Judgment :- 1. This is a petition for expunging certain remarks made against the petitioner in the order in Preliminary Enquiry Case No.1 of 1125 on the file of the Stationary First Class Magistrate, Kuzhithura. The petitioner was examined as PW.1 in that case. He is the Headmaster of the English High School, Munchira. The school was formerly under a private management. The prosecution case was that the accused, 8 in number, formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the common object of taking forcible possession of the school from the then manager and that they took from the Headmaster by threat of violence the keys, records and money that were in his possession. The accused were discharged by the learned Magistrate by his order dated 25.2.1953. Certain remarks were made against the petitioner in that order which, according to him, are quite irrelevant and uncalled for and are not supported by anything in the evidence. The remarks are those contained in the following passages: "(1) It is surprising to see how high handed is the act of these two responsible and educated people. (The two people referred to are PW.1, the headmaster and PW. 2, the manager) (page 8) (2) The conduct of PWs.1 and 2 in this behalf appears to be very suspicious (page 8) (3) In the circumstances of this case the argument advanced by learned counsel appearing for the defence that PWs.1 and 2 were working as a team against the school interests and for their own personal pecuniary benefits with a view to commit misappropriation of the school funds gains ground (page 10). (4) All these facts go to show that the hands of PW.1 are not clean and that it is not at all advisable to act upon his words (page 11)." 2. Notice of the petition was given to the State and also to the accused. The petition was not opposed by the learned Public Prosecutor, but it was opposed by learned counsel who appeared for the accused. 3. Before going into the merits of the petition it is necessary to consider the jurisdiction of this Court in the matter of expunging objectionable remarks contained in judgments and orders of subordinate courts. The question was discussed by Tek Chand, J. In the matter of H. Daly (AIR 1928 Lahore 740). 3. Before going into the merits of the petition it is necessary to consider the jurisdiction of this Court in the matter of expunging objectionable remarks contained in judgments and orders of subordinate courts. The question was discussed by Tek Chand, J. In the matter of H. Daly (AIR 1928 Lahore 740). The learned judge observed: "The power of this Court to expunge passages from judgments delivered by itself or by subordinate courts is undoubted. The Chief Court of the Punjab exercised this power in various cases, see for example, Nur Din v. Emperor (21 PLR 1904), Gopal Singh v. Emperor (154 PLR 1901), Modi Shah v. Emperor (80 PLR 1904), In Re Malik Umar Hayat Khan (5 Indian cases 611) and Naha v. Emperor (193 PLR 1911). Similarly in other provinces courts in the exercise of their revisional jurisdiction directed the expunction of remarks from judgments in appropriate cases. Ma Kaya v. Kin Lat Gya (11 Indian Cases 1000), Emperor v. Thomas Pillako (14 Indian Cases 643), Baroda Nath v. Karait Sheik (2 Calcutta Weekly Notes 236 (Notes) and Leachachu v. Emperor (24 Indian Cases 156). A discordant note was however struck by the Allahabad Court in Emperor v. G. Dun (1922 Allahabad 107) where a Division Bench held that the powers of a High Court were restricted to making an amendment of an effective order of the court below and not of expunging passages which did not comment themselves to it. The matter has however, been now made beyond controversy by the legislature by the enactment of S. 561A, Criminal Procedure Code, wherein it is provided. 'Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the processes of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice'. Since this amendment was made in the Code of 1923 the Allahabad Court also has entertained and granted applications for expunction of remarks. In AIR 1927 Allahabad 193 it was held that the High Court has inherent power to order deletion of passages which are either irrelevant or inadmissible and which adversely affect the character of persons before court. Since this amendment was made in the Code of 1923 the Allahabad Court also has entertained and granted applications for expunction of remarks. In AIR 1927 Allahabad 193 it was held that the High Court has inherent power to order deletion of passages which are either irrelevant or inadmissible and which adversely affect the character of persons before court. Similarly the Lahore High Court in Amar Nath v. Emperor (1925 Lahore 187) and Benarai Das v. Emperor (1925 Lahore 392) expunged remarks made in judgments of lower courts". 4. In Panchanan v. Upnodra Nath (AIR 1927 Allahabad 193) Sulaiman, J., observed that he saw no reason why the inherent power of the High Court to "prevent abuse of the processes of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice" should not comprise a power to order a deletion of passages which are either irrelevant or inadmissible and which adversely affect the character of persons before the Court. The learned judge said: "The High Court, as a Supreme Court of revision, must be deemed to have power to see that courts below do not unjustly and without any lawful excuse take away the character of a party or of a witness or of a counsel before it. Shadi Lal, C.J. in the case of Mahomed Qarim v. Anwar Khan (1926 Lahore 382) recognised that under S. 561A there is an inherent power of the High Court to delete objectionable remarks against witnesses or accused persons. Such jurisdiction, however, can only be exercised when there is no foundation whatever for the remark objected to and not where it is a matter of inference from evidence." In In re Public Prosecutor (1944 Madras 320), Leach, C.J., observed: "We have no doubt that in a proper case the court has power to expunge a part of a judgment of a Court subordinate to it; but it will only take such action when the words objected to are not relevant to the case and are of a scandalous or very improper nature". 