Raiamannar, C.J.- This is an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of Viswanatha Sastri, J., dismissing S.A. No 1178 of 1947, with his leave. The appeal arises out of a suit brought by the original respondent to recover the amount due under a mortgage-deed, dated 24th January 1927, executed by one Muthu Goundan to one Kannayya Reddi for Rs.1,000. The respondent claimed under an assignment from the original mortgagee. The mortgaged property comprised three items. Subsequent to the mortgage by a sale-deed, dated 4th Tune, 1941, Muthu Goundan conveyed to the 1st defendant a moiety of items 1 and 2 of the mortgaged properties. On the same day, a brother of Muthu Goundan sold the other moiety in these items to the 2nd defendant. The third item continued to remain with the mortgagor. The suit was brought against the purchasers, as defendants 1 and 2, but the original mortgagor was not made a party. The plaint schedule, however, included item 3 also, though the mortgagor who was in possession of it was not made a party. But at the time of the trial, the plaintiff’s vakil made an endorsement on the plaint that he did not claim any relief against item 3 and that the plaintiff exonerated it from the suit. The suit was, therefore tried only against defendants 1 and 2. The learned Subordinate Judge who tried the suit dismissed it as against the 2nd defendant as he held that the mortgage executed by Muthu Goundan was not binding on his brother whose share in items 1 and 2 was purchased by the 2nd defendant. That dismissal became final because the appeal filed by the plaintiff was dismissed as out of time by the learned District Judge of North Arcot. The learned Subordinate Judge decreed the suit against the share of Muthu Goundan in items 1 and 2 in the hands of the 1st defendant. There was an appeal by the 1st defendant, but that was dismissed by the learned District Judge. He then preferred a second appeal to this Court, viz., S.A. No.1178 of 1947, which was also dismissed by Viswanatha Sastri, J. Pending the Letters Patent Appeal, the 1st defendant appellant died and his legal representatives were also brought on record. Mr.K. Bhashyam Ayyangar, learned Counsel for the appellants, raised two-contentions in the main. He then preferred a second appeal to this Court, viz., S.A. No.1178 of 1947, which was also dismissed by Viswanatha Sastri, J. Pending the Letters Patent Appeal, the 1st defendant appellant died and his legal representatives were also brought on record. Mr.K. Bhashyam Ayyangar, learned Counsel for the appellants, raised two-contentions in the main. But both the contentions were founded on the fact that the original mortgagor, Muthu Goundan, had not been made a party to the suit. The first contention was that the 1st defendant was entitled to the right of marshalling conferred by section 56 of the Transfer of Property Act as it now stands after the amending Act of 1929. The view taken by Viswanatha Sastri, J., was that the section as it now stands does not apply to the present case which is covered by the section as it stood before the amendement. The section as it stood originally was as follows:- "Where two properties are subject to a common charge, and one of the properties is sold, the buyer is, as against the seller, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, entitled to have the charge satisfied out of the other properties, so far as such property will extend ". It was well established that this provision did not entitle the purchaser to claim marshalling as against the. mortgagee himself. The mortgagee had a right to proceed against whatever property he chose to realise the sum due to him under the mortgage and he could not be compelled to split his security. The purchaser of a portion of the property was not entitled to insist on an abatement of the amount due in respect of the mortgage proportionate to the value of the property in his hands. That this was the law, in any event so far as this Court was concerned, on the construction of the original section, was not seriously disputed by Mr. Bashyam Ayyangar. Indeed, he could not do that, having regard to the ruling of the Full Bench of this Court in Perumal Pillai v. Raman Chettiar1. It was there held that a mortgagee releasing from the suit a portion of the mortgaged property was not bound to abate a proportionate part of the debt and was entitled to recover the whole of the mortgage amount from any portion of the mortgaged property. The contention of Mr. It was there held that a mortgagee releasing from the suit a portion of the mortgaged property was not bound to abate a proportionate part of the debt and was entitled to recover the whole of the mortgage amount from any portion of the mortgaged property. The contention of Mr. Bashyam Ayyangar, therefore, was that the section which was substituted for the original section 56 by the amending Act and which stands today should be applied to his case. That provision does certainly give right to the purchaser of one of the properties mortgaged to claim marshalling even as against the mortgagee, because it says he will be entitled to have the mortgage debt satisfied out of the property not sold to him so far as the same will extend. In the present case, the date of the mortgage is 24th January, 1927, that is to say, prior to the passing of the amending Act. Section 63 of the amending Act (XX of 1929) provides inter alia that nothing in the provision of the Act mentioned in that section which include the provision substituting for the old section 56 the present section, shall be deemed in any way to affect the terms or incidents of any transfer of property effected before 1st April, 1930, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired or incurred before such date, or any remedy or proceeding in respect of such title, obligation, or liability. This, it may be remarked, is merely a statement of the general law relating to interpretation of statutes, some of the principles of which are found embodied in the General Clauses Act. Mr. Bhashyam Ayyangar contended firstly, that the mortgagee had no right on the date on which the mortgage was executed, that is, before the coming into force of the amending Act, which continued to remain