Judgment :- 1. The second defendant in O.S. No. 21 of 1120 on the file of the District Court of Parur is the appellant in A.S. No. 800 of 1950. He is the third defendant in O.S. No. 31 of 1104 of that court and is the appellant in A.S. No. 105 of 1952. The plaintiff is the same in both the cases. 2. The properties which are the subject-matter of O.S. No. 21 of 1120 belonged to the plaintiff's father, deceased Krishna Kurup. He was the second husband of the plaintiff's mother, Parvathi Amma. The first defendant is Parvathi Amma's son by her first husband, Kutta Kurup. Krishna Kurup died in 1093. The plaintiff was a minor at the time of his death. Plaintiff attained majority in 1102. The plaintiff's case is that his mother was of unsound mind even during the life-time of Krishna Kurup and that she continued in that condition till her death in 1113. It is also alleged in the plaint that she was completely under the influence of the first defendant and that she was made to execute along with him certain deeds of alienation in respect of some of the plaint properties. When the plaintiff came of age he instituted O.S. No. 31 of 1104 for partition of his one-half share in the plaint properties and for setting aside the alienation in respect of that share. The alienations were impeached on the ground that the first defendant had no right in the properties, that the plaintiff's mother was not of sound mind at the time of the execution of the documents, that the documents were executed as a result of undue influence exercised by the first defendant and that they were not supported by consideration and necessity. The suit was decreed except in respect of one hypothecation bond for Rs. 125/- that stood in the name of the 16th defendant in that case (i.e., the third defendant in this case). During the pendency of the suit the plaintiff's mother, who was the second defendant, died and the plaintiff was recorded as her legal representative. He also moved for an amendment of the plaint so that he might be allowed to recover possession of his mother's share also in the properties. The amendment was not allowed by the trial court. During the pendency of the suit the plaintiff's mother, who was the second defendant, died and the plaintiff was recorded as her legal representative. He also moved for an amendment of the plaint so that he might be allowed to recover possession of his mother's share also in the properties. The amendment was not allowed by the trial court. The third defendant in that case (i.e., the second defendent in this case) and the 16th defendant (i.e., the third defendant in this case) preferred appeals from the decision. The High Court confirmed the decision of the trial court but directed that in partitioning the properties by metes and bounds the allotment of the plaintiff's share should, as far as possible, be made out of the properties which have not been alienated. The plaintiff filed a memorandum of objection in the appeal filed by the 16th defendant in which he prayed that he might be allowed to amend the plaint so as to claim relief in respect of his mother's share also in the properties. This prayer was not allowed by the High Court. In execution of the final decree passed in the case the plaintiff recovered possession of his one-half share in the properties. The present suit was brought for recovery of the other half share in the properties after getting the alienations set aside in respect of that share also. Plaintiff also claimed mesne profits from the defendants in possession of the different items of properties. 3. The second defendant is an alienee in respect of items 2 and 3. The third defendant is in possession of item No. 1. Under the final decree passed in O.S. No. 31 of 1104 the second defendant was allowed to retain possession of items Nos. 2 and 3 and the third defendant item No. 1. Defendants 4 to 6 got 15 cents in three other items under that decree. The first defendant contended that he was entitled to one-half share in the properties left by his mother. He died during the pendency of the suit and his legal representatives were impleaded as defendants 7 to 15. Defendants 2 and 3 filed separate written statements. They denied the allegation that the plaintiff's mother was insane at the time of the execution of the documents impeached by the plaintiff and that she was under the influence of the first defendant. Defendants 2 and 3 filed separate written statements. They denied the allegation that the plaintiff's mother was insane at the time of the execution of the documents impeached by the plaintiff and that she was under the influence of the first defendant. They also contended that the documents were supported by consideration and necessity. They questioned the right of the plaintiff to impeach the alienations as regards his mother's share. It was also contended that the suit was barred by limitation as it was brought more than three years after the death of the plaintiff's mother and that the rate of mesne profits claimed in the plaint were excessive. The third defendant further contended that he was not liable to pay any mesne profits until he was paid the sum of Rs. 125/- due to him. 4. The plaintiff did not adduce any independent evidence in the case to show that his mother was insane at the time of the execution of the documents impeached by him or that the documents were executed as a result of undue influence exercised by the first defendant. Nor was any evidence adduced to prove that the documents were not supported by consideration and necessity. The plaintiff relied upon the findings in O.S. No. 31 of 1104. At the time of the hearing of the case the court raised an additional issue relating to the question whether the defendants were concluded by the findings in O.S. No. 31 of 1104 and whether those findings operated as res judicata. 