Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal has been referred to a Full Bench on account of a conflict of opinion revealed by the reported decisions of the erstwhile Travancore High Court on the question whether a member or a branch of a Malabar tarwad to whom is allotted properties for purposes of maintenance is entitled to claim compensation for improvements before dispossession of those properties in connection with a suit for partition or otherwise. The facts are these: In the year 1065 there was an arrangement in the tarwad of the parties wherein the properties were divided into three. One portion was put in possession of one of the two sakhas of the tarwad and another in the possession of the other Sakha. Plaintiff and the defendants belong to the said two Sakhas respectively. The third division of property was meant for the maintenance of the karnavan of the tarwad for the time being as also for meeting the expenses of certain charities which were being conducted by the tarwad which the karnavan for the time being was to conduct thereafter. Neither of the two sakhas was accountable for the income of the properties out in their possession nor was the karnavan accountable for the income derived from the other group of properties. The first defendant became karnavan of the entire tarwad in the year 1095. He was also, therefore, the karnavan of the defendants' sakha. A house was put up in the property allotted to that sakha which is item No. 4 in the plaint. Other improvements were also effected upon those properties. In answer to the suit which was one for partition of all the properties of the tarwad the first defendant in his written statement claimed that his sakha effected various improvements in the property for which the sakha is to be compensated. The 4th defendant in a separate written statement made a similar claim on behalf of his sakha. The 4th defendant did not appear thereafter in the case which proceeded without him. The first defendant when examined as DW. 4 said that the house as also the other improvements were put up and effected by him at his own cost. The Munsiff decreed partition with the direction that the site on which the building, item No. 4 in the plaint, stands would if possible be allotted to the defendant's sakha. The first defendant when examined as DW. 4 said that the house as also the other improvements were put up and effected by him at his own cost. The Munsiff decreed partition with the direction that the site on which the building, item No. 4 in the plaint, stands would if possible be allotted to the defendant's sakha. As regards the other improvements he found that no value could be given therefor. In appeal by defendants 1 and 4 together the District Judge upheld their claim for improvements and fixed their value at a certain figure. Both the courts below concurrently found that the plea of the defendants that the arrangement of the year 1065 was an outright partition cannot be accepted. The 4th defendant by this second Appeal challenges that finding and claims enhanced compensation for the improvements. The first defendant died pending the appeal in the court below. The plaintiff has filed a memorandum of cross objections challenging the decree given by the lower appellate court for improvements. The question of the character of the arrangement of the year 1065 having been concurrently found by the courts below the only point pressed before us and before the learned judge who made the reference related to the question whether value of improvements could be claimed by the sakha of the defendants who were upon the concurrent finding holding the properties only on an arrangement for maintenance. 2. There are three decisions of the erstwhile Travancore High Court reported in 29 TLJ 220, 30 TLJ 754 and 30 TLJ 737, the first and the last of which took the view that an allottee of properties for the purpose of maintenance is not entitled to claim compensation for improvements. The case in 30 TLJ 754 though reported at a later page was in fact decided before the case reported at P. 737 and the view taken in the second case was different from the earlier view. No reference is seen made to the first case in the second nor is reference made to the second in the third. There have been three decisions of this Court, the first of which is reported in 1949 KLT 143 (FB). That was a case where the Karnavan of a tarwad who was in management of tarwad properties claimed compensation for improvements alleged to have been effected by him upon tarwad properties. There have been three decisions of this Court, the first of which is reported in 1949 KLT 143 (FB). That was a case where the Karnavan of a tarwad who was in management of tarwad properties claimed compensation for improvements alleged to have been effected by him upon tarwad properties. The claim was disallowed saying that: "The trees planted by a karnavan in the ordinary course of husbandry cannot be treated as acquisitions falling within S. 40 of the Act. The karnavan's claim under this head cannot be put on the same basis as value of improvements effected by junior member on tarwad properties allotted to him for maintenance." S. 40 of the Travancore Nayar Act, II of 1100, provides that: "If a person was in management of his or her tarwad, one-fourth of the acquisition, if any, made by such person during such management with the aid of the income from tarwad property shall, on partition, be allowed to him in addition to the share which he would otherwise be entitled to get". Whether the improvements effected by a karnavan would be an acquisition within the meaning of that section was the only question that their Lordships had to consider and it has held that they will not. If the improvements would constitute an acquisition within that section the karnavan