K. Nagarathnammal v. S. Ibrahim Saheb — 1954 DIGILAW 503 (MAD)

Balakrishna Ayyar, J.-On 24th March, 1950, Komaravelu Pillai, the permanent hereditary karnam of the village of Thadikombu in Dindigul taluk died leaving him surviving a widow by name Nagarathnammal and a minor son, Vellaswami aged about 12 years. By an order made on 4th September, 1950, the Sub-Collector Dindigul, registered Vellaswami as the permanent karnam and appointed one Ibrahim Saheb to be his deputy during the period of his minority. Against this order appointing Ibrahim Saheb as deputy, Nagarathnammal, preferred an appeal to the District Collector, Mathurai. Her prayer to the Sub-Collector appears to have been that one Nagaratnam, a relation of hers, should be appointed deputy By an order, dated 28th October, 1950, the District Collector set aside the appointment of Ibrahim Saheb on the ground that it was undesirable to appoint a Muslim as deputy of a Hindu minor. As Nagarathnammal had intimated that she was willing to nominate Nagaratnam, the District Collector directed the Sub-Collector to examine the qualifications of the nominee and to appoint him if he was found suitable. Ibrahim Saheb thereupon filed a revision petition to the Board of Revenue. Nagarathnammal appeared by counsel before the Board and raised the objection that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Collector. But by its order, dated 25th April, 1951, the Board overruled the objection of Nagarathnammal to its jurisdiction and set aside the order of the Collector and confirmed the appointment of Ibrahim Saheb as deputy. Nagarathnammal then preferred a revision petition to the Government, and the Government allowed the petition without notice to Ibrahim Saheb who thereupon came to this Court by a Writ Petition No 173 of 1952 calling in question the order of the Government on the ground that it was passed without notice to him and therefore in contravention of the principles of natural justice. The writ petition was allowed on that ground and the matter remitted to Government for fresh disposal in accordance with law. When the matter thus went back to the Government, they took the view that they had no revisional powers and declined to interfere. The result was that the order of the Board appointing Ibrahim Saheb as deputy stood. The writ petition was allowed on that ground and the matter remitted to Government for fresh disposal in accordance with law. When the matter thus went back to the Government, they took the view that they had no revisional powers and declined to interfere. The result was that the order of the Board appointing Ibrahim Saheb as deputy stood. Nagarathnammal has therefore come to this Court with this petition to quash the order of the Board on the ground, that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the District Collector. That petition came on in the first instance before one of us, namely Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. He observed: “The question, therefore, is whether the Board of Revenue have or have not the power of revision which they have purported to exercise in their order now impugned, dated 25th April, 1951. There are two decisions of this Court both of them of Benches which have a bearing upon this question, the first one being Seshagiri Sarma v. State of Madras1, and the other which is still unreported being one rendered in L.P.A.No.225 of 1952 . In the earlier decision the learned Chief Justice and Venkatarama Aiyar, J., have taken the view that the Board of Revenue have no revisional powers over Collectors in respect of their judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the latter case, a directly opposite conclusion was reached by Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ. It is possible that there might be some small points of difference or distinction between the present case and those dealt with by the two judgments but I do not think that without preferring the one decision to the other the present writ can be disposed of. The proper course, it appears to me to follow, is to place the papers before my Lord the Chief Justice for directions either to refer the case to a Bench or to a Full Bench for resolving the conflict between these two Bench decisions and there will be a direction accordingly.” That is how. the matter now comes before us. The question we have to decide is whether the Board of Revenue has power to interfere with an order made by the the District Collector under section 10(5) of Madras Act III of 1895-the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895-appointing a deputy to a post registered in the name of a minor. the matter now comes before us. The question we have to decide is whether the Board of Revenue has power to interfere with an order made by the the District Collector under section 10(5) of Madras Act III of 1895-the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895-appointing a deputy to a post registered in the name of a minor. To answer this question it is necessary at the outset to examine the statutes that have a bearing on the powers of the Board and the Collector. The earliest of these is Regulation I of 1803. Up to that time the Board had a considerable amount of judicial authority in the determination of certain cases of a civil nature. The Regulation formally abrogated this judicial