JUDGEMENT : CHATURVEDI, J. This is an appeal from an order made by the Additional District Judge of Ujjain refusing to appoint a receiver of the property of respondent No.2 in the suit filed by the appellants for recovery of Rs.28,298/14/- on the basis of a mortgage deed executed on 19-1-1947 by respondent No.1 in their favour. Respondent No.2 is the husband of one Basanti Devi in whose name one-fourth of the mortgaged property is alleged to have been purchased by a sale-deed dated 23-11-1947 and it is conceded that respondent No.2 is in possession of the said one-fourth portion. An application was made by the appellants on 11-4-1951 to the trial Court under O.41, R.1 for appointment of a receiver of the mortgaged property and the Court passed an order appointing a receiver for three-fourth of the mortgaged property which is in possession of the mortgagor respondent No.1, but observed that it would not be just and convenient to appoint a receiver for the property which is in possession of respondent No.2. 2. The appellants have come in appeal against this order, and the only ground advanced by Mr. Pande, learned counsel for the appellants, is that the mortgagor is heavily indebted and that interest is in arrear. Mr. Sanghi, on behalf of respondent No.2 invited our attention to the affidavit dated 10-8-1951 filed and sworn to by respondent No.1 in the Court below which stated that the market value of the mortgaged property is at least Rupees one lakh, and also to the fact that the interest from the debt does not amount to more than Rs.180/- per month while the rent fetched from the portion in possession of the receiver amounts to Rs.300/- per month. There is nothing on record to which Mr. Pande could draw our attention which may be likely to controvert these assertions. So the position is that the value of the property is sufficient to cover the debt and the rent received by the receiver is sufficient to cover the interest. The general ground on which a Court appoints a receiver is ultimately in every case the protection or preservation of property for the benefit of persons who have an interest in it -'Owen v. Homan', (1853) 4 HLC 997 (A). The general ground on which a Court appoints a receiver is ultimately in every case the protection or preservation of property for the benefit of persons who have an interest in it -'Owen v. Homan', (1853) 4 HLC 997 (A). In the case before us, by the appointment of a receiver of the three-fourth portion of the mortgaged property the interests of the appellants are already safeguarded and therefore we do not think it proper to interfere in the order passed by the learned trial Court. The wording of S.503 of the Code of 1882 relating to the appointment of a receiver was different from the wording of O.41, R.1 of the present Code. Under the present Code, the Court can appoint a receiver if it appears to it be "just and convenient" to do so. The test therefore is whether it is just as well as convenient to appoint a receiver for the one-fourth of the mortgaged property. It is obvious that the right to possession of that portion had passed to the purchaser of the equity of redemption and was not in the mortgagor on the date of the suit and the said purchaser has paid valuable consideration for it. These circumstances weighed with the trial Court in not appointing a receiver for the property in possession of respondent No.2; and, as stated above, when the appellants' interests are already safeguarded by appointing a receiver for three-fourth portion of the mortgaged property, we do not think that the discretion exercised by the trial Court was either vague, fanciful or arbitrary. 3. Considering the special circumstances of this case we do not think the rulings cited by Mr. Pande have any material bearing on the question before us. Those rulings discussed and considered the only question: whether the Court has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver in a simple mortgage suit; for, in a simple mortgage the right of the mortgagee is no more than a right to have the corpus of the mortgaged property sold by the process of a judicial sale and to look to those proceeds for his own re-imbursement of principal, interest and costs. It was held in these rulings that the Court has certainly jurisdiction to appoint a receiver in such a suit, but whether it will do so must depend upon what is just and convenient in each particular case having regard to the reason for which he is appointed, to the precise nature of the security in the particular contract whereby a simple mortgage has been created and bearing in mind the limitations imposed by sub-rule (2) of the Rule itself. Mr. Pande contended that a receiver should normally be appointed for the mortgaged property when the interest is in arrear. There is no doubt that such a principle was propounded in two rulings reported in - 'Ally Ramzan Yezdi v. Batlhazar and Son Ltd.', AIR 1936 Rang 290 (B) and - 'Venkenna v. Manzommal', AIR 1936 Rang 296 (C). In - 'Damodar Moreshwar v. Radhabai Damodar', AIR 1939 Bom 54 (D), Beaumont, C.J. doubted the proposition but expressed no definite opinion whether interest being in arrear by itself would be sufficient for the appointment of a receiver, and, the larger Full Bench in - 'Ma Hnin Yeik v. K.A.R.K. Chettyer Firm', AIR 1939 Rang 321 (E) rightly observed that it was too broad a proposition to commend itself for acceptance. It was further observed that the fact that the interest on the mortgage debt is in arrear can only be a factor in deciding whether a receiver should be appointed. The fact that security is likely for any reason to become insufficient may be another factor; but the governing words of the rule are whether it would be just and convenient and in deciding this matter due weight must be given to all relevant considerations. It will thus be clear that the question of appointment of a receiver will have to be determined on the facts of each particular case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down for all cases. Order 40 R.1 is expressed in general terms. It empowers the Court to appoint a receiver of any property whenever it appears to the Court to be just and convenient. Order 40 R.1 is expressed in general terms. It empowers the Court to appoint a receiver of any property whenever it appears to the Court to be just and convenient. Thus the discretion vested in the Court under the present Code is very wide and, in appeal, the appellant must show those special circumstances which may persuade the appellate Court to come to the conclusion that the discretion exercised by the trial Court is not exercised on well-established principles of law but has been according to the whim and caprice of the trial Judge. In this appeal, we need not reiterate that Mr. Pande has completely failed to convince us that the discretion exercised by the trial Court in this case can be said to be arbitrary or capricious. We are therefore of opinion that this appeal must fail. We dismiss it with costs. 4. NEWASKAR, J.: I agree that this appeal be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.