactions after 1st August, 1933, when the Act came into force. We are bound by these decisions and do not see any reason to differ from them and to refer the case to a Full Bench. Some arguments were advanced on the question of the nature of the presumptions that should be invoked in construing gifts made or properties purchased in the name of a wife or a wife and her children by a person governed by Marumakkattayam Law. The leading case on the subject is the decision of the Full Bench in Chakkra Kannan v. Kunhi Pokkar3. The leading case on the subject is the decision of the Full Bench in Chakkra Kannan v. Kunhi Pokkar3. There a gift was made by a father to his two sons and daughter. The question that arose for decision was whether they took the property as joint tenants or only as members of the tarwad. The Full Bench held that where properties were given by a person to his wife and children or to the children alone following the Marumakkattayam Law, the presumption was that the donees took the property with the incidents of tarwad property. The principle of the decision is that the tavazhis or the subordinate groups consituting the tarwad, are capable of holding properties and that, if a gift is made to the members of a tavazhi, the presumption is that they had the properties with the incidents of tarwad property. This decision has been followed without question in all subsequent decisions. The law on the subject has been reviewed and re-stated by Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ., in Lakshmi v. Mukundan4. In that case, the gift was in favour of a woman called Tala. But, in the operative portion, it was stated that the donor gave the properties to Tala and her santhanams. The document directed Tala and her santhanams to enjoy forever in jenm the property given to them. The question was whether the gift enured for the tavazhi constituted by Tala, her children and their descendants in the female line or whether it was only for Tala and her two daughters mentioned in the deed. On a construction of the document, the learned Judge held that by that document the donor intended to give the properties to the entire group constituting the tavazhi. After considering the earlier case-law on the subject, the learned Judges observed at page 547 as follows:- “It is therefore clear that if the donees constitute a natural group according to the Marumakkattayam Law capable of acquiring and owning property, there is no reason why the presumption in Chakkra Kannan v. Kunhi Pokker1, should not be applied to them”. It is contended that the learned Judges laid down that even if a gift is made to some of the members of the tavazhi, the presumption should be drawn that the donor intended to give the property to the entire tavazhi. It is contended that the learned Judges laid down that even if a gift is made to some of the members of the tavazhi, the presumption should be drawn that the donor intended to give the property to the entire tavazhi. But the judgment does not lay down any such proposition. At the time the gift was made, there were only three members of the tavazhi and they constituted a natural group. The document expressly recited that the gift was to Tala and her santhanams, and that the santhanams at the time of the gift were those two girls. ‘The learned Judges, therefore, construed the document to mean that the gift was to the tavazhi. In Thatha Amma v. Thankappa,2 after a consideration of the earlier decisions, Somayya and Yahya Ali, JJ., laid down that where property is gifted to the wife alone, or to some of the children alone, there is no presumption that the donees took it with the incidents of tarwad property and that such a presumption will arise only if the gift was in favour of the wife and children or in favour of all the children who by themselves form a tavazhi. The same principle, they said, would apply in the case of acquisition by the father in the name of one or more children. Though some of the observations made by the learned Judges were not accepted by the Division Bench in Lakshmi v. Mukundan,3 as we understand the said Bench decision, they did not purport to differ from the conclusion arrived at by Somayya and Yahya Ali, JJ., in the earlier decision. Though some of the observations made by the learned Judges were not accepted by the Division Bench in Lakshmi v. Mukundan,3 as we understand the said Bench decision, they did not purport to differ from the conclusion arrived at by Somayya and Yahya Ali, JJ., in the earlier decision. It would be seen from the aforesaid decisions that the following principles are well settled: (1) that a person governed by Marumakattayam Law can make a gift to an entity called a tavazhi, in which case the members of the said tavazhi take the property with all the incidents of tarwad property; (ii) when a gift is made to a wife and her children or to all the children or the entire group