Judgment:- This appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the appellant against the Madura Municipality for a permanent injunction restraining them from starting or laying or continuing any prosecution against the plaintiff for alleged trade in mutton in a stall in No.37, Khanpalayam First Street, Madurai. Both the Courts rejected the plaintiff’s claim. It is now contended in appeal that at any rate for the period from 17th November, 1947, to 31st March, 1948, the plaintiff preferred an application to the Municipal Commissioner, Madurai, under Exhibit A-15, asking for a grant of a licence for that period for the purpose of carrying on the business of a meat-stall. The reply rejecting the request is Exhibit A-16, dated 26th March, 1948. It says “Licence requested for a meat-stall at No.37, Khanpalayam First Street was refused as running of the trade in the premises will be prejudicial to the interests of public health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the locality.” Relying on sub-clause (11) of section 321 of the District Municipalities Act it is argued that as there has been a failure on the part of the municipality to communicate to the applicant within thirty days after the receipt of his application, it must be deemed that the application had been allowed for the period for which it was made. The relevant portion of section 321(11) is in the following terms: “and save as otherwise specially provided in this Act, if orders on an application for licence or permission or for registration are not communicated to the applicant within thirty days after the receipt of the application by the executive authority, the application shall be deemed to have been allowed for the year or for such less period as is mentioned in the application, and subject to the law, rules, by-laws, regulations and all conditions ordinarily impose”. The further contention is that if section 321(11) is applicable, it will not be open to the municipality to prosecute the plaintiff for carrying on the business of meat-stall during the period from 17th November, 1947, to 31st March, 1948. The refusal of the licence subsequently is relied upon to show that section 321(11) would not apply. The further contention is that if section 321(11) is applicable, it will not be open to the municipality to prosecute the plaintiff for carrying on the business of meat-stall during the period from 17th November, 1947, to 31st March, 1948. The refusal of the licence subsequently is relied upon to show that section 321(11) would not apply. The question was considered by a Bench of this Court with reference to a corresponding provision in the earlier Act in In re Venkatasubbayya1, where an application was made to the chairman of the municipality for the continuation of his licence for boiling paddy at a certain place during the financial year and the licence was refused more than thirty days after the receipt of the application by the chairman and the applicant used the place for boiling paddy notwithstanding the refusal. It was held that the applicant was not guilty of an offence under the corresponding provision of the District Municipalities Act, applying the provision corresponding to section 321(11) to the facts of that case. In the circumstances it was held that as there was no communication within the period prescribed under section 188 (5), i.e., corresponding to section 321(11), the application shall be deemed to have been granted. Similarly in respect of a prosecution launched against the applicant for running a tea-shop without a licence, he having already applied but having received a reply of refusal after forty-five days, Horwill, J., in Abdul Razack Sahib, In re2, held that under the corresponding provision of section 365(10) of the City Municipal Act, the licence must be deemed to have been granted and the prosecution could not therefore be sustained. It is however urged on behalf of the municipality that section 269 of the Act prohibits any person without a licence from carrying on a trade of a butcher and in the face of such an express prohibition clause (11) of section 321 would not apply and since the provision which deemed that an application has been allowed consequent on the non-receipt of a reply within thirty days of the receipt of the application is qualified by the following clauses, namely “save as otherwise specially provided in this Act”, it is urged that section 269 is the special provision which excludes the application of the clause granting this privilege. I am unable to accept this argument for the reason that the specific provision that is contemplated is a specific provision to the contrary. A specific provision contrary to what is laid down under clause (11) must be found somewhere in the Act to take away a case from the application of that sub-clause. It is not suggested that there is any such provision to the contrary except the general provisions relating to the granting of licences and prohibition of trade without such licences. This case is governed by the decision of the Bench in In re Venkatasubbayya1, and to the exent of the period from 17th November, 1947, to 31st March, 1948, it must be deemed by reason of the failure of the municipality to intimate their refusal within thirty days that licence has been granted, and that therefore for the carrying on of any trade during the said period there could be no prosecution even though the licence was subsequendy refused. It is stated by Mr. Satyanarayana Raju on behalf of the municipality that there’ is no pending prosecution against the applicant for his having carried on the trade between 17th November, 1947 and 31st March, 1948. In view of that statement which is not contradicted by the learned counsel for the appellant, there is no reason to interfere with the decision of the lower appellate Court, though if there is such a prosecution, the appellant would be entitled to an injunction restraining the municipality from proceeding with such a prosecution. I am in agreement with the lower appellate Court that there cannot be a general injunction restraining the municipality from prosecuting the applicant in respect of earlier or future offences under the Act, if any. In the result the appeal has to be dismissed but in the circumstances of the case each party will bear their respective costs. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.