JUDGMENT This is an application under section 23(2)(b) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, to require the Board of Revenue to make a reference as several questions of law are said to arise out of the order of the Board under section 22(5), passed on the 10th March, 1952. 2. The Board of Revenue rejected the application under section 23(1) as barred by time and also on the ground that no question of law arose out of its order dated the 10th March, 1952. That order, rejecting the applicant's application for revision, was signed on the 10th March, 1952, by two members constituting the Division Bench of the Board of Revenue. This date was not fixed for delivery of the order and no notice of this date was given to the parties. On the 12th March, 1952, the applicant received a post card from the office of the Board of Revenue stating that the Application No. 33 was rejected on the 10th March, 1952. It was stated before us that a copy of the order dated the 10th March, 1952, was received by the applicant from the Sales Tax Officer on the 23rd April, 1952. Prior to this, an application for a certified copy of the order was made by the applicant on the 20th March, 1952, and the copy was received by him on the 7th May, 1952. The application for reference was filed on the 12th May, 1952. This application was dismissed as filed on the 63rd day from the 10th March, 1952, while the limitation under section 23(1) of the Act was 60 days from the passing of the order. 3. This Court has jurisdiction to require the Board to make a reference if it is not satisfied that the refusal was justified. If the application for reference was barred by time, the Board was bound to dismiss it and its refusal to state the case was justified. 4. We have, therefore, heard the parties on the preliminary question of limitation and we hold that the order of the Board of Revenue rejecting the application as barred by time was not justified. The order as it stands is clearly unsupportable. 4. We have, therefore, heard the parties on the preliminary question of limitation and we hold that the order of the Board of Revenue rejecting the application as barred by time was not justified. The order as it stands is clearly unsupportable. According to the Board the limitation in the instant case expired on the 9th May, 1952, even though no date was fixed for delivery of the order and even though intimation of the order had not been given to the assessee. In this view a glut of work in the office of the busy Board of Revenue or the negligence of its subordinates concerted may deprive the assessee of the right of appeal. This cannot be the intention of the Legislature. There must be such "passing of the order" as will not deprive the party aggrieved of his remedies. What the members of the Board of Revenue did in the instant case was simply to sign the order and to send the case to the office. It is not disputed that in case of a Civil Court such an act does not amount to either pronouncing a judgment or passing an order. As already pointed out, section 23(1) provides that an application for reference must be made within 60 days of the passing of the order under section 22(5). According to the learned counsel for the applicant the date of passing such order is the date on which the order is passed in the presence of parties and when the order is reserved or is not signed and delivered on a date fixed for passing the order, of which due notice is given to the parties concerned, the date on which a copy thereof is received by the assessee. The learned counsel relies on The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Gopisetti Narayanaswami Naidu Garu ((1911) I.L.R. 34 Mad. 151), S. Ramanatha Reddiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax ((1928) A.I.R. 1928 Rang. 152), Lal Mohammad Hayat v. Commissioner of Income-tax ((1929) A.I.R. 1929 Lah. 170), and Swaminathan v. Lakshmanan ((1930) A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 490). If this contention is sound, the application is clearly within limitation. If limitation is to be counted from the 12th March, 1952, the application was made on the 61st day and is barred by time. 5. 152), Lal Mohammad Hayat v. Commissioner of Income-tax ((1929) A.I.R. 1929 Lah. 170), and Swaminathan v. Lakshmanan ((1930) A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 490). If this contention is sound, the application is clearly within limitation. If limitation is to be counted from the 12th March, 1952, the application was made on the 61st day and is barred by time. 5. The other submission of the learned counsel for the applicant is that he is entitled to the exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order. According to him section 12(2) of the Limitation Act is applicable in view of section 29(2) of that Act. Reliance was placed on India Ice and Cold Storage Co., Ltd. v. Member, Board of Revenue, West Bengal ([1949] 1 S.T.C. 191), Radhakishan Bhagwan Din v. Commissioner of Sales Tax ([1951] 2 S.T.C. 173), Bharat Sabaigrass Ltd. v. Collector of Commercial Taxes, Orissa ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 453), Amritsar Sugar Mill Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 271), Dropadi v. Hira Lal ((1912) I.L.R. 34 All. 496) and Mohanlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax ((1930) A.I.R. 1930 Pat. 14). 6. In reply, the Additional Government Pleader contented himself merely with replying on Doma Sao v. State of Bihar ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 167; A.I.R. 1952 Pat. 357). He made no attempt to show that the decisions relied on by his opponent were not correctly decided or were distinguished or were inapplicable. He made no attempt to meet the submissions of the learned counsel for the applicant based on section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. This is hardly a satisfactory presentation of the case on behalf of the State. 