This Rule is directed against an appellate order of the Subordinate Judge of Gauhati who reversed an order of the learned Munsif of Gauhati refusing temporary injunction in a suit brought by Keolraj Sethi, the opposite party in this rule in the Court of the Munsif at Gauhati chal­lenging the validity of a decree passed against a ' third party, in Title Suit No. 209 of 1948 which was brought by the petitioner Musst. Ladi Agarwallani and another asking for eviction of Prithamchand Malik and others. It is necessary to refer in short to the facts of this case with a view to understand the present proceeding. (2) Mt. Ladi Agarwallani and another brought Title Suit No. 209 of 1948 against Pritham Chand and others for eviction from a residential house which was alleged to have been leased out to them on or about the year 1931. The suit for eviction was brought after due notice alleging that the plaintiffs wanted the house for themselves and that the defendants had failed to pay the rent regularly. The decree in that suit was resisted on two grounds, namely, that there was no bona fide necessity of the-house for the plaintiffs and that the notice was bad in law inasmuch as the house was being utilised for a manufacturing purpose and six months' notice was due under the law whereas a shorter notice had been served on the defendants to vacate the house by 30-7-1948. It appears from the lower appellate court judg­ment as well as the judgment of his Court that both these grounds had no substance. The defen­dants were defaulters and the tenancy was purely for a residential purpose and the plea of utilising the premises for a manufacturing work under the name of Malik Soap Factory was found to be un­substantiated. It was further found that the so-called plant or the manufacturing process of soap manufacture were carried outside in a neighbour­ing plot and not within the premises with respect to which the eviction decree was sought. The decree of the High Court was passed on 30-3-1953 and the present suit was instituted on 25-4-1953 when the plaintiffs in that suit made an attempt to exe­cute the decree of eviction against the Maliks. The decree of the High Court was passed on 30-3-1953 and the present suit was instituted on 25-4-1953 when the plaintiffs in that suit made an attempt to exe­cute the decree of eviction against the Maliks. The case of the opposite party, Keolraj Sethi is that he is a partner of the Malik Soap Factory and" he not being made a party in the earlier suit had the legitimate and bona fide claim to continue in possession of the said premises. In assertion of this right, he prayed for temporary injunction on the same day the plaint was presented asking for restraining the plaintiffs in the earlier suit from executing the decree for eviction with respect to the house in question. (3) The learned Munsiff on receipt of this appli­cation issued notice on the other party to show cause why temporary injunction should not be granted and on the defendants showing cause chal­lenging the plaintiffs' right to ask for temporary injunction and alleging that the plaintiffs' move was inspired by the Malik defendants in the earlier suit to resist or thwart in the matter of execution of the decree against them, the learned Munsiff by his order of 20-6-1953 held following the principle of the case reported in - 'Abdul Hamid v. Tridip. Kumar', AIR 1953 Assam 104 (A), that no relief was available to the plaintiff under O. 39 R. 2,. Civil P. C., and dismissed his application for issue of temporary injunction. He further held that "as the factory is not in the house in question, in its entirety, no substantial loss will occur to the plain­tiff or the persons concerned". The appellate judgment of the High Court in connection with the earlier suit also discloses that there was nothing to show that any essential part of the manufacturing was carried on in the house and on the admission of the defendants themselves, it appeared that the machinery and plant were placed in different premises. Even assuming that •the present plaintiff Keolraj Sethi is a partner in the Malik Soap Factory, that would not entitle him to remain in the house if he was not a tenant of the plaintiffs. Even assuming that •the present plaintiff Keolraj Sethi is a partner in the Malik Soap Factory, that would not entitle him to remain in the house if he was not a tenant of the plaintiffs. It appears from the petition that no defence was taken in the earlier suit to the effect that Keolraj Sehi was a tenant of the plaintiffs or a co-tenant, and the suit was defective for not adding him as a party and that statement has no­where been challenged. (4) The learned Subordinate Judge unfortunately developed a story of his own on the basis of a single statement made by one of the defendants .in the earlier suit in the course of his deposition that Keolraj Sethi was a partner in the Malik Soap .Factory and there from he deduced that Keolraj was a necessary party in the earlier suit. There •was no such finding in the original suit itself and it is beyond my comprehension how the learned Subordinate Judge could make an observation here -that the earlier suit was defective for not framing .an issue as to whether Keolraj was a necessary party unless the point was raised in the pleading. That the decree was defective or that he has a right to stay in the premises will have to be proved by