5. As regards the alleged insanity of the plaintiff's mother at the time of the execution of the documents in question the defendants contended that that matter was not in issue in O.S. No. 31 of 1104, while according to the plaintiff it was one of the issues tried in that case, viz., Issue No. 2. That issue was to the following effect: "Is the second defendant insane? That issue was to the following effect: "Is the second defendant insane? Is the property represented by a guardian or not?" According to the defendants, this issue happened to be raised in the case on account of the contention raised by them that the plaintiff's mother (second defendant in O.S. No. 31 of 1104) was not insane on the date of the suit and that it was not necessary to appoint a guardian for the suit for her, and the issue did not relate to the question whether she was insane at the time of the execution of the document impeached by the plaintiff. This contention was repelled by the learned Additional District Judge who held that Issue No. 2 in O.S. No. 31 of 1104 related to the question whether the plaintiff's mother was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the documents. It was also held that the finding of that issue operated as res judicata so far as this suit is concerned. It was further held that the finding in the former suit that the alienations were invalid operated as res judicata even as regards the plaintiff's mother's one-half share in the properties. As for the question of limitation the learned judge was of opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to exclude, under S.14 of the Limitation Act, the period between the date of his application to amend the plaint in O.S. No. 31 of 1104 (i.e., 24.10.1114) and the final rejection of that application by the High Court on 24.10.1119, and that the suit was therefore not barred by limitation. The first defendant was found to be entitled to one half-share in the properties left by his mother. The plaintiff was allowed to recover possession of the other one-half share subject to the charge under the hypothecation bond in favour of the third defendant in respect of item No. 1. The plaintiff was also allowed to recover one-half of the mesne profits at the rates mentioned in the plaint. A.S. No. 800 of 1950 is filed by the second defendant from this decision. The third defendant has filed a memorandum of objection in respect of the portion of the decree that is against him. 6. The plaintiff was also allowed to recover one-half of the mesne profits at the rates mentioned in the plaint. A.S. No. 800 of 1950 is filed by the second defendant from this decision. The third defendant has filed a memorandum of objection in respect of the portion of the decree that is against him. 6. A.S. No. 105 of 1952 happened to be filed under the following circumstances: In execution of the decree in O.S. No. 31 of 1104 the plaintiff attached properties which have been sold to the third defendant in that case, for realising mesne profits payable by the first defendant. The third defendant contended that the properties belonged to the second defendant in that case, viz., the plaintiff's mother, and not to the first defendant, that so long as the alienation in his favour was not set aside as regards the mother's share and he was allowed to retain possession of the properties under the final decree passed in the case the plaintiff had no right to proceed against those properties for realising mesne profits due from the first defendant. On the basis of the decision in O.S. No. 21 of 1120 declaring the alienations invalid even as regards the one-half share of the plaintiff's mother this contention of the third defendant was repelled by the execution court. The appeal is from that order. 7. One of the questions raised in A.S. No. 800 of 1950 is whether the suit is barred by limitation. If that question is decided in favour of the appellant it will not be necessary to consider the other points raised in the appeal. It is conceded by the respondent that the period of limitation for the suit is three years from the date of the death of the plaintiff's mother which was on 19.9.1113. The suit was instituted only on 6.4.1120. The ground of exemption from the bar of limitation is not stated in the plaint in express terms, although it is stated that the cause of action arose from the date of the death of the plaintiff's mother and also from the date of the High Court decree in O.S. No. 31 of 1104, i.e., 24.10.1119. The ground of exemption from the bar of limitation is not stated in the plaint in express terms, although it is stated that the cause of action arose from the date of the death of the plaintiff's mother and also from the date of the High Court decree in O.S. No. 31 of 1104, i.e., 24.10.1119. The argument advanced by the plaintiff in the court below and which was accepted by that court was that the plaintiff was entitled, under S. 14(1) of the Limitation Act to exclude the period from the date of his application to amend the plaint in O.S. No. 31 of 1104, i.e., 24.10.1114, up to the date of the High Court decree, i.e., 24.10.1119. The question for consideration is whether the plaintiff is entitled to exclude this period under S. 14(1) of the Limitation Act. 8. S. 14(1) provides: "14(1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or in a court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it". It is not contended for the plaintiff-respondent that O.S. No. 31 of 1104 was founded upon the same cause of action as the present suit. That suit was to set aside the alienations in respect of the