Judgement This is an application for ad-interim injunction filed in C.S. No.322 of 1954. 2. The facts are: The Plaintiff V. Narasimhachariar is a retired Assistant Secretary of the Government of Madras. The Defendant is a well-known credit institution of this City with many branches viz. the Egmore Benefit Society, 3rd Branch Limited. The Society is run on the principles of a Nidhi or Permanent Fund viz. takes deposits and lends out moneys on first mortgages, jwellery etc. In fact but for such credit institutions the industrial and commercial life of this city will not be able to progress. The plaintiff executed a mortgage in respect of his houses No.33 Gengu Reddi Road and No.64 Eg-more High Road, in favour of the defendant Society for Rs.32,000/- payable with interest at 7½ per cent per annum. This amount was borrowed to pay off a prior mortgage of 1947 executed in favour of one Thaiyanayagi Ammal. This loan was a special loan under the bye-laws of this Society repayable within one year viz. on or before 6-12-1951. The mortgage deed expressly conferred upon the mortgagee the power of sale as specified in S.69, Transfer of Property Act. Inasmuch as the Plaintiff was paying regularly interest till June 1952 the Society did not attempt to recall the loan. The plaintiff defaulted from June 1952 and after he had done so for three months statutory notice of sale as per S.69, Transfer of Property Act was issued by the defendant Society to the plaintiff on 14-10-1952. When the period of three months of the said notice expired in January 1953, the plaintiff paid Rs.1000/- towards the accumulated arrears in February 1953 and promised to clear off the arrears of interest and the principal amount within a short time. This promise was not kept up and therefore the defendant Society issued a second statutory notice as per S.69, Transfer of Property Act on 21-9-1953. On the expiry of the three months the defendant Society on 7-1-1954 intimated to the plaintiff that 17-3-1954 had been fixed for sale of the mortgaged properties and the date was so fixed so that even before the properties were actually sold the plaintiff could pay the mortgage money and save the properties. Then the plaintiff put up some propositions for the defendant Society to collect the rent and credit the same towards its loan. Then the plaintiff put up some propositions for the defendant Society to collect the rent and credit the same towards its loan. These propositions were accepted and the defendant Society states that the plaintiff has double-crossed it and it had not been able to collect any rent. On the date fixed for sale 17-3-1954 on the application of the plaintiff the Society adjourned the sale to 19-6-1954. This was to enable the plaintiff to pay up as he desired without prejudice to the statutory notice of sale dated 21-9-1953. But inasmuch as the plaintiff did not stick up to his undertaking and interest was accumulating, the properties were put up for sale on 19-6-1954. There were no bidders and the sale was adjourned to 24-7-1954. There was very wide advertisement of the sale by circulations of auction catalogues and publication in the well-known dailies "The Hindu" and "Indian Express". The plaintiff thereupon rushed to the City Civil Court and filed O. S.1198 of 1954 and obtained an interim injunction on the eve of the sale. This was contested by the defendant Society on notice being served upon them. Seeing that the sale could not be averted the plaintiff proposed certain terms and this was accepted by the defendant Society. The consent contained the following terms: "The plaintiff will pay Rs.4500-0-0 towards the amount due on or before 5-10-1954 to the defendant Society at its office. In default of such payment, the defendant Society can bring the property to sale without any further notice to the mortgagor. The defendant will not exercise the power of sale on or before 5-10-1954." The plaintiff again did not keep up his undertaking and is said to have tendered according to the defendant Society Rs.2000 and according to the plaintiff Rs.1500 on 5-10-1954 and this was refused by the Secretary of the defendant Society. Therefore the sale was fixed to take place on 23-10-1954 and there was wide circulation of the sale both by hand-bills. advertisements in "The Hindu" "Indian Express" and "Swadesamitran". On 23-10-1954 the defendant Society states that the plaintiff and his wife scared off the bidders by telling them that the plaintiff was going to file the present suit in the High Court. The sale was therefore adjourned to 6-12-1954. advertisements in "The Hindu" "Indian Express" and "Swadesamitran". On 23-10-1954 the defendant Society states that the plaintiff and his wife scared off the bidders by telling them that the plaintiff was going to file the present suit in the High Court. The sale was therefore adjourned to 6-12-1954. It is in these circumstances that the present suit has been filed for a declaration that the power of sale vested in the defendant Society under S.69, Transfer of Property Act and under the mortgage deed dated 6-12-1950 is not valid and for an injunction restraining the defendant from selling the properties on the ground that he is an agriculturist entitled to the benefits of Madras Act 5 of 1954. The plaintiff has also filed this application for an ad-interim injunction. 