ORDER : This is a revision application by the defendants. 2. The facts of the case are briefly stated as follows:-One Deoji son of Dhannaji Thakur filed a suit against the petitioners in the Court of the Civil Judge, Second Class, Kannod. As the claim was resisted by the petitioners the trial of the case was proceeded with. The petitioners, who were defendants in the lower Court did not engage any pleader for conducting their case before the trial Court, but were represented by one Hiralal Dube who held an 'Am Mukhtyar Nama' from them. 3. On 19-2-1954 one Rajaramsingh was examined on commission at his residence by the plaintiff as his witness. The petitioners were absent at the time of his examination but their 'Mukhtyar' Hiralal Dube was present. He wanted to cross-examine the witness but the Commissioner who was of the opinion that the recognised agent had no right to cross-examine his witness told him to suggest questions in order that he may put them to the witness and elicit his replies. The 'Mukhtyar' however did not agree and the result was that the commission was closed and the commission-warrant was returned to the Court by the Commissioner. 4. On 20-2-1954 the defendants applied to the Court for issuing the commission again, contending that the Commissioner had wrongly refused to allow the 'Mukhtyar' to cross-examine the witness. The learned Civil Judge by his order upheld the view taken by the Commissioner but ordered the commission to be re-issued on defendants' depositing the commission fees. Aggrieved by this order the defendants have preferred this revision application. 5. Mr. Pande, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the trial Court had wrongly held that the 'Mukhtyar' could not be allowed to cross-examine the witness. The learned counsel submitted that by doing so the trial Court had exercised jurisdiction vested in it illegally or with material irregularity. 6. Dealing with the merits Mr. Pande urged that O.3, R.1, C.P. Code permitted a recognised agent "to appear, apply and to act" for his principal before any Court. The learned counsel submitted that the word "act" was wide enough to include examination of witnesses. To support his arguments, the learned counsel referred to the decision reported in - 'Governor General in Council v. Bhagwan Sahai', AIR 1948 EP 61 (A). 7. The learned counsel submitted that the word "act" was wide enough to include examination of witnesses. To support his arguments, the learned counsel referred to the decision reported in - 'Governor General in Council v. Bhagwan Sahai', AIR 1948 EP 61 (A). 7. According to O.3, R.1, C.P. Code any appearance, application or act to be made by a party before a Court may be made by him in person or by a recognised agent or by pleader (appearing, applying or acting as the case may be) on his behalf. Recognised agent by whom such appearance, application or act may be done includes, in the language of O.3, R.2, a person holding a power of attorney authorising him to do such appearance, application or act on behalf of a party. 8. Under the terms of the 'Mukhtyar Nama', copy of which was filed at p.10, Part B of the trial Court's record, this Hiralal Dube is authorised to appear, apply and to conduct cases. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the words was intended to confer authority to act within the meaning of O.3, R.1, C.P. Code. The petitioner's 'Mukhtyar' Hiralal Dube was thus a recognised agent who could appear, apply and act before a Court of law on behalf of the petitioners provided he was authorised to do so. 9. The question which is of some general importance and which arises for consideration in this case is whether a recognised agent can examine and cross-examine witnesses on behalf of his principal before a court of law. In AIR 1948 EP 61 (A) it is held by Teja Singh J. that he can. 10. The scope of the authority and power of a recognised agent to work on behalf of a party in a court of law has been the subject matter of consideration in several decisions. 11. The first case bearing on this point is the decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in - 'Harchand Ray v. B.N. Rly. Co.', AIR 1916 Cal 181 (1) (B). In that case a person holding a power of attorney claimed a right to argue a case on behalf of a party before the Small Causes Court but was not allowed to do so. Co.', AIR 1916 Cal 181 (1) (B). In that case a person holding a power of attorney claimed a right to argue a case on behalf of a party before the Small Causes Court but was not allowed to do so. On the case being taken up to the High Court, Jenkins C.J. and Chatterjee J. held that he could not do so as a recognised agent had no right of audience. 