SARJOO PROSAD C. J.: In this application under Art. 226 of the Consti­tution, the petitioner complains against an order of the Deputy Commissioner -of Sibsagar, dated 5-5-54 and a Resolution of the Local Board, Sib­sagar, dated 31-5-54. He prays that the said order of the Deputy Commissioner should be quashed by an appropriate Writ or direction, and the Board should be restrained from giving effect to its aforesaid resolution. (2) The material facts lie in a short compass and are almost undisputed. The petitioner was the lessee of a 'hat' or market, known as the Simaluguri Hat, under the Sibsagar Local Board. The lease in favour of the petitioner having ter­minated, it was farmed out by public auction on 13-2-54 in the presence of the Chairman and some other members. The petitioner, along with Dharma-kanta Gogoi, opposite party No. 3 to this petition, and one other man bid at the auction. His bid was Rs. 8,000/- while that of Dharmakanta was Rs 8100/-. The bid of Dharmakanta, which was the highest bid, was accepted by the persons con­ducting the sale who recommended that the lease of the 'Hat' should be granted to him. The bid list, with the proposal of the officers holding the sale, was in due course laid before a meeting of the Board on 30-3-54. There was also an objec­tion by the petitioner. The minutes of the pro­ceedings of that meeting of the Board show that the Board considered two rival proposals one in favour of the petitioner, the outgoing lessee who had also agreed to advance more as premium, and another in favour of the Opposite Party 3 who was the highest bidder. Votes were taken by secret ballot, and the Vice-Chairman of the Board who appears to have presided found, on counting, that the proposal in favour of settle­ment of the market with the petitioner was carried by a majority of 15 to 8, one of the members present being neutral. Accordingly the Board resolved, by a majority decision, that the 'Hat' should be settled with the petitioner. The grounds for that decision are contained in the Resolution itself which is recited in Annexure B to this petition. This deci­sion of the Board should have been final under R. 10 of the Rules of procedure for the sale of pounds and markets by Local Boards in Assam. The grounds for that decision are contained in the Resolution itself which is recited in Annexure B to this petition. This deci­sion of the Board should have been final under R. 10 of the Rules of procedure for the sale of pounds and markets by Local Boards in Assam. Opposite Party Dharmakanta Gogoi was evidently not satisfied with the above resolution of the Board and moved the Deputy Commissioner against it. What jurisdiction the Deputy Com­missioner possessed to interfere with this resolu­tion of the Board is a matter which has been hotly canvassed before us. The Deputy Commis­sioner, by his order, dated 26-4-54, suspended the resolution and directed that "the Local Board may reconsider the matter and take necessary action". This order of the Deputy Commissioner is challenged before us as being quite illegal and unwarranted. The order forms Annexure C to the petition. It runs thus : "5-5-54. I have gone through the petition filed by Shri Dharma Kanta Gogoi and the report submitted by the Chairman, Sibsagar Local Board. The Chairman himself admits that the procedure was illegal. According to him, this could happen as he was absent. The settlement Committee recommended the settlement of Simalguri Local Board Hat with the petitioner Dharma Kanta Gogol who was the highest bidder. The previous lessee submitted a peti­tion for reconsideration. As there was differ­ence of opinion regarding the matter, it was decided by secret ballot under the Chairman- , ship of the Vice-Chairman. The bid offered by the previous lessee was lower. There is also no provision for deciding any such matter by the Local Board by secret ballot. Accordingly, under S. 82, Assam Local Self-Government Act, I suspend the execution of the Board's resolution granting settlement of Simalugari Hat to Dambarudhar Barua, as the execution of the resolution is likely to cause annoyance to body of persons. The Local Board may reconsider the matter and take necessary action. Sd/- B. L. Sen, f Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, Jorhat." The main reason for the aforesaid order is that the procedure adopted at the meeting "was illegal" inasmuch as "the difference of opinion regarding the matter was decided by secret ballot under the Chairmanship of the Vice-Chairman". , It refers to the fact that the bid offered by the petitioner was less and there was no provision j in the law for deciding any such matter in the f manner aforesaid. , It refers to the fact that the bid offered by the petitioner was less and there was no provision j in the law for deciding any such matter in the f manner aforesaid. Accordingly, purporting to act under Section 82, Assam Local Self-Government Act, which admittedly corresponds to Section 89 of the present Act, the officer suspended the reso­lution of the Board. A subsidiary reason given by the Deputy Commissioner for suspension of the resolution is that its execution was "likely to cause annoyance to (Sic a) body of persons" The order is a speaking order. It will have to be seen whether the Deputy Commissioner was justi­fied in making it or whether he