Raghuwar Singh v. State — 1954 DIGILAW 60 (MP)

JUDGEMENT : DIXIT, J. The appellant Raghuwar Singh was tried by the Sessions Judge of Gwalior on the charge of murdering his sister-in-law Mst. Amritju. At the end of the trial the learned Judge agreeing with the opinion of the assessors found the appellant guilty under S.302, I.P.C, and sentenced him to transportation for life. The accused has now appealed to this Court against the conviction and sentence. 2. The case for the prosecution was that the appellant and his sister-in-law used to live in one house but messed separately; that in this state of living when Amritju became 'enceinte', she told some people that she and the appellant. Raghuwar Singh had been living together. Raghuwar Singh resented the suggestion of Amritju that he had illegal intimacy with her. He, therefore, claimed before the Panchas that he had nothing to do with the pregnancy of the deceased Amritju and asked them to determine the truth about the matter. A Panchayat was held on 6-4-1952 and the Panchas on inquiry learnt from Amritju that Raghuwar Singh was the father of the expected child. The Panchas, therefore, asked Raghuwar Singh to swear at the next meeting of the Panchayat that he had no connection whatsoever with Amritju. On 7-4-1952, on the day of which the Panchas were to meet again, the appellant gave several blows with a lathi to Amritju and inflicted on her fatal injuries. Amritju died immediately after the injuries were inflicted at about 9 A.M. The prosecution further stated that after killing Amritju the accused came before the Panchas with the lathi with which he had struck her and told them that he had killed Amritju and that thereafter the accused went away saying that he was proceeding to Karera Police station. Thereupon, the Panchas asked Hallu P.W.5 to lodge a report with the police. On his way to police station, Karera, Hallu met the accused armed with the blood-stained lathi. He also met Khuba P.W.9 the chowkidar who had gone to the police station to make a report to the effect that Amritju who was with a child had procured an abortion and that Raghuwar Singh had caused the pregnancy. Hallu informed Khuba of the fatal attack by Raghuwar Singh on Amritju and then both of them accompanied by the accused went to the police station, Karera, where Khuba lodged the First Information Report Ex. Hallu informed Khuba of the fatal attack by Raghuwar Singh on Amritju and then both of them accompanied by the accused went to the police station, Karera, where Khuba lodged the First Information Report Ex. P.7 on 7-4-1952 at about 3 P.M. The appellant also produced in the police station the lathi which he was carrying. The accused was then arrested. On 8-4-1952 the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Karera recorded a confession of the accused (Ex. P.12). Before the Committing Magistrate the appellant admitted having struck Amritju with lathi and having killed her. Before the learned Sessions Judge he denied having committed the crime, pleaded alibi and said that he had been falsely implicated on account of enmity. The learned Sessions Judge first convicted Raghuwar Singh without questioning him as regards the statement made by him before the Committing Magistrate. When the matter came up before this Court in appeal, the conviction was set aside and the learned Sessions Judge was directed to re-summon the assessors and question the accused as regards his statement before the Committing Magistrate and to record such evidence as the accused might lead in his defence. When the case went back and the appellant was questioned by the Sessions Judge as regards the statement made by him before the Committing Magistrate, the appellant said that he gave the statement at the instance of police and on account of police pressure. The learned Sessions Judge rejected this plea and on the evidence before him and the statement made by the accused before the Committing Magistrate, found him guilty under S.302, I.P.C. 3. At the trial the evidence against the appellant consisted of (1) the depositions of two eye witnesses Gyasia and Doma; (2) the evidence of Pyareraja and Durag Singh that the accused had confessed before them that he had killed his sister-in-law; (3) the confession of the accused Ex. P.12 recorded by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Karera; (4) and the statement of the appellant before the committing Magistrate admitting his guilt. As to the evidence of, the eye witnesses the learned Sessions Judge observed that "their testimony has to be sifted in the light of other evidence and may be acted upon so far as it is supported by the latter". He accepted the evidence of extra-judicial confessions and the statement made by the accused before the Committing Magistrate. As to the evidence of, the eye witnesses the learned Sessions Judge observed that "their testimony has to be sifted in the light of other evidence and may be acted upon so far as it is supported by the latter". He accepted the evidence of extra-judicial confessions and the statement made by the accused before the Committing Magistrate. The learned Sessions Judge also found the confession Ex. P.12 of the accused to be voluntary. 