constituting the tavazhi, a presumption is drawn that the gift is for the tavazhi; and (iii) if the gift is to a wife or only to some of her children, there is no scope for invoking any presumption; but the question falls to be considered in each case on the facts whether the gift was intended for the tavazhi or for the donees absolutely or for the donees as joint tenants. Bearing these principles in mind, we shall now proceed to consider the two documents Exhibits B-23 and B-24. Exhibit B-23 is a will executed by Kunhan in favour of his seven children in respect of moveable and immoveable properties belonging to him. At the time Exhibit B-23 was executed, it is conceded that the first plaintiff was born and he was two years old. It is, thereofore, a case where the father bequeathed his properties only to some of the members of the tavazhi. But it is argued that the boy perhaps was excluded because he was too young and that the intention of the testator would have been only to benefit of the group constituting the tavazhi. Though we see some force in the argument, we cannot accept it in view of the case-law on the subject and the recitals in the document. At the time the will was executed, Kunhan, for one reason or other not only excluded the first plaintiff but made a specific statement in the will that, “except for them, no other persons can lay any manner of claim to this property”. At the time the will was executed, Kunhan, for one reason or other not only excluded the first plaintiff but made a specific statement in the will that, “except for them, no other persons can lay any manner of claim to this property”. If he intended that the property should be taken, by the tavazhi, he would not have made such a specific statement in the will. It is, therefore, not permissible to raise the presumption that the bequest was to the tavazhi with the incidents of tarwad property. It was specifically made to the persons named therein to the exclusion of other persons and, therefore, in law, the persons named therein took the property as tenants-in-common. Now coming to items 1 to 47 it may be recalled that items 16 to 21 were purchased by Kunhan with his funds in the names of defendants 1 and 14 and the other items in the name of his wife Kunhikutti Kolpad. The question is whether the purchases were benami for Kunhikutti Kolpad, or for the benefit of the persons in whose name they were purchased, or for the benefit of the tavazhi. The theory of advancement is not accepted in India, and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that the properties were purchased for the benefit of the wife and her children. Assuming that Kunhan advanced moneys for the benefit of his wife in one case, and his two children in the other case, no presumption can be raised that the said sale-deeds were taken for the benefit of the tavazhi, for as has been pointed out, such presumptions are permissible only in a case where the purchase is in the name of the wife and children or in the name of all the children or the entire group constituting the tavazhi. The question, therefore, is what was the intention of Kunhan when he purchased the properties in the names of his wife and children. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the intention of Kunhan is made clear in Exhibit B-24. Exhibit B-24 does not by itself create any interest in the parties to the document. It is styled as a Bischayapatram executed amongst the sons of Kunhikutti Kolpad. The parties to the document are Kunhan and his seven children. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the intention of Kunhan is made clear in Exhibit B-24. Exhibit B-24 does not by itself create any interest in the parties to the document. It is styled as a Bischayapatram executed amongst the sons of Kunhikutti Kolpad. The parties to the document are Kunhan and his seven children. The first child, Kavunni Thirumulpad (Defendant 1) is described as karnavan of the private tavazhi, and Kunhikutti Kolpad (Defendant 14) the next eldest child, is described as karnavathi. Under that document, items 1 to 47 of the Plaint B schedule are dealt with. The gist of the document is that the said items are treated as the properties of the tavazhi and the management thereof is entrusted to Kunhan. Items 1 to 47, excluding items 16 to 21, were purchased in the name of his wife Kunhikutti Kolpad, and the other items in the names of defendants 1 and 14. As the contentions of the parties turn upon the interpretation of paragraph 1 of the document, the said paragraph may be read as in full:- “As it is found expedient and desirable that a settlement should be effected for the protection and management of the landed properties described in the sub-joined Schedule, which, we, Nos. 1 to 7, got from No.8 our father in Putravakasam right, which stand in the name of our private tavazhi and which are being held in possession and caused to