JUDGMENT : K.S. Govinda Pillai, J. The plaintiffs are the appellants. They were members of an undivided Nair tarwad, which became split into several branches by the partition deed Ext. A of 1st Mithunam 1102. The plaint properties were obtained by the plaintiff’s branch. The common Karnavan of the plaintiffs’ branched had executed a chitty hypothecation bond pledging the plaint properties to the predecessor-in-interest of the 2nd defendant. It was directed in Ext. A that this debt should be discharged by a branch collateral to that of the plaintiffs. The information of the plaintiffs was that the debt had been discharged by that branch. The 2nd defendant as the plaintiff, filed a suit O.S. 307 of 1109 in the Munsiff’s court, Thiruvella for the amount due under that bond. He purchased the plaint schedule properties along with other properties on 17.6.1115 in execution of the decree in that suit. The decree in that case, Ext. B, was not valid and binding on the plaintiff’s branch, as the Karnavan and the senior Anandaravan of the plaintiff’s branch had not been impleaded in that case, as provided for in S. 31 of the Nair Act. The decree and the execution proceedings were, therefore, sought to be set aside. 2. The auction-purchaser in execution of the decree Ext. B, in O.S. 307 of 1109 is the 1st defendant and her contention was that she was not aware of Ext. A partition deed of 1102. The hypothecation bond, which was the subject matter of Ext. B decree, had been executed by the common Karnavan of the tarwad. It was also contended that the debt was binding on the whole tarwad, that the decree Ext. B, was obtained against the common Karnavan and the senior member of every Thavazhi in the tarwad, that the said decree and execution proceedings, were, therefore, valid and binding on the plaintiffs and their branch, that the creditor was not to take into account any partition deed effected in the tarwad of the debtor as long as the debtor continued to be the common tarwad, that this debt was acknowledged to be a tarwad debt in the partition deed of 1102 and that the decree and the execution proceedings were, therefore, valid, and regular and not liable to be set aside. The suit, which was brought in 1118 to set aside the execution sale held in 1115, was contended to be barred by limitation. 3. The courts below have concurrently found that Ext. B decree and the proceedings taken out in execution were not liable to be set aside, that Ext. B decree was binding on the tarwad of the plaintiffs, that the same had been obtained in conformity with the provisions of S. 31 of the Nair Act, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief. The trial court held that the suit was not barred by limitation whereas the lower appellate court took a different view, that, as the suit was filed more than one year after the execution sale, it was barred under Art. 9 of the Limitation Act. 4. The debt was incurred before 1102 and the creditor had advanced the money, while the tarwad was undivided. The creditor could, therefore, consider only the entire tarwad as his debtor and he need not take into the account a partition deed entered into in the tarwad after the debt was incurred. He was not a party to that partition deed nor had he any notice of the same. S. 31 of the Nair Act enjoined that a decree, in order that it may be binding on the tarwad, should be obtained against the Karnavan as such, the senior member of the Karnavan’s Thavazhi and the senior member of every Thavazhi collateral to the Thavazhi of the Karnavan. It had been concurrently found that all the branches collateral to the Thavazhi of the Karnavan were represented in the suit by the senior Anandaravan of all those Thavazhis along with the Karnavan and the senior Anandaravan of his Thavazhi. The creditor need only look into the condition of the Tarwad at the time the debt was incurred. If that is so, he had obtained a valid decree, and no objection can be taken to it. The senior adult member in the plaintiffs’ branch at the time of Ext. B suit was the plaintiffs’ mother and she had been impleaded in the case as the 12th defendant. Admittedly, there was no adult male member then. The decree Ext. B, as it stands, would certainly be binding on the common tarwad of the plaintiffs, if it had been partitioned. B suit was the plaintiffs’ mother and she had been impleaded in the case as the 12th defendant. Admittedly, there was no adult male member then. The decree Ext. B, as it stands, would certainly be binding on the common tarwad of the plaintiffs, if it had been partitioned. The appellants’ argument was that, by a subsequent arrangement in the tarwad, the tarwad properties became split up and they went into the possession of different branches of the tarwad so that each branch constituted a tarwad and, in order that the decree may be binding on each branch, the Karnavan and senior Anandaravan of each branch were necessary parties. 5. As mentioned already, the creditor need not look into the subsequent developments in the tarwad of which he had no notice and so, he was to implead only persons competent to represent the tarwad. If the plaint properties had been alienated by the tarwad after the hypothecation bond, then certainly he would have to implead the alienee also. A partition in a tarwad is not considered to be an alienation. It only indicates an arrangement of the tarwad by which the properties held in common were distributed among the several members. At any rate, that objection also could not be taken, for, the plaint properties, which had been allotted to the plaintiffs’ branch were in the possession of the plaintiffs’ mother, who was the Karnavathi of that branch. She had also been impleaded as a defendant in Ext. B case. When a junior member institutes a suit after partition to avoid a pre-partition alienation, it had been held, that the competency of the junior member must be determined with respect to the circumstances, which were in existence at the time when the transaction, sought to be challenged, took place. If, at the time when the transaction was entered into, a member of a tarwad had the right to impugn it and show that it cannot be held to be binding on the tarwad, such a right cannot be said to have been lost by partition in the tarwad which took place later. See Kochu Pennu v. Rukmini Amma, 1946 T.L.R. 948. The decision in S.A. 415 of 1124 does not indicate a contrary view. 6. See Kochu Pennu v. Rukmini Amma, 1946 T.L.R. 948. The decision in S.A. 415 of 1124 does not indicate a contrary view. 6. If the junior member could exercise such a right, as mentioned above, there is no reason why the alienee also should not be allowed that privilege. He was, therefore, to look into the state of affairs at the time when he advanced the amount on a bond binding on the tarwad. Except that, he will have to bring on record the parties, who got possession of the properties subsequent to the security in his favour. He can maintain a suit against the tarwad ignoring the arrangement between the members of the tarwad dividing the properties. The view taken by the courts below is, therefore, correct. The decree Ext. B is valid and binding on the common tarwad and so, the plaintiffs would be governed by the one year rule to avoid the court sale so that the suit itself was barred by limitation. We, therefore, confirm the decree of the lower appellate court and dismiss the second appeal with costs. Dismissed.