authority of the Board of Revenue in those districts where Zilla Courts had been established. Thereafter the preamble proceeds to state the further object of the Regulation: “and whereas it is important..............that the powers and authorities entrusted to the said Board of Revenue in respect of the executive administration of the revenues, should be defined and published ;” These words make it plain that the intention of the Regulation was to define the power of the Board in so far as it related to the executive administration of the revenues. Section 4 of the Regulation specifies the duties of the Board to be “the general superintendence of the revenues from whatever source they may arise.” Section 5 runs: “The Board of Revenue have had, and are hereby declared, to have authority to superintend and control all persons employed in the executive administration of the public revenue........as far as the said superintendence and control may relate to the executive administration of the revenue under the Regulations now enacted, or to be hereafter enacted.” It will be noticed that the section, though it confers on the Board power and authority to superintend and control all persons employed in the executive administration of the public revenues, imposes one important qualification thereon, and it is this: the power of superintendence and control is limited to the executive administration of the revenue. In other words, under the guise of superintendence and control of persons employed in the executive administration of the revenue, the Board cannot give instructions to them in respect of other matters ; as for instance the spread of literacy. In other words, under the guise of superintendence and control of persons employed in the executive administration of the revenue, the Board cannot give instructions to them in respect of other matters ; as for instance the spread of literacy. Section 33 of the Regulation explicitly places on the Board of Revenue the responsibility of seeing that the executive officers employed under it discharge their duties diligently. The section runs: “The Board of Revenue shall be responsible that the executive officers employed under them discharge the duties of their respective stations with assiduity, and shall require them to pay a ready and implicit obedience to all orders and regulations, and shall punish neglect in the subordinate officers of revenue, at their discretion, according to the powers vested in them for that purpose.” While fixing responsibility on the Board for maintaining discipline among the officers subordinate to it, the requisite power to discharge responsibility is also conferred on the Board by empowering it to punish the officers subordinate to it. The limitation on this power is the requirement that it shall be exercised according to the powers vested in them for that purpose" which might be by statute or rule or otherwise. We have next Regulation II of 1803. The Preamble recites: " and whereas the said system (the system of internal Government established for the administration of the public revenue) further requires that the power and authority heretofore vested in the immediate Collectors of the revenue should be curtailed; wherefore, the following Regulation has been passed for the purpose of defining the authority committed to Collectors, and for describing the modes of procedure, required in the discharge of their duty."/p> Section 5 states: "Collectors shall be under the immediate control of the Board of Revenue, and shall obey all orders communicated to them by the authority of that Board" Section 9 enacts: "Collectors have had, and are hereby declared to have, authority to superintend and control, under the orders of the Board of Revenue, all persons employed in the executive administration of the public revenue............as far as the said superintendence and control may relate to the executive administration of the revenue under the regulations now enacted, or to be hereafter enacted." It will be noticed that this section is practically the same as section 5 of Regulation. I of 1803 with the "Collectors" taking the place of the "Board". I of 1803 with the "Collectors" taking the place of the "Board". The next Regulation that has to be referred to is Regulation VII of 1828. It is. headed: "A Regulation for declaring the powers of Subordinate and Assistant Collectors in charge of particular divisions of districts and for facilitating proceedings under Regulation IX, 1822." The Preamble runs: "Whereas the efficient discharge of the functions of Collectors requires that Subordinate and Assistant Collectors should be empowered to exercise within their divisions all the powers of the Collector, but subject, nevertheless, to their revision and correction." The first paragraph of section 3 states: "A Subordinate or Assistant Collector in charge of a particular division of a district shall ex officio have authority to exercise within the division under his charge all the powers granted to Collectors by the Regulation now in force, or that may be hereafter enacted unless the contrary shall be expressly declared in any Regulation." We would emphasise the last words of the section - " unless the contrary shall be expressly declared in any Regulation"-which mean that, in the absence of express provision to, the contrary, all the