Judgment :- 1. The counter-petitioner in Arbitration Petition No.2 of 1951 on the file of the Kottayam District Court is the revision petitioner. He is the petitioner in Arbitration Petition No.3 of 1951. The former petition is by the arbitrator under S.14 of the Arbitration Act for filing the award. The latter petition is one filed under S.33 of the Act challenging the validity of the award. In the course of the enquiry, a preliminary objection was raised by the petitioner in Arbitration Petition No. 3 of 1951 that the award was void and unenforceable by reason of the fact that it was not registered under the Registration Act. This objection was over-ruled by the court below by its order dated 20.2.1954. The revision petition is from that order. 2. The revision petitioner and the first counter-petitioner in this court are brothers. Their father executed a settlement deed in respect of his properties in favour of his elder son, the revision petitioner. The younger son took objection to this; and himself and his children resorted to Satyagraha in the house in which his father and brother were living. As a result of this the elder brother agreed to refer the dispute to an arbitrator. Ext. B is the agreement of reference. The second counter-petitioner in this Court was the arbitrator. The award given by the arbitrator is Ext. A. The operative portion of the award is to the effect that the elder brother should execute a registered document conveying a portion of the properties covered by the settlement deed in favour of the younger brother (1st counter-petitioner in this Court) free of all liabilities. The award given by the arbitrator is Ext. A. The operative portion of the award is to the effect that the elder brother should execute a registered document conveying a portion of the properties covered by the settlement deed in favour of the younger brother (1st counter-petitioner in this Court) free of all liabilities. The exact wording of the award is as follows: (1) That the petitioner shall execute a registered document conveying (the property is described here) in favour of the counter-petitioner free of all the liabilities imposed by the settlement deed dated 1st April 1950 (in view of the lion share given to the petitioner by this award) whereby the counter-petitioner will be entitled to whatever rights in those properties the petitioner gets under the document dated 1st April 1950." The second clause is as follows: "(2) That the petitioner shall execute the above said document within fifteen days at his cost from the date of this award failing which the counter-petitioner is entitled to get a decree as per this award and execute the same." The third clause reads: "(3) All other properties entered in the document of 1st April 1950 other than those set apart for the counter-petitioner shall go to the petitioner as he is entitled to the same." 3. The revision petitioner's contention is that the award comes within S.17(1)(b) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, compulsorily registrable; while the counter-petitioner's case is that it comes within the exception contained in S.17(2)(v) of the Act. S.17(1)(b) reads: "Other non-testamentary instrument which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property." It is argued for the revision petitioner that the award, Ext. A, purports to create and declare an interest in immovable property of the value of over rs.100 in favour of the counter-petitioner and that it also purports to extinguish the revision petitioner's interest in that property. Sub-s. (2) of S.17 provides certain exceptions to Cls. (b) and (c) of sub-s. (1). A, purports to create and declare an interest in immovable property of the value of over rs.100 in favour of the counter-petitioner and that it also purports to extinguish the revision petitioner's interest in that property. Sub-s. (2) of S.17 provides certain exceptions to Cls. (b) and (c) of sub-s. (1). Sub-s. (2)(v) relates to "any document not itself creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property, but merely creating a right to obtain another document which will, when executed, create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest." It is not disputed that, under the Indian Registration Act, Act XVI of 1908, an award will come within the category of non-testamentary instruments mentioned in S.17(1)(b). The question for decision is whether the award. Ext. A, purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in the immovable property mentioned in the award, or whether it merely creates a right in the counter-petitioner to obtain a document which will, when executed, create, declare or assign a right in the property in his favour and will to that extent limit the right which the petitioner had in the properties covered by settlement deed. 4. A reading of Cl. (1) of Ext. A leaves no room for doubt that it only imposes an obligation on the petitioner to execute a deed of conveyance in favour of the counter-petitioner in respect of a portion of the properties included in the settlement deed executed in his favour by his father. The right it creates in favour of the counter-petitioner is only the right to get such a deed executed in his favour by the petitioner. There is no declaration in the award that the settlement deed is invalid to any extent. The award proceeds on the basis that the settlement deed is valid in law. This is clear from the wording of Cl. (1). Under the second clause the petitioner is directed to execute the deed of conveyance within fifteen days from the date of the award. That clause also provides that in case the petitioner fails to execute the deed within the prescribed time the counter-petitioner will be entitled to get a decree as per the award and to execute the same. (1). Under the second clause the petitioner is directed to execute the deed of conveyance within fifteen days from the date of the award. That clause also provides that in case the petitioner fails to execute the deed within the prescribed time the counter-petitioner will be entitled to get a decree as per the award and to execute the same. In fact, the right that is conferred on the counter-petitioner is a mere right in personam to compel the petitioner to execute the deed of conveyance in his favour. If the award is filed in Court and a decree is passed on the basis of it, the decree will be only one compelling the petitioner to execute the deed of conveyance in favour of the counter-petitioner. The execution of the decree can relate only to the execution of such a deed. For obtaining possession of the property the counter-petitioner will have to institute a fresh suit after getting the deed of conveyance executed in his favour either by the petitioner or on his behalf by the Court. It will be only when the deed of conveyance is executed that the ownership of the property will be transferred to the counter-petitioner. 