unaffected by the amendment, and secondly, that even if there is any right, it would accrue only at the time of the enforcement of the mortgage, which was certainly long after the amending Act. He tried to build up some argument on the fact that the provision in the General Clauses Act (section 6) mentions in addition to right, obligation, liability, etc., also "privilege". He tried to build up some argument on the fact that the provision in the General Clauses Act (section 6) mentions in addition to right, obligation, liability, etc., also "privilege". Privilege is not mentioned as such in section 63(c) of the amending Act of 1929 and therefore any privilege which the mortgagee might have had of recovering the entire amount of the mortgage money payable to him from any part of the security was not saved by section 63 of the amending Act. We are unable to agree with this contention. We have no hesitation in holding that the mortgagee had a right which accured to him on the date of the mortgage itself of realising, if he chose, the entire amount due to him from any part of the mortgaged property. Such a right was not subject to any right of marshalling at the instance of the purchaser of a portion of the hypotheca. To speak of this right as a mere privilege is not correct. Even assuming that all that the mortgagee had was privilege, even then under section 6 of the General Clauses Act, that privilege itself would not be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment by the amending Act. We therefore agree with the learned Judge, Viswanatha Sastri, J., that notwithstanding the amending Act which came into force by the time of the institution of the suit, the rights of the parties are governed by the original section 56 under which the purchaser of any portion of the hypothecated property did not have the right of marshalling as against the mortgagee. Mr. Bashyam Ayyangar’s next contention was a plea of non-joinder. Under Order 34, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, all the persons interested in the equity of redemption are to be made parties. So the mortgagee could not be allowed to deliberately exclude the mortgagor himself who certainly was interested in the equity of redemption so far as item 3 was concerned and claim to recover the entire money from the purchaser only. So his argument ran. Having regard to the terms of Order 1, rule 9, Civil Procedure Code, learned Counsel could not insist upon a dismissal of the suit. So his argument ran. Having regard to the terms of Order 1, rule 9, Civil Procedure Code, learned Counsel could not insist upon a dismissal of the suit. But he argued that even if the suit be not dismissed, the mortgagee should not be given anything more than a proportionate share of the mortgage money, to be recovered from the part of the mortgaged property in the hands of the purchaser. Mr. Bashyam Ayyangar sought to rely upon a decision of this Court in Periakaruppa v. Satyanarayanamoorthy 1, as lending him some support to his argument. But we think that decision has no application whatever to the facts of this case. That was a suit for redemption, and it was held that in spite of the integrity of the mortgage being broken by the mortgagee, one of several mortgagors or a purchaser of a portion of the equity of redemption was entitled to redeem the whole property subject to the equities in favour of other persons. In that case, one of the persons interested in the equity of redemption was not made a party. It was found, that he had been deliberately omitted. Such omission, however, did not entail a dismissal of the suit, but the plaintiff could not be given the only relief of redeeming that part of the mortgaged property in which the plaintiff was interested on payment of a porportionate amount but he was not entitled to the larger relief of redemption of the entire property. In the case, it had been found that the integrity of the mortgage has been broken by the mortgagee himself. It was therefore possible to direct a partial redemption at the instance of a person interested in a part of the equity of redemption. We fail to see how the principle of this decision can apply to the present case. As the suit cannot be dismissed on account of the omission to implead the mortgagor as a party and as the 1st defendant purchaser cannot claim any abatement by reason of the fact that the mortgagee had given up the items in the possession of the mortgagor, the decree passed by the Courts below and confirmed by the learned Judge in second appeal was the proper decree to be passed. Mr. Mr. Bhashyam Ayyangar wanted us even now to exercise the power which we undoubtedly have under Order 1, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, to implead the mortgagor or her representatives as parties to the suit. He pointed out that the plaintiff deliberately omitted to join the mortgagor as a defendant because he was afraid that on an application of the provisions of Madras Act (IV of 1938) the mortgage debt would be scaled down and even the purchaser may become entitled to the benefit of the scaling down. But that danger is now completely averted by reason of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Venkatavadhamulu v. Ramayya Gam. This may be true, but we see no justification for impleading the mortgagor at this last stage and to remand the suit to the trial Court practically for re-trial of the suit. As laid down in Perumal Pillai v. Raman Chettiar 3, the right of the 1st defendant to contribution against the original mortgagor is not affected "by the decision in this suit granting relief to the mortgagee. We are therefore convinced that this is not a case in which we should add the mortgagor as a party at this late hour. Mr. Bhashyam Ayyangar made a faint attempt to argue that the release of one of the items mortgaged by itself brought about a splitting of the mortgage. We are unable to agree with the contention in the absence of any authority. We are inclined to hold that it has no such effect. We agree with Viswanatha Sastri, J., that the conclusion arrived at by the two Courts below is correct. The Letters Patent Appeal is, therefore, dismissed with cossts. K.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.