Keolraj himself in the present suit if he so desires. The learned Judge though refers casually to have perused the judgment of the High Court, it does •not appear from his judgment that he took pains to understand it or the facts of the earlier case as found. He even fails to take note of the facts stated in the Munsiff's judgment from which the appeal was preferred to his Court. The learned Judge surprisingly enough did not consider the earlier decision of this Court reported in AIR 1953 Assam 104 (A), on which the learned Munsiff relied. Neither did he try to distinguish the ruling of this Court. I am in entire agreement -with the view expressed therein by my learned .brother, Ram Labhya J., where he observed- "It is a question whether taking execution of a subsisting decree which is the subject-matter of a litigation or which is being challenged by the plaintiff in a case amounts to an injury of the kind contemplated by R. 2 of O. 39, Civil P. C. ................ But it seems to me that a per­son may not be prevented from executing a decree obtained by him on the ground that it causes, injury to the plaintiff. The execution of a decree is in the exercise of a legal right and it can­not be placed on a par with the breach of a contract or injury to property or the disturbance of other rights vesting in a particular individual." i This view finds support from the opening lines of R. 2 O. 39, Civil P. C. (5) My learned brother in the self-same judgment referred to S. 94, Civil P. C., which says that in order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated, the Court may, if it is so prescribed, grant a temporary injunction. With a view to ascer­tain whether the ends of justice are being defeated unless an order of injunction is passed, the facts in each case have therefore to be closely scanned and carefully considered by the Court before issue of an injunction. The learned Munsiff in this case thought it unnecessary to issue the temporary in­junction on appreciation of the facts but the learned Subordinate Judge totally lost sight of the back­ground from which the present litigation springs. The finding in the earlier case being that the lease was not for a manufacturing purpose, the learned Subordinate Judge should not have assumed that an alleged partner of the so-called manufacturing con­cern will be aggrieved or injured if the decree obtained for eviction with respect to a particular residential house be executed. The words "other injury of any kind" in O. 39, R. 2, in my opinion have no application to the facts of this case and the learned Subordinate Judge assumed jurisdiction in a matter which the law does not vest in him in the matter of issuing a temporary injunction. (6) The learned Advocate for the opposite party strenuously contended that no relief can be given in this case under S. 115, Civil P. C. and placed before me the Supreme Court ruling reported in .- 'Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen', AIR 1953 SC 23 (B) and while I am fully alive to the prin­ciples decided therein, it contains nothing which would favour the opposite party. Section 115, Civil P. C. provides that the High Court can interfere when the lower Court assumes jurisdiction which is not vested in it. Section 115, Civil P. C. provides that the High Court can interfere when the lower Court assumes jurisdiction which is not vested in it. I have already held in agree­ment with the view expressed by Ram Labhaya J. that O. 39, R. 2, does not cover cases of the pre­sent sort and therefore the order of the learned Subordinate Judge is without jurisdiction and that may be interfered with under S. 115, Civil P. C. and more so when the spirit of S. 94, Civil P. C. is looked to. The case cited by the opposite party, - 'Umapati Choudhuri v. Subodh Chandra', AIR 1953 Gal 377 (C) in their support, was a revision case where relief was given under S. 115, Civil P. C. It is held therein that the Court should give the widest interpretation to the word 'injury' appearing in O. 39, R. 2, for doing justice even if the injury which the plaintiffs may suffer is not injury within the meaning of R. 2. The ends of justice in any event have to be looked to and I very much doubt whether the ends of justice would require the stay of execution of the decree obtained by Ladi Agarwallani and others in the earlier suit where the plaintiffs' present claim was non-existent. The facts of that case are also widely divergent. I therefore do not get much assistance from this ruling either. The learned Advocate for the opposite party failed to place before me any ruling where any of the courts has given relief under similar circum­stances. I cannot further lose sight of the fact that it has almost been a practice to bring a suit in the name of a third party no sooner a decree for eviction has been finalised in the court of law and ask for injunction only with a view to delay the execution of the decree. Without expressing any opinion as to the merits of this case so far the suit is concerned, -- the practice I cannot but de­nounce - and I hope, the Courts will effectually check this subterfuge. The result is that the order moved against is set aside and the application for temporary injunction is rejected. The Rule is made| absolute with cost. Hearing fee Rs. 51/-. Records to go down immediately and the hearing of the suit should be expedited. Rule made absolute.