3. The points which arise for consideration are (a) whether S.69, Transfer of Property Act offends the equal potection of law guaranteed under Art.14 of the Constitution; (b) whether it offends Art.19 (1)(f) of the Constitution guaranteeing the right to all citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and (c) whether the plaintiff is entitled to the benefits of Madras Act 5 of 1954. 4. On a review of the entire circumstances of the case, I have come to the conclusion that S.69, Transfer of Property Act does not offend Art.14 or Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India and secondly, that the plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of Act 5 of 1954. Here are my reasons. 5. Point (a): Art.14 of the Constitution declares that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The Article applies to citizens as well as to non-citizens of the Indian Union. The first part of the Article is of Irish origin. Section 40(1) of the Constitution of Eire provides that "all citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law, and further proceeds to add that this shall not be held to mean that the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral and of social function." The latter part of the Article, namely, Equal protection of the laws is of American origin. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S.A. Constitution states: "No state shall . . . . . . Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S.A. Constitution states: "No state shall . . . . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws". Both laws, substantive and adjective, are equally subject to the constitutional limitations under Art.14 unless of course the change in procedure is merely technical or formal. (-Traux v. Carrigan, (1921) 257 U.S.312 (A); - Duncan v. Missouri, (1893) 152 U.S.377 (B); - State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75 (C); Weaver Constitutional Law p.407 referred to:) - Dr. Khare v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 211 (D); - Mohta and Co. v. Viswanatha Sastri, AIR 1954 S.C. 545 (E). 6. The scope and extent of the fundamental right of equal protection guaranteed under Art.14 can best be set out in the following extract from Basus Commentary on the Constitution of India (Second Edition) - Sarkar and Sons Ltd. Page 71: (a) The guarantee of equal protection cannot interfere with the police power of the State, - to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity, for which legislation of a special character is often necessary. (Burdick Law of the American Constitution pages 603-611). Thus Special burdens are often necessary for general benefits (such as) for supplying water, preventing fires, lighting districts, cleaning streets, opening parks, and many other objects. Regulations for the purposes may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon anyone, but to promote, with as little inconvenience as possible, the general good, though in many respects, necessarily special in their character, they do not furnish just ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all persons and property under the same circumstances and conditions. (ibid P.595) And in the exercise of such powers the State has a wide discretion in determining what measures are necessary for its own protection and properly to promote the safety, peace and good order of its people. - Terrace v. Thompson, (1923) 263 U.S.197 (F). (ibid P.595) And in the exercise of such powers the State has a wide discretion in determining what measures are necessary for its own protection and properly to promote the safety, peace and good order of its people. - Terrace v. Thompson, (1923) 263 U.S.197 (F). The discretion has been so widely interpreted in the U.S.A. as to support the adoption by the State of- whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare - Nebbia v. Newyork, (1934) 291 U.S.502 (G); e.g., protection of the public from the evils of excessive competition, exemption, exempting certain trades or occupation from its antimonopoly legislation; preservation of competition where necessary; restricting the right to engage in certain business or professions. On the same principle, though the equal protection extends to aliens resident within the jurisdiction of the State, and aliens are not to be discriminated against simply on the ground of alienage, they may be subjected to special restrictions on the ground of peril to the public welfare. Again, owing to difference in the nature of their allegiance to the State, classification may be made between citizens and aliens as regards acquiring land. It is reasonable to deny aliens the use of Shotguns for protecting game, but it is not reasonable to deny them the right to work for a living. (b) The guarantee of equal does not prevent the State from applying different laws or different systems of judicature to different parts or local sub-divisions of the country according to local circumstances, for the clause does not secure to all persons the benefit of the same laws and same remedies. Equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. - Bowman v. Lewis, (1879) 101 U.S.22 (H); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, (1886) 118 U.S.356 at p.369 (I). Judgement This is an application for ad-interim injunction filed in C.S. No.322 of 1954. 