powers conferred by any statute on a Collector may be exercised within the limits of his territorial jurisdiction by a Sub-Collector or Assistant Collector in charge of a division. But the powers so granted are subject to the control of the District Collector-a control very comprehensive in its scope. The third paragraph of section 3 makes this unmistakably plain: " The proceedings of Subordinate and Assistant Collectors acting under the preceding clause shall be subject, in all cases, and in the fullest manner to the superintendence, control and revision of the Collector, who shall have power either to direct, generally, that the proceedings of any of his Subordinates or Assistants shall be regularly submitted to himself before the decision order or sentence is carried into execution, and to confirm, modify or annul them, or issue any further orders in the cases, as he may see fit ; or in any particular case to direct that the decision, order or sentence of any of his Subordinates or Assistants shall not be carried into execution and to pass such further orders as he may see fit. " It will be appreciated that the scheme of these Regulations is this. " It will be appreciated that the scheme of these Regulations is this. The duty and the responsibility for the executive administration of the revenue is placed squarely on the Board and it is given the power to discharge that responsibility by punishing those who neglect their duties. In like manner so far as his district is concerned, the responsibility is placed on the Collector ; but in order to enable him to discharge his duties, he is given a plenary power of control and superintendence over his Subordinate and Assistant Collectors. It will be noticed that the third paragraph of section 3 of Regulation VII of 1828 states that the proceedings of the Subordinate and Assistant Collectors shall be subject, in all cases, and in the fullest manner to the superintendence, control and revision of the Collector. He has been given power to require Sub-Collectors and Assistant Collectors to submit to him their proceedings before they are given effect to and he is given power to confirm, modify or annul their decisions. At the bottom of the revenue hierarchy are the village officers. So far as they are concerned their appointment, removal, etc., are governed by two statutes. One is Act II of 1894 which deals, generally speaking, with village establishments in zamindaries. With that Act we are not here concerned. The other is Act III of 1893 which deals with village establishments in ryotwari areas. section 3 of this Act enumerates the village offices to which it applies, and the enumeration includes village munsifs and karnams. One is Act II of 1894 which deals, generally speaking, with village establishments in zamindaries. With that Act we are not here concerned. The other is Act III of 1893 which deals with village establishments in ryotwari areas. section 3 of this Act enumerates the village offices to which it applies, and the enumeration includes village munsifs and karnams. The first paragraph of section 10 provides: “When a vacancy occurs in any of the village officers forming class (1) in section 3, the Collector shall fill up the vacancy in accordance with the provisions of the following sub-sections.” One of these is Sub-section (2) which says: “The succession shall devolve on a single heir according to the general custom and rule of primogeniture governing succession to impartible zamindaries in Southern India.” Sub-section (5) provides: “When the person who would otherwise be entitled to succeed to an office is a minor the Collector shall register the minor as the heir of the last holder and appoint some other person qualified under sub-section(1) to discharge the duties of the office until the person registered as heir, on attaining majority, or within three years thereafter, is qualified under sub-section(1) to discharge the duties of the office himself, when he shall be appointed thereto.” Under section 13 any person who considers that he is entitled to any of the offices specified in section 3 may sue before the Collector to establish his right to the office. Under section 23, an appeal lies to the District Collector from every decision given by the Collector under section 13 and to the Board of Revenue if the decree was made by the District Collector. In certain cases a second appeal is also provided for. Under section 7(b), the Collector is given power to fine, suspend, dismiss or remove village officers. Under sub-section (2) the Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar is also given certain punitive powers though they are of a more limited kind. In respect of every punishment imposed under section 7 by the Collector, an appeal lies to the District Collector, and, in certain cases, to the Board of Revenue. But what has to be noticed - and that is the point we desire to emphasise here - is that no appeal is provided for from an order made under section 10(5). In respect of every punishment imposed under section 7 by the Collector, an appeal lies to the District Collector, and, in certain cases, to the Board of Revenue. But what has to be noticed - and that is the point we desire to emphasise here - is that no appeal is provided for from an order made under section 10(5). Village Officers in the State fall into two