acted merely under colour of authority and without any legal sanc­tion, whatsoever. The matter was again consider­ed by the Board at a meeting, dated 19-5-1954. The minutes of the meeting show that "after a good deal of discussion of the resolution of the Board and the Deputy Commissioner's order, the Board decided to let it over to the next meeting." In other words, the Board came to no decision at all. There was no date fixed for the next meet­ing and the Chairman, who appears to have pre­sided adjourned the meeting sine die. The next meeting of the Board appears to have been held on 31-5-54 and the record shows that the proceed­ings of ordinary and special meetings held on 30-3-54 were confirmed "with the alteration that the Simaluguri Hat be settled with Sri Dharma-kanta Gogol in place of Sri Dambborudhar Barua." The petitioner was then informed by letter dated 1-6-54 that he should hand over charge of the said 'hat' to the opposite party, Dharmakanta. (3) The petitioner submits that the Deputy Commissioner Sibsagar acted in excess of his juris­diction in directing the Board to reconsider its decision, dated 30-3-54, settling the Hat with the petitioner, and that there was no apprehension of the said resolution of the Board causing "any annoyance to the public or to any class or body of persons or lead to a breach of the peace." Even the Chairman of the Local Board, in his letter, dated 4-5-54, to the Deputy Commissioner, admit­ted that there was no likelihood "of any serious consequence even though there is any division both for and against the petition." He claims that during the period of his possession, the petitioner had managed the Hat smoothly and peacefully, and any apprehension to the contrary was un­founded. The petitioner further submits that the Board's decision to settle the Hat with the peti­tioner by virtue of its resolution, dated 30-3-54, was final and even the Board had no jurisdiction to re-open the matter within six months except by a requisition signed by at least two-thirds of the members of the Board calling for special meeting to reconsider it under B. 29 of the Rules. He suggests that the Opposite Party is a near relation of the Chairman of the Board and the proceedings have been manoeuvred to suit his purpose. (4) The Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, and the Chairman of the Local Board who are opposite parties to this petition and have shown cause, have not filed any counter-affidavit controverting the allegations. They have been content to send their replies through letters addressed to the Deputy Registrar. This procedure in my opinion, is quite unsatisfactory. Parties to an application or proceeding should not be allowed to address letters to an officer of the Court, but they should show cause through their counsel and by means of affi­davits or petitions filed in the proceeding. I quite deprecate the procedure adopted by these officers in the present case," and I would not have taken any notice of these letters but for the fact that probably these officers may be unaware of the proper steps to be taken in connection with such applications. I quite deprecate the procedure adopted by these officers in the present case," and I would not have taken any notice of these letters but for the fact that probably these officers may be unaware of the proper steps to be taken in connection with such applications. The Deputy Commissioner in his letter merely says that the resolution of the Board was suspend­ed under S. 89, Assam Local Self-Government Act, and that if the highest bidder is not given settle­ment, it was likely to cause annoyance to the pub­lic. The Chairman of the Local Board states there is no provision to decide a question by secret bal­lot except either by show of hands or by a division, as contemplated by Subsidiary Rule No. 32(2) at page 275 of the Local Self-Government Act, and that it was for the President of the meeting to determine the method of taking votes by division, if such division was desired by members. As the said resolution of the Board was illegal, and due to its illegality, was suspended by the Deputy Commissioner, it gave a chance to the Board to reconsider the matter at its meeting held on 31-5-54, in which it was decided that the settle­ment of the 'hat' should be made with Opposite Party No. 3, Sri Dharmakanta Gogol, the highest bidder. He denies the alleged relationship and simply says that both the petitioner and the op­posite party belong to the Ahom community, of which he is also a member, and the question of 'mala fides' or relationship did not anise in the case. The Chairman does not say anything as to the allegation that the earlier resolution of the Board was likely to lead to any annoyance to a body of persons. (5) The salient facts, therefore, are substan­tially admitted. The questions which arise for consideration are (1) whether the Deputy Com­missioner was justified in making the order, dated 5-5-54 suspending the resolution of the Local Board under which the Board had decided to make a settlement in favour of the petitioner, and, if not justified, whether this Court could inter­fere with the order in question, and (2) whether the resolution of the Board, dated 31-5-54 recall­ing its previous resolution, dated 30-3-54, and directing the settlement with opposite party No. 3, was