7. In Doma Sao v. State of Bihar ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 167; A.I.R. 1952 Pat. 357), it was held that in the absence of a provision similar to section 67-A of the Income-tax Act, time requisite for obtaining a copy could not be excluded in computing the period of limitation for an application for reference to High Court. It did not consider the applicability to section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, nor did it consider the first submission made by the learned counsel for the applicant about the interpretation of the expression "passing of the order". It is, therefore, of little assistance in the instant case. 8. The Sales Tax Act is undoubtedly a local law. It did not consider the applicability to section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, nor did it consider the first submission made by the learned counsel for the applicant about the interpretation of the expression "passing of the order". It is, therefore, of little assistance in the instant case. 8. The Sales Tax Act is undoubtedly a local law. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act provides that the provisions of section 3 of the Act shall apply where a local law prescribes a period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, different from the period prescribed by the First Schedule of the Act. Section 3 provides that every suit, appeal or application shall be dismissed unless it is brought within the time prescribed by the First Schedule or unless the time in enlarged by any of the provisions in section 4 to 25 of the Act. Section 29(2) provides that for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, by any special or local law, the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18 and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply. If, therefore, follows that the period prescribed by section 23(1) of the Sales Tax Act will be regarded as the period prescribed by the First Schedule to the Limitation Act for the purposes of section 3 of the Act, and sections 4 and 9 to 18 and 22 will apply as there is no provision in the Sales Tax Act to exclude any of these provisions. 9. Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel, however, applies to appeals, applications for leave to appeal and applications for review of judgments. An application to the Board of Revenue under section 23(1) of the Sale Tax Act does not fall under any of these categories. Section 12(2) will, therefore, not help the applicant. 10. The decisions on which his learned counsel relied are clearly distinguishable. Radha Kishan Bhagwan Din v. Commissioner of Sales Tax ([1951] 2 S.T.C. 173) was followed in Amritsar Sugar Mill Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 271). Section 12(2) will, therefore, not help the applicant. 10. The decisions on which his learned counsel relied are clearly distinguishable. Radha Kishan Bhagwan Din v. Commissioner of Sales Tax ([1951] 2 S.T.C. 173) was followed in Amritsar Sugar Mill Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 271). In the former it was held that till rules were framed under the Sales Tax Act, the rules under the Income-tax Act should be deemed to be applicable to proceedings under the former Act. The rules of the Allahabad High Court under the Income-tax Act required that a certified copy of the order should be filed along with the application under section 66(2), and consequently it was held that the time requisite for obtaining copies must be excluded in computing the period of limitation. It was held in Amritsar Sugar Mill Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 271), that a certified copy of the order of the Sales Tax Authority refusing to make a reference was necessary. In Simbhaoli Sugar Mills Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax ([1953] 4 S.T.C. 289) time for obtaining a copy of the order was excluded under section 12 because of the decision in Amritsar Sugar Mill Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 271). 11. In Dropadi v. Hiralal ((1912) I.L.R. 34 All. 496) the question was of the exclusion under section 12(2) of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order appealed from in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal under the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1907. It was held that the Act was a special law within the meaning of section 29 of the Limitation Act which made the provisions of sections 3, 4, 9 to 18 and 22 applicable to special and local laws. It was, therefore, held that section 12(2) was applicable. 12. By adding section 67-A by the Amending Act, XXII of 1930, a provision similar to that of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act has been expressly made applicable to applications under section 66 of the Income-tax Act. Prior to this, section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was applicable in computation of limitation prescribed by this special law. Consequently section 12(2) applied to the proceedings specified therein. Prior to this, section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was applicable in computation of limitation prescribed by this special law. Consequently section 12(2) applied to the proceedings specified therein. In Bharat Sabaigrass Ltd. v. Collector of Commercial Taxes, Orissa ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 453), India Ice and Cold Storage Co., Ltd. v. Member, Board of Revenue, West Bengal ([1949] 1 S.T.C. 191) and Lal Mohammad Hayat v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab ((1929) A.I.R. 1929 Lah. 170), their Lordships did not examine and did not decide whether an application under section 66 of the Income-tax Act fell within any of the categories of appeal, application for leave to appeal, or an application for review mentioned in section 12(2). These decisions are, therefore, not helpful. 