SARJOO PROSAD C. J.: The only question which arises for considera­tion in this appeal is - whether the notice to quit served on the defendants was a valid notice. (2) The relevant facts are that the plaintiffs-res­pondents sued to eject the defendants from cer­tain lands and houses in their occupation as tenants of the plaintiffs. The case of the plain­tiffs specifically was that the tenancy was a monthly one according to the English calendar, for which a rent of Rs. 757- p.m. was payable toy the defendants. The defendants appear to have taken settlement of some adjoining lands from another person on which they set up a machinery for sawing timber and also laid out a trolley track. The plaintiffs' case is that the plaintiffs require the houses and the godowns for their own use and, therefore, they sent a registered notice to quit asking the defendants to give up possession of the premises by 31-1-1948. The defendants Nos. 1 to 7 were impleaded as the principal tenants and defendants 8 to 18 were impleaded as sub-tenants under those de­fendants. The defendants, in their written statement, did not specifically deny that the tenancy was a monthly tenancy, as agreed to between the parties. They, however, asserted that the notice to quit was insufficient because the lease was for manufacturing purposes and, therefore, the tenancy should have been terminated by six months' notice to quit. They also asserted that the plaintiffs had given them to understand that they were to remain in occupation of the land as long as they liked and on that understand­ing, they had set up a saw-mill and laid a trolley track. They also disputed that the defendants Nos. 2 to 17 were sub-tenants under them. (3) The Courts below have found concurrently that the plaintiffs required, the premises for their own use and also that the defendants 8 to 17 were sub-tenants under the defendants 1 to 7. These are, therefore, concluded by the find­ings of the two Courts below. The Courts be­low have also not accepted the defendants' plea that they had a right to stay on the land as long as they liked or that there was any such understanding between the parties as stated by the defendants. These are, therefore, concluded by the find­ings of the two Courts below. The Courts be­low have also not accepted the defendants' plea that they had a right to stay on the land as long as they liked or that there was any such understanding between the parties as stated by the defendants. On the question- of the nature of the tenancy, the trial Court came to the find­ing that the tenancy was for homestead purposes and, therefore, there was a monthly tenancy, and the notice to quit expired within fifteen days of the expiry of the month of the tenancy, and was a valid notice to quit in the eye of law. In doing so, it observed that there was no evidence, oral or circumstantial, to prove that the premises were leased out for manufacturing purposes, and that in the reply to the notice for ejectment it was not asserted by the defendants that the nature of the tenancy was for manufacturing purposes. 'The Court accordingly decreed the plaintiffs' suit for ejectment and also for com­pensation. The compensation decreed was to a modified extent only. The lower appellate Court definitely held that the tenancy was for manufacturing purposes. But it pointed out that a, lease for manufac­turing purposes had to be created by a registered instrument and, in the absence of any such instrument, the tenancy should be regarded as a monthly tenancy terminable by fifteen days notice to quit. It, therefore, decreed the suit for ejectment, though for somewhat different reasons, affirming the decree of the trial Court, but disallowed the claim for compensation. (4) It has been now contended before us by the learned Advocate-General that in view of the finding of the lower Appellate Court that the tenancy was for manufacturing purposes, the notice to quit must be held to be invalid. (4) It has been now contended before us by the learned Advocate-General that in view of the finding of the lower Appellate Court that the tenancy was for manufacturing purposes, the notice to quit must be held to be invalid. In this connection, he relied upon S. 106, Transfer of Property Act, which lays down that "in the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy." He submits that in this case the tenancy was not disputed and inasmuch as the purpose of the tenancy was, as found by the lower appel­late Court, a manufacturing purpose, it should be deemed to be a lease from year to year, ter­minable by six months' notice, and inasmuch as such a notice had not been given, the decree for ejectment could riot be made. He also refers to the language of S. 116, Transfer of Property Act, which says that where a lessee or under-lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal repre­sentative accepts rent from the lessee or under-lessee, the lease is, in the absence of an agree­ment to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the tenancy has been created. The learned counsel submits that here, al­though there was no specific period given, still the lease being for manufacturing purposes, should be held to be valid lease for a year, and after the determination of that period, his possession of the leasehold should be regarded as the pos­session of a tenant holding over from year to year having regard to the purpose of the manu­facturing lease. The decision of the learned Additional District Judge that the absence of a registered and written lease will render the tenancy to be a monthly lease terminable by fifteen days' notice to quit, prima facie does not appear to be sound, because if S. 106, Transfer of Property Act, applies, then, having regard to the purpose of the tenancy, six months' notice to quit was essential. (5) Mr. (5) Mr. Ghose on behalf of the respondents has, however, contended that the decision can be supported on the short ground that in this case, irrespective of the nature of the tenancy, there was a contrast that the tenancy should be a monthly tenancy, and, therefore, terminable by fifteen days' notice to quit. In paragraph 5 of the plaint, the plaintiffs very definitely assert­ed that the defendants 1 to 7 were in occupa­tion of the' above lands in suit and the houses thereon as tenants under the plaintiffs and the tenancy was a monthly tenancy according to the English calendar months. The plaintiffs also stated therein that the rent was fixed at Rs. 75 /-p. m., which the defendants undertook to pay monthly to the plaintiffs, and which they had been paying month by month, and on the plain­tiffs' refusal to accept it, had been depositing in Court every month. The plaint, therefore, very distinctly averred that the tenancy was a month­ly one according to the contract between the parties. This assertion in the plaint was never controverted in the written statement. In