5. The jurisdiction of the High Court to expunge objectionable passages from the judgments of subordinate courts was recognised by the Bombay High Court in State v. Gulam Mahomed (1953 Bombay 152). A Full Bench of that Court considered the question in State of Bombay v. Nil Kath (1954 Bombay 65). 5. The jurisdiction of the High Court to expunge objectionable passages from the judgments of subordinate courts was recognised by the Bombay High Court in State v. Gulam Mahomed (1953 Bombay 152). A Full Bench of that Court considered the question in State of Bombay v. Nil Kath (1954 Bombay 65). In that case an application was made by the State of Bombay to expunge certain remarks made by the Sessions Judge, North Satara, when dealing with a bail application. The Full Bench held that under S. 561A, Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the application although the application is not one contemplated by the Code. Chagla, C.J. observed thus: "Therefore, in our opinion, as S. 561A was enacted to emphasize the fact that the High Court has the widest jurisdiction to pass orders to secure the ends of justice, S. 561A must give the power to this Court to entertain application which are not contemplated by Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, if the High Court feels that ends of justice require that an order should be made in an application, although the applications is not contemplated by the Code, the High Court will entertain the application and make the necessary orders to secure the ends of justice." 6. The further question considered by the Full Bench was whether is such cases the High Court has inherent power to amend or alter the judgment of the lower court. On this point, the learned Chief Justice said: "The important question that arises is whether a Supreme Court has inherent power to alter the record, as it were, by changing or altering a judgment which was already been delivered and has become final as far as that particular court is concerned. It is difficult to understand how such an inherent power can possibly arise in a Supreme Court. A judgment of a lower court may be wrong; it may even be perverse. The power way to attack that judgment is by bringing it under the security of the Supreme Court and getting the judgment of the lower court judicially corrected. But is it proper for the Supreme Court to alter or amend the judgment which has already been delivered? The power way to attack that judgment is by bringing it under the security of the Supreme Court and getting the judgment of the lower court judicially corrected. But is it proper for the Supreme Court to alter or amend the judgment which has already been delivered? In our opinion, the inherent power that the High Court possesses is, in proper cases, even though no appeal or revision may be preferred to this Court, to judicially correct the observations of the lower Court by pointing out that the observations made by the Magistrate were not justified or were without any foundation or were wholly wrong or improper". The learned Chief Justice further observed: "The power of the High Court judicially to correct any subordinate judge exists independently of applications which came before it by way of appeal or revision. This Court can judicially correct any subordinate judge in any application made to it, which it can entertain under S. 561A of the Code." 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that he was not particular that the objectionable remarks in the order of the learned Magistrate should be expunged from the order and that he will be satisfied with an observation by this court that those remarks were uncalled for and unwarranted. Learned Counsel for the counter petitioners did not contend for the position that this Court has no jurisdiction to judicially correct the order of the learned Magistrate in this case. His argument was that it is only in very rare and exceptional cases that such jurisdiction will be exercised by this Court. Reference was made to the observation of Tek Chand, J., in AIR 1928 Lahore 740 cited above. The learned judge said: "This jurisdiction which independently exists in this court is, however, of an extra ordinary nature and has to be exercised with great care and caution. As pointed out by the learned Chief Justice in AIR 1926 Lahore 382 'the power to expunge a portion of a judgment delivered by a competent court, is intended for cases of exceptional circumstances and should be exercised sparingly'. As pointed out by the learned Chief Justice in AIR 1926 Lahore 382 'the power to expunge a portion of a judgment delivered by a competent court, is intended for cases of exceptional circumstances and should be exercised sparingly'. On the one hand it has to be borne in mind that in weighing evidence and arriving at conclusions on questions of fact lower courts have to review the conduct of witnesses with reference to particular incidents and at times have to adjudge generally on the veracity or otherwise of such persons and in doing so they have often to make remarks which reflect adversely on their character. It is of the utmost importance to the administration of justice that courts should be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by this Court. At the same time, it is as remarked by Clark, C.J., in