2. The facts are: The Plaintiff V. Narasimhachariar is a retired Assistant Secretary of the Government of Madras. The Defendant is a well-known credit institution of this City with many branches viz. the Egmore Benefit Society, 3rd Branch Limited. The Society is run on the principles of a Nidhi or Permanent Fund viz. takes deposits and lends out moneys on first mortgages, jwellery etc. The Defendant is a well-known credit institution of this City with many branches viz. the Egmore Benefit Society, 3rd Branch Limited. The Society is run on the principles of a Nidhi or Permanent Fund viz. takes deposits and lends out moneys on first mortgages, jwellery etc. In fact but for such credit institutions the industrial and commercial life of this city will not be able to progress. The plaintiff executed a mortgage in respect of his houses No.33 Gengu Reddi Road and No.64 Eg-more High Road, in favour of the defendant Society for Rs.32,000/- payable with interest at 7½ per cent per annum. This amount was borrowed to pay off a prior mortgage of 1947 executed in favour of one Thaiyanayagi Ammal. This loan was a special loan under the bye-laws of this Society repayable within one year viz. on or before 6-12-1951. The mortgage deed expressly conferred upon the mortgagee the power of sale as specified in S.69, Transfer of Property Act. Inasmuch as the Plaintiff was paying regularly interest till June 1952 the Society did not attempt to recall the loan. The plaintiff defaulted from June 1952 and after he had done so for three months statutory notice of sale as per S.69, Transfer of Property Act was issued by the defendant Society to the plaintiff on 14-10-1952. When the period of three months of the said notice expired in January 1953, the plaintiff paid Rs.1000/- towards the accumulated arrears in February 1953 and promised to clear off the arrears of interest and the principal amount within a short time. This promise was not kept up and therefore the defendant Society issued a second statutory notice as per S.69, Transfer of Property Act on 21-9-1953. On the expiry of the three months the defendant Society on 7-1-1954 intimated to the plaintiff that 17-3-1954 had been fixed for sale of the mortgaged properties and the date was so fixed so that even before the properties were actually sold the plaintiff could pay the mortgage money and save the properties. Then the plaintiff put up some propositions for the defendant Society to collect the rent and credit the same towards its loan. These propositions were accepted and the defendant Society states that the plaintiff has double-crossed it and it had not been able to collect any rent. Then the plaintiff put up some propositions for the defendant Society to collect the rent and credit the same towards its loan. These propositions were accepted and the defendant Society states that the plaintiff has double-crossed it and it had not been able to collect any rent. On the date fixed for sale 17-3-1954 on the application of the plaintiff the Society adjourned the sale to 19-6-1954. This was to enable the plaintiff to pay up as he desired without prejudice to the statutory notice of sale dated 21-9-1953. But inasmuch as the plaintiff did not stick up to his undertaking and interest was accumulating, the properties were put up for sale on 19-6-1954. There were no bidders and the sale was adjourned to 24-7-1954. There was very wide advertisement of the sale by circulations of auction catalogues and publication in the well-known dailies "The Hindu" and "Indian Express". The plaintiff thereupon rushed to the City Civil Court and filed O. S.1198 of 1954 and obtained an interim injunction on the eve of the sale. This was contested by the defendant Society on notice being served upon them. Seeing that the sale could not be averted the plaintiff proposed certain terms and this was accepted by the defendant Society. The consent contained the following terms: "The plaintiff will pay Rs.4500-0-0 towards the amount due on or before 5-10-1954 to the defendant Society at its office. In default of such payment, the defendant Society can bring the property to sale without any further notice to the mortgagor. The defendant will not exercise the power of sale on or before 5-10-1954." The plaintiff again did not keep up his undertaking and is said to have tendered according to the defendant Society Rs.2000 and according to the plaintiff Rs.1500 on 5-10-1954 and this was refused by the Secretary of the defendant Society. Therefore the sale was fixed to take place on 23-10-1954 and there was wide circulation of the sale both by hand-bills. advertisements in "The Hindu" "Indian Express" and "Swadesamitran". On 23-10-1954 the defendant Society states that the plaintiff and his wife scared off the bidders by telling them that the plaintiff was going to file the present suit in the High Court. The sale was therefore adjourned to 6-12-1954. advertisements in "The Hindu" "Indian Express" and "Swadesamitran". On 23-10-1954 the defendant Society states that the plaintiff and his wife scared off the bidders by telling them that the plaintiff was going to file the present suit in the High Court. The sale was therefore adjourned to 6-12-1954. It is in these circumstances that the present suit has been filed for a declaration that the power of sale vested in the defendant Society under S.69, Transfer of Property Act and under the mortgage deed dated 6-12-1950 is not valid and for an injunction restraining the defendant from selling the properties on the ground that he is an agriculturist entitled to the benefits of Madras Act 5 of 1954. The plaintiff has also filed this application for an ad-interim injunction. 