broad categories: those in respect of whom there is specific statutory provision and those for whom there is no such provision. In the case of certain specified village offices in ryotwari areas, claims to them by way of hereditary right are recognised by statute, which confers some special rights on the claimants to and incumbents of such offices. If the claim which such a person thinks he has to a particular office is not conceded, he can maintain a suit before the Collector to establish his claim. From the decision of the Collector, an appeal and in certain cases, a second appeal lies. Village officers who are not governed by these statutes have no such right. A village officer to whom Act II of 1894 or Act III of 1895 applies cannot be punished except in the manner provided for by the Acts; and when he is punished, he has got a right of appeal as provided in the Acts. To put it in another way, holders of offices governed by Act II of 1894 or Act III of 1895 cannot in relation to their offices be dealt with except in the manner provided by the relevant statute. Neither the Revenue Divisional Officer nor the District Collector nor the Board can touch them except In the manner that the statute permits. The other village officers, that is to say, village officers not governed by either of those Acts are not in so fortified a position. They are under the superintendence and control of the District Collector, the Board and the Government just like other Government servants. We will next examine the case-law on the subject. The earliest of the decisions cited before us is reported in Subha Rao v. Secretary of state1. The facts there were these: “The plaintiff was a karnam of the ryotwari village of Voonagatla. On 4th October, 1921, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Ellore, dismissed him. We will next examine the case-law on the subject. The earliest of the decisions cited before us is reported in Subha Rao v. Secretary of state1. The facts there were these: “The plaintiff was a karnam of the ryotwari village of Voonagatla. On 4th October, 1921, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Ellore, dismissed him. He appealed to the District Collector who modified the order into one of suspension for one year. He preferred a second appeal to the Board of Revenue, the result of which was that the Board on 8th July, 1922, restored the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer dismissing him. The plaintiff maintained that that order was ultra vires and invalid. The above proceedings were then taken under Act III of 1895. The original dismissal was under section 7 and the appeals were under section 23.” Balakrishna Ayyar, J.-On 24th March, 1950, Komaravelu Pillai, the permanent hereditary karnam of the village of Thadikombu in Dindigul taluk died leaving him surviving a widow by name Nagarathnammal and a minor son, Vellaswami aged about 12 years. By an order made on 4th September, 1950, the Sub-Collector Dindigul, registered Vellaswami as the permanent karnam and appointed one Ibrahim Saheb to be his deputy during the period of his minority. Against this order appointing Ibrahim Saheb as deputy, Nagarathnammal, preferred an appeal to the District Collector, Mathurai. Her prayer to the Sub-Collector appears to have been that one Nagaratnam, a relation of hers, should be appointed deputy By an order, dated 28th October, 1950, the District Collector set aside the appointment of Ibrahim Saheb on the ground that it was undesirable to appoint a Muslim as deputy of a Hindu minor. As Nagarathnammal had intimated that she was willing to nominate Nagaratnam, the District Collector directed the Sub-Collector to examine the qualifications of the nominee and to appoint him if he was found suitable. Ibrahim Saheb thereupon filed a revision petition to the Board of Revenue. Nagarathnammal appeared by counsel before the Board and raised the objection that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Collector. But by its order, dated 25th April, 1951, the Board overruled the objection of Nagarathnammal to its jurisdiction and set aside the order of the Collector and confirmed the appointment of Ibrahim Saheb as deputy. Nagarathnammal appeared by counsel before the Board and raised the objection that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Collector. But by its order, dated 25th April, 1951, the Board overruled the objection of Nagarathnammal to its jurisdiction and set aside the order of the Collector and confirmed the appointment of Ibrahim Saheb as deputy. Nagarathnammal then preferred a revision petition to the Government, and the Government allowed the petition without notice to Ibrahim Saheb who thereupon came to this Court by a Writ Petition No 173 of 1952 calling in question the order of the Government on the ground that it was passed without notice to him and therefore in contravention of the principles of natural justice. The writ petition was allowed on that ground and the matter remitted to Government for fresh disposal in accordance with law. When the matter thus went back to the Government, they took the view that they had no revisional powers and declined to interfere. The result was that the order of the Board appointing Ibrahim Saheb as deputy stood. Nagarathnammal has therefore come to this Court with this petition to quash the order