Judgment 1. In this case the petitioner Shri S. L. Bhardwaj has moved the High Court for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari to call up and quash an order of the Chief Medical Officer, Eastern Railway, Calcutta, dated the 27th of February 1953 removing the petitioner from Railway service. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he was serving as a dispenser in the Eastern Railway at Nawadah in the district of Gaya. On 30-10-1951 proceedings were started against the petitioner by the Chief Medical Officer under Rule 2, Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules. The petitioner sent a representation in due course. On 28-12-1951 the petitioner appeared before the Committee of Advisers at Calcutta. After a long interval of time the petitioner received the order of the Chief Medical Officer Eastern Railway, Calcutta, dated 27-2-1953 removing him from service. The petitioner received the notice of removal on 3-3-1953. The case of the petitioner is that the proceeding started against the petitioner was mala fide and illegal and there was infringement of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioner under the Constitution of India. 3. In our opinion this application must be dismissed on the preliminary ground that Patna High Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the Chief Medical Officer, Eastern Railway, Calcutta. The language of Art. 226 must be closely examined in this connection. Article 226 states that the: "High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose." It is clear from the language of Art. 226 that there are two limitations imposed upon the jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter of issuing a writ. In the first place, the power of the High Court is to be exercised "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction"; in other words, the writ issued by the High Court cannot run beyond the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. In the first place, the power of the High Court is to be exercised "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction"; in other words, the writ issued by the High Court cannot run beyond the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. In the second place, the person or authority to whom the High Court issues the writ must be "within those territories", which means by necessary implication that the person or authority must be amenable to the (jurisdiction of the High Court either by residence or by location within those territories. These are the two conditions upon which the jurisdiction of the High Court is based and it is with reference to these two conditions that the jurisdiction of the High Court must be determined in any particular case. The argument was put forward that the petitioner was serving at Gaya and the order of dismissal was served on the petitioner at Gaya within the territorial limits of Bihar. It was said that the cause of action has accrued in Bihar and the Patna High Court has therefore the necessary jurisdiction to grant a writ under Art. 226. We are unable to accept this argument ,as correct. The test of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 is not whether the cause of action has accrued within the territorial limits of Bihar. The language of Art. 226 makes no express reference to any cause of action or where the cause of action arises. There is nothing in the language of Art. 226 to suggest that the cause of action has any relevance in determining the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ. On the other hand, the express limitation imposed by Art. 226 is that the person or authority to whom writ is issued must be within the territorial limits of the Bihar State. That is the basis of the jurisdiction which is exercised by the High Court under Art. 228 and the question whether the cause of action has arisen within the State of Bihar has no relevance in this connection. 4. This view is borne out by an examination of the scope and nature of prerogative writs in the English law. Article 226 expressly makes reference to writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. 4. This view is borne out by an examination of the scope and nature of prerogative writs in the English law. Article 226 expressly makes reference to writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. All these writs are known in the English law as prerogative writs, the reason being that they are specially associated with the Kings name. These writs were normally granted by the Court of the Kings Bench the theory of the English law being that the King himself superintends the due course of justice through his own Court preventing cases of usurpation of jurisdiction, insisting on vindication of public rights and interposing for the personal freedom of his subjects. These writs were historically intended to provide a summary remedy to persons seeking redress and the special feature of these writs was that they were specifically directed to persons or authorities against whom redress was sought and they were made returnable to the Court issuing them and in case of disobedience the writs were enforceable by attachment for contempt, (see Holdsworth History of English law, Volume 1, page 226). In view of these procedural characteristics it was an essential requirement in the English law that the person or authority to whom the Court was asked to issue a writ should actually be within the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. That is the doctrine of English law and our Constitution makers have borrowed the conception of prerogative writs from English law. The interpretation of Art. 226 must therefore be considered in the background of English law, and so interpreted, it is clear that the person or authority against whom relief is sought under Art. 226 must have its residence or its permanent location within the territorial limits of the High Court. 5. This view as to the interpretation of Art. 226 is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Election Commission, India V/s. Saka Venkata Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210 (A). It was decided in that case that the High Court of Madras had no authority to issue a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the Election Commission which had its office permanently located at New Delhi. It was decided in that case that the High Court of Madras had no authority to issue a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the Election Commission which had its office permanently located at New Delhi. It was argued in that case that the parties in dispute were residents of Madras and the respondent claimed the right to sit and vote in the Legislative Assembly at Madras. It was contended that the cause of action had arisen within the territorial limits of the Madras State. But the argument was rejected by the Supreme Court and it was held that the Madras High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the Election Commission. The principle of this case has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in a recent case K. S. Rashid & Son Income-tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207 (B). The question at issue in that case was whether the Punjab High Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the Income-tax Investigation Commission in Delhi although the assessees were within the State of Uttar Pradesh and their original assessments were made by the Income-tax Officers of that State. The Punjab High Court rejected the application of the assessee on the ground that it had no jurisdiction. The assessee took an appeal which was allowed by the Supreme Court and it was held that the Punjab High Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the incometax Investigation Commission. In view of the principle laid down by these authorities it is clear in this case that we have no jurisdiction to issue a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the Chief Medical Officer whose permanent office is located at Calcutta. 6. It was next argued on behalf of the petitioner that a writ may be issued against the Divisional Medical Officer of Dinapore who communicated the order of dismissal which was signed by the Chief Medical Officer. We are unable to accept this argument. The relief which the petitioner seeks is in substance against the Chief Medical Officer of Calcutta who passed the order of dismissal on the 27-2-1953. The order was communicated to the petitioner by the Divisional Medical Officer of Dinapore who merely acted as a post-office. We are unable to accept this argument. The relief which the petitioner seeks is in substance against the Chief Medical Officer of Calcutta who passed the order of dismissal on the 27-2-1953. The order was communicated to the petitioner by the Divisional Medical Officer of Dinapore who merely acted as a post-office. On principle it is difficult to hold that a writ under Art. 226 could be granted against an inferior or ministerial officer bound to obey the orders of a higher authority to compel him to do something which is part of his duties in that capacity. That is the view taken by a Pull Bench of this Court in In re. Babul Chandra Mitra, AIR 1952 Pat 309 (C) in which it was held that a writ could not be issued against the Assistant Registrar of the High Court who communicated the order of the Court rejecting an application for enrolment to the petitioner. In the present case we cannot grant a writ against the Divisional Medical Officer of Dinapore who merely communicated to the petitioner the order of dismissal passed by the Chief Medical Officer of Calcutta. 7. For these reasons we hold that this application should be dismissed. There will be no order as to the costs.