SARJOO PROSAD C. J.: This Second Appeal involves an interesting question of law which, we are advised, is not covered by any precedent or authority. It arises out of a suit for dissolution of marriage instituted by the plaintiff-respondent. (2) The plaintiff and the defendant who are Muslims by religion, were married on the 25th of Bysak, 1356 B.S., corresponding to 8-5-49. Before this marriage, admittedly the defendant had two other wives, this being permissible under the Muhammadan Law. It .appears that these other wives were not living with the defendant. At the time of the marriage, a 'kabinnama' was executed, under the terms of which the parties agreed that in case the defendant would bring any of his formerly married wives to stay with him, without the consent of the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be at liberty to divorce the defendant after per­formance of the ordinary legal formalities. In, Bysak, 1357 B.S., corresponding to April or May, 1950, the defendant brought one of his former wives to stay with him without the plaintiff's consent, and when the plaintiff objected to this, it was alleged she was ill-treated, assaulted and driven out of the house. Thereafter the plaintiff observed the formalities of divorce on the 23rd of Ashar 1357 B.S., which corresponds to 8-7-50, and then instituted the present suit. (3) The substantial defence now is that the agreement in the kabinnama giving the plaintiff the right to divorce the defendant in case the latter brought his former wives to stay with him without the consent of the plaintiff, was illegal and could not be enforced, and, therefore, the suit for dissolution of marriage should be dismissed. (4) Both the Courts below have concurrently found that the kabinnama was a genuine docu­ment and by virture of it the defendant had dele­gated to the plaintiff the right to divorce the defendant in the circumstances mentioned there­in. It was also found that the plaintiff had ob­served the necessary formalities leading to a divorce. The Munsiff, however, who tried the suit, held that the contract was an invalid con­tract and opposed to public policy. It was also found that the plaintiff had ob­served the necessary formalities leading to a divorce. The Munsiff, however, who tried the suit, held that the contract was an invalid con­tract and opposed to public policy. He was of opinion that the two former wives of the defen­dant were entitled to conjugal association with him and to have marital relations with their husband, and inasmuch as this contract purported to put an impediment in their way, it was an invalid contract under S. 23, Contract Act. He accordingly dismissed the suit. The lower Appel­late Court has disagreed with this view and held that the contract was valid, there being nothing illegal or opposed to public policy in the terms thereof; and, accordingly that Court has decreed the suit. (5) There is no doubt that the Muhammadan law permits divorce. There is also no doubt that it is open to the husband to delegate this power of divorce to the wife under certain contingencies. Besides, it is well known that a Muslim marriage is a contract, and not a sacrament and, there­fore, the validity or invalidity of the conditions in the 'kabinnama' entitling the plaintiff to exer­cise the right of divorce, will depend upon the fact whether the condition specified in the docu­ment is or is not against the provisions of the Indian Contract Act. It is difficult to see how a contract of this nature can be opposed either to law or to public policy. It is true that under the Muhammadan law, a husband is entitled to have as many as four wives, and those wives are also entitled to the exercise of marital rights with their husband; but the contract in question does not in any manner militate against this provision of the law. All that it says is that in case the husband brings any of his other wives to stay with him along with the plaintiff, without her consent, in that event the plaintiff will be at liberty to exercise this right of divorce. This does not place any impediment of the rights of the other two wives to have marital relations with their husband. This does not place any impediment of the rights of the other two wives to have marital relations with their husband. It does not even put any such impediment on the right of the husband to have marital rela­tions with those two other wives; all that it does is that if it is without the consent of the plaintiff, she would be entitled to live away from them •and to claim divorce. The learned Subordinate Judge is certainly right in observing that it is of the utmost im­portance that everyone should be allowed to live in peace and happiness and that even if the plaintiff is allowed the relief claimed by her un­der the agreement, the other two wives would be free to enjoy their lives. Even