Order This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ to direct the respondents, the State of Madras and the Accommodation Controller, Madras, to release under the provisions of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control Act) (Madras Act XXV of 1949) the premises, No. 7, Pachaiyappa’s Hostel Road, Chetput, Madras, for the residence of the petitioner. No. 7, Pachiayappa’s Hostel Road, is a residential house. The petitioner purchased it from the previous owner on 5th April, 1951. On that date Mr. Sathianathan, Member of the Board of Revenue, Madras, was the tenant in occupation of the house and his tenancy was not affected by the change in ownership. The petitioner averred that, when she requested Mr. Sathinathan to vacate the house so that she as the owner could occupy it herself, Mr. Sathianathan agreed to vacate the house when he found other accommodation. Quite independent of the question whether the petitioner could have desired to seek the eviction of the tenant, Mr. Sathinathan, there was section 7(3-A) of Madras Act (XXV of 1949) which barred such an application. Mr. Sathianathan vacated the house of his own accord on 30th September, 1953. The petitioner forwarded to the Accommodation Controller the statutory notice of vacancy under section 3(1)(a) of the Act on 2nd October, 1953. On 10th October, 1953, the Accommodation Controller acting under instructions of the Government, informed the petitioner that the premises were required by the Government, that is, he exercised the statutory power vested in him by sub-section 3 of section 3 of the Act. A further request which the petitioner preferred to the Government was rejected on 23rd October, 1953. Eventually the house was allotted for the occupation of an officer of the Government, Sri M.K. Shetty, I.P.S. In the counter-affidavit of respondent 1 it was averred: “On 12-10-1953, the petitioner herein again sent a petition to the honourable Minister for House Rent Control, repeating her earlier request. Sri M.K. Shetty I.P.S. Deputy Director, Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India) Madras, wanted the petitioner’s building to be allotted to him for the reasons that the building which he was occupying was too costly for him in rent and he accepted it as a temporary measure for want of a more suitable building. Sri M.K. Shetty I.P.S. Deputy Director, Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India) Madras, wanted the petitioner’s building to be allotted to him for the reasons that the building which he was occupying was too costly for him in rent and he accepted it as a temporary measure for want of a more suitable building. As the need of Sri M.K. Shetty I.P.S., was a bona fide one, this respondent by its Memo. No. 5217/53-2 Public (General-C) Department, dated 23-10-1953 informed the petitioner herein that her request, could not be complied with and directed the Accommodation Controlller, Madras, to allot the premises to Sri M.K. Shetty. Accordingly on 26-10-1953, the Accommodation Controller allotted the premises to Sri M.K. Shetty, I.P.S.” The learned counsellor the petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the Government and the Accommodation Controller to requisition the premises for allotment to a Government Officer when the petitioner, as the owner of the house, required it for her own occupation. That the petitioner had no other house in Madras of her own which she could occupy was not in dispute. All the same the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the Government and the Accommodation Controller had no jurisdiction at all under Act (XXV of 1949) to requisition the petitioner’s house must be negatived. Section 3(4) of Act (XXV of 1949) makes it clear that, even if the owner of a residential house having no other house of his own which he could use for bis residence, desires to occupy his house after giving the statutory notice of vacancy under section 3(1) of the Act, the owner cannot occupy the building within the perod of 10 days specified in subsection (3). Section 3(3) gives the authorised officer, that is, the Accommodation Controller, or the State Government, the jurisdiction to requisition the house during the statutory period of 10 days and that jurisdiction is left unaffected by the desire or even the need of the owner of the house to occupy it for his own residential purpose. No doubt, as pointed by the learned counsel for the petitioner the scheme of the Act recognises the claim of the owner of a residential house, having no other residential house of his own, to occupy his own residential house under certain conditions. No doubt, as pointed by the learned counsel for the petitioner the scheme of the Act recognises the claim of the owner of a residential house, having no other residential house of his own, to occupy his own residential house under certain conditions. Section 7(3-a)(1) makes such a need one of the grounds on which the owner can seek the eviction of the tenant. Similarly section 7(3-c) permits the owner of a house a portion of which is in the occupation of a tenant, to seek eviction of the tenant if the owner requires the whole house for his residential purpose. But both these provisions are controlled by those in section 7(3-a) and if the tenant is engaged in any employment or class of employment notified by the State Government as essential service for