4. The argument of Mr. De, learned counsel for the appellant, was that the conviction of the appellant was based solely on his statement before the Committing Magistrate inasmuch as the learned Sessions Judge was not prepared to believe the eye witnesses Doma and Gyasia or accept the evidence of Pyareraja and Durag Singh unless it was corroborated and that the confession Ex. P.12 and the statement of the accused before the Committing Magistrate could not be held as evidence corroborating the evidence of the witnesses Doma, Gyasia, Pyareraja and Durga Singh. It was further said that the confession Ex. P.12 and the statement made by the accused before the committing Magistrate were not voluntary as they were given by the accused on account of police pressure and ill-treatment by the police. 5. At the outset I must say that the manner in which the learned Sessions Judge has dealt with the evidence of the eye witnesses is far from satisfactory. All that he did, was to summarize the evidence of Gyasia and Doma making the observation in the end that their evidence had to be sifted in the light of other evidence and might be acted upon so far as it was supported by the latter. In his judgment the learned Sessions Judge made no attempt to determine the credibility of these eye witnesses. In making the observation that the evidence of the eye witnesses had to be sifted in the light of other evidence and that it might be, acted upon in so far as it was supported by "other evidence", the learned Sessions Judge seems to have thought that the evidence of eye witnesses requires corroboration.That there is no such general rule has been recently made clear by the Supreme Court in the case of - 'Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab', AIR 1953 SC 364 (A). Pointing out that there is no such general rule of prudence requiring corroboration of the evidence of eye witnesses, the Supreme Court observed that in a given case a Judge for reasons special to that case and to that witness can of course say that he is not prepared to believe that witness because of his general unreliability or for other reasons unless he is corroborated; "but the basis for such a conclusion must rest on facts special to the particular instance and cannot be grounded on a supposedly general rule of prudence enjoined by law as in the case of accomplices." In the present case the learned Sessions Judge has given no indication as to why in his opinion corroboration of the evidence of the eye witnesses was necessary. In my opinion the eye witnesses Gyasia and Doma are not worthy of any credit, Gyasia while admitting that his vision was bad and he could not see things and persons beyond a distance of twenty paces, yet deposed that he saw the appellant strike Amritju with a lathi from a distance of nearly 250 paces. He made the strange statement that Amritju did not shout when she was hit. The witness said that he also did not shout. But in his statement before the police Gyasia said that when he saw the appellant hitting Amritju with a lathi, he shouted and asked Raghuwar Singh as to what he was doing. Gyasia's further statement that while he was watching the occurrence from underneath a Pipal tree Doma also came and joined him and that he had no talk with Doma about the matter does not agree with Doma's statement who said that when he met Gyasia, he was told by Gyasia that the accused was giving lathi blows to his sister-in-law. No reliance can be placed on Doma's statement also for the simple reason that immediately after the occurrence though he met Hallu and Durag Singh, he did not tell Hallu and Durag Singh that he had actually seen Raghuwar Singh attacking Amritju. According to Mr. Tikle, the investigation Officer, when he first visited the scene of occurrence and prepared a Panchanama of the body of Amritju, Doma did not tell him that he had witnessed the occurrence. According to Mr. Tikle, the investigation Officer, when he first visited the scene of occurrence and prepared a Panchanama of the body of Amritju, Doma did not tell him that he had witnessed the occurrence. In these circumstances I am not prepared to accept the statements of Doma and Gyasia that they saw Raghuwar Singh strike Amritju with a lathi. 6. In regard to the statements of Pyareraja and Durag Singh that the appellant admitted before them having killed his sister-in-law, I think the learned Sessions Judge was right in acting upon those statements. The evidence of Pyareraja is that the accused had met him some time previous to the occurrence and told him that he should not leave the village as he was going to call a Panchayat for investigating into the charge of pregnancy against him by Amritju; that on the day of the occurrence when he happened to pass by the house of the accused, the accused came out of his house and said that The accused was at this time carrying a bloodstained lathi. According to Pyareraja Raghuwar Singh also told him that he was going to Thana. From all these circumstances the witness concluded that the appellant had killed Amritju. Pyareraja said that thereafter, he went to the Panchas and told them what the accused had said to him and that when the accused also came there he i.e., the witness, went away. Durag Singh supported the statement of Pyareraja that he came and told the Panchas that the accused had killed his wife (sic) and that some time after the accused also came where the Panchas had collected. According to Durag Singh the appellant said to the Panchas and added that he had killed his sister-in-law. Durag Singh also deposed that Raghuwar Singh was carrying a blood-stained lathi when he came to the Panchas and that he also told the Panchas that he was proceeding to Karera police station. Now it is quite true that evidence of oral confessions of guilt has to be received with great caution. But none of the considerations which tend to impair the value of this kind of evidence is present here. There is nothing in the cross-examination