Judgement ORDER :- In January 1954, the petitioner was an Assistant Bridge Inspector in the employ of the Southern Railway. Under the rules then in force disciplinary action against such an employee could be taken in one of the following ways : 1. Under R. 148 of the Railway Establishment Code his services could be terminated by notice (or salary in lieu of notice) of a specified duration; 2. One or more of the punishments enumerated in Chap. 17 of the Railway Establishment Code could be imposed on him for misconduct proved in the manner provided in the chapter; 3. Under the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1949, his services could be terminated for what has been described as subversive activities. 2. On 25-1-1954 the General Manager of the Southern Railway wrote to the petitioner intimating him that it was proposed to take action against him under the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, and requiring him to say whether he wished to proceed on such leave as was due to him. On 18-2-1954 the petitioner replied that he was surprised at the communication that had been sent to him, that he was ignorant of the grounds on which it was proposed to take action and that there was no provision in the rules whereby he could be compelled to go on leave. However, without, prejudice he asked for 15 days leave to be granted to him. No order granting leave appears to have been issued. On 15-3-1954 the General Manager of the Southern Railway issued a notice to the petitioner telling him that in the opinion of the "competent authority" there were reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner was engaged in subversive activities and that consequently his services were liable to be terminated. Six grounds were then set out as the basis of the proposed action. He was required to state within 14 days of the receipt of the notice "whether he accepted or denied the accuracy of the above allegations; and if he did not reply within the above period, it would be assumed that he admitted the allegation. "He was also told that within the period of 14 days he might limit any representations he might desire to make as to why his services should not be terminated. On 21-3-1954 the petitioner was placed under suspension. "He was also told that within the period of 14 days he might limit any representations he might desire to make as to why his services should not be terminated. On 21-3-1954 the petitioner was placed under suspension. While the proceedings issued in pursuance of the notice D/-15-3-1954 were still pending, a new set of rules came into force. These are called the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954. So on 15-7-1954 a fresh notice was issued to the petitioner under the new rules. There is no material difference between the notice issued on 15-3-1954 and the notice issued on 15-7-1954 and the annexure thereto. On 26th July 1954 the petitioner came to this Court praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings instituted on the basis of the notice dated 15-7-1954 and, in the alternative, for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to forbear from taking any further proceedings against him on the basis of that notice. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent took the preliminary objection that the petition is premature. According to him the petitioner has so far suffered no injury and he is bound to wait till the President has passed orders under R. 3 of the Rules of 1954. According to him, the petitioner cannot seek the protection of this Court when the disciplinary enquiry against him is still pending. Now, the circumstance that disciplinary proceedings are pending would very frequently be treated by this Court as a good ground for refusing to interfere; but such a circumstance is not an absolute bar and does not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to act in appropriate instances. In the present case the petitioner has been suspended from his duties and therefore he has been actually and substantially hurt. To say that he has not been injured and that, therefore, he has no right to come to this Court is to ignore realities. 4. Reference may be made here to the decision in - Himmatlal Harilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 403 (A). The facts there were these : The appellant represented a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, having its head office at Bombay and several branches in the State of Madhya Pradesh. 4. Reference may be made here to the decision in - Himmatlal Harilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 403 (A). The facts there were these : The appellant represented a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, having its head office at Bombay and several branches in the State of Madhya Pradesh. For the quarter ended 31-3-1951, the appellant declined to pay the tax an respect of the purchases made during that quarter on the ground that the transactions could not be made legally liable for payment of the tax in the State of Madhya Pradesh. But apprehending that the company might be subjected to payment of tax without authority of law, the appellant preferred an application in the High Court of Judicature, Nagpur, praying for an appropriate writ or writs which may secure to the company protection from the impugned Act and its enforcement by the State. For various reasons the High Court dismissed the application. On appeal the Supreme Court stated : "In our opinion, the contentions raised by the learned Advocate-General are not well founded. It is plain that the State evinced an intention that it could certainly proceed to apply the penal provisions of the Act against the appellant if it failed to make the return or to meet the demand and in order to escape from such serious consequences threatened without authority of law, and infringing fundamental right, relief by way of a writ of mandamus was clearly the appropriate relief." In that case the writ was issued even though no wrongful act had been actually committed but had been only threatened. The present is an a fortiori case since the petitioner has been actually suspended. 