JUDGMENT : 1. The only question raised in this second appeal on behalf of the appellants is that the execution petition No. 309 of 1943-44 filed by the decree-holder in the Court of First Munsiff Court Darbar Dhar is barred by S. 48, Civil P.C. Laving been filed more than 12 years from the date of the decree. The point put forward on behalf of the appellants is that the decision of the highest Court on a revision petition filed will not be 'the date of the decree' within the meaning of S. 48, C.P.C. and reliance in this connection is placed upon the decision of the Madras High Court repented in- "Nagalinga Chetty v. Srinivnsa Iyengar', AIR 1941 Mad 477 (A). 2. The facts of the present case are as follows : In Civil Suit No. 15 of 1910-20 a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 1556-12-9 and interest tm 12-1-1921. Against this decision an appeal was preferred. This was appeal No. 14 of 1920-21. This appeal was disposed of on 25-7-1922. In this the decree of the lower court was confirmed with a slight modification. Against this decision second appeal was preferred in the High Court of Dhar. This was Civil Second Appeal No. 3 of 1922-23. It was dismissed with costs on 6-6-1923. Thereafter a petition for revision was filed in the Dhar Darbar on 21-1-1924. It was finally disposed of on 2-10-1941. 3. The plaintiff decree holder thereafter filed execution petition on 15-12-1941. This was dismissed for default on 29-4-1942. Fresh application for execution was filed on 26-5-1944. 4. To this application several objections were raised on behalf o! the judgment-debtor including one regarding the execution petition being barred under S. 48, Civil P.C. The Executing Court overruled all these objections and ordered the execution to proceed. 5. Judgment-debtors preferred appeal against that decision and the appellate court dismissed the appeal. This is a second appeal against that decision. 6. Mr. Bhawaniprasad for the appellant judgment-debtors has pressed the point set out by me at the commencement of this judgment and took reliance upon AIR 1941 Mad 477 (A). 7. On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. This is a second appeal against that decision. 6. Mr. Bhawaniprasad for the appellant judgment-debtors has pressed the point set out by me at the commencement of this judgment and took reliance upon AIR 1941 Mad 477 (A). 7. On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. Chaphekar that the case reported in AIR 1941 Mad 477 (A) is disapproved by the Madras High Court itself in 'Nacharammal v. Veerappa Chettiar', AIR 1946 Mad 231 (B) and this latter Madras case is followed recently in- 'Kunjammal v. Krishna Chettiar AIR 1954 Mad 170 (C). It was also pointed out that Patna High Court in- 'Jagnnath Bal v. Sadhu Charan Bal', AIR 1943 Pat 371 (D) considered the aforesaid decision of the Madras High Court but refused to follow it. Thus he contended, both according to Patna High Court and after Madras decision, where a revision petition is filed and disposed of it is the decision of that matter which affords terminus quo of the litigation and an execution petition can be filed within 12 years from the decision in that proceeding. 8. In order to appreciate the argument it will be useful to refer to the provisions of S. 48, Civil P.C. in so far as they are material for the present purpose : 9. Section 48(a), Civil P.C. runs as follows : "(1) Where an application to execute a decree not being a decree granting an injunction has been made, no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration or 12 years from : (a) the date of the decree sought to be executed, or, ……………………………………….." Thus, according to S. 48, Civil P.C. the period of 12 years, except in the case subsequently mentioned in the Section, has to be computed from the date of the decree. 10. The word 'decree' has been defined in S. 2(2), Civil P.C. as under : "In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context : 'decree' means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within S. 47 or S. 144, but shall not include (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default." 11. Thus, where rights of parties are conclusively determined by an adjudication in a suit which is formally expressed it becomes a decree. It cannot be doubted that a decision of a Court of appeal would be a decree whether it affirms, modifies or sets aside the decision of the lower tribunal. But it is said that a decision in a revision petition will not be a decree. 12. This contention however is not correct. Even in a revision petition the jurisdiction exercised in an appellate one and the Court in either reversing, modifying or confirming the decision of the Court of appeal acts in exercise of that jurisdiction. 13. In- 'Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey', AIR 1932 PC 165 (E) either Lordships of the Privy Council while dealing with the term appeal held as follows : "There is no definition of appeal in the Civil Procedure Code, but their Lordships have no doubt that any application by a party to an appellate Court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a subordinate Court, is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term, and that it is no less an appeal because it is irregular or incompetent." 14. In the present case the Court of revision considered the matter on merits and dismissed the revision petition confirming the decision of the lower tribunal. While considering the merits it could have set aside or modified the decision. In that case it could not have been said that that decision is not a decree. Will it make any difference if it confirms the decision ? While thus confirming it exercises an appellate jurisdiction though limited in character circumscribed by the limitations placed by S. 115, Civil P.C. 15. The reasoning in AIR 1941 Mad 477 (A), which take the view that decision in revision does not alter the date of decree, is based on the Full Bench decision of that Court in- Ramachandra Rao v. Parsurarmayya', AIR 1940 Mad 127 (FB) (F). The reasoning in AIR 1941 Mad 477 (A), which take the view that decision in revision does not alter the date of decree, is based on the Full Bench decision of that Court in- Ramachandra Rao v. Parsurarmayya', AIR 1940 Mad 127 (FB) (F). That was a case of amendment of a decree and it was held that the period of 12 years is to be computed under S. 48, Civil P.C. not from the date of amendment but from the date of the decree itself. The Full Bench case referred to above was not dealing with a case of decision in a revision petition and the case cannot properly serve as a guide in deciding whether the decision in revision can be called a decree within the meaning of the term as used in S. 48, C.P.C. 16. In AIR 1946 Mad 231 (B) their Lordships of the Madras High Court had to consider the question whether the word 'decree' means that of the trial court or of appellate Court. It held after referring to several authorities that it means decree of the appellate court. In this case their Lordships did not agree with the interpretation sought to be put by Mockett and Burn, JJ. upon the decision in AIR 1940 Mad 127 (F) in AIR 1941 Mad 477 (A). 17. The same view is taken in AIR 1954 Mad 170 (C). Although these decisions do not involve the question regarding a revision petition they at any rate do suggest that the interpretation put in AIR 1941 Mad 477 (A) ay regards the Full Bench decision of Madras High Court is not correct. 18. The decision of Rowland, J. in AIR 1943 Pat 371 (D) suggests that a petition for revision and an appeal are placed on the same footing as regards the application of S. 48, C.P.C. 19. On these considerations and authorities referred to above I hold that the contention raised on behalf of the appellant does not deserve to succeed. 20. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.