be cultivated under executant No. 8, the same is set out as below”. The paragraph requires to be scrutinised with some care. It will be seen therefrom that the father recognises that the said items were granted by him in Putravakasam right and they stand in the name of the private tavazhi. It is not suggested that the father made a gift of the items subsequent to the purchases made by him. It is, therefore, manifest that, when the father made the purchases, he did not purchase the said items benami for himself in the name of his wife and children. But the difficult question is whether he purchased them for his seven children or for the tavazhi. In the aforesaid paragraph, it is clearly mentioned that the father gave it to them in Putravakasam right and that it stands in the name of the private tavazhi. But the difficult question is whether he purchased them for his seven children or for the tavazhi. In the aforesaid paragraph, it is clearly mentioned that the father gave it to them in Putravakasam right and that it stands in the name of the private tavazhi. The first plaintiff joined as a party to the document also in his capacity as karanavan of the private tavazhi. If the natural meaning of the recitals is accepted, it prima facie shows that the gift was a Putravakasam gift made to the tavazhi. But it is contended that Putravakasam right only means a title conferred by a person on his wife and children and does not take in a right conferred on the entire tavazhi, that there is no institution like a private tavazhi, in Marumakkattayam Law, and that those words are used only in a loose sense to convey the group of seven persons included in Exhibit B-24. In P. R. Sundra Aiyar’s “Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law,” Putravakasam is defined as a gift by the father to his wife and children. In Lewis Moore’s “Malabar Law and Custom,” it is stated to be a term applied in North Malabar to that portion of a man’s self-acquisitions which his tarwad, on his death sometimes allows to his children. In Chakkra Kantian v. Kunhi Pokker1, Srinivasa Ayyangar, J., describes it at page 336 as follows:- “The husbands of the female members and the children of the male members of a tarwad are not members of the tarwad. It is not uncommon for them to make gifts of properties to their wives, daughters or sisters and their children, and such properties are called Putravakasam properties.” In Subramania v. Meenakshi Amma1, gifts made in favour of children were described as Putravakasam property, though in that case the learned Judge held further that in the case of donees of Putravakasam property, they must be presumed to have taken as co-owners or tenants-in-common. Putravakasam property etymologically means property given to a son, but it is not disputed that it includes also property given to children, whether male or female. Sundara Aiyar in his “Malabar and Aliyasathana Law” states, at page 160, that a tavazhi may acquire property by gifts and other kinds of acquisitions, and that such property, when the donor is the father, is known as Putravakasam property. Sundara Aiyar in his “Malabar and Aliyasathana Law” states, at page 160, that a tavazhi may acquire property by gifts and other kinds of acquisitions, and that such property, when the donor is the father, is known as Putravakasam property. Even if the donee is not the entire tavazhi but only some members of the group constituting the tavazhi,. it is also described as Putravakasam property. It cannot, therefore, be laid down that whenever a gift is made in Putravakasom right, the gift is to the tavazhi, though gifts to the tavazhi are also described by that name. It follows that the word Putravakasam right is consistent with the gift made by the father to his children or to all the members of the tavazhi. The executants of Exhibit B-24 do not leave the question in any doubt, for, they make it clear that the gift of the properties was by the father in Putravakasam right, which stand in the name of the private tavazhi. Here we find no room for ambiguity. Tavazhi literally means taya, mother, and vazhi line, i.e., mother’s line. Sundara Aiyar points out in his text-book, at page 161, that one of the modes of acquisition by the tavazhi is by getting gifts of Putravakasam property. In Chakkra Kannan v. Kunhi Pokker2 Srinivasa Iyengar, J., describes tavazhis as follows:- “The tavazhis, or the subordinate groups constituting the tarwad, are, I think, capable of holding properties as corporate units with the incidents of tarwad, property at the same time retaining their joint interest in the properties of the main tarwad, just as branches and sub-branches in a Mitakshara joint Hindu family are capable of holding properties with the incidents of joint Hindu family property. I am also of opinion that some only of the members of a tavazhi cannot form a corporate unit capable of holding property as such. The