without jurisdiction. I realise that even IS the first question is answered in favour of the petitioner, the point still remains whether the last resolution of the Board would not stand in his way and, if this resolution is held to be in order, the mere fact that the Deputy Commissioner had passed some illegal order interfering with the earlier resolution of the Board, would not entitle the petitioner to come to this Court for relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The Local Board is a sort of an autonomous body functioning according to the provisions oj the Local Self Government Act and the Rules framed there under. Therefore, ultimately the es­sential question would be to examine the vires of the last resolution of the Board. But it is contend­ed on behalf of the petitioner that the whole mis­chief has been created by the illegal and uncall­ed for order of the Deputy Commissioner. If that order had not been passed, the Board would have been content to act upon its previous resolution, dated 30-3-54, and, as required by the rules, given a lease of the market to the petitioner; and that on account of these illegal and unwarranted orders, the petitioner's right to get a settlement of the market in his favour has been seriously affected. I, therefore, propose to deal with the question whether the order of the learned Deputy Commissioner is without jurisdiction or it was permissible to make the order under S. 89, Assam Local Self-Government Act (Act 25 of 1953). I, therefore, propose to deal with the question whether the order of the learned Deputy Commissioner is without jurisdiction or it was permissible to make the order under S. 89, Assam Local Self-Government Act (Act 25 of 1953). (6) Section 89 of the Act says "The State Government or the Deputy Commis­sioner, after hearing the Chairman, may by order in writing, suspend the execution of any1 resolution or order of any Local Board or the doing of any act which is about to be done, or is being done, by such Board if, in its or his opinion, the execution of the resolution or order or the doing of the act, is likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public, or to any class or body of persons, or to lead to a breach of the peace." Where the Deputy Commissioner suspends the execution of any resolution or order, or the do­ing of any act under S. 89, he is enjoined by S. 91 of the Act to submit forthwith to the State Gov­ernment a copy of the order, with a statement of his reasons for making it, and then the State Government may confirm, modify or rescind the order of the Deputy Commissioner. It is to be seen that there is no provision in the law under which the Deputy Commissioner could override the resolution of the Local Board even if the Board had followed any irregular or illegal pro­cedure. Under S. 84(2) of the Act, the power to annul is given to the State Government by an order in writing, but there is no such power given to the Deputy Commissioner at all. The resolution of the Board, therefore, passed on 30-3-54 was final. It is nobody's case that the State Govern­ment has interfered with or annulled that resolu­tion. The Deputy Commissioner, however, claims to have acted under S. 89 of the Act to suspend the order, and the main reason given by the Deputy Commissioner for doing so was that the procedure followed by the Board at its earlier meeting was an illegal procedure inasmuch as there was no provision for decision by secret bal­lot. We are not satisfied that the Deputy Commis­sioner could, under S. 89, interfere with the reso­lution on that ground nor was it open to him to direct the Local Board to reconsider the matter and to take necessary action. We are not satisfied that the Deputy Commis­sioner could, under S. 89, interfere with the reso­lution on that ground nor was it open to him to direct the Local Board to reconsider the matter and to take necessary action. In assuming such jurisdiction, the Deputy Commissioner has acted in contravention of the provisions of the Local Self-Government Act and of the provisions oj S 89 of the Act under which he purports to have exercised this power. It is true that in the last part of his order, he does state that the execution of the resolution was likely to cause annoyance to a body of per­sons. In his 'show cause' application, he merely says this would be so because the settlement was not made with the highest bidder. The Chairman, of the Board says nothing about any such anno­yance; on the contrary his letter to the Deputy Commissioner, as stated earlier, admitted that no serious consequence was likely to ensue on account of that decision. On these admitted facts, the statement in the order that it was likely to cause annoyance to a body of persons, was en­tirely, baseless. The assumption made by the Deputy Commissioner would lead to the untenable position that in every case where the Board re­fused to make settlement with the highest bidder, there was likely to be annoyance to a body of per­sons, and therefore, the jurisdiction under S. 89 of the Act was attracted to suspend the resolu­tion. If that were so, then under the law, the Board would have been bound to accept the highest bid in making settlement of these markets, however undesirable or insecure the person making the bid may be. This is evidently contrary to reason and