13. In Mohanlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax ((1930) A.I.R. 1930 Pat. 14), which followed Dropadi v. Hiralal ((1912) I.L.R. 34 All 496), it is not anywhere stated how an application for reference fell within the terms of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. Their Lordships pointed out that since section 29(2) made section 12 applicable to special or local laws for determining the period of limitation prescribed by such law for any suit, appeal or application, it was reasonable to hold that section 12 was applicable to applications under the old section 66(2) and (3). With all respect, we do not agree with this interpretation of section 12. An application for reference or for mandamus to require the tribunal to make a reference cannot be regarded as an application for review without placing an unwarranted construction on these words. 14. The expression "passing as order" must be so construed as not to defeat the right of appeal of an assessee for no fault of his. If the interpretation put upon it by the Board of Revenue is accepted, that right may be defeated. In Boon v. Howard ((1874) L.R. 9 C.P. 277, 308) Keating, J., observed :- "I hold it to be an essential canon of construction, that, if the words are susceptible of a reasonable and also of an unreasonable construction, the former construction must prevail." In Falmouth Boat Construction Company Ltd. v. Howell ([1950] 2 K.B. 16, 29 - 30) which was affirmed in Howell v. Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd. ([1951] A.C. 837) Singleton, L.J., observed :- "I regard the word 'licence' in the order as capable of meaning either a written or an oral licence. I think it would be the duty of the judge in such a case to point out to the jury that, though 'a licence granted by the Admiralty' would normally connote a written instrument, it need not of necessity bear that meaning if it were capable of another meaning and if so to read it would made the carrying out of urgent repairs in war-time impossible without committing a breach of the order. After all, common sense must apply to construction, and if there are two possible meanings of the word the one which makes sense of the order and renders its working practically possible should be given." 15. It cannot be the intention of the Legislature that the authority signing an order in the absence of a party should not communicate its decision to him and that the right of appeal should depend on the sweet-will of the authority or its officials. In The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Gopisetti Narayanaswami Naidu Garu ((1911) I.L.R. 34 Mad. 151), it was held that the "date of the decision" for the purpose of limitation was the date when the decision was passed and the decision could not be said to be passed unless it was in some way pronounced or published under such circumstances that the parties affected by it had a reasonable opportunity of knowing what it contained. The expression "passing an order" must, therefore, be so construed as to mean that it is passed in the presence of the parties or is passed on the date of which due notice is given to the parties or where no such date is fixed on the date the party receives a copy of the order. Merely intimating that the appeal or application is dismissed is not enough. 16. There is nothing in the Sales Tax Act to prevent the Board of Revenue or other authorities acting under the Act from giving the assessee sufficient notice of the day on which it would pass its decision to enable him, if he chooses to be present, to hear it; and if that is done limitation would run from that day if the decision is announced on that date. That is the date of communication though the assessee may not care to listen. There is a catena of cases of the Madras High Court taking this view : Annamalai Chetti v. Colonel J. G. Cloete ((1883) I.L.R. 6 Mad. 189) Seshama v. Sankara ((1889) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 1), Swaminathan v. Lakshmanan ((1930) I.L.R. 53 Mad. 491) and Muthiah Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax ([1951] 19 I.T.R. 402) which was relied on in Bharat Sabaigrass Ltd. v. Collector of Commercial Taxes ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 453). In Mohanlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax ([1930] A.I.R. 1930 Pat. 14) a contrary view was taken. It was followed in State of Bihar v. Telu Ram Jain ([1953] 4 S.T.C. 252). On a literal interpretation of the section it was held by the Allahabad High Court in Simbhaoli Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax ([1953] 4 S.T.C. 289) that the date of the passing of the order is the date on which it is signed irrespective of whether it is done in the presence of parties or after notice to them. The decision was, however, obiter. In Rahman Stores v. Commissioner of Taxes ([1953] 4 S.T.C. 336) the Assam High Court refused to rely on Rambhagatsao v. Province of Bihar ([1946] 1 S.T.C. 145) and Muthia Chettiar's case ([1951] 19 I.T.R. 402) on the ground that they referred to an original order and not to an appellate order. 17. We hold that for the purpose of limitation the order in the instant case was passed when a copy of it was received by the assessee. In this view the application is within limitation. 18. Three questions of law which are said to arise are stated in the petition made to this Court, but the learned Counsel concedes that questions 1 and 2 are really one question. 