plaintiff's one-half share in the plaint properties and for partition of that one-half share. There was no prayer in the suit to set aside the alienations in respect of the half-share that belonged to the plaintiff's mother or for recovery of that share. The grounds for setting aside the alienations in respect of the plaintiff's one half-share are not necessarily the same as those for setting aside the alienations in respect of the share of his mother. As regards the plaintiff's one-half share the alienations were effected by his mother in her capacity as his guardian, and such alienations will be valid only if they are supported by consideration and necessity. But so far as the one-half share of the plaintiff's mother is concerned, no question of consideration or necessity arises. As regards the plaintiff's one-half share the alienations were effected by his mother in her capacity as his guardian, and such alienations will be valid only if they are supported by consideration and necessity. But so far as the one-half share of the plaintiff's mother is concerned, no question of consideration or necessity arises. It was her own property which she could dispose of as she liked. The documents can be set aside only if it is proved that she had no disposing power at the time of the execution of the documents or that they were executed without her free consent. It is therefore clear that the two suits are not founded upon the same cause of action. 9. But the plaintiff relies, as stated already, on the application filed by him on 24.10.1114 for amending the plaint in O.S. No. 31 of 1104 so as to include a prayer for recovery of possession of the one-half share of his mother also. Ext. L is the copy of that petition. It was filed after the case was partly heard. On 17.10.1113 the plaintiff had filed a petition (Ext. K) for recording that he was the legal representative of his deceased mother, and it was so recorded. No order seems to have been passed by the court on the petition filed on 24.10.1114, but the matter was dealt with by the court in paragraph 62 of the judgment, Ext. F. This is what was stated in that paragraph, "The reason last stated for refusing the claim of defendants 3 and 16, just dealt with, is also the reason for refusing the plaintiff's claim to have his share in the second defendant's one-half share in the estate adjudged to him in this suit, as prayed for by him in his petition dated 24.10.1114. His suit is for his one-half share only in the whole estate. This decree would render the alienations invalid to that extent only. Her incapacity was not alleged as a ground for a declaration that her documents had failed to convey on her account any interest, and no issue was raised on it. The causes of action for the two reliefs are distinct and different. The prayer in the petition is therefore disallowed". The judgment is dated 30.10.1114. The plaintiff did not appeal from the decree. The causes of action for the two reliefs are distinct and different. The prayer in the petition is therefore disallowed". The judgment is dated 30.10.1114. The plaintiff did not appeal from the decree. The third defendant in the case (the present second defendant) filed an appeal as A.S. No. 135 of 1115 and the 16th defendant (the present third defendant) filed A.S. No. 131 of 1115. In the latter appeal, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of objection (Ext. M) on 26.5.1115 objecting to the decree of the trial court in so far as it upheld the hypothecation for Rs. 125/- in favour of the 16th defendant, and court fee was paid on one-half of the amount covered by the hypothecation bond. It was also stated in the memorandum of objection as ground No. 3 that the plaintiff's petition dated 24.10.1114 ought to have been allowed. The High Court disposed of the memorandum of objection in the following words: "The respondent's learned counsel submitted that his client might be allowed to amend his plaint so as to claim relief in respect of the other half-share of his mother also, as the court below has held that the alienations are invalid. It was pointed out that such a petition was presented to the court below on 24.10.1114 where the plaintiff had also undertaken to pay additional court fee and that the court below erred in rejecting it. We are unable to grant this prayer as the plaint relief is confined to a partition of the plaintiff's half-share only, after declaring his title thereto. A partition suit cannot now be converted in the manner prayed for. Besides, the prayer itself was made very late. We therefore refuse the above prayer". The question for consideration is whether, in the circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled under S. 14(1) of the Limitation Act to exclude the period between 24.10.1114, the date of his application for amending the plaint, and 24.10.1119, the date of the decision of the High Court rejecting the memorandum of objection filed by the plaintiff in A.S. No. 137 of 1115. One of the points to be considered in deciding this question is whether this is a case in which the court, "from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature", was "unable to entertain" the application for amending the plaint; and the other point is whether the plaintiff has been "prosecuting with due diligence" the application for amending the plaint. 