of the Board on the ground, that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the District Collector. That petition came on in the first instance before one of us, namely Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. He observed: “The question, therefore, is whether the Board of Revenue have or have not the power of revision which they have purported to exercise in their order now impugned, dated 25th April, 1951. There are two decisions of this Court both of them of Benches which have a bearing upon this question, the first one being Seshagiri Sarma v. State of Madras1, and the other which is still unreported being one rendered in L.P.A.No.225 of 1952 . In the earlier decision the learned Chief Justice and Venkatarama Aiyar, J., have taken the view that the Board of Revenue have no revisional powers over Collectors in respect of their judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the latter case, a directly opposite conclusion was reached by Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ. In the earlier decision the learned Chief Justice and Venkatarama Aiyar, J., have taken the view that the Board of Revenue have no revisional powers over Collectors in respect of their judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the latter case, a directly opposite conclusion was reached by Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ. It is possible that there might be some small points of difference or distinction between the present case and those dealt with by the two judgments but I do not think that without preferring the one decision to the other the present writ can be disposed of. The proper course, it appears to me to follow, is to place the papers before my Lord the Chief Justice for directions either to refer the case to a Bench or to a Full Bench for resolving the conflict between these two Bench decisions and there will be a direction accordingly.” That is how. the matter now comes before us. The question we have to decide is whether the Board of Revenue has power to interfere with an order made by the the District Collector under section 10(5) of Madras Act III of 1895-the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895-appointing a deputy to a post registered in the name of a minor. To answer this question it is necessary at the outset to examine the statutes that have a bearing on the powers of the Board and the Collector. The earliest of these is Regulation I of 1803. Up to that time the Board had a considerable amount of judicial authority in the determination of certain cases of a civil nature. The Regulation formally abrogated this judicial authority of the Board of Revenue in those districts where Zilla Courts had been established. Thereafter the preamble proceeds to state the further object of the Regulation: “and whereas it is important..............that the powers and authorities entrusted to the said Board of Revenue in respect of the executive administration of the revenues, should be defined and published ;” These words make it plain that the intention of the Regulation was to define the power of the Board in so far as it related to the executive administration of the revenues. Section 4 of the Regulation specifies the duties of the Board to be “the general superintendence of the revenues from whatever source they may arise.” Section 5 runs: “The Board of Revenue have had, and are hereby declared, to have authority to superintend and control all persons employed in the executive administration of the public revenue........as far as the said superintendence and control may relate to the executive administration of the revenue under the Regulations now enacted, or to be hereafter enacted.” It will be noticed that the section, though it confers on the Board power and authority to superintend and control all persons employed in the executive administration of the public revenues, imposes one important qualification thereon, and it is this: the power of superintendence and control is limited to the executive administration of the revenue. In other words, under the guise of superintendence and control of persons employed in the executive administration of the revenue, the Board cannot give instructions to them in respect of other matters ; as for instance the spread of literacy. Section 33 of the Regulation explicitly places on the Board of Revenue the responsibility of seeing that the executive officers employed under it discharge their duties diligently. The section runs: “The Board of Revenue shall be responsible that the executive officers employed under them discharge the duties of their respective stations with assiduity, and shall require them to pay a ready and implicit obedience to all orders and regulations, and shall punish neglect in the subordinate officers of revenue, at their discretion, according to the powers vested in them for that purpose.” While fixing responsibility on the Board for maintaining discipline among the officers subordinate to it, the requisite power to discharge responsibility is also conferred on the Board by empowering it to punish the officers subordinate to it. The limitation on this power is the requirement that it shall be exercised according to the powers vested in them for that purpose" which might be by statute or rule or otherwise. We have next Regulation II of 1803. The limitation on this power is the requirement that it shall be exercised according to the powers vested in them for that purpose" which might be by statute or rule or otherwise. We have next Regulation II of 1803. The Preamble recites: " and whereas the said system (the system of internal Government established for the administration of the public revenue) further requires that the power and authority heretofore vested in the immediate Collectors of the revenue should be curtailed; wherefore, the following Regulation has been passed for the purpose of defining the authority committed to Collectors, and for describing the modes of procedure, required in the discharge of their duty."