to the express provisions of the rule wherein it is provided that the officers holding the sale are not bound to accept the highest bid or, in fact, any bid at all. It seems to us therefore, quite clear that in purporting to act under S. 89, Local Self-Government Act in the circumstances of the present case, the Deputy Commissioner attempted to usurp a jurisdiction which he did not at all possess. (7) Mr. It seems to us therefore, quite clear that in purporting to act under S. 89, Local Self-Government Act in the circumstances of the present case, the Deputy Commissioner attempted to usurp a jurisdiction which he did not at all possess. (7) Mr. Medhi, on behalf of the opposite party, has strenuously urged that the section vests com­plete discretion in the officer to suspend the exe­cution of any resolution or order of any Local Board or the doing of any act by such Board if, in his opinion, the execution of the resolution or order or the doing of the act was likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public or to any class or body of persons, or to lead to a breach of the peace. The Deputy Commissioner, according to the contention of Mr. Medhi, is the sole judge of the matter subject to the powers of the State Gov­ernment under S. 91 of the Act, and that the matter was not at all justiciable. I am not inclin­ed to agree with the contention of Mr. Medhi. It is true that S. 89 gives the discretion to the Deputy Commissioner to act in the circumstances of a given case, but that discretion has to be judicially exercised; it is not an unfettered jurisdiction, but is conditioned by certain circumstances. If the facts found come within the conditions mentioned in compelling him to act under S. 89, then his discretion cannot be interfered with. Pri­marily it is his responsibility to decide on the facts and circumstances of each case, whether they come within the conditions mentioned in S. 89 so as to enable him to take action under that section. But where those conditions do not exist, as it is on the admitted facts of this case, his mere as­sertion to the contrary will not confer any juris­diction on him to act under S. 89. In the pre­sent case, we find that he has acted merely under a colour of authority and purported to sus­pend the resolution on the ground that an illegal procedure was followed. This, in my opinion, he had no jurisdiction to do, and in the circumstances, this Court is bound to quash that order. It is contended that the order in question is a mere administrative order passed by the Deputy Com­missioner. This, in my opinion, he had no jurisdiction to do, and in the circumstances, this Court is bound to quash that order. It is contended that the order in question is a mere administrative order passed by the Deputy Com­missioner. Even if it were so, this Court is not precluded under Art. 226 of the Constitution from restraining the Deputy Commissioner to give effect to such an order which, on the face of it, is clearly erroneous and. without jurisdiction or in excess of it. Mr. Medhi has, in support of his contention, relied mainly upon a decision of my learned brother sitting with Ram Labhaya, J. in - 'Mahboob Khan v. Dy. Commr., Lakhimpur', AIR 1953 Assam 145 (A). This was a case arising under S. 291, Assam Municipal Act (Act 1 of 1923) the provisions whereof are substantially analogous to the provisions of S. 89, Local Self-Government Act. The decision does not actually support him. The learned Judges there held that even if an order was not judicial or quasi-judicial in its nature or was purely of an administrative cha­racter, the High Court could interfere in exer­cise of its powers under Art. 226 of the Consti­tution, though, on the facts of that case, the application could not be entertained. This is obvious from the fact that the Deputy Commis­sioner in his affidavit had controverted the main allegations of the petitioner and the matter, therefore, could not be correctly settled on evi­dence, which was not before the Court. Indeed, my learned brother quoted with approval the dictum of Chagla, C. J. in - 'State of Bom­bay v. Laxmidas Ranchhoddas", AIR 1952 Bom 468 (B), wherein the learned Chief Justice ob­served : "There is nothing in principle, and there is none in authority either, why the same principle should not be applied to officers exercising the power conferred upon them by statute. If the power is unlimited, the Court undoubtedly can­not interfere. If certain matters are left to the discretion of the officer, the Court cannot control that discretion unless the discretion is arrived at mala fide or is not a proper exer­cise of discretion." In this case, as I have shown, there has been no proper exercise of discretion by the Deputy Commissioner at all, in usurping his functions under S. 89, Local Self-Government Act. (8) Mr. (8) Mr. Medhi has also sought to rely upon some English and American decisions on the point. A recent decision of the House of Lords in -'Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De 6. Jayaratne', 1951 AC 66 (C), has been cited by him. The decision rests upon the interpretation of Regulation 62, Defence (Control of Textiles) Regulations, 1945 of Ceylon, which empowered the Controller to cancel textile licenses "where the Controller has reasonable grounds to believe that any dealer is unfit to be