the defendant would be free to marry any other woman he chooses provided he does not go beyond the per­missible limit; and there is absolutely no mean­ing in asking an unwilling partner to stay in company with those other wives with whom she may not, after all, agree. The condition, therefore, is quite in accord with reason and public 'policy and in my opinion, it should be enforced. (6) Reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondent upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in - 'Bai Fatima v. All Mahomed', 37 Bom 280 (A), wherein it has been held that an agree­ment for future separation arrived at between husband and wife who are Mahomedans, is void as being opposed to public policy, under S. 25, Contract Act. This case has no application to the present facts. Besides, it is doubtful whe­ther the law propounded there can be of universal application, to all cases of agreement for future separation. The view taken in some later deci­sions, including a decision of this Court in - 'Mirjan Ali v. Mt. Maimuna Bibi', AIR 1949 Assam 14 (Bi, does not seem to be in accord with the above view. Besides, it is doubtful whe­ther the law propounded there can be of universal application, to all cases of agreement for future separation. The view taken in some later deci­sions, including a decision of this Court in - 'Mirjan Ali v. Mt. Maimuna Bibi', AIR 1949 Assam 14 (Bi, does not seem to be in accord with the above view. The decision of this Court, as ex­pressed in -- 'Mirjan All's case (B)' has been followed in - 'Buflatan Bibi v. Sheikh Abdul -Salim', AIR 1950 Cal 304 (C), wherein it was laid down that an ante-nuptial agreement by a Muhammadan husband in a kabinnama that he would pay separate maintenance to his wife in case of disagreement and that the wife would have power to get herself divorced in case of failure to pay maintenance for a certain period, is not opposed to public policy and is enforceable under the Muhammadan law. These decisions are evidently based upon the .principle that a contract which serves to ensure j peace and domestic happiness should not be disregarded as invalid and opposed to public policy. There are several other decisions from which it appears that a contract embodied in a 'kabin­nama', both ante and post nuptial, under which the husband authorises the wife to divorce her­self in the event of the husband taking a second wife, has been held to be valid; See - 'Maharam Ali v. Ayesa Khatun', AIR 1916 Cal 761 (D) and 'Mahammad Amin v. Mt. Aimna Bibi', AIR 1931 Lah 134 (E) and - 'Mt. Sadiqua Begam v. Ata Ullah', AIR 1933 Lah 885 (P). The real question here is not whether the other wives were restrained from coming to stay with the defendant and having marital relations with him, but the real question was-what is the effect, under the terms of the kabinnama, if they come and stay, without the plaintiff's consent, with the defendant? They may be welcome to stay with the defendant, but the plaintiff is given the right to seek divorce, if she chooses, under those conditions. Such a right cannot be said to be invalid. Mr. Sen argues that those cases which follow the Calcutta view, all relate to cases of prohibition against other marriages, while, in the present case, the defendant had already been married, to two other women who, under the law, were entitled to their marital rights. Such a right cannot be said to be invalid. Mr. Sen argues that those cases which follow the Calcutta view, all relate to cases of prohibition against other marriages, while, in the present case, the defendant had already been married, to two other women who, under the law, were entitled to their marital rights. He con­tends that the effect of the agreement was to de­prive those women of their rights. He also points out that in the above cases, mainly S. 26, Con­tract Act was considered, while, in the present case, according to the learned advocate, the con­tract comes within the mischief of S. 23, Contract Act. According to him, the consideration or ob­ject of the agreement is unlawful and forbidden by law. These contentions are, in my opinion, quite un­sound. Those cases may not apply, but, as I have said, the contract in the present case is not hit by the provisions of S. 23, Contract Act; it is a valid and reasonable contract because all that it seeks to do is to give a right to the plaintiff to seek divorce and live apart from the defendant and other co-wives in case they choose to live together. I am unable to see how any exception can be taken to such a contract. In my opinion, the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge, directing dissolution of marriage and granting a decree to the plaintiff, is quite correct and the appeal must be dismissed. In the circumstances, however, I would not make any order as to costs. (7) DEKA J.: I agree. Appeal dismissed.