5. In order to understand the contentions of Mr. Mohan Kumarammangalam, who appeared for the petitioner, it is necessary to examine some of the provisions, of the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954. These rules are eight in number. The first one is prefatory and the second one contains a number of definitions. 5. In order to understand the contentions of Mr. Mohan Kumarammangalam, who appeared for the petitioner, it is necessary to examine some of the provisions, of the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954. These rules are eight in number. The first one is prefatory and the second one contains a number of definitions. Rule 3 runs as follows : "Where the President is of opinion that a member of the railway service is engaged in or is reasonably suspected to be engaged in subversive activities or is associated with others in subversive activities and that his retention in the public service is on that account prejudicial to national security, the President may make an order compulsorily retiring such a person from service or terminating his services after he has been given due notice or pay in lieu of each notice in accordance with the terms of agreement of his service or under R. 148 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Vol. I." 6. Paragraph (a) of R. 4 requires that before an order under R. 3 is made, the "competent authority" shall, by notice in writing, inform the member of the railway service of the action proposed to be taken against him and give him an opportunity to make to the President, his representations. Paragraph (b) of R. 4 requires the President to take into consideration any representations so made. Rule 5 imposes an obligation on the "competent authority" to place under suspension a member of the railway service against whom it is proposed to take action under these rules. The proviso to the rule is that the member, if he so desires, may proceed on such leave as may be due to him before he is actually suspended. R. 6 excludes the operation of Chap. 17 of the Railway Establishment Code, Vol. I. Rule 7 excuses, the President from consulting the Union Public Service Commission in respect of an order passed under the rules. Rule 8 deals with questions of compensation, pension, gratuity etc., in respect of a person compulsorily retired or whose services are terminated under the rules. 7. The arguments of Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam in relation to these rules may be thus summarized : Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination or differential treatment between citizen and citizen except on the basis of reasonable classification. 7. The arguments of Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam in relation to these rules may be thus summarized : Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination or differential treatment between citizen and citizen except on the basis of reasonable classification. The prohibition extends not merely to matters which may be regarded as involving substantive rights but also to matters of procedure (See State of Madras v. V.G. Rao, AIR 1952 SC 196 at pp. 199-200 (B)). What is reasonable classification would depend on the purpose the enactment seeks to attain, the class of persons whom it affects, the correspondence between the purpose of the enactment and the provisions thereof, the situation existing at the relevant time and various other facts. The enactment should show what the basis of the classification is and its rationale. In - State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75 at p. 99 (C), it was observed : "Of course there may be certain offences whose trial requires priority over the rest and quick progress, owing to their frequent occurrence, grave danger to public peace or tranquillity, and any other special features that may be prevalent at a particular time in a specified area. And when it is intended to provide that they should be tried more speedily than other offences, requiring in certain respects a departure from, the procedure prescribed for the general class of offences, it is but reasonable to expect the Legislature to indicate the basis for any such classification. It the Act does not state what exactly are the offences which in its opinion need a speedier trial and why it is so considered, a mere statement in general words of the object sought to be achieved, as| we find in this case, is of no avail because the classification, if any, is illusive or evasive. The policy or idea behind the classification should at least be adumbrated, if not stated, so that the court which has to decide on the constitutionality might be seized of something, on which it could base its view about the propriety of the enactment from the standpoint of discrimination or equal protection." The class for which special provision is made must be well defined - State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318 (D). 8. 