husbands of the female members and the children of the male members of a tarwad are not members of the tarwad”. It will be seen, therefore, that the word tavazhi has got a definite connotation in Marumakkattayam Law. It is a branch of the tarwad and it is a distinct entity. It comprises one of the females of the tarwad and her descendants in the female line. It is capable of owning property and taking gifts of property. It will be seen, therefore, that the word tavazhi has got a definite connotation in Marumakkattayam Law. It is a branch of the tarwad and it is a distinct entity. It comprises one of the females of the tarwad and her descendants in the female line. It is capable of owning property and taking gifts of property. When the executants, who must be presumed to know the concept of a tavazhi and its incidents, say in a solemn document executed between them that the property stands in the name of the private tavazhi, we find it very difficult to say that they do not mean what they say. But it is said that there is no distinction in the instant case between tavazhi and tarwad, for, it is pointed out that the same individuals are members of the tarwad as well as the tavazhi. This argument in our view does not really help the respondents for the use of the word tavazhi, notwithstanding the fact that all the members of the tavazhi are members of the tarwad indicates clearly that the executants consciously and deliberately used that word so as to distinguish their tarwad properties from tavazhi properties. Nor can we appreciate the emphasis on the word “private” made by the learned counsel for the respondents. Private tavazhi cannot mean only some members of the tavazhi. It qualifies the entire word tavazhi. The parties could have only meant to emphasise by the use of the adjective ‘private’ the distinction between their tavazhi (Kunhikutti and her descendents in her female line) and the tarwad. The parties only intended to bring out the idea that the properties belonged to their tavazhi as distinct from the tarwad. If there is any ambiguity, it is also dispelled by the subsequent statement made in the document. In paragraph 4 it is stated that after the death of No.8, the aforesaid acts of management shall be done and caused to be done in the manner above-mentioned by the executant No.1, the karnavan and by executant 2, the karnavathi. This passage makes it clear that the gift was for the tavazhi. Otherwise if the properties were the separate properties of the seven individuals, no question of the karnavan of the tavazhi or the karnavathi of the tavazhi managing the properties arises. This passage makes it clear that the gift was for the tavazhi. Otherwise if the properties were the separate properties of the seven individuals, no question of the karnavan of the tavazhi or the karnavathi of the tavazhi managing the properties arises. In paragraph 5, a distinction is made between borrowings by members individually and for and on behalf of the tavazhi. In the case of individual borrowings it is expressly agreed that neither the property in the schedule nor any of the other properties belonging to the said private tavazhi shall be liable. This paragraph makes it clear that the gift was to the tavazhi and that its properties could not be made available for private debts of the executants. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on paragraph 6 of the document, wherein we find that certain amounts due under the kuri chit fund were allotted specifically to some of the executants and the other amount, due from different persons were allotted to other executants. In regard to Etamarathoiti kuri, it was agreed that if it was drawn in favour of the executants, the interest accruing due from the prize-money and the interest recovered from the other outstandings should be utilised for the due payment of the future instalments and that if interest from the other outstanding was insufficient, the deficit therein should be made good from the income from the schedule properties. Relying upon this recital, it is contended that as the parties agreed to pay the deficit interest in respect of the kuri drawn in favour of the executants from and out of the income of the properties covered by the document, it indicates that the properties are not the properties of the tavazhi but that of the executants. In our view, no such irresistible inference would flow from this passage. It only means that the executants as representing the tavazhi agreed that, in that eventuality, the income from the tavazhi properties should be utilised. As the kuri drawn was on behalf of the tavazhi the deficit interest was agreed to be paid by the tavazhi. What is more, in paragraph 9, they specially mentioned that none of the tarwad properties belonging to executants 1 to 7 had been included in this kdrar. It is not suggested that executants 1 to 7 constituted the tarwad. As