5. Reference may be made in this connection to a decision of West, J., in Burjorji Cursetji Panthaki v. Mancherji Kuverji (5 Bombay 143). In that case the document in question was in the following terms. "I have received from you Rs. 100, namely, rupees one hundred, as earnest (i.e.) at the time of the execution of this bargain-paper. And as to the remaining Rs. 1,800, namely, one thousand and eight hundred, the same are duly to be paid to me within one month from this day, when you will get the deed (or) document made in your favour. And all the expenditure in respect of the deed (or) documents and transferring (the property) to your name you are duly to make your account ...." It was held that the document created only a right to get a deed of conveyance executed in respect of the property and that it was, therefore, not compulsorily registrable. This is what the learned judge said: "It is merely a right in personam against Muncherji. By the contract, Burjorji has acquired a secondary right of action to insist on Muncherji's making his engagement good by executing an effectual conveyance, but no more. This is what the learned judge said: "It is merely a right in personam against Muncherji. By the contract, Burjorji has acquired a secondary right of action to insist on Muncherji's making his engagement good by executing an effectual conveyance, but no more. The document stipulates for a formal conveyance, but is not itself a conveyance. The ownership remains vested in Muncherji until his specific performance of the existing obligation is sought by the plaintiff. Burjorji by executing an actual and effectual conveyance whereby the ownership shall be transferred from the one to the other. The real right, as distinguished from the obligation, will then have passed, but not till then, nor then without a registration of the final instrument. The one now executed, giving a right to that, is of exactly the kind contemplated by S.17, Art.(b) of Act III of 1877." S.17(h) of Act III of 1877 corresponds to S.17(2)(v) of Act XVI of 1908. The learned judge further observed at page 151: "Now what the plaintiff in the present suit seeks, is specific performance by the execution of the conveyance which will convert his contractual right into a right of ownership. I think that for such a purpose the document A is admissible to show the contract entered into for another conveyance though not as a conveyance itself." 6. It was argued for the revision petitioner that the mere fact that the award provides for the execution of a deed of conveyance will not take it out of the purview of S.17(1)(b) of the Act if it really creates, declares, assigns, limits or extinguishes a right in immovable property. Reference was made to the observation of Wadsworth, J. in Yanedamme v. Venkiteswarlu (1947 Madras 168). The learned judge said: "It is no doubt well settled (vide 57 M.L.J. 765 and 13 Madras 281) that when a document creates, declares, assigns, limits or extinguishes any right, title or interest in immovable property of a value exceeding Rs. 100 it must be registered, even though the document itself contains a clause contemplating the execution of a mere formal registered document in future." But the question is whether the award in this case does create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable property. As stated already, the award does not create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right. As stated already, the award does not create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right. It only imposes an obligation on the petitioner to execute a deed of conveyance in respect of the property in favour of the counter-petitioner and creates a corresponding right in favour of the latter to get such a deed executed. The learned judge further observes in paragraph 7 of the judgment: "When there is a dispute between parties and that dispute is referred to an arbitrator whose decision the parties agree to accept, there is, in fact, a contract between these parties, the final terms of which will embody the decision of the arbitrator on the point referred to him. If the nature of the contract between the parties is such that it actually declares or creates or assigns any interest in immovable property, the award just like any other contract having that effect, must be registered. If, however, the contract between the parties merely relates to the terms on which one party shall have the right to demand from the other party a future conveyance of the property, then the award which settles the terms upon which this future conveyance should be made, is nothing more than part of an agreement to convey, and it is well settled that an agreement to convey in future falls under the exception in S.17(2)(v), Registration Act." In that case the plaintiff who had a right to maintenance demanded an assignment of property in lieu of the right to maintenance. The dispute related to the quantum of property and the terms on which it should be assigned. The decision of the arbitrator settled this dispute, but it did not of itself operate as a conveyance. The learned judge was of opinion that the award conferred on the plaintiff only a right to compel the defendant to convey to him the property selected by the arbitrator. It was, therefore, held that the award stood on no higher footing than an agreement to transfer in future and that it came within the exception contained in S.17(2)(v). It will thus be seen that this decision is really in favour of the counter-petitioner. 7. For the above reasons I hold that Cls. It was, therefore, held that the award stood on no higher footing than an agreement to transfer in future and that it came within the exception contained in S.17(2)(v). It will thus be seen that this decision is really in favour of the counter-petitioner. 