the purpose of this sub-section the owner’s rights have to give way. Section 3(7-a) gives the owner who owns a number of residential houses a right to choose one of them for his residential purpose and to notify his choice within 15 days from the commencement of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Amendment Act of 1951. Section 3(7-b) gives similar rights to the owner to obtain the use of one or more of his houses other than the one he desires to keep for his own residential purpose, in the interest of the other members of his family. But considering the scheme of the Act as a whole, it should be obvious that, though the Act itself provided for the owner of a house having no other residential houses in the area to which the Act applies, being enabled to obtain possession of that house for his residential purpose, the right is not an absolute right. I have therefore to negative the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that neither the Government nor the Accommodation Controller had any jurisdiction to requisition the house when the owner required it for her residential purposes. The question of jurisdiction under section 3(3) of the Act came up for consideration before Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) in Nataraja Mudaliar v. The State of Madras1. I respectfully agree with the reasoning and the conclusion of the learned Judge. The question of jurisdiction under section 3(3) of the Act came up for consideration before Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) in Nataraja Mudaliar v. The State of Madras1. I respectfully agree with the reasoning and the conclusion of the learned Judge. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that even if the Accommodation Controller and the Government had jurisdiction to requisition the house under section 3(3) of the Act the requisitioning in this case was not a proper exercise of the statutory power. As I have already pointed out, that the petitioner had no other residential house of her own in the City was never in dispute. That she needed this house, which she bought in 1951, for her residence was not in dispute either. It was certainly a relevant consideration to be taken into account by the Accommodation Controller and by the Government, when they dealt with the statutory notice of vacancy given by the petitioner under section 3(1) of the Act before they exercised the statutory power vested in them by section 3(3) of the Act. That the house was required for the occupation of a Government Servant was an equally relevant consideration in the exercise of the power under section 3(3) of the Act. It was certainly within the jurisdiction of the Government to exercise its discretion in favour of the owner or in favour of itself in passing orders under section 3(3) of the Act. In this case, however, I am constrained to hold that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was an improper exercise of the statutory power to reject the claims of the petitioner as owner is well founded. From the averments in paragraph 2 of the counter-affidavit filed by the Government, which I have extracted above, it should be clear that Sri M.K. Shetty, for allotment to whom for his residential purpose the Government exercised its powers under section 3(3) of the Act was already in occupation of a house apparently requisitioned by the Government under section 3(3). If at the time the Accommodation Controller received the notice of vacancy under section 3(1) of the Act the Government servant, for whom a house was required, had no house allotted to him in which he could live as a tenant, the discretion exercised in favour of requisitioning could not have been challenged. If at the time the Accommodation Controller received the notice of vacancy under section 3(1) of the Act the Government servant, for whom a house was required, had no house allotted to him in which he could live as a tenant, the discretion exercised in favour of requisitioning could not have been challenged. In this case however, Mr. Shetty had already been allotted a house but his complaint was that the rent for that building was too high. As I understand the averments in paragraph 2 of the counter-affidavit it was not the need for providing for the residential accommodation of Mr. Shetty but the desire of Mr. Shetty to have a cheaper house. Such a desire is perfectly intelligible on the part of the officer himself that prevailed with the Government in assessing the relevant claims of the owner and the Government. Such a consideration, to benefit a Government Officer to the extent of allotting a house cheaper than the one in which he was actually living at the time of the exercise of the powers under section 3(3) of the Act, is, in my opinion totally irrelevant in the exercise of that statutory power. Since the order of the Accommodation Controller, dated 10th October, 1953, was based upon such an irrelevant consideration, that order as well as the subsequent order of the Government virtually confirming the order of the Accommodation Controller, have to be set aside by the issue of a writ of certiorari. This petition is allowed. A writ of certiorari will issue quashing the order of the Accommodation Controller, dated 10th October, 1953, and the order of the Government, dated 23rd October, 1953. Respondent 1 should pay the costs of petitioner. Counsel’s fee Rs. 100.