19. The facts as appearing from the record are : Before the commencement of the Act, the assessee was carrying on business of buying and selling cotton, cotton seed and other articles, ginning cotton and manufacture of edible oils. His turnover as stated in the application for registration was over 4 1/2 lakhs for the year preceding the commencement of the Act and his taxable turnover was nil. His turnover as stated in the application for registration was over 4 1/2 lakhs for the year preceding the commencement of the Act and his taxable turnover was nil. On the 30th June, 1947, he was granted a certificate of registration under section 8(3) of the Act in which it was stated that his purchases of ginned and unginned cotton, cotton seed, other oil seeds, oil cakes, all edible oils, machinery, lubricating oils, gunnies, hessian, gin stores whether for manufacture of all kinds of oil or for resale were exempt from payment of sales tax. 20. On the 23rd February, 1948, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax issued a notice to the assessee to show cause why his certificate should not be cancelled. No reasons were stated for the proposed cancellation of the certificate. The assessee appeared in person and made an oral representation on the 1st March, 1948. The Assistant Commissioner passed the following order :- "On examining this case in the light of instructions issued in this office memorandum No. ST/1163, dated the 12th December, 1947, the Sales Tax Officer now reports that the dealer is not liable to registration as his turnover from the sales of taxable goods during the year preceding the commencement of the Act was nil. The registration certificate is, therefore, cancelled." This order dated the 1st March, 1948, was communicated to the assessee by the Sales Tax Officer on the 26th March, 1948, and the dealer had to return the registration certificate. 20. The assessee did not prefer an appeal against this order; but after some fruitless correspondence he made a representation to the Commissioner on the 20th October, 1948, questioning the validity of the order dated the 1st March, 1948, and praying for its cancellation and revival of the certificate with effect from the 1st March, 1948. On the 21st September, 1948, he had made a fresh application for registration. On the 11th April, 1949, a new registration certificate was issued. On the 2nd January, 1950, the assessee again applied to the Commissioner praying for revival of the original certificate from the date of its cancellation. By a memorandum dated the 24th March, 1950, the Sales Tax Officer informed the assessee that the application for revival of the original certificate was rejected by the Commissioner and the new certificate was made operative from the 8th October, 1948. 21. By a memorandum dated the 24th March, 1950, the Sales Tax Officer informed the assessee that the application for revival of the original certificate was rejected by the Commissioner and the new certificate was made operative from the 8th October, 1948. 21. The assessee applied to the Board of Revenue for revision of this order. That application was dismissed on the 10th March, 1952, on the ground that the order dated the 1st March, 1948, was an order passed in review under section 22(6) and was passed in accordance with law. It was also stated that if the assessee was aggrieved by the order dated the 1st March, 1948, the proper course was to appeal against it. 22. The application under section 23(1) for reference was rejected on the ground that it was barred by time and that no question of law arose out of the order dated the 10th March, 1952. 23. In our view, on these facts, the following questions of law do arise out of the order dated the 10th March, 1952. (1) Whether the order dated the 1st March, 1948, was passed in exercise of the power of review under section 22(6). (2) whether the authority which passed the order had power to review the order of the Sales Tax Officer granting a registration certificate. (3) Whether the order dated the 1st March, 1948, is according to law. (4) Whether the applicant's failure to appeal against this order precludes consideration of any of the above 3 questions by the Board of Revenue. 24. Rule 67 empowers the Commissioner to delegate the power to register a dealer and the power to cancel registration to the Sales Tax Officer. Section 22(6) empowers any person appointed under section 3 to review any order passed by him. Apparently, therefore, the Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, had no jurisdiction to pass the order dated the 1st March, 1948, reviewing the order of the Sales Tax Officer granting the certificate and to cancel that certificate. This important question of law is not considered by the Board of Revenue. Similarly, the question whether on the facts stated by the Board the applicant was entitled to a certificate of registration on the 30th June, 1947, is undoubtedly a question of law and there appears to be a likelihood of a different conclusion. This important question of law is not considered by the Board of Revenue. Similarly, the question whether on the facts stated by the Board the applicant was entitled to a certificate of registration on the 30th June, 1947, is undoubtedly a question of law and there appears to be a likelihood of a different conclusion. The assessee relies on Fateh Chand Muralidhar v. The Province of Bihar ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 293). He is a manufacturer of oil for the purpose of sale by himself. His turnover exceeds the taxable quantum of Rs. 5,000 required by section 4(1). He submits that the word "turnover" in section 4(1) cannot be read as "taxable turnover", and that memorandum referred to in the order in question, which is now before us, proceeds on this misconception. We have adverted to these aspects as the questions of law arising in this case are not well settled and require decision by this Court. 25. We are, therefore, not satisfied that the refusal of the Board of Revenue to make a reference was justified and so direct it to state the case and refer the questions of law arising out of the order dated the 10th March, 1952, which we have indicated above. 26. The application succeeds and is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 100 if certified. Application allowed.