the kuri drawn was on behalf of the tavazhi the deficit interest was agreed to be paid by the tavazhi. What is more, in paragraph 9, they specially mentioned that none of the tarwad properties belonging to executants 1 to 7 had been included in this kdrar. It is not suggested that executants 1 to 7 constituted the tarwad. They were only making a distinction between tarwad and tavazhi properties. The fact that the husband of the 14th defendant and the husband of one of the other executants attested the document is relied on. But that does not make the gift any the less a gift to the tavazhi, if really it was a gift to the tavazhi. It is said that in Exhibit B-31, the partition-deed in respect of the B Schedule properties executed between the seven executants, they used the word “private” tavazhi only to include the seven children and not their children. It is true that under that document, they divided the properties into seven shares. It is also true that the husband of the 2nd, 6th and 14th defendants attested the document. If Exhibit B-24 clearly shows that the gift was for the tavazhi, the mere fact that the executants of Exhibit B-24 divided the properties into seven shares in Exhibit B-3 cannot make the gift to the tavazhi a gift to the seven individuals as tenants-in-common. Indeed, the partition effected by Exhibit B-31 is now questioned in this suit. We, therefore, hold that the said items are the properties of the tavazhi. Items 51 to 53 were purchased by Kunhan in the name of Kunhikutti Kolpad and four of her children. These items are not covered by Exhibit B-24. It follows that Kunhikutti and her four children take the same as tenants-in-commnon. Kunhikutti’s share, it is admitted, devolves on the tarwad. On that basis, the plaintiffs and the 14th defendant would be entitled to 5/18 of the 1/5th share of Kunhikutti in the said items. It is then contended that the suit is barred under Order 2, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. To appreciate this contention, some relevant facts may be stated. Kunhikutti Kolpad and her children separated from their Mandilakkottil tarwad under the partition-deed Exhibit A-1 in the year 1914. Thereafter they constituted a separate tarwad. It is then contended that the suit is barred under Order 2, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. To appreciate this contention, some relevant facts may be stated. Kunhikutti Kolpad and her children separated from their Mandilakkottil tarwad under the partition-deed Exhibit A-1 in the year 1914. Thereafter they constituted a separate tarwad. In regard to those properties, the 14th defendant and her children instituted O.S. No.72 of 1938 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Walluvanad, for partition against the other members of the tarwad. The parties settled their disputes and executed a partition-deed in respect of the properties, Exhibit B-72. Thereafter, they filed an application under Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code to dismiss the suit on the ground that it had been settled. The suit was dismissed-vide Exhibit B-76. The argument is that as no partition was asked of the B Schedule properties in that suit, the present suit is barred under Order 2, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. If, under Exhibit B-76, the District Munsif made a valid order under Order 23, rule 3, Civil Procedure Code, no question of any bar under Order 2, rule 2, would arise. Even if Order 23, rule 3, did not apply, -we cannot hold that Order 2, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, bars the present suit. The necessary condition for the application of Order 2, rule 2, is that both the suits should arise in respect of the same cause of action. From the aforesaid statement of facts, it is seen that O.S. No.72 of 1938 was a suit filed by the plaintiffs for partition of their tarwad properties, that is, properties which they got in the partition of Mandilakkottil properties. On the other hand, O.S.No.85 of 1944 is a suit for partition of the properties of the tavazhi of Kunhikutti Kolpad as a different entity. Though it is a coincidence that in the instant case, all the members of the tarwad are members of the tavazhi it need not necessarily be so. They are two legal entities. The cause of action for partition of the tarwad properties and that of the tavazhi properties gifted to it by Kunhan is not the same. We, therefore, hold that Order 2, rule 2, is not a bar to the maintainability of the suit. They are two legal entities. The cause of action for partition of the tarwad properties and that of the tavazhi properties gifted to it by Kunhan is not the same. We, therefore, hold that Order 2, rule 2, is not a bar to the maintainability of the suit. The next contention is that the suit, as framed, is not maintainable, as by reason of the filing of O.S. No.390 of 1943, there was a division in status