allowed to continue as a dealer". It was held that in acting under Regulation 62, the Controller was not acting judicially. In fact, when he can­celled a license, he was not determining a ques­tion; all that he was doing was to take executive action to withdraw a privilege because he believ­ed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the holder was unfit to retain it. The mere requirement that the Controller must have rea­sonable grounds for the belief, though imposing a condition that there must in fact exist such reasonable grounds, was not adequate to oblige him to act judicially, when there was nothing else in the context or conditions of his jurisdiction which suggested that he must regulate his action by analogy to judicial rules. In those circumstances, it was held that the Controller was not amenable to a mandate in the nature of a certiorari. On the facts also, their Lordships found that there was ample materials justifying the action taken by the Controller. In the present case, the position is entirely differ­ent. Under S. 89 of the Local Self-Government Act, the Deputy Commissioner has to suspend a resolution or order of an autonomous body, which order is otherwise final, and this he is entitled to do only within the special limitations provided by that section. The discretion here is not as unfettered as it was in the other case, and obviously it could not be so on the plain terms of the section. In my opinion, on the plain language of S. 89, it seems to me that the Deputy Commissioner has to perform more or less a quasi-judicial act in suspending orders of an autonomous body like the Local Board, which orders would be otherwise final. In my opinion, on the plain language of S. 89, it seems to me that the Deputy Commissioner has to perform more or less a quasi-judicial act in suspending orders of an autonomous body like the Local Board, which orders would be otherwise final. He had to hear the Chairman of the Board and then decide whe­ther the conditions mentioned in the section did exist in order to enable him to take action. Moreover 'Nakkuda All's case (C)', was a case only of certiorari, and did not cover any other kind of Writ, such as those which this Court is entitled to issue by virtue of Art. 226 of the Con­stitution. Another case to which Mr. Medhi has referred is - 'Westminster Corpn. v. London and North Western Rly. Co.', 1905 AC 426 (D). This case is entirely beside the point. It merely says that where the sanitary authority, in providing sanitary conveniences under the Public Health Act, uses its statutory powers bona fide and rea­sonably, and if it so acts, its discretion as to the mode of acting cannot be interfered with. But even in this case, their Lordships made it clear that the power given by the Legislature for one purpose could not be used for another. This is quite obvious from the speech of the Lord Chan­cellor, the Earl of Halsbury. Reference has also been made to a quotation from - 'Adams v, Nagle', (1937) 303 US 532 (E). The quotation is as follows: "Where a statute vests no discretion in an exe­cutive officer but to act under a given set of circumstances, or forbids his acting except upon certain named conditions, a Court will compel him to act or to refrain from acting if he essays wholly to disregard the statutory mandate; but if a discretion is vested in him, and he is to act in the light of the facts, he ascertains and the judgment he forms, a Court cannot restrain him from acting, on the ground that he has exceeded his discretion by reason of an error either of fact or law which induced his conclusion." Mr. Medhi submits that this case should be treated as falling in the category contemplated by the latter part of the quotation. I do not think so. Medhi submits that this case should be treated as falling in the category contemplated by the latter part of the quotation. I do not think so. Having regard to the facts of this case, I am of the view that it falls in the earlier part, namely, that here he was to act under a given set of cir­cumstances and if those circumstances did not exist, S. 89 of the Act did not confer upon the Deputy Commissioner any discretion to suspend the resolution of the Board. In my opinion, there­fore, the order of the Deputy Commissioner was without any legal sanction and quite uncalled for. The resolution of the Board, dated 30-3-54, was final and conclusive and it was not open to the Deputy Commissioner to interfere with that reso­lution simply because in his opinion, the correct procedure was not followed in the meeting at which the resolution was passed. (9) Mr. Medhi, in fact, has concentrated his whole argument upon this aspect of the case and he has contended that the question whether the second resolution of the Board was or was not a valid resolution, did not arise. He, therefore, did not attach much importance to this aspect of the matter. I, however, consider that it is essen­tial for us to examine whether this resolution is a valid resolution because if it is held to be so, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. Rule 29 of the Model Subsidiary Rules framed under S. 91 of the old Local Self-Government Act, provides that "Unless not less than two-thirds of the members of the Board consent by signing a requisition, no sub­ject once finally disposed of shall be