of the witnesses Pyareraja and Durag Singh to show that they had any motive for implicating the appellant. The witnesses had not made any different statements previously. But none of the considerations which tend to impair the value of this kind of evidence is present here. There is nothing in the cross-examination of the witnesses Pyareraja and Durag Singh to show that they had any motive for implicating the appellant. The witnesses had not made any different statements previously. They have not been confronted with any and asked to explain variations. They did not state merely their conclusion about the guilt of the accused but also deposed to the actual words uttered by the appellant. There is thus no reason to discard the statements of Pyareraja and Durag Singh that the accused admitted having killed his sister-in-law in the words deposed to by them. Regard being had to the fact that when the appellant met Pyareraja and Durag Singh before the Panchas he was carrying a blood-stained lathi and that the appellant expressed his intention to go to the police station, I think it would not be unreasonable to infer that when the appellant said he thereby admitted having killed his sister-in-law. 7. The evidence of oral extra-judicial confession is undoubtedly a very weak piece of evidence and it would be dangerous to convict a person solely on its basis. But it can be taken into consideration along with other evidence. The other evidence in this case is the statement of the accused before the Committing Magistrate wherein he admitted having given lathi blows to Amritju and having killed her.Under S.287, Criminal P.C. the examination of the accused duly recorded by or before the Committing Magistrate has to be read as evidence. It cannot be brushed aside on the mere suggestion without any more of the accused person that he made the statement at the instance of police or on account of ill-treatment by the police. In order to hold that the statement made by the accused before the Committing Magistrate was at the instance of the police, there must be either intrinsic evidence in the statement itself to show that it must have been made on account of police pressure, or the accused must show by evidence that he made it under threats and duress of the police. No such intrinsic or external evidence is present in the case. No such intrinsic or external evidence is present in the case. When the appellant was first questioned on 14-3-1953 about his statement before the Committing Magistrate, he said that he had made the statement at the suggestion of the Thanedar. It was only when the appellant was examined again on 11-1-1954 when the case was sent back second time by this court to the learned Sessions Judge that the appellant came out with the story that the police beat him severely and forced him to make the statement that he did before the Committing Magistrate. The plea of ill-treatment at the hands of the police is thus clearly an after thought. Indeed, if the statements of Pyareraja and Durag Singh that immediately after the occurrence the accused met them with a blood-stained lathi and that he admitted having killed Amritju and also told them that he was proceeding to the Thana are believed, as I think they should be, and if, as the evidence shows, the appellant himself went to the police station and produced lathi, then there could be no apparent occasion or reason for the police to bring pressure upon the accused to admit his guilt before the Committing Magistrate. The admission made by the accused before the Committing Magistrate is quite consistent with his conduct deposed to by the witnesses Pyareraja and Durag Singh. Learned counsel for the appellant said that a Division Bench of this Court has ruled in-The State v. Umarao Singh', Confirmation Case No.2 of 1954, D/-24-8-1954 (Madh. B) Indore Bench (B), that in this State where there are no proper arrangements of judicial lock-up, an accused person though technically in the judicial custody yet remains under police influence and that, therefore, no weight can be attached to a statement made by the accused before the Committing Magistrate admitting his guilt, As I read that decision I do not think that my learned others Newaskar and Samvatsar JJ., laid down by such wide and general proposition. In that case after observing that the examination of the accused duly recorded by the Committing Magistrate has to be read as evidence and could be taken into account with other evidence and that the question as to what weight should attached to such evidence would depend upon circumstances of each case, my learned others proceeded to say: This Court has on several occasions considered he weight to be attached to the statement of the accused and the confession made by him before the Magistrate during the period in which he was actually in the custody of the police. This necessity arose on more occasions than one, owing to the unsatisfactory arrangements of judicial lock-ups at several places in Madhya Bharat. This Court has generally taken the view that reliance cannot be placed on the admissions of guilt contained in the statement made by the accused person during the days he was actually in the hands of the police. The learned Sessions Judge has placed great deal of reliance on the statement of the accused P/13 and has answered the argument advanced on behalf of the accused by saying that the accused had not complained of police tortures before the Committing Magistrate. If the accused was actually in the custody of the police, he would naturally be reluctant to charge them with ill-treatment knowing that after the court-hours he would again be placed in their charge. I cannot attach much weight to the fact that the accused had failed to complain to the Commtting Magistrate regarding the treatment alleged to have been given to him by the Police Officer. I am also of the opinion that it is rather unsafe to rely on the statement contained in P/13 as the accused was actually in the hands of the police when the statement was made. The learned Judge has himself disbelieved certain parts of this statement of the accused. The accused had admitted having told Daya that he had killed Champa but the learned Judge refused to place much faith in the statement of Daya and this admission by the accused." 