Order:- This is a petition by one Sivakami Ammal against her husband Bangaruswami Reddi, who has obtained a decree for dissolution against her in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Salem, for giving her Rs.100 a month as maintenance during the pendency of her appeal and Rs.350 for her expenses in prosecuting the appeal. The petition has been made under section 5(7) of Madras Act VI of 1949. It is opposed vigorously. The respondents’ contentions are five, and I shall consider them seriatim below. The first is that the petitioner has deserted the respondent, and that the respondent will only be too happy if she were to live with him and to give him the conjugal rights he is entitled to, and that therefore a woman like that should not be given relief under section 5(7). I am afraid that contention cannot be upheld in this petition because section 5(7) does not entitle the Court to go into an enquiry as to the moral merits of the husband and wife inter se in a summary petition like this. The second contention was that the petitioner has ceased to be a wife the moment the lower Court passed the decree for dissolution of her marriage with the respondent, and that it is only a wife who can apply for the relief under section 5 (7), and so she cannot be given any relief. The argument is extremely ingenious but wholly unconvincing. Under our law, no order of any Court is final, until the last appeal, revision or review, or writ, allowed by law and filed in time is decided. Therefore the lower Court’s order dissolving the marriage is held in suspension during the pendency of the appeal, and the petitioner’s status as wife has not ceased, as is argued. Under the law, certain phrases are used which have got wider implications than they bear, if literally interpreted. Thus, a man in continuous possession of land which became ryoti land after the coming into operation of the Madras Estates Land Act or the amending Act of 1936 has been deemed to be in possession of ryoti land though at the time the possession began it had not become ryoti land. The Privy Council and several High Court decisions are to that effect. They interpret the term ‘ryoti‘as land which would be ryoti land under the Act subsequently passed. The Privy Council and several High Court decisions are to that effect. They interpret the term ‘ryoti‘as land which would be ryoti land under the Act subsequently passed. So too, the word ‘wife’ in section 5(7) must mean a person who would have been a wife but for the decree of divorce or dissolution passed in the trial Court. Else, much of the meaning and content of section 5(7)(c) will be taken away, and section 5(7)(c) will remain an attenuated and anaemic provision. The third contention was that the petitioner did not apply for maintenance or legal expenses in the lower Court and should not be given any. now. But that fact will not prevent her from applying for the same in appeal. The respondent should be glad that he escaped paying maintenance and legal expenses, in the lower Court. That he escaped once will be of course, no reason why he should escape continually, in the absence of limitation, abandonment, waiver, agreement, etc., none of which have been proved. The fourth contention was that the petitioner’s father has been maintaining the petitioner and meeting her legal expenses so far, and that he can easily do so even hereafter. Under the Hindu law, there is no obligation on the part of a father to maintain his married daughter and meet her legal expenses in divorce and dissolution petitions, and he cannot be compelled to do so, even if he is able to do so. So too, a maintenance petition by a wife cannot be dismissed, because her father, brother and other relatives are rich enough to maintain her. Hence this contention too fails. The fifth contention was that the respondent was only getting Rs.350 per year as income from his property, and that in these hard days it would be hardly sufficient to maintain himself, and would leave nothing to give the petitioner for maintenance or legal expenses. The learned counsel for the petitioner says that the income of the respondent would be Rs.6,500 per year. There is no sufficient evidence to find out what the actual income is; nor is it necessary to find it out. Doubtless, the truth lies in between the two extremes. Even a poor Hindu husband has, according to me, a liability under section 5(7), to the extent of his ability. There is no sufficient evidence to find out what the actual income is; nor is it necessary to find it out. Doubtless, the truth lies in between the two extremes. Even a poor Hindu husband has, according to me, a liability under section 5(7), to the extent of his ability. After considering all the representations on both sides, I direct the respondent to pay the petitioner’s counsel Rs.100 within a month from to-day for meeting the expenses of the appeal, and a lump sum of Rs.250 for the petitioner’s maintenance within a month thereafter. The C.M.A. will be posted to the third week of April, 1954, as prayed for by both sides. As undertaken by Mr. Ramaswami Ayyangar, his client will type the papers necessary for the appeal and printing is dispensed with. K.C. ----- Petition allowed.