/p> Section 5 states: "Collectors shall be under the immediate control of the Board of Revenue, and shall obey all orders communicated to them by the authority of that Board" Section 9 enacts: "Collectors have had, and are hereby declared to have, authority to superintend and control, under the orders of the Board of Revenue, all persons employed in the executive administration of the public revenue............as far as the said superintendence and control may relate to the executive administration of the revenue under the regulations now enacted, or to be hereafter enacted." It will be noticed that this section is practically the same as section 5 of Regulation. I of 1803 with the "Collectors" taking the place of the "Board". The next Regulation that has to be referred to is Regulation VII of 1828. It is. I of 1803 with the "Collectors" taking the place of the "Board". The next Regulation that has to be referred to is Regulation VII of 1828. It is. headed: "A Regulation for declaring the powers of Subordinate and Assistant Collectors in charge of particular divisions of districts and for facilitating proceedings under Regulation IX, 1822." The Preamble runs: "Whereas the efficient discharge of the functions of Collectors requires that Subordinate and Assistant Collectors should be empowered to exercise within their divisions all the powers of the Collector, but subject, nevertheless, to their revision and correction." The first paragraph of section 3 states: "A Subordinate or Assistant Collector in charge of a particular division of a district shall ex officio have authority to exercise within the division under his charge all the powers granted to Collectors by the Regulation now in force, or that may be hereafter enacted unless the contrary shall be expressly declared in any Regulation." We would emphasise the last words of the section - " unless the contrary shall be expressly declared in any Regulation"-which mean that, in the absence of express provision to, the contrary, all the powers conferred by any statute on a Collector may be exercised within the limits of his territorial jurisdiction by a Sub-Collector or Assistant Collector in charge of a division. But the powers so granted are subject to the control of the District Collector-a control very comprehensive in its scope. The third paragraph of section 3 makes this unmistakably plain: " The proceedings of Subordinate and Assistant Collectors acting under the preceding clause shall be subject, in all cases, and in the fullest manner to the superintendence, control and revision of the Collector, who shall have power either to direct, generally, that the proceedings of any of his Subordinates or Assistants shall be regularly submitted to himself before the decision order or sentence is carried into execution, and to confirm, modify or annul them, or issue any further orders in the cases, as he may see fit ; or in any particular case to direct that the decision, order or sentence of any of his Subordinates or Assistants shall not be carried into execution and to pass such further orders as he may see fit. " It will be appreciated that the scheme of these Regulations is this. " It will be appreciated that the scheme of these Regulations is this. The duty and the responsibility for the executive administration of the revenue is placed squarely on the Board and it is given the power to discharge that responsibility by punishing those who neglect their duties. In like manner so far as his district is concerned, the responsibility is placed on the Collector ; but in order to enable him to discharge his duties, he is given a plenary power of control and superintendence over his Subordinate and Assistant Collectors. It will be noticed that the third paragraph of section 3 of Regulation VII of 1828 states that the proceedings of the Subordinate and Assistant Collectors shall be subject, in all cases, and in the fullest manner to the superintendence, control and revision of the Collector. He has been given power to require Sub-Collectors and Assistant Collectors to submit to him their proceedings before they are given effect to and he is given power to confirm, modify or annul their decisions. At the bottom of the revenue hierarchy are the village officers. So far as they are concerned their appointment, removal, etc., are governed by two statutes. One is Act II of 1894 which deals, generally speaking, with village establishments in zamindaries. With that Act we are not here concerned. The other is Act III of 1893 which deals with village establishments in ryotwari areas. section 3 of this Act enumerates the village offices to which it applies, and the enumeration