Judgment This revision arises out of a suit filed by the tenant to recover the excess amount paid by him. The petitioner in this case is the landlord. The respondent was the tenant. The tenancy commenced on 15th May, 1947, with the payment of Rs. 60 as advance rent and the monthly rent was agreed at Rs. 30. Subsequently the tenant filed a petition before the Rent Controller for the fixation of fair rent. On 7th June, 1948, by an order of the Rent Controller, the rent was fixed at Rs. 6-4-0. It was taken up in appeal by the landlord and by an order dated 17th November, 1948, the rent was fixed at Rs. 8-15-0. The suit is new filed on 13th November, 1951, for recovering the excess amount that he paid. In the lower Court it was agreed that the period for which the excess amount was to be recovered was from 15th May, 1947, to 27th May, 1948. Among the several pleas that were taken by the landlord one was the plea of limitation. It was contended before the lower Court that Article 62 of the Limitation Act applied to the case under which the limitation is three years from the date the money is received. The lower Court has held that it was not Article 62 butArticle 120 that applies to the case. Mr. Srinivasa Ayyar appearing for the petitioner, that is the landlord, contends that the proper Article that is applicable is Article 62 and not Article 120 of the Limitation Act. In support of his contention he relies on a Bench decision of this Court reported in The India Sugars and Refineries, Ltd. v. The Municipal Council, Hospet1, which has been followed and approved in Amritsar Municipality v. Amar Dass2. In the Madras case the facts were that a company was started to build a sugar factory in October, 1933, and profession tax was levied on the company from the half year ending 31st March, 1934, onwards and the plaintiff company did not start the manufacture of sugar till the beginning of 1935. Profession tax was levied by the Municipal Council from October 1933 to September, 1937. It was held that so far as the tax levied for the first half year ending 31st March, 1934, it was barred by limitation applying Article 62 of the Limitation Act. Wadsworth. Profession tax was levied by the Municipal Council from October 1933 to September, 1937. It was held that so far as the tax levied for the first half year ending 31st March, 1934, it was barred by limitation applying Article 62 of the Limitation Act. Wadsworth. and Patanjali Sastri, JJ., observed: "Article 62 is intended to apply to all actions for money had and received to the use of the plaintiff whether they be actions which may be deemed strictly to be based on implied contracts or whether they be merely to enforce an equitable claim to the return of the money had and received. We therefore agree with the learned District Judge that the claim in so far as it relates to the first year’s profession tax is barred by limitation. We may add that a similar view has been taken in Taluk Board of Devakotta v. Chockkalingam Chettiar1, following the reasoning in Municipal Council Dindigul v. Bombay Company Ltd., Madras2." This decision has been followed in the Punjab High Court reported in Amritsar Municipality v. Amur Dass3. Kapur, J., after referring to Mahomed Wahib v. Mahomed Ameer4 has quoted the observations of Mukerjee, J., viz., "It seems to me to be clear as pointed out by Markby, J., in Raghumoni Audhikary v. Nilmoni Singh Deo5, that the Article when it speaks of a suit for money received by the defendant for the plaintiff’s use, points to the well known English action in that form; consequently the Article ought to apply wherever the defendant had received money which in justice and equity belongs to the plaintiff under circumstances which in law render the receipt of it, a receipt by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff. As pointed out by Lord Mansfield, C.J., in Moses v. Macferlane6, this form of action lies for money paid by mistake or upon a consideration which happens to fail, or for money got through imposition (express) or implied or extortion or oppression or an undue advantage taken of the plaintiff’s situation contrary to laws made for the protection of persons (Italics are mine). Under those circumstances in other words, this form of action would be maintainable in cases in which the defendant at the time of receipt, in fact or by presumption or by fiction of law receives the money to the use of the plaintiffs ". Under those circumstances in other words, this form of action would be maintainable in cases in which the defendant at the time of receipt, in fact or by presumption or by fiction of law receives the money to the use of the plaintiffs ". In this case it is clear that the landlord has, undoubtedly, taken an undue advantage of the plaintiff’s situation contrary to the laws contained in the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act which was meant for the protection of the tenants. It will therefore fall within the scope of the observations cited above and the defendant must be held to have received the money for the plaintiff’s use. The Article that would be applicable is, therefore, Article 62 of the Limitation Act and not Article 120. The suit is barred by limitation and is therefore dismissed. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed with costs here and in the lower Court. R.M. ----- Petition allowed.