8. In the present case the only clue we have to the attempted classification consists of the expression "subversive activities". That is a very vague expression. Ideas which within living memory were regarded as subversive are now part of the law of the land. 9. Provision for dealing with conduct of the and attributed to the petitioner already exists in Chap. 17 of the Railway Establishment Code; and to single out cases of the present kind involves a transgression of the provisions of the Constitution which prohibits discrimination. The decision in - Surajmall Mohta and Co. v. Viswanatha Sastri, AIR 1954 SC 545 (E), directly applies. That case arose out of Sub-S. (4) of S. 5, Taxation of Income (Investigation Commission) Act 30 of 1947. The second paragraph of the headnote of the case sets out everything that is now relevant : "Both S. 34, Indian Income-tax Act and Sub-S. (4) of S. 5 of Act 30 of 1947 deal with all persons who have similar characteristics and similar properties, the common characteristics being that they are persons, who have not truly disclosed their income and have evaded payment of taxation on income. There are substantial differences between the procedures under S. 34, Income-tax Act and S. 5(4) of Act 30 of 1947, and the different procedure under the latter operates to the detriment of persons dealt with. Accordingly Sub-S. (4) of S. 5 and the procedure prescribed by Act 30 of 1947 in so far as it affects the persons proceeded against under that Sub-Section being a piece of discriminatory legislation offends against the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution and is thus void and unenforceable." Thus Mr. Kumaramangalam. 10. On the other side, it was replied that R. 3 is not so vague as it was stated to be. It does not speak merely of subversive activities but only subversive activities prejudicial to national security. That said Mr. Govindaraja Iyengar is a readily comprehensible category of misconduct and regard being had to its nature there is nothing unreasonable in special provisions being made for dealing with any kind of misconduct that falls within that category. 11. Notwithstanding the explanation offered by Mr. Govindaraja Aiyangar, one cannot avoid the feeling that there is some force in the criticism of Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam that R. 3 is loosely worded and that it lacks definiteness. 11. Notwithstanding the explanation offered by Mr. Govindaraja Aiyangar, one cannot avoid the feeling that there is some force in the criticism of Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam that R. 3 is loosely worded and that it lacks definiteness. In order to be classed as subversive, has the act to involve violence to person or to property or incitement to such violence ? The rule does not say anything. Again, in order to be classed as subversive has the act to involve a violation of any provision of law or abetment of such violation ? Rule 3 does not say anything in the matter. Would the exposition of ideas with which the Government in power for the time being disagrees and which that government might genuinely regard as prejudicial to national security come within the scope of that rule ? It is well known that Buddha and Mahaveera taught that all life is sacred and must not be taken. Supposing a railway employee being a Buddhist or a Jain or being persuaded that, the tenets of Budhdha and Mahaveera ought to be propagated were to take active steps to that end would he come within the mischief of the R. 3 ? Now if a soldier or policeman were deeply imbued with the doctrine that under no circumstance should life be taken then it is obvious that as a soldier and as a policeman he would be of no use to the State. In fact, his being in the police or in the army might well be a very serious danger to the security of the state and the nation. Be it remembered that not Buddha or Mahaveera alone taught the sanctity of life, some of the original Christians also held similar views. If as a consequence of a reaction to the horrors of war such ideas were to spread or to be spread, would persons holding those views or spreading such views come within the ambit of R. 3? Several similar problems may be posed; but no guidance it, laid down in R. 3 for dealing with such questions. Nevertheless and in spite of my having said all this, it does not appear to me to be necessary to strike the rule down in its entirety. Several similar problems may be posed; but no guidance it, laid down in R. 3 for dealing with such questions. Nevertheless and in spite of my having said all this, it does not appear to me to be necessary to strike the rule down in its entirety. For it seems to me that in spite of the omission of the necessary words, the rule is intended to cover only cases which involve an infringement of the law. In other words what the rule does is this. Out of the numerous categories of unlawful activities certain categories are picked out as those which involve a special element of danger to the national security. Everybody would recognise that passing on information to a hostile foreign power would stand in a class entirely, different from passing such information in ordinary gossip to people inside the country. Attempts to destroy the loyalty or sap the discipline of the army would stand in a class wholly different from spreading disaffection, amongst the members of the civilian staff in civilian occupations. To prescribe a special procedure for dealing with acts and conduct unlawful in themselves and of a kind specially dangerous to the security of the nation would, it seems to me, be defensible on the principle, of reasonable classification. Our entire criminal law proceeds on the basis of classification of offences. For trivial offences a summary procedure is prescribed; for those a little grave in character the summons case procedure is laid down; for offences still more serious the warrant case procedure is prescribed; and finally for offences which entail the capital sentence we have a regular trial in a Court of Session. Again the gravity of an offence would vary according to the nature of the position which the offender holds at the time of its commission. Disobedience to an order in times of peace in a