the written statement, some of the specific allega­tions made in the other paragraphs were denied, I but there was no denial of this averment, and 'the only plea which the defendants set up in paragraph 6 of their written statement was that the lease granted to the defendants, being a manufacturing lease, the notice was invalid. ID paragraph 11 of the written statement also, there was only a vague denial wherein the de­fendants stated that they did not admit any statement made by the plaintiffs in the plaint except those which were expressly admitted in the written statement. In the absence of any specific denial, one had to assume, according to the rules of pleadings, that there was a contract according to which, in spite of the nature of the tenancy, the parties agreed that the tenancy should be a monthly tenancy for which a monthly rent was payable. Indeed paragraph 8 of the written statement to some extent implicitly supports the assertion of the plaintiffs that the tenancy was a monthly tenancy, because therein the defendants ad­mitted that they had been paying a monthly rent originally and later the rent was enhanced to Rs. 75/- per month, and when the plaintiffs re­fused to accept rent, the defendants deposited the amount each month in Court. 75/- per month, and when the plaintiffs re­fused to accept rent, the defendants deposited the amount each month in Court. The position, therefore, is that on the pleadings, there was a contract between the parties to treat the tenancy as a monthly tenancy. Such a contract is per­missible in law. That being so, on the terms of S. 106, Transfer of Property Act, itself, the tenancy was terminable by fifteen days' notice to quit expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. It is not disputed here that if the tenancy is held to be a monthly tenancy, then the notice to quit is valid. Ordinarily, of course, in the case of a tenancy for manufacturing pur­poses, it should be held to be a tenancy from year to year terminable by six months' notice to quit, but there is nothing in law to prevent the parties from coming to an agreement be­tween themselves, under which, irrespective of the nature of the tenancy, they should treat the tenancy as a monthly one. Indeed the opening lines of the section make a saving in favour of such contracts. On these grounds it cannot be disputed that there was a valid notice to quit in this case, and that the suit for ejectment has been rightly decreed by the two Courts below. (6) It has been further argued by Mr. Ghose that there being no document creating the lease, apart from any question of contract or agree­ment between the parties, there should be a presumption, from the payment of monthly rent that the tenancy was a monthly one. In this connection, he relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in - 'Ram Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo', AIR 1952 SC 23 (A). It was argued there on behalf of the appellant that from the fact that the rent paid was an annual rent, it could be fairly inferred that the agreement between the parties was certainly not to create a monthly tenancy. This argument did not find favour with their Lordships in the circumstances of that particular case. But their Lordships ob­served thus in repelling the contention: "It is not disputed that the contract to the contrary, as contemplated by S. 106, Transfer of Property Act, need not be an express con­tract; it may be implied, but it certainly should be a valid contract. But their Lordships ob­served thus in repelling the contention: "It is not disputed that the contract to the contrary, as contemplated by S. 106, Transfer of Property Act, need not be an express con­tract; it may be implied, but it certainly should be a valid contract. If it is no contract in law, the section will be operative and regulate the duration of the lease. It has no doubt been recognised in several cases that the mode in which a rent is expressed to be payable affords a presumption that the tenancy is of a character corresponding thereto. Consequently, when the rent reserved is an annual rent, the presumption would arise that the tenancy was an annual tenancy unless there is something to rebut the presumption. But the difficulty in applying this rule to the present case arises from the fact that a tenancy from year to year or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by registered instrument, as laid down in S. 107, T. P. Act." Their Lordships did, therefore, accept the prin­ciple that the mode in which rent is expressly payable affords a presumption that the tenancy is of a character corresponding to the nature of the monthly or the annual payment. It is argued by Mr. Ghose that in this case, the rent was payable monthly and, therefore, this presump­tion is available to him leading to the inference that the tenancy was a monthly tenancy. It is true that in that case, their Lordships did not consider the effect of S. 116, Transfer of Property Act, when they observed that a tenancy from year to year or reserving an annual rent could be created only by a registered instrument as pro­vided in S. 107, Transfer of Property Act. But Mr. Ghose contends that S. 116, Transfer of Property Act, has no application to a case like the one before us, where there was no deter­minate period for which the lease had been created. There is nothing to show that the lease was for any definite period, on the termination of which the defendant was holding over on the terms of the lease and in accordance with the nature of the tenancy. There is nothing to show that the lease was for any definite period, on the termination of which the defendant was holding over on the terms of the lease and in accordance with the nature of the tenancy. He also relies in support of his contention, upon the illustrations to S. 116, Transfer of Pro­perty Act, and observes that in view of the deci­sion of the Supreme Court, no question of hold­ing over will arise in cases where the lease is not for any fixed period, but merely a lease from year to year, which will have to be by a regis­tered instrument, as provided by S. 107, Transfer of Property Act. These arguments open up broader questions for consideration, which at present it is not necessary for us to answer. In my opinion, the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that in the present case there was a contract to the contrary, treating the tenancy as a monthly one and, as such, the decree of the Court below is correct and must be affirmed. (7) The appeal is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order for costs of this appeal. (8) The defendants are given three months' time to remove any constructions that they may have on the land and to deliver vacant posses­sion of the house and premises to the plaintiffs, failing which, they would be liable to be evicted by process of execution. Appeal dismissed.