10. So far as the first point is concerned, we do not think that it can be said that the petition for amending the plaint was disallowed by the court on account of its inability to entertain it on the ground of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. Neither the trial court nor the High Court gave any such reason for dismissing the petition. Both the courts dismissed the petition on the merits. It is true that one of the reasons given by the trial court for not allowing the petition is that the causes of action for the two reliefs were distinct and different. But that does not mean that the court was unable to entertain the petition for amending the plaint on account of any defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. It was argued for the respondent that under Explanation III to S.14 "misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction." But so far as the petition for amending the plaint was concerned there was no misjoinder of causes of action and the court was not prevented from entertaining it on account of any such defect. To say that if the petition to amend the plaint was allowed it would introduce a distinct and different cause of action is not the same as to say that the petition was defective on account of misjoinder of causes of action. It was not a case in which the court found itself unable to entertain the petition on account of a defect of the nature of misjoinder of parties or of causes of action. The court did entertain the petition and went into the merits thereof. The High Court also did not refuse to consider the petition on the merits by reason of any defect of the nature of misjoinder of parties or of causes of action. The court did entertain the petition and went into the merits thereof. The High Court also did not refuse to consider the petition on the merits by reason of any defect of the nature of misjoinder of parties or of causes of action. The High Court considered the question on the merits and held that the petition could not be allowed. One of the reasons given by the High Court was that the petition was filed at a very late stage. In the circumstances, we do not think that it can be held that the plaintiff's petition for amending the plaint in O.S. No. 31 of 1104 so as to include a relief in respect of his mother's one half-share in the properties was disallowed either by the trial court or by the High Court on account of the fact that the court was "unable to entertain" the petition "from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature." 11. Reference may be made in this connection to the following observation of Macleon, C.J. in India Publishers Limited v. Aldridge (I.L.R. 35 Calcutta 728 F.B.): "There is a marked difference between the language of the Act of 1859 and that of the existing Limitation Act. In the present Act the words are 'unable to entertain', in the previous Act the words are 'unable to decide upon it'. A court may be able to entertain a suit in its inception, but be unable to decide it on the merits owing to some defect, not in jurisdiction, but in procedure. There must have been some reason for this change of language, and a possible reason is that the legislature intended to limit the benefit of the section to cases, where the court had no power to embark upon the case at all". It is true that this case was decided before Explanation III was added to the section. But that cannot affect the force of the observation made by the learned Chief Justice regarding the interpretation to be put upon the words "unable to entertain". It is also true that the tendency of the later rulings is to give the words "other cause of a like nature" as liberal an interpretation as possible. But that cannot affect the force of the observation made by the learned Chief Justice regarding the interpretation to be put upon the words "unable to entertain". It is also true that the tendency of the later rulings is to give the words "other cause of a like nature" as liberal an interpretation as possible. But however liberal an interpretation one may give to these words, it is difficult to hold that the petition for amending the plaint was disallowed by the court on account of its inability to entertain it "from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature." In Rajabapayya v. Basavayya (1942 Mad. 713), King. J. observed. "To say that a court which has considered all the merits of a case and held that the facts alleged by the petitioner have not been proved and therefore dismissed his application is unable to entertain it seems to us to be stretching a liberal interpretation of language to an impossible length." To the same effect is the observation of Strachey, C.J., in Mathura Singh v. Bhawani Singh (I.L.R. 22 Allahabad 248 F.B.). The learned Chief Justice said: "Clearly the failure of the plaintiff to prove his cause of action and to establish the defendant's liability does not, in the first place, make the court "unable to entertain the suit" because the suit is entertained and dismissed and, in the second place, is in no sense analogous to defect of jurisdiction in the court". In Murugesa Mudaliar v. Jattram Davy (I.L.R. 23 Mad. 621) Sir Arnold White, C.J. and Subramonia Iyer, J. observed thus: "No doubt a liberal construction has been placed by the courts on the words "or other cause of a like nature" contained in S. 14. But, in our judgment, the section cannot be construed so as to apply to this case. The suit was dismissed not because the court through defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature was unable to entertain it, but because it was misconceived. Unless we were prepared to go so far as to say that whenever a plaintiff mistakes his remedy he is entitled to the benefit of S. 14, it would be impossible for us to hold that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of it in the present case". 12. Unless we were prepared to go so far as to say that whenever a plaintiff mistakes his remedy he is entitled to the benefit of S. 14, it would be impossible for us to hold that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of it in the present case". 12. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to various decisions in support of the position that the plaintiff in this case is entitled to claim the benefit of S.14 of the Limitation Act. On such decision is Ram Dutt v. E.D. Saosoon & Co. (A.I.R. 1929 P.C.103). What was held in that case was that S.14 of the Limitation Act applied to proceedings before an arbitrator and that the time spent in prosecuting in good faith the same claim before an arbitrator who was not competent to exercise jurisdiction in the matter should be excluded in computing the period of limitation. This decision has no application to the facts of this case. Another decision of the Privy Council referred to by learned counsel for the respondent is Sreemathi Nrityamoni Dassy v. Lakhan Chunder Sen (20 Calcutta Weekly Notes 522). That was a suit for recovery of possession of a property by a part owner impleading the other co-owners as defendants. They also set up their title to the property. A decree was given by the first court in favour of the plaintiff and the other co-owners. The decree in favour of the co-owners was set aside in appeal. They subsequently instituted a suit for recovery of their share of the property and claimed the benefit of S.14 of the Limitation Act. It was held by the Privy Council that the plaintiffs were entitled to the benefit of the section. This case also has nothing in common with the facts of the present case. 13. Reference was made by learned counsel to three decisions of the Patna High Court, viz., Kishore Mal v. Jagdish Narain Singh (A.I.R. 1924 Pat. 471), Lal Vihari Lal v. Bani Madhava (A.I.R. 1949 Pat. 293 F.B.), and Janki Prasad v. Ram Kripal (A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 486). The question raised in the first case was whether an execution petition was barred by limitation. A previous execution petition had been dismissed on the ground that the relief asked for in that petition was not in conformity with the decree. 293 F.B.), and Janki Prasad v. Ram Kripal (A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 486). The question raised in the first case was whether an execution petition was barred by limitation. A previous execution petition had been dismissed on the ground that the relief asked for in that petition was not in conformity with the decree. It was held that the dismissal of that execution petition was due to a defect of the nature of misjoinder of causes of action and that therefore S.14 of the Limitation Act applied to the case. Mullick, J. said: "It is clear that in the present case the basis of the decision of the Subordinate Judge and of the High Court in appeal was that it was not right for the execution court to entertain an application in which the legitimate prayer for the execution of the decree was joined with a prayer which the court thought it was not competent to grant and which related to relief given by another decree. That defect appears to me to be a defect in the nature of misjoinder of causes of action and in my opinion the defect is covered by S.14." The second case related to a suit for setting aside a claim order. The plaintiff claimed exclusion of the period during which a revision petition filed from the claim order was pending in the High Court. The Full Bench held that S.14 of the Limitation Act applied to the case. It was a case in which the High Court refused to interfere in revision since the remedy of the party was a fresh suit as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. The third case, viz., Janki Prasad v. Ram Kripal (A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 486), related to an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in making an application for review of a judgment. The applicant first applied for leave to appeal to the Federal Court which was not allowed. He then applied for special leave in the Supreme Court which also was not allowed. The applicant sought exclusion of the time occupied in prosecuting the applications for leave to appeal from the decree in computing the period of limitation for the application to review the judgment. He then applied for special leave in the Supreme Court which also was not allowed. The applicant sought exclusion of the time occupied in prosecuting the applications for leave to appeal from the decree in computing the period of limitation for the application to review the judgment. Although the real question that had to be decided in the case was whether there was sufficient cause under S. 5 of the Limitation Act for not making the application in time the learned judges held that the applicant was entitled to claim the benefit of S. 14(2) of the Limitation Act. One of the reasons given was that the application for leave to appeal must be deemed to have been dismissed on account of the inability of the court to entertain it from defect of jurisdiction. It was also held that the case would be covered by the alternative clause "or other cause of a like nature". According to the learned judges, if the defect was of such a character as to make it impossible for the court to entertain the application and decide it on the merits it will be a case coming under the section. The facts of these three cases are different from those of the present case, and we do not think that these cases are of real assistance to us in determining the question whether the plaintiff's petition to amend the plaint in O.S. No. 31 of 1104 can be deemed to have been dismissed on the ground that the court was unable to entertain it from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. 