reconsidered within six months." The subject of granting lease of the market in question was considered and finally disposed of by a resolution of the Board, dated 30-3-54. The same subject, therefore, could not be reconsidered at a meeting of the Board held on 19-5-54 or 31-5-54, which was certainly with­in six months. Admittedly, there was no requisition sent for any special meeting, by at least two-third of the members of the Board, as required by R. 29. The resolution dated 31-5-54, was, therefore, in direct contravention of this rule and ultra vires. The Board had no jurisdiction at all to reconsider the matter except in the circumstances mentioned in that Rule. Admittedly, there was no requisition sent for any special meeting, by at least two-third of the members of the Board, as required by R. 29. The resolution dated 31-5-54, was, therefore, in direct contravention of this rule and ultra vires. The Board had no jurisdiction at all to reconsider the matter except in the circumstances mentioned in that Rule. This aspect of the case cannot be challenged. The Rules have the effect of a Statute. It has been, however, suggested in the order of the Deputy Commissioner and in the resolution of the Board, dated 31-5-54, that the previous re­solution was illegal inasmuch as there was no provision in the law for secret voting. Mr. Medhi, of course, has not specifically pressed the question, but in view of the above attitude of the Board and the Deputy Commissioner, it requires serious consideration. Rule 32 of the above rules provides that every question shall be resolved in the affir­mative or in the negative according to the majo­rity of votes, and the votes may be taken by show of hands or by division, if any member so desires. It is obvious that the rule contemplates mainly two modes of ascertaining votes, - one by show of hands and another by division. It is Important to notice that a note by division shall be taken only if a member so desires, and then the President of the meeting shall determine the method of taking votes by division. The Chairman of the Board, in his 'show cause' letter suggests that in the present case, votes were taken by a division. If that is so, then obviously it was open to the President of the meeting, namely, the Vice-chairman, to determine the method of taking votes by division. The minutes of the proceedings of the meeting dated 30-3-54 indicate that it was the Vice-Chairman who himself counted the secret ballots. Therefore, there was nothing illegal in the method adopted. But even if it be assumed that the procedure adopted was illegal, it was not such an illegality as to vitiate the resolution altogether. There is no doubt that it did ascertain the views of the majority of the members who, by a proportion of 15 to 8, decided in favour of the settlement being given to the petitioner. But even if it be assumed that the procedure adopted was illegal, it was not such an illegality as to vitiate the resolution altogether. There is no doubt that it did ascertain the views of the majority of the members who, by a proportion of 15 to 8, decided in favour of the settlement being given to the petitioner. If there was any irregula­rity, it was open to the members in minority to lodge their protest, as contemplated by Rules 34 to 36. No such protest was lodged or objection made, and it was also open to them, to carry the matter to Government for annulment of the reso­lution, as contemplated by S. 84(5,) of the Act. All these, therefore, indicate that the irregularity in the procedure, if any, did not affect the validity or correctness of the resolution passed by the Board on the 30th March, 1954; or the jurisdiction of the Board to pass it, and but for the illegal steps taken by the Deputy Commissioner, possibly there would have been no occasion for the sub­sequent resolution of the Board dated 31-5-54. In­deed, the Chairman admits that the order of the Deputy Commissioner was responsible for giving a chance to the Board to reconsider the matter, irrespective of the provisions of the Statute and the Rules framed thereunder. I cannot, therefore, but hold that both the Deputy Commissioner and the Local Board have acted illegally and without jurisdiction in adopt­ing the procedure which they did. The Local Board is a statutory body functioning under the Act. The purpose of the Act is to make this body autono­mous as far as possible subject to the controls pro­vided by Chap. 5 of the Act. Except the State Government, no other officer or authority is em­powered to supersede the resolution of the Board, and the interference permissible under S. 89 is only permissible under the exceptional circum­stances mentioned therein. As noticed above, there were no such circumstances existing in the pre­sent case. I am, therefore, constrained to allow this application and to direct that a mandate should issue to the Deputy Commissioner to re­call his order, dated 5-5-54 suspending the resolu­tion of the Board, dated 30-3-54, and similarly, there should be a direction issued to the Board not to give effect to its resolution, dated 31-5-54, which is quite illegal and ultra vires. (10) The Rule is accordingly made absolute. (10) The Rule is accordingly made absolute. The petitioner is entitled to his costs: Hearing fee Rs. 100/- (11) DEKA J.: I agree. Application allowed.