12. This case was followed by another Division Bench of the same High Court in - 'Re: Eastern Tavey Minerals Corporation Ltd.', AIR 1934 Cal 563 (C). In that case a Director of a limited Company holding the power of attorney from the company claimed a right of audience. This was not allowed as the learned Judges were of the opinion that to plead is not the same thing as to make an appearance or an application or an act within the meaning of O.3, R.1, C.P. Code. 13. In - 'Jivanlal v. Ram Ratan', AIR 1935 Oudh 261 (D) a party to an appeal applied to the court that his recognised agent may be allowed to argue the appeal on his behalf. This prayer was refused. The learned Judges followed the two Calcutta cases mentioned above and held that the words used in O.3, R.1, C.P. Code viz., any "appearance, application or act" meant no more than that the recognised agent could appear, make application and take such steps as may be necessary in the course of litigation for the purpose of the case for the principal being properly laid before the Court and that they could not justify a recognised agent being allowed to argue and plead. 14. The next case which has some bearing on this point is the decision of Madras High Court in - 'Thayarammal v. Kuppuswami Naidu', AIR 1937 Mad 937 (E). The question referred to the Full Bench in that case was whether an agent with a power of attorney to appear and conduct judicial proceedings has a right of audience in court. The next case which has some bearing on this point is the decision of Madras High Court in - 'Thayarammal v. Kuppuswami Naidu', AIR 1937 Mad 937 (E). The question referred to the Full Bench in that case was whether an agent with a power of attorney to appear and conduct judicial proceedings has a right of audience in court. The question was answered in the negative and Beasley C.J. after referring to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in AIR 1916 Cal 181 (1) (B) observed: "It is plain that Rr.1 and 2 of O.3, C.P. Code do not give the recognised agent any right to plead in Court on behalf of his principal either in the appellate or original side of the High Court." It is true that the ultimate decision of the Madras case turned on S.119, C.P. Code but the observations so far as they go follow the view expressed by Jenkins C.J. and Chatterjee J. in AIR 1916 Cal 181 (I) (B) and indicate that according to the learned Judges, a recognised agent representing his principal was not entitled to claim audience before the Court under the provisions of O.3, R.1, Civil P.C. 15. In AIR 1948 EP 61 (A), Teja Singh J. examined all those various authorities. The learned Judge agreed that a recognised agent could not claim a right of audience and was not entitled to "argue or plead" before a court on behalf of his principal, but the learned Judge was however of the opinion that pleading is quite different from acting and since the law allows the recognised agent to act he was entitled to examine the witnesses of his principal and to cross-examine the witnesses of the other side. According to the learned Judge the term acting was wide enough to include all actions which do not constitute pleading. 16. The word plead is not defined anywhere but the word "pleader" is defined in S.2, Cl.15, C.P. Code as a person entitled to appear and plead. All the High Courts seem to be agreed on the proposition that it is the privilege of a pleader to be allowed to plead and to claim an audience for that purpose and that a recognised agent has no such right. All the High Courts seem to be agreed on the proposition that it is the privilege of a pleader to be allowed to plead and to claim an audience for that purpose and that a recognised agent has no such right. The learned Judge who decided that East Punjab case appears to have drawn a distinction between addressing the Court in arguing a case and appearing before a Court for examining witnesses. According to the learned Judge the examination of witness was covered by the word act or acting used in O.3, R.1, C.P.C. and this did not involve pleading or argument. I find it difficult to agree to this line of reasoning. Examination of witnesses and cross-examination requires special skill and training and also discussion of questions of relevancy and admissibility of the evidence. Questions often arise during the examination of witnesses regarding relevancy and admissibility of evidence and persons in charge of the case of the parties are required to address the Court and argue the points raised. It cannot therefore be said that for conducting examination of Witnesses there is no need to claim an audience or to address the Court. If therefore a recognised agent has no right to address the Court, it is difficult to understand how he can be allowed to examine or cross-examine witnesses. 17. In my opinion the words 'appearance, application or act' only mean appear, make application and take such other necessary steps as may be required to be taken up for the progress of the proceedings. I think the interpretation of the language used in O.3, R.1, C.P. Code as made in AIR 1936 Oudh 261 (D) indicates the real scope of the authority of a recognised agent. In my opinion, examination and cross-examination of witnesses require an audience before the Court, which a recognised agent cannot claim. He cannot, therefore, be allowed to examine witnesses on behalf of his principal or to cross-examine the witnesses of the other side. 18. I am, therefore, of the opinion that there is no need to interfere with the order passed by the trial Court and the revision application must be dismissed. In the circumstances of the case I make no order for costs. Revision dismissed.