14. Three other cases referred to by learned counsel for the respondent are Briji Mohan Das v. Mannu Bibi (I.L.R.19 All. 348 F.B.), Mathura Singh v. Bhawany Singh (I.L.R. 22 All. 248 F.B.), to which reference has already been made, and Venkamma v. Parthasarathi & Brothers (A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 1081). In 19 Allahabad 348 the plaintiff filed the first suit in a wrong court on account of a bonafide mistake of law. It was held that S.14 would apply to the case. In 22 Allahabad 248 the first suit was dismissed by the trial court on the ground of misjoinder of plaintiffs and causes of action. The High Court remanded the case with the direction to the trial court to return the plaint for amendment. It was held that S.14 would apply to the case. In 22 Allahabad 248 the first suit was dismissed by the trial court on the ground of misjoinder of plaintiffs and causes of action. The High Court remanded the case with the direction to the trial court to return the plaint for amendment. The plaint was accordingly returned and one of the plaintiffs alone continued the suit after amending the plaint. One of the other plaintiffs in the suit, as it was originally instituted, filed a second suit on the same cause of action and claimed exclusion of the period during which he was prosecuting the first suit. It was held that he was entitled to the benefit of S. 14. In 1926 Madras 1081 the first suit was brought by the plaintiff for declaration of his title to the suit property. That suit was held to be not maintainable since possession was not asked for in the suit. In the second suit in which possession also was asked for it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to exclude the period during which the former suit was pending. We do not think that these three cases also are of assistance to us in determining the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of S.14 of the Limitation Act in this case. 15. For the reasons already given we are of opinion that this is not a case in which the court was unable to entertain the plaintiff's application to amend the plaint in O.S. No. 31 of 1104 on the ground of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. 16. The second point for consideration is whether the plaintiff has been "prosecuting with due diligence" his application for amending the plaint in the former suit. As stated already, the application for amendment was filed on 24.10.1114 and it was dismissed by the judgment dated 30.10.1114. The plaintiff did not appeal from the decree. Nor did he file a memorandum of objection in the appeal filed by the present second defendant, i.e., A.S. No. 135 of 1115. What he did was to file a memorandum of objection in the appeal filed by the present third defendant, i.e., A.S. No. 137 of 1115. The plaintiff did not appeal from the decree. Nor did he file a memorandum of objection in the appeal filed by the present second defendant, i.e., A.S. No. 135 of 1115. What he did was to file a memorandum of objection in the appeal filed by the present third defendant, i.e., A.S. No. 137 of 1115. In that memorandum of objection he paid court fee only on one-half of the amount covered by the hypothecation bond in favour of the present third defendant. It was stated in the memorandum that the plaintiff's petition dated 24.10.1114 ought to have been allowed by the trial court. It has to be noted that the present second defendant was not a party in A.S. No. 137 of 1115. In the circumstances it cannot be said that the plaintiff has been prosecuting his application for amendment of the plaint in the High Court as against the present second defendant. Plaintiff is, therefore, not entitled, in any case, to exclude the period during which A.S. No. 137 of 1115 was pending in the High Court so far as the present second defendant is concerned. Even as regards the present third defendant we do not think that it can be said that the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence his application for amending the plaint. 17. For the above reasons we hold that in computing the period of limitation for this suit the plaintiff is not entitled to exclude the period between the date of his application for amending the plaint in O.S. No. 31 of 1104 (i.e., 24.10.1114) and the date of the disposal of the appeals, A.S. Nos. 135 and 137 of 1115, by the High Court (i.e., 24.10.1119). It follows from this that the suit, O.S. No. 21 of 1120, is barred by limitation. 18. In view of this finding on the question of limitation it is not necessary to consider the other points raised in the appeal or in the memorandum of objection filed by the third defendant. 19. In the result, we set aside the judgment and decree of the court below and dismiss the suit (O.S. No. 21 of 1120) with costs in both the courts. Only one set of costs is allowed. A.S. No. 800 of 1950 is thus allowed. The memorandum of objection is dismissed, but without costs. 20. 19. In the result, we set aside the judgment and decree of the court below and dismiss the suit (O.S. No. 21 of 1120) with costs in both the courts. Only one set of costs is allowed. A.S. No. 800 of 1950 is thus allowed. The memorandum of objection is dismissed, but without costs. 20. In the light of the decision in A.S. No. 800 of 1950, A.S. No. 105 of 1952 has also to be allowed. If the alienations effected by the plaintiff's mother are not liable to be set aside as regards her one-half share in the properties it follows that the 1st defendant can get no right in that half share that the plaintiff cannot proceed against that share for mesne profits due to him from the 1st defendant. The order of the court below rejecting the objection of the appellant in A.S. No. 105 of 1952 is, therefore, set aside and that appeal also is allowed with costs in both the courts. Allowed.