8. It will be seen from the above observations that in the 'case of Umraosingh (B)', my learned brothers did not lay down that in this State a statement made by an accused person before the Committing Magistrate would be presumed to have been given under police influence. It will be seen from the above observations that in the 'case of Umraosingh (B)', my learned brothers did not lay down that in this State a statement made by an accused person before the Committing Magistrate would be presumed to have been given under police influence. Nor did they on the basis of any such presumption refuse to place reliance on the statement of the accused Umraosingh. They found the statement of the accused unreliable because the Sessions Judge himself had disbelieved portions of the statement of the accused before the Committing Magistrate. Thus ultimately they rested their conclusion not on the general observations made by them but on acts special to the particular statement made by the accused before the Committing Magistrate. As I have said before there is no internal or external evidence in this case to suggest that the statement made by the appellant before the Committing Magistrate must have been under police influence. Mr. De then argued that the statement of the accused under S.342, Criminal P.C., cannot be used to fill up gaps in prosecution evidence. It is quite true that the purpose of the examination of the accused under S.209 or 342, Criminal P.C., is to afford the accused an opportunity of explaining such circumstances as appear in the evidence against him. Where, therefore, there is no evidence against the accused and the Magistrate proceeds to examine him and records his answers the examination of the accused cannot be said to have been duly recorded within the meaning of S.287. But when the evidence led before the Committing Magistrate made out, as in this case, a prima facie case against the accused and the Magistrate examined the accused on this prima facie evidence, then it cannot be maintained that the statement of the accused was not duly recorded. Learned counsel for the appellant then referred us to - 'Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh'. AIR 1952 SC 159 (C), and said that the statement of the accused before the Committing Magistrate wherein he admitted his guilt cannot be made the foundation of conviction. I do not think 'Kashmira Singh's case (C)', lays down the proposition that even if the accused has voluntarily confessed his guilt in his statement under S.342 before the Magistrate, he cannot be convicted on such confessional statement. I do not think 'Kashmira Singh's case (C)', lays down the proposition that even if the accused has voluntarily confessed his guilt in his statement under S.342 before the Magistrate, he cannot be convicted on such confessional statement. What was decided in 'Kashmira Singh's case (C),' was that when the substantive evidence is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case against the accused, it is not permissible to use confession of a co-accused, under S.30, Evidence Act, as if it were itself substantive evidence. 'Kashmira Singh's case (C)', in no way assists the appellant. As regards the confession of the accused Ex. P.12 recorded by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate I do not think it cart be admitted in evidence when from the record of the confession it does not appear that before recording the confession the Magistrate questioned him in such a manner as to satisfy himself affirmatively about the voluntariness of the confession. 9. In my view if the extra-judicial confessions made by the appellant before Pyareraja and Durag Singh, and the statement made by the appellant before the Committing Magistrate are taken into consideration with the proved facts that the appellant and his sister-in-law used to live together, that he complained to the Panchas that Amritju was making a false accusation against him off having become pregnant on his account, that immediately after the occurrence the appellant appeared before the Panchas with a blood-stained lathi, showed no concern about the death of his sister-in-law and that thereafter went to the police station and produced the lathi, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the appellant murdered Amritju. It must be mentioned that when the accused was first examined by the learned Sessions Judge, he admitted having gone to the police station to make a report and also admitted the fact that he produced the lathi before the police. The appellant did not lead any evidence to establish the plea of alibi. 10. For all these reasons I am of the opinion that the learned Sessions Judge was right in convicting the appellant under S.302, I.P.C., and sentencing him to transportation for life. This appeal must, therefore, be dismissed. 11. A. H. KHAN, J.: I agree. Appeal dismissed.