civilian office would be in an entirely different category from disobedience to an order by a soldier in the presence of the enemy. A person in the position of the petitioner who plants a bomb under a railway bridge cannot claim to be dealt with in the same manner as someone not charged with the duty of reporting on the safety of bridges. A person in the position of the petitioner who plants a bomb under a railway bridge cannot claim to be dealt with in the same manner as someone not charged with the duty of reporting on the safety of bridges. I do not consider that the classification of conduct into those categories which involve a danger to the national security and those which do not involve such danger is an unreasonable classification, But then as I have already stated all this is on the basis that R. 3 is understood in the sense that it comprises only activities which are unlawful; and understood in that way the rule would lose most of its indefiniteness and be reduced to a shape to which just exception cannot be easily taken. In any other view it would be difficult to uphold that rule. 12. It is necessary to make one or two further observations about the scope of R. 3. Before a person can be punished by virtue of that rule, one of three things must be established : (1) he must be engaged in subversive activities which are prejudicial to national security; or (2) he must be reasonably suspected of being so engaged; or (3) he must be associated with others in such activities. This last, point requires clarification. What is made punishable is not association with persons who engage in subversive activities; what it, made punishable is association in their subversive activities. A person cannot be punished under this rule because he dines or plays cards or is on visiting terms with persons who engage in subversive activities. He must be associated with them in their subversive activities. This is an important distinction but one that may not be noticed and therefore ignored. It will also be appreciated that subversive activity must occur in some particular place and at some particular time, or in particular places and at particular times. 13. These considerations bring me to the next criticism of Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam. His complaint was that what may be called the charges framed against the petitioner are so vague that it is not reasonably possible to answer them. This criticism seems to me to be quite pertinent. The annexure to the notice issued by the General Manager Southern Railway under date 15-7-1954 sets out what may be called six charges. Mohan Kumaramangalam. His complaint was that what may be called the charges framed against the petitioner are so vague that it is not reasonably possible to answer them. This criticism seems to me to be quite pertinent. The annexure to the notice issued by the General Manager Southern Railway under date 15-7-1954 sets out what may be called six charges. The first one reads : "You are a member of the communist party of India and of the communist controlled S.I. Railway labour union, Golden Rock." This particular charge of course does not lack definiteness since it speaks in the present tense. But then in July 1954 which is the date to which this charge must be referred, the communist party was a perfectly lawful party and I presume the Labour Union too. There is nothing unlawful in a person being a member of that party or in his being a member of the South Indian Railway Labour Union. It must be emphasised that though several members of the communist party may be guilty of activities which are both unlawful and subversive the membership of the party does not necessarily involve association in those subversive activities. As I tried to explain earlier, R. 3 can be upheld only on the basis that it prohibits unlawful activities alone. So charge No. 1 does not furnish any basis for taking disciplinary action against the petitioner. 14. Charge No. 2 reads : "You are in touch with the Polit Bureau Secretariat of the communist party Bombay." This charge is as vague as words can make it. What was the nature of the contact between the petitioner and the Polit Bureau ? Did he write to them asking them to take steps to blow up bridges or incite disaffection in the army or to rob treasuries ? Did he write to them at all and if he did what did he write and when did he write The charge save nothing at all. Being "in touch" does not involve association in subversive activities. In fact a person may be in touch and very strongly dissuade others from subversive activities. It is Impossible to suggest that being to touch necessarily involves instigation or abetment of any subversive activity. 15. Being "in touch" does not involve association in subversive activities. In fact a person may be in touch and very strongly dissuade others from subversive activities. It is Impossible to suggest that being to touch necessarily involves instigation or abetment of any subversive activity. 