7. For the above reasons I hold that Cls. (1) and (2) of the award which direct the petitioner to execute a deed of conveyance in favour of the counter-petitioner in respect of a portion of the properties included in the settlement deed come within the exception contained in S.17(2)(v) of the Act. 8. It was next argued for the revision petitioner that Cl. (3) of the award amounts to a declaration of right in respect of immovable property and that it, therefore, comes within S.17(1)(b). According to the counter-petitioner, this clause does not amount to a declaration of right in the sense in which that term is used in S. 17(1)(b). It is argued on his behalf that the clause contains only a statement of fact and not a declaration of right. I think that this argument has to be accepted. As stated already, the award does not purport to declare the settlement deed invalid to any extent. The arbitrator accepted the settlement deed as valid, but, for the purpose of restoring peace in the family, directed the petitioner to execute a deed of conveyance in respect of a portion of the properties in favour of the counter-petitioner. The effect of executing such a deed of conveyance will be that the counter-petitioner will get the property covered by it and that the rest of the properties included in the deed of settlement will continue to belong to the petitioner. Cl. (3) of the award only amounts to a statement of this fact. It has been held in a good number of cases that the mere statement of fact will not amount to a declaration as contemplated by S.17(1)(b). The question was first discussed by West, J., in Sakharum Krishnaji v. Madan Krishnaji (5 Bombay 232). In that case the document which came up for consideration contained the following words: "Our eldest brother M has built houses and is building new houses on property appertaining to his share To the same we three persons and our heirs and representatives have no interest of any kind whatever. In that case the document which came up for consideration contained the following words: "Our eldest brother M has built houses and is building new houses on property appertaining to his share To the same we three persons and our heirs and representatives have no interest of any kind whatever. If we or they should prefer any claim, then the same is to be null. This release paper we have duly passed in writing jointly and severally and in sound mind." It was held that the document did not amount to a declaration of right in immovable property in the sense intended by S.17 of the Registration Act, Act III of 1877. The learned judge said: "Here, however, the document is not itself one which declares a right in immovable property, in the sense probably intended by S. 17. There 'declare' is placed along with'create', 'assign', 'limit' or 'extinguish' a 'right', 'title' or 'interest', and these words imply a definite change of legal relation to the property by an expression of will embodied in the document referred to. I think this is equally the case with the word 'declare'. It implies a declaration of will, not a mere statement of fact, and thus a deed of partition, which causes a change of legal relation to the property divided amongst all the parties to it, is a declaration in the intended sense; but a letter containing an admission, direct or inferential, that a partition once took place does not 'declare' a right within the meaning of the section. It does in one sense 'declares' a right; that is, the existence of the right is directly or indirectly stated by the writing, but it is not the expression or declaration of will by which the right is constituted. Unless such a distinction as this were accepted, all correspondence would be excluded from which an admission might be gathered of a right or interest the instrument of which, if there was one, would need to be registered." 9. In Rangenayaki v. Virupakshee Rao (1923 Madras 621) Coutta Trotter, J., quoted this observation and said : "I wish to associate to myself with all that the learned judge says on the point. In Rangenayaki v. Virupakshee Rao (1923 Madras 621) Coutta Trotter, J., quoted this observation and said : "I wish to associate to myself with all that the learned judge says on the point. It does not appear to me that any of the later decisions, whether of the Privy Council or of the other High Courts in India, have in any way modified it, and indeed in one case in which in its initial stage I was concerned, the case of Varada Pillai v. Jeevarthanammal (43 Madras 244), it appears to me that the judgment of the Board entirely recognises and proceeds on the principle laid down in the Bombay Case by West, J." The question was considered by the Privy Council in Bhageshwari v. Jagarnath (1932 Privy Council 55). Viscount Dunodin, who delivered the judgment of the Board, quoted with approval the observation of West, J., in 5 Bombay 232 and, after referring to the subsequent decisions of the Indian High Courts including 1923 Madras 621, said: "Their Lordships have no doubt that this track of decisions is right. Though the word 'declare' might be given a wider meaning, they are satisfied that the view originally taken by West, J., is right. The distinction is between a mere recital of a fact and something which in itself creates a title." 10. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner referred to a decision of the Peshawar Judicial Commissioner's Court in Abdulla Khan v. Bahran Khan (1935 Peshawar 69) in support of his argument. Middleton, J.C., observed in that case: "A mere statement of fact by a party to an instrument would obviously have no effect upon legal relations, but a similar statement in an award by arbitrators regarding a point in dispute between the parties does affect the legal relationship; in the first case it is a mere admission of an undisputed fact; in the second case, it is a decision and a finding upon a fact which is disputed. The statement in the award that the 16 Mianas do belong to the respondent may in the future constitute a title deed for the respondent." But, I do not think that this observation applies to the facts of the present case. In this case, there was no dispute between the parties as to the right of the father to execute a settlement deed in respect of his properties. In this case, there was no dispute between the parties as to the right of the father to execute a settlement deed in respect of his properties. Consequently, there was no dispute regarding the legality of the settlement deed. The arbitrator only directed the petitioner to give up his right in respect of a portion of the properties to which he was legally entitled. The remaining portion of the properties will continue to belong to him even if the arbitrator did not say anything about it in the award. Cl. (3) of the award is, in fact, a superfluity. Even if that clause was not in the award the petitioner would continue to be the owner of the properties retained by him after executing the deed of conveyance in favour of the counter-petitioner in respect of the portion mentioned in the award. In the circumstances, Cl. (3) of the award cannot amount to a declaration of right as contemplated by S.17(1)(b) of the Act. 11. It follows that the award, Ext. A, is not an instrument coming within the meaning of S.17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. The learned Additional District Judge was, therefore, right in holding that the award is not compulsorily registrable. The order of the court below is confirmed and the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.