Subba Rao, C.J.- This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a writ of certiorari to quash the order issued by the Registrar, High Court of Madras and given effect to by the State of Andhra, placing the petitioner under suspension from the date of the receipt of the order. The petitioner, Mohammed Ghouse, entered the Madras Judicial Service as a District Munsif in the year 1935 and was promoted to the office of Subordinate Judge in September, 1949. On the formation of the Andhra State on 1st October, 1953, he became a member of the Andhra State Judicial Service. The High Court of Madras took disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner on a charge of bribery. A Judge of the High Court was specially appointed to enquire into the allegations. The learned Judge conducted the enquiry at Vijayawada on 14th September, 1953 and 15th September, 1953 and continued the enquiry on 17th September, 1953 and 18th September, 1953, at Rajahmundry and subsequently on 20th October, 1953, at Madras. After the enquiry, the High Court issued an order placing the petitioner under suspension. The order was duly served on the petitioner on 30th January, 1954. The petitioner seeks to get the order quashed on various grounds given in the petition. Mr. Nambiar, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the High Court has no power to continue disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner after the Andhra Civil Service (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Andhra Rules) came into force on the 1st day of October, 1953, and that, thereafter, the said power was vested only in the Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings. The learned Advocate-General replied by stating that the said Rules were neither intended nor had the effect of removing the pre-existing jurisdiction from the High Court and transferring it to the Tribunal and that, even if that was the effect, it would be ultra vires of the rule-making power of the Government. The first question, therefore, is whether the Andhra Rules made any departure from those obtaining in Madras. The Madras and the Andhra Rules may be placed in juxtaposition to appreciate the difference between the two sets of rules. Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1948. 1st January, 1949. The first question, therefore, is whether the Andhra Rules made any departure from those obtaining in Madras. The Madras and the Andhra Rules may be placed in juxtaposition to appreciate the difference between the two sets of rules. Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1948. 1st January, 1949. In exercise of the powers conferred by section 241(1)(b) and 2(b) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and of all other powers hereunto enabling, His Excellency the Governor of Madras hereby makes the following rules: RULES. 1.(a) These rules may be called The Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1948. (b) They shall come into force on 1st January, 1949. (c) They shall apply to all Government servants under the administrative control of the Government. * * * * 4. The Government may, subject to the provisions of rule 5, refer to the Tribunal, (a) Cases relating to Government servants on a monthly salary of Rs. 150 and above, in respect of matters involving corruption on the part of such Government servants in the discharge of their official duties, Andhra Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1953. Kurnool October 32, 1953. No. 3. In exercise of the powers conferred by the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of the Andhra State hereby makes the following rules: RULES. 1. (a) These rules may be called The Andhra Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1953. (b) They shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st October, 1953. (c) They shall apply to all officers under the rule-making control of the State Government. * * * * 4. (1) The Government shall, subject to the provisions of rule 5, refer the following cases to the Tribunal, namely, (a) Cases relating to Government servants on a monthly salary of Rs. (c) They shall apply to all officers under the rule-making control of the State Government. * * * * 4. (1) The Government shall, subject to the provisions of rule 5, refer the following cases to the Tribunal, namely, (a) Cases relating to Government servants on a monthly salary of Rs. 150 and above in respect of matters involving corruption on the part of such Government servants in the discharge of their official duties and (b) all appeals to the Government from Government servants against disciplinary orders passed by heads of departments and other competent authorities on charges of corruption and (c) any other cases or class of cases which the Government consider, should be dealt with by the Tribunal: Provided that cases arising in the Judicial Department and against Government servants in the subordinate ranks of the Police forces of the rank of Sub-Inspector and below shall not be referred to the Tribunal. (b) all appeals or petitions to the Government against orders passed on charges of corruption and all disciplinary cases in which the Government proposes to revise original orders passed on such charges: Provided that it shall not be necessary to consult the Tribunal: (i) in any case in which the Tribunal has, at any previous stage, given advice in regard to the order to be passed and no fresh question has thereafter arisen for determination, (ii) Where the Government propose to pass-orders rejecting such appeal or petition. (2) The Government may, subject to the provisions of rule 5, also refer to the Tribunal any other case or class of cases which, they consider, should be dealt with by the Tribunal: Provided that the following cases shall-not be referred to the Tribunal namely, (i) cases arising in the