15. The third charge reads : "You contributed articles to communist organs criticising the Government of India and the Railway administration with a view to spread discontent and disaffection among railway staff. Anybody accustomed to any form of legal procedure would read this charge with mixed feelings. What are the articles which the petitioner contributed to the communist organs? When did he contribute them ? Where were those "organs" published ? Criticism of the Government and of the railway administration does not necessary involve the spread of discontent and disaffection among the railway staff. If it was intended to proceed against the petitioner in respect of particular articles then, those articles or the offending portions of those articles should have been specifically referred to in the charge. Mr. Govindaraja Aiyangar explained that the petitioner wrote the articles, that therefore he knows what the charge refers to and that therefore he cannot, complain that the charge is vague. I cannot possibly accept this explanation. By way of analogy suppose a superintendent or Assistant Secretary in the Governments Secretariat were to be charged in terms like these "Your notes reveal communal bias and dishonesty." Without anything more how would the official possibly meet this charge? Before any body could even attempt to meet the charge. He would require information as to the particular note or notes which formed the subject-matter of the charge. It is only then that he would be able to explain that the note was a "bona fide one supported by the papers on record. If charges of this kind were to be held as sufficient no Government employee can be confident of remaining in service beyond the week. 16. Charge 4 runs : "Yon spread the doctrine of communism among the public and railway staff." To the questions which the petitioner is entitled to ask in relation to the charge as to when, where, and how he spread the doctrines the charge gives no answer. Besides as a charge, it strikes one as most extraordinary. 16. Charge 4 runs : "Yon spread the doctrine of communism among the public and railway staff." To the questions which the petitioner is entitled to ask in relation to the charge as to when, where, and how he spread the doctrines the charge gives no answer. Besides as a charge, it strikes one as most extraordinary. If a person could be dealt with on this ground every Librarian in our Universities and in our colleges who issues a copy of Karl Marx or Engels would be liable to disciplinary action because by issuing the books he spreads the doctrine of communism. 17. Charges 5 and 6 run as follows : "You collected funds for the communist party of India. You actively canvassed for communist party candidates in the last elections to the Legislative Assembly." In respect of charge 5 it will be noticed that it does not say when the funds were collected or where the funds were collected or from whom they were collected. In respect of charge 6 it will be noticed that it does not any where the canvassing took place or in favour of which particular candidate it took place. Did the petitioner tour all over "India supporting every communist candidate in every constituency ? or only a particular candidate in a particular area ? It must also be remarked here that the party being a lawful party there was nothing unlawful in either of these activities and in the absence of anything to chow that the funds were collected to promote illegal subversive activities or that the candidates for whom the petitioner canvassed were briefed to engage in unlawful subversive activities, the petitioner cannot be brought within the scope of R. 3. 18. That, the charge which a person is called upon to meet must be clear, precise and accurate has been laid down in a number of decisions. I shall for the moment forget the Criminal Procedure Code. In re Rajdhar Kalu Patil, AIR 1948 Bom 334 (FB) (F), was a case under the Bombay Public Security Measures Act. At pages 335 and 336 the Court observed : Therefore we mast draw a sharp distinction between a ground which is outside the purview of the statute and a ground which is bad because it lacks precision and accuracy. In re Rajdhar Kalu Patil, AIR 1948 Bom 334 (FB) (F), was a case under the Bombay Public Security Measures Act. At pages 335 and 336 the Court observed : Therefore we mast draw a sharp distinction between a ground which is outside the purview of the statute and a ground which is bad because it lacks precision and accuracy. In the latter case the ground has to be completely ignored, if no ground was furnished at all." See also M.R.S. Mani v. District Magistrate, Mathurai, AIR 1950 Mad 162 (G). The necessity of precision was emphasised at page 171 : "We are not concerned with the objects of a particular political party, nor are we prepared to accept the argument advanced on behalf of the applicants that the proceedings under the Act are actuated by political animosity and that therefore they are mala fide. We are concerned only with the question whether the grounds communicated are definite and are such as would enable the applicant to present his case properly to the Provincial Government .... .... .... No dates are given as to when and where the person concerned ridiculed the policy of the Government ......... ......... ...... The grounds are not outside the purview of the Act but are indefinite and vague." 19. Mr. Govindaraja Aiyangar argued that it is not open to a Court to examine the materials on the basis of which the President might come to the conclusion that a person arranged under the rules has been guilty of subversive activity. To this contention there are two or three answers. One is that in a sense the situation contemplated by this argument has not actually arisen in the present case, because no findings have been given by the President on the charges framed against the petitioner. Secondly, to the complaint that the charges are too vague to permit of an explanation being offered in relation to them, it is not an answer to say that the correctness of the findings recorded cannot be canvassed in a Court of law. Thirdly, I do not subscribe to the view that once at proper charge is framed, the decision of the resident recorded under R. 3 is absolute. No doubt, Court cannot substitute its own discretion or its own judgment for that of the President. Thirdly, I do not subscribe to the view that once at proper charge is framed, the decision of the resident recorded under R. 3 is absolute. No doubt, Court cannot substitute its own discretion or its own judgment for that