would be entitled to compensation to the extent provided for by that section. Against this right of the karnavan as a contract the learned judges refer to the claim made by an anandiravan for improvements made by him on tarwad properties allotted for maintenance. It appears to us that the learned judges were of the view that the claim of the anandiravan who is in possession of property for maintenance for improvements is not sustainable. This decision which is relied upon by the appellant is in our view against him. The next decision of this Court in A.S. No. 664 of 1120 which has not been reported but which has been referred to in the later decision reported in 1951 KLT 347. This decision which is relied upon by the appellant is in our view against him. The next decision of this Court in A.S. No. 664 of 1120 which has not been reported but which has been referred to in the later decision reported in 1951 KLT 347. At page 351, the learned judges say: "The improvements were effected on the tarwad property, and while it is possible that equitable considerations may prevail when a rearrangement or readjustment is brought about, no claim can be legally enforced against the tarwad to recover the value of improvements effected on the property in the course of such enjoyment, unless there is an express understanding to the effect that such improvements will be compensated for in the event of any disturbance of possession or enjoyment". The latest reported decision of this Court on this question is AIR 1953 TC 175. The view taken there is in accord with the view already expressed by this Court in the aforesaid earlier decisions. 3. The allottee of tarwad properties for purposes of maintenance, whether a member or a branch, is in possession of the properties allotted as a member or members of the tarwad. This is to say, the allottee is in possession of his own property, the income whereof he is entitled to appropriate for his maintenance. There is no scope for any claim arising on account of the improvements made by him in that property because if he improves property and has to claim value therefor he has to make the claim against himself. It is only when the holder of a property has an interest independent of and apart from the person against whom the claim is to be made it is possible to think of a claim for value of improvements. If, for example, a junior member is an allottee of tarwad property under the tarwad or a branch of the tarwad is a lessee then the possession of that member or that branch is not qua member or members of the tarwad and they hold the property as lessees just like a stranger would do. That will not be the case when members of a tarwad are put in possession of tarwad properties as such members for purposes of their maintenance. That will not be the case when members of a tarwad are put in possession of tarwad properties as such members for purposes of their maintenance. In our judgment there is no scope for doubt upon this question as it appears to us to be clear that a claim for improvements by a maintenance holder cannot be sustained. 4. In this view the decree appealed against in so far as it awards compensation for improvements to the defendants is set aside. The second appeal is dismissed. As regards the memorandum of cross-objections filed by the plaintiff-respondent in the second appeal a preliminary objection is taken by the appellant that it does not call in question the decree of the lower appellate court awarding improvements to the defendant's sakha. The language of the memorandum no doubt may afford some little ground for this objection because the memorandum claims 1/24th of the value of improvements awarded to the defendant's sakha. The share claimed by the plaintiff is 1/24th of the entire property and a claim to 1/24th of the value of the improvements awarded to the defendants is one way of negativing the title of the defendants to exclusive claim to the improvements made by them. The plaintiff is not concerned whether 23/24th of the value of improvements is paid to the defendants because they are the persons liable to pay. The plaintiff's interest in the property being limited to 1/24th the claim by him to that fraction of the improvements made by the defendants really means a negativing of their claim for improvements. Understanding the memorandum of objections in this fashion which is the only way to understand it, we allow the memorandum of cross-objections. There is a virtue perhaps in having couched the memorandum in this fashion because otherwise a question of court fee might have arisen as the memorandum may have to be valued at the amount granted by the court below as value of improvements. 5. There is a virtue perhaps in having couched the memorandum in this fashion because otherwise a question of court fee might have arisen as the memorandum may have to be valued at the amount granted by the court below as value of improvements. 5. While disallowing the defendants' claim to get value of improvements we direct that in effecting the partition by metes and bounds and slicing out the 1/24th share due to the plaintiff the site on which the building and the other improvements exist should as far as possible be allotted to the share of the defendants, that is to say, the slice to which the plaintiff is entitled, may be so selected as not to take any item of improvement to which the defendants lay claim as theirs. If however, it is not possible to so allot the plaintiff's share, and a share has to be allotted to him in which any improvement effected by the defendants exist, liberty should be given to the defendants to remove the improvements without injuriously affecting the site. 6. The appellant will pay the costs of the respondent both in the Second Appeal as well as in the memorandum of objections. Dismissed.