includes village munsifs and karnams. One is Act II of 1894 which deals, generally speaking, with village establishments in zamindaries. With that Act we are not here concerned. The other is Act III of 1893 which deals with village establishments in ryotwari areas. section 3 of this Act enumerates the village offices to which it applies, and the enumeration includes village munsifs and karnams. The first paragraph of section 10 provides: “When a vacancy occurs in any of the village officers forming class (1) in section 3, the Collector shall fill up the vacancy in accordance with the provisions of the following sub-sections.” One of these is Sub-section (2) which says: “The succession shall devolve on a single heir according to the general custom and rule of primogeniture governing succession to impartible zamindaries in Southern India.” Sub-section (5) provides: “When the person who would otherwise be entitled to succeed to an office is a minor the Collector shall register the minor as the heir of the last holder and appoint some other person qualified under sub-section(1) to discharge the duties of the office until the person registered as heir, on attaining majority, or within three years thereafter, is qualified under sub-section(1) to discharge the duties of the office himself, when he shall be appointed thereto.” Under section 13 any person who considers that he is entitled to any of the offices specified in section 3 may sue before the Collector to establish his right to the office. Under section 23, an appeal lies to the District Collector from every decision given by the Collector under section 13 and to the Board of Revenue if the decree was made by the District Collector. In certain cases a second appeal is also provided for. Under section 7(b), the Collector is given power to fine, suspend, dismiss or remove village officers. Under sub-section (2) the Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar is also given certain punitive powers though they are of a more limited kind. In respect of every punishment imposed under section 7 by the Collector, an appeal lies to the District Collector, and, in certain cases, to the Board of Revenue. But what has to be noticed - and that is the point we desire to emphasise here - is that no appeal is provided for from an order made under section 10(5). In respect of every punishment imposed under section 7 by the Collector, an appeal lies to the District Collector, and, in certain cases, to the Board of Revenue. But what has to be noticed - and that is the point we desire to emphasise here - is that no appeal is provided for from an order made under section 10(5). Village Officers in the State fall into two broad categories: those in respect of whom there is specific statutory provision and those for whom there is no such provision. In the case of certain specified village offices in ryotwari areas, claims to them by way of hereditary right are recognised by statute, which confers some special rights on the claimants to and incumbents of such offices. If the claim which such a person thinks he has to a particular office is not conceded, he can maintain a suit before the Collector to establish his claim. From the decision of the Collector, an appeal and in certain cases, a second appeal lies. Village officers who are not governed by these statutes have no such right. A village officer to whom Act II of 1894 or Act III of 1895 applies cannot be punished except in the manner provided for by the Acts; and when he is punished, he has got a right of appeal as provided in the Acts. To put it in another way, holders of offices governed by Act II of 1894 or Act III of 1895 cannot in relation to their offices be dealt with except in the manner provided by the relevant statute. Neither the Revenue Divisional Officer nor the District Collector nor the Board can touch them except In the manner that the statute permits. The other village officers, that is to say, village officers not governed by either of those Acts are not in so fortified a position. They are under the superintendence and control of the District Collector, the Board and the Government just like other Government servants. We will next examine the case-law on the subject. The earliest of the decisions cited before us is reported in Subha Rao v. Secretary of state1. The facts there were these: “The plaintiff was a karnam of the ryotwari village of Voonagatla. On 4th October, 1921, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Ellore, dismissed him. We will next examine the case-law on the subject. The earliest of the decisions cited before us is reported in Subha Rao v. Secretary of state1. The facts there were these: “The plaintiff was a karnam of the ryotwari village of Voonagatla. On 4th October, 1921, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Ellore, dismissed him. He appealed to the District Collector who modified the order into one of suspension for one year. He preferred a second appeal to the Board of Revenue, the result of which was that the Board on 8th July, 1922, restored the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer dismissing him. The plaintiff maintained that that order was ultra vires and invalid. The above proceedings were then taken under Act III of 1895. The original dismissal was under section 7 and the appeals were under section 23.”