of the President. But I have no doubt that it can examine the materials on which the accusation is founded and the explanation offered in order to ascertain whether the conclusion reached by the President is one which could possibly be reached by a reasonable person. This is only another way of saying that arbitrary or capricious or manifestly unfair decisions cannot secure immunity from judicial review. If there is a fair and sufficient nexus between the materials on which the charge stands, the explanation and the conclusion, the Court cannot interfere. But it can certainly do where the procedure prescribed by the rules is merely used as a machinery for getting rid of an employee whose views are distasteful to the administration. (In this connection see - Monohar Damodar v. Govt. of Bombay, AIR 1950 Bom 210 (SB) (H), and AIR 1952 SC 196 (B)). It is necessary to bear in mind here that though R. 3 speaks of the President and the opinion of the President, actually it would not be the President who would personally examine the evidence in support of the charges and the explanation offered by a person placed in the position of the petitioner but someone else, an officer or committee, to whom under the rules framed for the despatch of business, the powers of the President in this regard have been delegated. 20. Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam raised another point. In the notice issued to the petitioner on 15-7-1954 the General Manager stated : "...............Consequently it is proposed to terminate your services in terms of R. 148 Indian Railway Establishment Code, as provided for in R. 3, Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954 ..........". This, said Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam, is most extraordinary procedure. Even before the explanation of the petitioner had been received, the General Manager was in effect and substance felling the petitioner that it was proposed to terminate his services. This is clear evidence that the administration had decided to send the petitioner out of service whatever his explanation, might be. I am reluctant to suppose that the railway administration was acting in so mala fide a manner. This is clear evidence that the administration had decided to send the petitioner out of service whatever his explanation, might be. I am reluctant to suppose that the railway administration was acting in so mala fide a manner. The probability is that they were only trying to eliminate delays by sending up the explanation of the petitioner in relation not merely to the charges framed against him but also in relation to the proposed punishment so that the entire papers might be before the appropriate authority in Delhi at one and the same time. Nevertheless it must be recognised that the procedure actually adopted is calculated to arouse just apprehensions in the mind of a person placed in the position of the petitioner. Though the analogy does not entirely hold the position would be somewhat like that of a Judge telling a prisoner before the evidence is called that if the jury were to bring in a verdict of guilty he would send him to jail for seven years. It is a cardinal rule of judicial administration that justice must not only be done but must also manifestly appear to be clone. Though in its strictness the rule may not apply to quasi-judicial proceedings, it is a salutary one and may well be adopted by all quasi-judicial bodies with visible advantage. The proper procedure in a case of this kind would be first to obtain the explanation of the petitioner and then arrive at a finding whether the charges are proved or not. The question as to what punishment should be imposed should be taken up only after the conclusion has been reached that the charges have been made out. 21. Mr. Govindaraja Aiyangar finally stated that the petition as framed is bad and must fail. He pointed out that the prayer in the petition is for the issue either of a writ of certiorari or the issue of a writ of mandamus; and that neither writ is suitable nor appropriate to the present case. I do not think that the petition can be disposed of on so technical a point. Our constitution does not incorporate all the severe technicalities of the English law relating to the various forms of writs. Article 226 of the Constitution empowers High Court to issue "directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, etc. I do not think that the petition can be disposed of on so technical a point. Our constitution does not incorporate all the severe technicalities of the English law relating to the various forms of writs. Article 226 of the Constitution empowers High Court to issue "directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, etc. "It will not do to ignore the significance of the words underlined (here in ). The circumstance, therefore, that the petitioner has applied for a particular form of writ whereas he should have asked for a different kind of writ or order does not preclude the Court from moulding the remedy to the circumstances of the case. See in this connection - "T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 at p. 443 (I). At p. 443 it is observed : "In view of the express provisions in our Constitution, we need not look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges. We can make an order or issue a writ in. the nature of certiorari in all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner, so long as we keep to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law." 22. In the result, the petition is allowed and a writ will issue quashing the order placing the petitioner under suspension and also the charges framed against him. The petitioner will get his costs. advocates fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.