3. The points which arise for consideration are (a) whether S.69, Transfer of Property Act offends the equal potection of law guaranteed under Art.14 of the Constitution; (b) whether it offends Art.19 (1)(f) of the Constitution guaranteeing the right to all citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and (c) whether the plaintiff is entitled to the benefits of Madras Act 5 of 1954. 4. On a review of the entire circumstances of the case, I have come to the conclusion that S.69, Transfer of Property Act does not offend Art.14 or Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India and secondly, that the plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of Act 5 of 1954. Here are my reasons. 5. Point (a): Art.14 of the Constitution declares that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The Article applies to citizens as well as to non-citizens of the Indian Union. The first part of the Article is of Irish origin. Section 40(1) of the Constitution of Eire provides that "all citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law, and further proceeds to add that this shall not be held to mean that the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral and of social function." The latter part of the Article, namely, Equal protection of the laws is of American origin. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S.A. Constitution states: "No state shall . . . . . . Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S.A. Constitution states: "No state shall . . . . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws". Both laws, substantive and adjective, are equally subject to the constitutional limitations under Art.14 unless of course the change in procedure is merely technical or formal. (-Traux v. Carrigan, (1921) 257 U.S.312 (A); - Duncan v. Missouri, (1893) 152 U.S.377 (B); - State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75 (C); Weaver Constitutional Law p.407 referred to:) - Dr. Khare v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 211 (D); - Mohta and Co. v. Viswanatha Sastri, AIR 1954 S.C. 545 (E). 6. The scope and extent of the fundamental right of equal protection guaranteed under Art.14 can best be set out in the following extract from Basus Commentary on the Constitution of India (Second Edition) - Sarkar and Sons Ltd. Page 71: (a) The guarantee of equal protection cannot interfere with the police power of the State, - to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity, for which legislation of a special character is often necessary. (Burdick Law of the American Constitution pages 603-611). Thus Special burdens are often necessary for general benefits (such as) for supplying water, preventing fires, lighting districts, cleaning streets, opening parks, and many other objects. Regulations for the purposes may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon anyone, but to promote, with as little inconvenience as possible, the general good, though in many respects, necessarily special in their character, they do not furnish just ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all persons and property under the same circumstances and conditions. (ibid P.595) And in the exercise of such powers the State has a wide discretion in determining what measures are necessary for its own protection and properly to promote the safety, peace and good order of its people. - Terrace v. Thompson, (1923) 263 U.S.197 (F). (ibid P.595) And in the exercise of such powers the State has a wide discretion in determining what measures are necessary for its own protection and properly to promote the safety, peace and good order of its people. - Terrace v. Thompson, (1923) 263 U.S.197 (F). The discretion has been so widely interpreted in the U.S.A. as to support the adoption by the State of- whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare - Nebbia v. Newyork, (1934) 291 U.S.502 (G); e.g., protection of the public from the evils of excessive competition, exemption, exempting certain trades or occupation from its antimonopoly legislation; preservation of competition where necessary; restricting the right to engage in certain business or professions. On the same principle, though the equal protection extends to aliens resident within the jurisdiction of the State, and aliens are not to be discriminated against simply on the ground of alienage, they may be subjected to special restrictions on the ground of peril to the public welfare. Again, owing to difference in the nature of their allegiance to the State, classification may be made between citizens and aliens as regards acquiring land. It is reasonable to deny aliens the use of Shotguns for protecting game, but it is not reasonable to deny them the right to work for a living. (b) The guarantee of equal does not prevent the State from applying different laws or different systems of judicature to different parts or local sub-divisions of the country according to local circumstances, for the clause does not secure to all persons the benefit of the same laws and same remedies. Equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. - Bowman v. Lewis, (1879) 101 U.S.22 (H); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, (1886) 118 U.S.356 at p.369 (I).