Rajamannar, C.J.- The only question in these Letters Patent Appeals against the judgment of Panchapagesa Sastry, J., disposing of two second appeals relates. to the validity of the adoption of one Ramamurthi to Lakshminarasayya by his. widow. Both the Courts below found that the adoption had been made in fact and that finding was accepted by Panchapagesa Sastry, J., in Second Appeal and must be deemed to have become final. The only dispute was as to the authority to adopt. Undoubtedly such authority is to be found in the document, Exhibit P-1, described as a will. It is dated 30th May, 1924 and it was registered as a will but beyond the period of four months allowed in respect of documents compulsorily registrable. The contention pressed upon Panchapagesa Sastry, J., was that though it was styled a will, it was really not a will but a document containing a bare power to adopt and therefore the document had to be registered. Not. having been registered within the prescribed time of four months it was inadmissible in evidence under section 49 of the Registration Act. The learned Judge refused to accept this contention as he held that on the terms of the document it should be considered to be a will and not a document containing a bare power to adopt. He therefore dismissed the second appeals. M.S. Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel for the appellants, pressed before 11s the same contention. It is necessary, therefore, to first examine the contents of the document and the relevant clauses bearing on this question. The will purports to be executed in favour of one Venkataramiah. The testator proceeds to say: “As my end is now approaching you shall be the vicharanakarta in respect of my movable and immovable properties and conduct the entire proceedings till the boy whom my wife is hereby empowered to take in adoption attains majority”. After expressly conferring on the wife authority to adopt the testator makes a further provision with regard to his wife’s sister Mahanandamma, who in law would not be entitled to any rights against the testator or his property. The provision is as follows: “I have provided that if my junior paternal aunt Venkatalakshmamma and my wife’s sister Mahanandamma do not live amicably, Mahanandamma shall, after she attains majority, act according to the arrangement to be made by the vicharanakarta, namely, Achyutanna Venkataramiah”. Mr. The provision is as follows: “I have provided that if my junior paternal aunt Venkatalakshmamma and my wife’s sister Mahanandamma do not live amicably, Mahanandamma shall, after she attains majority, act according to the arrangement to be made by the vicharanakarta, namely, Achyutanna Venkataramiah”. Mr. Ramachandra Rao cited certain decisions of this Court and a decision of the Privy Council in support of his contention that on the terms of the document it could not be held to be a will. The first decision he cited was Seshamma v. Chennappa.1 There the testator, after conferring authority on his widow to adopt, provided that his son-in-law and his father-in-law should take care of his properties until the said adopted boy attains majority and becomes capable of managing the same. The question which arose in that case was whether these two persons would be entitled to obtain probate as executors by implication. There was no question in that case as to whether the document was a will or not. The learned Judges held that the duties which the said persons were directed to perform were not specifically the duties of the guardians of the child whose adoption was contemplated. They considered that it was clear from the document that there was no intention to vest any property in them as the only direction was to protect the property. We do not think that this decision is of much assistance to the appellants because in the case before us there is not merely a direction to protect the property, but there is a specific conferment of power on the Vicharanakarta to conduct the entire proceedings till the adopted boy attained majority. Presumably such conduct of proceedings is in his own right. There is no mention in the document that the Vicharanakarta should be the guardian as such of the adopted boy. The legal conclusion which logically follows from this direction is that till the adopted boy attains majority the property stands vested in the Vicharanakarta, though of course the beneficial title will be in the adopted son. There is no mention in the document that the Vicharanakarta should be the guardian as such of the adopted boy. The legal conclusion which logically follows from this direction is that till the adopted boy attains majority the property stands vested in the Vicharanakarta, though of course the beneficial title will be in the adopted son. In Kuppayammal v. Ammani Ammal2, where again there was no question whether the document concerned was a will or not and where again the only question was whether a person was entitled to a grant of probate as an executrix, the only direction in the will on which reliance was placed by the person applying for the grant of probate was a direction that out of certain property the applicant should pay certain debts. The learned Judges observed that such a direction was not enough to show an intention on the part of the testator that for the general purpose of administration she should be executrix. On the same reasoning we think it should be held in the present case that Venkataramiah was intended by the testator to represent the estate for the general purpose of administration as he was to conduct the entire proceedings. In In the matter of the last Will and Testament of Bukhtwar Mull Sowcar3, held that a document in the form of a will was in law not a will in respect of which probate could be granted because it dealt with no property and there was only an appointment of a guardian for the minors who did not take the property of the testator under the will but took the property under the general law by the rule of survivorship. There is no analogy between the document in that case and the document in the present appeals. Somasundara Muddy v. Duraiswami Mudaliar1 is an obvious case. The document concerned in that case, though it was styled a will, was nothing more than a power to adopt. It was addressed to the wife who was given authority to adopt and who was also given authority to put the adopted son in possession of the properties of the testator. There was no other term in the document. The learned Judges had no difficulty in holding that the document was in no sense a will and that it was only an authority to adopt and nothing else. There was no other term in the document. The learned Judges had no difficulty in holding that the document was in no sense a will and that it was only an authority to adopt and nothing else. The direction to put the adopted son into possession of the property could not be construed as a devise of the property. The Privy Council decision in Bheema Deo v. Behari Deo2, also does not help the appellants. There again the document, though called a will, was executed: in favour of the executant’s wife. It merely contained the following statement: “I have consented to your adopting a son at your pleasure and conducting the management of the estate in the best manner. None of my heirs shall have cause to raise disputes touching this matter. This will has been executed by my consent”. Their Lordships held that the document was merely an authority to adopt and not a will. It should not be overlooked that the person in whose favour the will purported to be executed was the person who in law would be the guardian of the adopted son and even in case no adoption was made he was the person who would be entitled to be in possession of and manage the estate. There was therefore nothing else in that case in the document than the conferment of a power to adopt. It will be seen from an analysis of the material terms of the particular documents concerned in the above decisions that they are not in any sense in pari materia with the terms of the document in question. We entirely agree with Panchapagesa Sastry, J., in holding that the document. Exhibit P-1, must be deemed to be in law a will and’ not a bare power to adopt. It therefore did not require registration. It was therefore admissible in evidence though it was actually registered beyond the prescribed time. The Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed with costs in one Letters Patent Appeal. K.S. ----- Appeals dismissed,