Judgment This is a revision petition filed by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 19 of 1946 in which the learned Subordinate Judge of Ramanathapuram, Sri Imamuddin, in his judgment dated 14th August, 1947, found a wakfnama, dated 1st April, 1945, purporting to be executed by the plaintiff’s deceased brother, Imar Sahib, to be a forgery. This finding was confirmed in appeal by Subba Rao, J. and Somasundaram, J., in Appeal No. 124 of 1948. More than three months after the disposal of the suit, the petitioner filed M.P. No. 159 of 1947 on 19th November, 1947, under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, for a complaint being laid against his brother’s son Mahammad, second defendant and eight others, including the writer and five attestors. This petition appears to have been filed after Mr. Imamuddin was transferred from the Sub-Court, Ramnad, on 12th September, 1947 and to have remained there in cold storage till after the disposal of the appeal by the High Court, after which it was taken up for hearing by Sri M. V. Harihara Ayyar, the then Subordinate Judge, who on 13th December, 1950, directed a complaint to be laid against seven persons, namely, the second defendant, and the writer and the attestors who had given evidence for offences of forgery and perjury. In appeal the learned District Judge of Ramanathapuram, now Ramaswami, J., in a very elaborate judgment covering seventeen printed pages did not consider it expedient in the interests of justice that a complaint, should be launched. This revision petition against that judgment filed in 1951 regretably comes up for hearing now, more than seven years after the disposal of the suit in relation to the trial of which forgery and perjury are alleged to have been committed. "I certainly see no grounds for interfering in revision. The petition however raises for consideration the legality of the procedure adopted in the present case and the scope of section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, in its application to complaints of this kind. "I certainly see no grounds for interfering in revision. The petition however raises for consideration the legality of the procedure adopted in the present case and the scope of section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, in its application to complaints of this kind. There appears to be a notion prevalent that at any time after judgment is pronounced in a suit a party may move the Court to lay complaints under section 476 and that a Court irrespective of the fact whether the presiding officer is the judge who actually disposed of that suit, should go again into the merits and come to the finding required by this section as to whether it is expedient in the interests of justice that an enquiry should be made into offences of perjury or forgery, which came to notice during the trial of the suit. This is in my view an entirely erroneous conception of the scope of section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, which in relation to offences such as perjury, or forgery on which the trial Court has given its finding requires the judge who has tried the case to record the finding required under section 476 and to lay the complaint. As I read section 476(1), the responsibility in this category of cases primarily rests on the Court, though it may also be moved to do so by an application. Section 476(1) is very wide in its scope and includes offences not actually committed such as perjury in the presence of the Court during trial but also offences committed in relation to Court proceedings outside the Court, for instance, that considered by a full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bahadur v. Eradatullah Mallaick1. That was a case in which a judgment-creditor brought to the notice of the munsif on the 23rd December, 1908, the fact of resistance to the attachment of moveables in execution of his decree and the Munsif called upon the opposite party to show cause. But his successor after holding a preliminary enquiry under section 476 of the Code ordered prosecution on 6th October, 1909 for offences under sections 183, 186 and 353 of the Penal Code. But his successor after holding a preliminary enquiry under section 476 of the Code ordered prosecution on 6th October, 1909 for offences under sections 183, 186 and 353 of the Penal Code. It was held that the order was not without jurisdiction and that the word "Court" in section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, included the successor of the Judge to whose notice the commission of it was brought in the course of a judicial proceeding. It is clear that in cases under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, the Judge who passed the final order under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, sometimes cannot and also need not in strict law be the Judge in office at the time the offence appeared to have been committed in relation to a Court proceeding. When however the offence contemplated by section 476 is committed in the course of or in relation to the trial of a suit and brought to the notice of a judge who gives his finding in his judgment as to whether a document is a forgery and whether the testimony given by witnesses before him is false, it is not only desirable but expedient from all standpoints that it is the Judge who disposed of the case who should ordinarily decide whether it is expedient in the interests of justice 10 lay a complaint under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code. In Rahimatulla Sahib v. Emperor2, a Full Bench of this Court, Sir Arnold White, C.J. and Wallis, J., with Miller, J., dissenting, took the view that it was the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 476 that "an order under this section should be made either at the close of the proceedings or so shortly thereafter that it may reasonably be said that the order is part of the proceedings." In that case a Magistrate acting suo motu ordered the prosecution of the petitioner under section 211, Indian Penal Code, on the 3rd November, 1906, for filing a false complaint after the District Magistrate refused in revision to set aside the Magistrate’s order discharging the accused. Miller, J., in his dissenting judgment found himself unable to agree to the broad proposition the Full Bench laid down who quoted with approval a ruling by Davies and Boddam, JJ., that a magistrate has no power to act suo motu under section 476 after the case before his predecessor has been closed without any action being taken under that section. A similar view was indicated in In re Subbaraya Vadhyar3to the effect that the language of section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, warranted and provides for immediate action. Miller, J., while indicating his agreement with In re Subbaraya Vadhyar3expressed his inability to go further and to hold that the section either expressly or impliedly excluded action taken after the close of the proceedings in the course of which the offence was comnutted or brought to notice. He took the view that there was nothing in this section to indicate that the opinion in all cases had to be formed as soon as the offence was committed. An illustration he gave was of a Court some days or weeks alter trying and deciding a suit before it discovering perhaps in the trial of another suit, that the plaintiff or a witness in the former suit has been guilty of gross