Nur Din v. Emperor (21 PLR 1904) equally'necessary that the right of Magistrates to make disparaging remarks on persons who appear, or are named, in the course of a trial, is one that should be exercised with great reserve and moderation, especially where the person disparaged has had little or no opportunity of explaining or defending himself'. If the conduct of the witness appears to the judge to be suspicious or otherwise not above board, he has the right and the duty to test his evidence by putting questions to him. But therefore he is justified in commenting adversely upon a witness's evidence he must establish the particular fact warranting such criticism by proper evidence in court and not on conjectures or by reference to materials which are not properly on the record Amarnath v. Emperor (1925 Lahore 187)". To the same effect is the observation of Din Muhamed, J. in In Re Advocate General (1939 Lahore 174). The learned judge said: "Suffice it to say that while on the one had courts are at liberty to discuss the conduct of the persons before them, either as parties or as witnesses, untrammelled by any considerations, on the other hand they are not permitted to travel beyond the record and are bound to exercise due restraint on the language employed by them. In other words, they should neither make any such sweeping assertions as are not borne out by the evidence produced before them nor should they use language which is unduly harsh". These observations were quoted with approval by Bhagwati, J. in AIR 1953 Bombay 152, already referred to. To the same effect is the observation of Chagla, C.J., in State of Bombay v. Nil Kanth (AIR 1954 Bombay 65). The learned Chief Justice said: "Going to the question of the exercise of the jurisdiction, I think it is necessary for us to point out that although we have the jurisdiction under S. 561A, judicially to correct the judgment of the lower court, this is a very exceptional jurisdiction which should be exercised in the most exceptional cases. It is very necessary, in order to maintain the independence of the judiciary, that every Magistrate, however junior, should feel that he can fearlessly give expression to his own opinion in the judgment which he delivers. If our Magistrates feel that they cannot frankly and fearlessly deal with matters that come before them and that the High Court is likely to interfere in their opinions, the independence of the judiciary might be seriously undermined. A jurisdiction like this is intended to be exercised when remarks are made without any foundation whatsoever, when remarks are made against strangers which remarks may do irreparable harm to them and who have not been heard in their defence by the Court which passes the remarks. This jurisdiction is not intended to substitute the opinion of the High Court for the opinion of the lower court. A judge, as we said before, however humble and however junior, is entitled to his own opinion with regard to matters that come before the Court. Judicial corrections should be restricted to cases where the decision is wrong or erroneous, but if the decision is right or if no decision is arrived at, then this Court should interfere under S. 561A in the most exceptionable and rarest of cases". 8. The question for consideration is whether, in the light of the principles enunciated above, the order of the learned Magistrate calls for judicial correction by this Court as regards the remarks contained in the order about the petitioner. In deciding this question each of the passages in the order objected to by the petitioner has to be considered separately. 9. The question for consideration is whether, in the light of the principles enunciated above, the order of the learned Magistrate calls for judicial correction by this Court as regards the remarks contained in the order about the petitioner. In deciding this question each of the passages in the order objected to by the petitioner has to be considered separately. 9. So far as the first passage is concerned, I do not think that the remarks contained therein are absolutely irrelevant or uncalled for and are based on mere conjecture. So far as the second passage is concerned, although the observation made by the learned Magistrate is couched in rather strong language, it cannot be said that the learned Magistrate went out of his way in making that observation. But the third and the fourth passages do contain remarks which are altogether irrelevant and unnecessary and are damaging to the character and reputation of the petitioner. Those remarks are not borne out by the evidence in the case and are based on conjectures. The remarks are to the effect that the petitioner was working for his "own personal pecuniary benefit with a view to commit misappropriation of the school funds and that his hands are not clean". The petitioner is one who occupies a responsible position in life as the Headmaster of a High School. He was only a witness in the case and had no opportunity of defending himself against a charge of misappropriation of funds belonging to the school. I have no doubt that these remarks were uncalled for. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that a suit has been instituted against the petitioner and the manager of the school (PW. 2) for misappropriation of school funds and that the suit is still pending. The question whether the petitioner has misappropriated any funds will have to be decided in that suit. In any case, the remarks contained in the order of the learned Magistrate suggesting that the petitioner has misappropriated school funds and that he is a man of unclean hands are altogether unnecessary and uncalled for. With this observation the petition is recorded. Petition recorded.