in the tavazhi. O.S. No.390 of 1943 was a suit filed by the 1st plaintiff for partition and separate possession of the B-Schedule properties. That suit was filed in the Court of the District Munsif of Walluvanad on 13th November, 1944. The learned District Munsif found that the Munsif’s Court had no jurisdiction to try the case, as the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction was more than Rs.3,000. The plaint -was accordingly returned for presentation to the proper Court. Thereafter, the present suit was filed. It was argued that, by reason of the filing of that suit, there was a division in status between the 1st plaintiff and the other members of the family, and that this suit, filed as if all the plaintiffs are members of the tavazhi, is not maintainable. It is true that the filing of the suit by the 1st plaintiff effected a division is status between the 1st plaintiff and others, and the return of the suit for presentation in a different Court would not efface the division in status created by the filing of the suit. It has been so held in Radhakrishna v. Satyanarayana1. There, a suit was filed for partition of the plaintiff’s share and for possession. Notice was served on all the defendants. Thereafter, the plaintiff intended to revoke the intention to divide, expressed in the plaint. The learned Judge held that division in status has been brought about by the plaint in the suit and it was not open to the plaintiff therein to revoke or withdraw the unambiguous intention to separate contained in the plaint, so as to restore the joint status, and, as such, the members should be treated as divided members for the purpose of working out their respective rights. So too, in the present case, as the plaintiff declared his unambiguous intention to divide from the rest of the members of the tavazhi by filing the suit, he cannot withdraw that intention. The fact that the plaint was returned for presentation to the proper Court could not have the effect of making him a member of the tarwad again. But, in our view, the said legal position has no practical bearing on the question of the maintainability of the suit. The present suit is filed by six plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 3 to 6, being minors, are represented by the 1st plaintiff as their next friend. Whether the 1st plaintiff is divided from the other plaintiffs or not, all the plaintiffs put together would be entitled to the same share. It is open to them to ask for separate shares, as between themselves, but they have, not chosen to do so. But that is not the concern of the defendants. The suit is, therefore, maintainable. The learned Counsel for the respondents then argues that the entire partition effected between the parties under Exhibit B-31 need not be re-opened, for the parties to the document other than the plaintiffs have neither questioned it nor have they any grievance in respect of it. The advocates appearing for the various respondents expressed their willingness to abide by the said partition. By reason of our aforesaid findings, it is not disputed that the partition should have been effected on per capita basis. But it is said that the 14th defendant should not be given any relief in this suit as she is not one of the plaintiffs. But in the plaint relief was asked for not only for the plaintiffs but also for the 14th defendant. In the partition effected under Exhibit B-31 she got 1/7 share in the family properties. Now, under the new scheme, she would only get a lesser share. Unless the partition is re-opened so far as she also is concerned, there would be conflict between the two partitions. We would, therefore direct the re-opening of the partition of the B-Schedule properties for the purpose of giving relief to the six plaintiffs and the 14th defendant. Now, under the new scheme, she would only get a lesser share. Unless the partition is re-opened so far as she also is concerned, there would be conflict between the two partitions. We would, therefore direct the re-opening of the partition of the B-Schedule properties for the purpose of giving relief to the six plaintiffs and the 14th defendant. Though the plaint-Schedule properties will have to be divided on per capita basis for the purpose of giving relief to the plaintiffs and the 14th defendant, as regards the other parties the partition effected by Exhibit B-31 would stand. As regards the share to which the plaintiffs and the 14th defendant would be entitled, it is not disputed that two of the plaintiffs were not born at the time when Exhibit B-31 was executed, and that therefore they are not entitled to separate shares. On that basis the plaintiffs 1 to 4 and the 14th defendant would be entitled to 5/18 share in the items covered by Exhibit B-24. In the result, the decree of the lower Court is modified. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. K.S. ----- Decree modified.