perjury or of using as genuine a forged document. He posed the pertinent query “Is the Court to be helpless in such a case? Must the offender go unpunished unless the opposite party (who it may be has obtained a decree in his favour on a point of law and is satisfied therewith) chooses to apply for sanction to institute proceedings or unless the Judge himself goes down to the Magistrate’s Court and makes and swears to a complaint.” That decision was however confined to a Court taking suo motu action some time after the proceedings had been closed. In a Fuller Bench of five Judges in Aiyakannu Pillai v. Emperor1, Miller, J., again dissenting, the same view was taken that the power conferred by section 476 can be exercised by the Court only in the course of the judicial proceeding, or at its conclusion or so shortly thereafter as to make it really the continuation of the same proceeding in the course of which the offence is committed. This view, by which I am bound, appears to curtail the powers of a Court acting suo motu under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code and although material may come to its notice in subsequent judicial proceedings which show that either perjury or forgery has been committed by a party in relation to earlier proceedings which have been closed, the Court which has this material both past and present in its possession appears to be precluded from filing any complaint suo motu under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code. The category of cases however with which this revision petition is concerned one of frequent occurrence, is confined to materials placed before the trying Judge himself in the trial of the suit. As I see it, it is primarily his duty and responsibility to decide suo motu at the time of judgment whether it is a fit case in which it is expedient in the interests of justice to lay a complaint. I need searcely say that it is always in the interests of justice for a Court to lay such a complaint if the nature of the evidence is prima facie sufficient to warrant a criminal conviction as otherwise a premium would-be put on these offences being committed with impunity in relation to civil justice. The point arises whether in such cases it is open to a party to file petitions for action under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code several weeks or months after the suit has been terminated, sometimes as in the present case after the Judge who tried the suit no longer presides over the Court. The view that I have no hesitation in taking is that the principle laid down in Rahimatulla Sahib v. Emperor2and Aiyakannu Pillai v. Emperor1should be applied to cases of this type and such petitions when made under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, must be deemed to be within the scope of the suit itself. Sri Gopalaswami Ayyangar for the petitioner has urged that it is not possible for a decision to be taken whether to file such a petition or not under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, in anticipation of the finding of the trial judge and that it is necessary for a copy of the judgment to be obtained and studied, before such a decision can be taken. I can see no substance in this contention. I can see no substance in this contention. Presumably during the trial of the suit and in the course of arguments thereon, the document in question has been vigorously challenged as a forgery and also evidence given sought to be made the subject of a complaint for perjury vigorously attacked as false at the trial. Mr. Ethiraj who appears for the respondents and also the learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. V.T. Rangaswami Ayyangar, who was given notice on this petition both agree that in cases of this type coming within the broader scope of section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, there is no legal impediment whatsoever to counsel at the time of arguments asking the Court in the event of its finding the document to be a forgery or the evidence of certain witnesses to be perjured to take action under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code or even to their filing petitions tor such action to be taken before judgment in the suit. The defendant may ask in his written statement for judgment in his favour on the basis of the suit document being a forgery. He can also ask for penal costs under section 35-A. There is so far as I can see nothing to prevent him from asking the Court to sanction the prosecution of those responsible for the forgery in anticipation of judgment. What must be strongly deprecated and discouraged is the filing of these petitions several months after judgment. It is bad enough for the trial Judge to go back into the facts of a case he has closed. Nor is such a petition complimentary to the trial Judge himself, suggestive as it is that he has not done his duty in laying a complaint for forgery or perjury suo motu at the time of judgment, which he was obviously competent to do. That a judge who has not tried the suit should deal with an application in cases such as this under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, is one which should if possible, be avoided at all costs. The party to the suit has every opportunity on the material in the suit itself during the trial or immediately after judgment to move the Court that is the judge, who disposed of the suit, to take immediate action under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code. There is another aspect of the matter from the standpoint of the appellate Court. The party to the suit has every opportunity on the material in the suit itself during the trial or immediately after judgment to move the Court that is the judge, who disposed of the suit, to take immediate action under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code. There is another aspect of the matter from the standpoint of the appellate Court. It is absolutely necessary that the trial Court should make up its mind and dispose of an application under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, as a continuation of the suit itself so that when the matter comes up in appeal there can be a final adjudication both of the suit, and the laying of a complaint under section 476, the trial of which is invariably stayed pending disposal of the appeal. I cannot deprecate too strongly the procedure in the present case which has resulted in this application under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, being kept in cold storage pending the disposal of the appeal with, it would appear, the appellate Court being in complete ignorance as to such an application having been made. The result has been a third cycle of litigation in appeal and revision in the matter of the application under section 47b, Criminal Procedure Code. I think that in this category of cases within the wider scope of section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, the principle laid down in Rahimatulla Sahib v. Emperor1, and Aiyakannu Pillai v. Emperor2should be applied not only to Judges and Magistrates acting suo motu after proceedings have been closed, but also to applications by parties under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, which must be moved by a party to the suit before or immediately after judgment. The petition is dismissed, without in the circumstances any order as to costs. K.C. ----- Petition dismissed.