RAM LABHAYA, J.: This Miscellaneous Appeal is directed aga­inst an order of the Subordinate Judge, U. A. D., dated 20-12-52, by which the objection of the judg­ment-debtor to the competency of the Court to proceed with the execution was disallowed. (2) The facts giving rise to the appeal are as follows : - The suit which ended in the decree sought to be executed, was admittedly pending on 15-8-47 in a Court at Sylhet. It was decreed on 30-1-43. The decree-holder obtained a non-satis­faction certificate, which was received by the Court at Silchar in May 1949. The application for execution was also filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Silchar on 21-5-49. At that time the non-satisfaction certificate had been re­ceived. (3) The objection of the judgment-debtor to the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with the execution of the decree, is not sound. The case was fully covered by the provisions contained in S. 4 of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceed­ings) Order, 1947. The section provides that "notwithstanding the creation of certain new Pro­vinces and the transfer of certain territories from the Province of Assam to the Province of East Bengal by the Indian Independence Act, 1947 : 1. all proceedings pending immediately be­fore the appointed day in any civil or criminal Court (other than a High Court) in the Province of Bengal, the Punjab, or Assam, shall be conti­nued in that Court as if the said Act had not been passed, and that Oourt shall continue to have, for the purposes of the said proceedings, all the jurisdiction and powers which it had im­mediately before the appointed day." The effect of the provision is that the Court at Sylhet, notwithstanding the partition of the coun­try, could proceed with the case as if the parti­tion had not taken place, and that for the pur­poses of the case, its powers under the Code of Civil Procedure were not affected. It could, there­fore, pass a decree and could also transfer the decree for execution to the Court at Silchar, as the suit was pending immediately before the ap­pointed day. The transfer of the decree for execution also was completed by 21-5-49. The transfer, there­fore, was perfectly legal at the time it was made. The execution application also was competent. The Court at Silchar had jurisdiction. The transfer of the decree for execution also was completed by 21-5-49. The transfer, there­fore, was perfectly legal at the time it was made. The execution application also was competent. The Court at Silchar had jurisdiction. The In­dependence Act and the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order were both in force at that time, and the decree could be validly transfer­red to the Court at Silchar. (4) Mr. Deb the learned counsel for the ap­pellant has, however, argued that even if the ap­plication was competent when filed, the Court lost its jurisdiction when the Indian Independence Act was subsequently repealed. The Indian Inde­pendence (Legal Proceedings) Order, which was promulgated by virtue of provisions contained in the Independence Act, also lost all effect. No ac­tion taken under the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order of 1947 could, therefore, re­tain its validity after the repeal of the parent Act. In support of his contention, he has relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court re­ported in Joti Prasad v. State 52 Cri LJ 1094 : ( AIR 1951 All 703 ) (A), in which it was held that S. 6 of the General Clauses Act would not apply to the repeal by the Constitution of any Act as the- Constitution is not a Central Act or a Regu­lation. It is argued that the Indian Independence Act has been repealed by the Constitution of India which is not a Central Act or a Regulation within the meaning of S. 6, General Clauses Act. This section, therefore, was not applicable to the repeal. It provides that "where this Act or any (Central Act) or Regu­lation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not - (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so re­pealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal pro­ceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid; and any such inves­tigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be insti­tuted, continued or enforced, and any such pe­nalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the Repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed." If cls. (c) or (e) of S. 6 applies, the proceeding could certainly continue. (c) or (e) of S. 6 applies, the proceeding could certainly continue. The contention, how­ever, is that S. 6 has got no application, and it cannot be utilised for saving the proceeding which was pending when the Independence Act was re­pealed. The contention does receive support from the decision relied on. But I feel, with profound respect to the learned Judge, that full effect has not been given by him to the provision contain­ed in Art. 367 of the Constitution. The provi­sion of the Article is that "unless the context otherwise requires, the Gene­ral Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adap­tations and modifications that may be made therein under Art. 372,i apply for the interpreta­tion of this Constitution as it applies for the in­terpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India." The whole of the General Clauses Act has been made applicable to the Constitution for purposes of its interpretation. The operative part of S. 6 could, therefore, be applied for the interpretation of the Constitution. It would be available for determining the effect of the repeal by the Consti­tution of the Indian Independence Act. It was made applicable to the Constitution in the same way as it was applicable, by its terms, to any re­peal enacted by any Central Act or Regulation. For purposes of the application of S. 6. the Cons­titution was placed on a level with Central Acts and Regulations referred to in S. 6. The contention that the repeal of the Inde­pendence Act by the Constitution (Art. 395) would not save the pending proceeding, is therefore not sound. Mr. Deb is certainly correct to this ex­tent that the Constitution is neither a Central Act nor a Regulation. He is also right when he urges that S. 6, in terms, covers cases where a Central Act or' Regulation repeals some enact­ment, but the Constitution, for purposes of S. 6, is to be treated as though it were a Central Act or Regulation, for, it is expressly provided that the General Clauses Act shall apply for the in­terpretation of the Constitution, as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Government of India. The Constitution is to be treated as an Act of the Legislature of the Government of India; in other words, as a Central Act, for purposes of S. 6, of the General Clauses Act. The Constitution is to be treated as an Act of the Legislature of the Government of India; in other words, as a Central Act, for purposes of S. 6, of the General Clauses Act. It is, therefore, not necessary that S. 6 of the General Clauses Act should have contained the word "Constitu­tion”. By a legal fiction, the Constitution has been placed on a par with Central Acts for pur­poses of its interpretation. The need for Art. 367 arose from the fact that, without it, the General Clauses Act, inclu­ding S. 6, could not be applied for the interpre­tation of the Constitution. If the interpretation of Art. 367, which prevailed in the Allahabad High Court, is correct, S. 6, which is a very important provision of the General Clauses Act, would not apply, but several other provisions would apply. If the intention was to exclude the application of S. 6 or any other particular section, it would have been stated expressly. In a Division Bench case of the Calcutta High Court, reported in Dungarmull v. Shambhu Charan, AIR 1951 Cal 55 (B), the view that pre­vailed was that notwithstanding the repeal of the Independence Act and the consequent lapse of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order of 1947, the execution proceedings transfer­red before the repeal, retained their validity and could continue in the transferee Court. The rights and liabilities which had accrued were not affected by the repeal. The learned Judges fol­lowed Iswar Madan Gopal Jiu v. Province of West Bengal, 54 Cal WN 807 : ( AIR 1950 Cal 463 ) (C). We are in respectful agreement with the view of the law enunciated in these cases. We hold that the repeal of the Indian Independence Act does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court or the right of the decree-holder to proceed with the execution. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. (5) DEKA, J.:- I agree. M.K.S. Appeal dismissed.