Judicial Department ; (ii) Cases arising against the Government servants in the subordinate ranks of the Police forces of the rank of Sub-Inspector and below, unless the cases are against them together with officers of higher ranks. It will be seen from the aforesaid Rules that rule 4 of the Madras Rules is divided into two sub-rules 4(1) and 4(2) in the Andhra Rules. Clause(c) of rule 4 of the former is, with some modifications, enacted as sub-rule 2 in the latter. In the Andhra Rules, two new provisos are added to rule 4(1)(a) and (b). It will be seen from the aforesaid Rules that rule 4 of the Madras Rules is divided into two sub-rules 4(1) and 4(2) in the Andhra Rules. Clause(c) of rule 4 of the former is, with some modifications, enacted as sub-rule 2 in the latter. In the Andhra Rules, two new provisos are added to rule 4(1)(a) and (b). The proviso to rule 4 (c) of the Madras Rules is added as a proviso, with some verbal changes, to rule 4 (2) of the Andhra Rules. Relying upon the changes made, it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, while under rule 4 of the Madras Rules read with its proviso, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide cases arising in the Judicial Department is excluded, under rule 4(1) of the Andhra Rules by reason of the deletion of that proviso from rule 4(1) that jurisdiction is conferred on the Tribunal. He would further contend that the proviso to rule 4(2) of the Andhra Rules, having been designedly excluded from rule 4(1) and added to rule 4(2), it cannot be construed as a proviso to rule 4(1), whereas the Advocate-General would say that the Andhra Rules did not make any conscious departure from the Madras Rules and that the ambiguity, if any, that crept into the new rules would disappear if the entire scheme of the rules and the wording used is looked at from the correct perspective. After carefully going through the two sets of rules, we should think that, in attempting to draft the rules artistically some unintended and unexpected confusion was introduced. But we are satisfied that no conscious departure from the Madras Rules was intended. The two provisos added to rule 4(1) of the Andhra Rules would be inappropriate to clause (2), for the provisos enabling Government not to refer to the Tribunal cases covered by rule 4(1) in the circumstances mentioned in the provisos would be unnecessary under clause (2), for, under the said clause, it is in the discretion of the Government to refer “any other cases or class of cases” to the Tribunal. So, clause (c) of Rule 4 of the Madras Rules was enacted as clause (2). But, in so doing, the provisos to clause (c) of the Madras Rules should have been added also as a further proviso to rule 4(1) of the Andhra Rules. So, clause (c) of Rule 4 of the Madras Rules was enacted as clause (2). But, in so doing, the provisos to clause (c) of the Madras Rules should have been added also as a further proviso to rule 4(1) of the Andhra Rules. Instead, the framers added the said proviso only after rule 4 (2). As the said proviso was intended to govern the entire rule, instead of repeating it under the two sub-rules, separately, it was added as a proviso after sub-rule (2). If it is construed only as a proviso to clause (2), it would lead to the anomaly of an enquiry of a Sub-Inspector getting a salary above Rs. 150 being conducted by a Tribunal and one getting less by his superior officer. It is obvious that no such distinction was intended between Sub-Inspectors getting different scales of salary. Further, such a construction would come into conflict with the provisions of Articles 227 and 235 of the Constitution of India, whereunder the control and superintendence of all Courts is vested in the High Courts. Though ordinarily a proviso shall be read as a proviso to the rule to which it is added, having regard to the emphatic words “shall not be referred to the Tribunal” used in the proviso and also having due regard to the h1story and the object of the rule and the necessity to avoid anomalies and conflict with the provisions of the Constitution, we are prepared to read the proviso disjunctively and hold that the said proviso is a proviso for both the sub-rules of rule 4 of the Andhra Rules. If the said proviso should be read only as a proviso to sub-rule (2) with the result that the High Court has no power to make an enquiry in the exercise of its disciplinary jurisdiction over subordinate Courts, the question arises whether such a rule would conflict with the provisions of the Constitution. The relevant provisions of the Constitution may now be read: “Article 227.- Every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Article 233.- Appointments of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, District Judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. Article 233.- Appointments of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, District Judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. (2) A person not already in service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a District Judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment. Article 234.- Appointments of persons other than District Judges to the judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service, Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. Article 235.- The control over District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of District Judge shall be vested in the High Court but nothing in this Article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law. Article 309.- Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of person appointed to public services ‘and posts, in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State: Provided that it shall be competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union and for the Governor or Rajpra-mukh of a State or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under this Article, and any rule so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act.” The substance of the above Articles may be stated thus: The High Court has the power of control and superintendence over all Courts within the State. The Governor has the power to appoint, post and promote District Judges in consultation with the High Court and in the case of direct recruitment on its recommendation. He has similar power of appointment in the case of persons other than District Judges in consultation with the High Court and the State Public Service Commission. The posting and the promotion of Judges other than District Judges is vested in the High Court. In the exercise of its power of control, the High Court shall exercise its power in accordance with the conditions of service prescribed under law. The Legislature may make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to any public office. Till then, the Governor is empowered to make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed. A combined reading of the provisions would, therefore, indicate that the general control and superintendence of Courts conferred on a High Court is restricted in specified directions. It was, therefore, contended, relying on Article 235 of the Constitution, that the said power of control of the High Court over subordinate Courts is subject to the conditions of service prescribed by the Governor or the Legislature as the case may be. It was, therefore, contended, relying on Article 235 of the Constitution, that the said power of control of the High Court over subordinate Courts is subject to the conditions of service prescribed by the Governor or the Legislature as the case may be. The question, therefore, is what is the meaning to be given to the words “conditions of service” in Article 235. Should they be given a wide connotation which would exhaust the content of the power of control, or, should it be given a limited meaning so as to reconcile it with the power of control? The Judicial Committee in North West Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain1, expressed the view that the words “conditions of service” would take in circumstances under which an employer is entitled to terminate the services of an employee. A rule providing that a Government servant can only be removed after a disciplinary enquiry by a Tribunal may in a general sense be also a condition of service. So too, a rule that a judicial officer shall be under the supervision or control of a person other than a High Court. It will be equally a condition of service if a rule is framed that a judicial officer other than a District Judge is not liable to be posted, transferred or promoted except by the Government. Indeed, every condition regulating the appointment, salary, pension, promotion, removal, discipline and amenities of a servant would be a condition of service. If such a wide construction is accepted, the Article itself would become nugatory and, therefore, it should be given a limited meaning. It is, therefore, necessary to give a limited meaning, which would reconcile both parts of the Article. The clue is found in the word “deal” in Article 235. That word is more appropriate to the procedure prescribed than to the power conferred or exercised. The power is exercised in the manner prescribed by the conditions of service. The procedure cannot obviously affect the power of control but it can only regulate the manner of its exercise. So construed, a reasonable reconciliation can be effected between the two parts of the Article. To illustrate, the High Court has control and superintendence over subordinate Courts. This power necessarily implies that the High Court can take disciplinary action against Subordinate Judges in appropriate cases. So construed, a reasonable reconciliation can be effected between the two parts of the Article. To illustrate, the High Court has control and superintendence over subordinate Courts. This power necessarily implies that the High Court can take disciplinary action against Subordinate Judges in appropriate cases. The control will certainly be ineffective, if the authority exercising the control cannot take disciplinary action against a person under its control. To put it in other words, a superior authority cannot control the actions of a subordinate if he cannot take disciplinary action against him. If the argument of the petitioner is accepted, it will mean that the High Court has control over a Subordinate Judge but if he misbehaves, it is the Tribunal that makes an enquiry and it is the Government that removes him. This construction would in effect take away the subordinate officer from the control of the High Court. On the other hand, if, it is held that in exercising control, the High Court shall follow the procedure prescribed under Article 309, as a condition of service, it will reconcile both parts of the Article. The conditions of service may prescribe that no person can be removed or otherwise punished without due enquiry or in disregard of the principles of natural justice. If there is such a condition, the High Court in exercise of control under Article 235 should deal with the subordinate concerned in accordance with that condition. We would, therefore, hold that “conditions of service” in Article 235 can only mean the conditions regulating the exercise of the power of control. A condition of service, therefore, providing in effect and substance that the High Court shall not have power to take disciplinary action either in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 or under the power of control under Article 235 is constitutionally invalid. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed with costs. (Rs. 200) (Rupees two hundred only). D.L.N. -------- Application dismissed.