Judgment :- 1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for redemption of a mortgage Ext. A dated 17.4.1055. The suit was filed on 17.7.1119. The plaintiff relied on an alleged acknowledgment contained in the original of Ext. D, which is copy of a statement said to have given by the mortgagee before the Settlement Officer on 3.11.1069. The suit was resisted on the ground of limitation. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that Ext. D could not operate as a valid acknowledgment. This decision was reversed by the District judge who held that Ext. D could be acted upon as acknowledgment. The 3rd defendant has preferred this second appeal. 2. The only question arising for decision is whether Ext. D can be treated as a valid acknowledgment made by the mortgagee. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that no presumption could be drawn that the original of Ext. D was given by the 1st defendant mortgagee or that the original was signed by him. S.19 of the Limitation Act requires that the acknowledgment of liability must have been made in writing signed by the party. No independent evidence was given in this case that the 1st defendant made the statement or that he signed it. The plaintiff did not care to get the original produced in the case, although it must have been available since the copy of Ext. D was issued as late as 1119. The nature and effect of statements given by parties in settlement proceedings have come up for consideration in several decisions of the Travancore High Court. In Neelakantaru Krishnaru v. Kanakku Kesavan Padmanabhan and 10 others (11 T.L.J. 409) it was held that statements purporting to have been made by a certain person before a Settlement Officer could not be presumed to be genuine. The decision in Raman Pillai Raghavan Pillai v. Parvathi Amma Kochupennamma (30 T.L.J. 749) is also to the same effect. Bhagavathi Pillai v. Janaki Pillai (31 T.L.J. 1212) was a case in which the facts were similar to those in this case. The plaintiff who sought redemption of a mortgage relied on a statement given by the mortgagee before the Settlement Officer to escape the bar of limitation for the suit. The original statement itself was filed in that case. It was held that the statement could not be acted upon as an acknowledgment. The plaintiff who sought redemption of a mortgage relied on a statement given by the mortgagee before the Settlement Officer to escape the bar of limitation for the suit. The original statement itself was filed in that case. It was held that the statement could not be acted upon as an acknowledgment. It was further held that the presumptions raised under S. 90 would not by themselves amount to proof that the statements were really made by the alleged deponents. The decision in 11 T.L.J. 409 was followed. It was held in Narayana Panicker v. Mathai Thomman (33 T.L.J. 397) that a Taluk register containing an abstract on an application filed by the original mortgagee and referring to the original mortgage which was sought to be redeemed would not amount to an acknowledgment of the mortgage. In Ouseph Varkey v. Karthiayani Amma Thankamma (34 T.L.J. 235) it was held that the production of a copy would not per se justify the court in drawing a presumption about the genuineness of the original. Their Lordships followed the decision in Basant Singh v. Brij Raj Saran Singh (57 All. 494 P.C.) In that case Lord Thankerton expressed the views of the Board in the following terms: "In face of the clear language of S. 90, Their Lordships are unable to accept these decisions as sound. The section clearly requires the production to the Court of the particular document, in regard to which the Court may make the statutory presumption. If the document produced is a copy, admitted under S. 65 as secondary evidence, and it is produced from the proper custody and is over thirty years, old, then the signatures authenticating the copy may be presumed to be genuine, as was done in 56 I.A. 146; in that case the dispute was as to the terms of grant, which had admittedly been made. Their Lordships approve of the decision in 15 M.L.R. 192 in which the Judicial Commissioner held that production of a copy was not sufficient to justify the presumption of due execution of the original under S. 90, and they are unable to agree with the subsequent overruling of that decision in 30 M.L.R. 155." The learned counsel for the respondent brought to my notice two decisions of the Travancore High Court - Kumaran Kochan v. Kochan Velayudhan (24 T.L.J. 872) and Chempaka Raman Eswaran Parameswaran v. Eswara Pillai (24 T.L.J. 1278). In the first of these cases a certified copy of a registered deed issued by the Sub-Registrar was produced. It was held that the provisions of S. 90 read with S. 65 Cl. (e) of the Evidence Act was to the effect that when the copy was filed, the court could infer that the purpose of filing the original was obtained. It was also held that S. 90 applied to copies as well as the originals and that if the copy was proved to be a true copy the presumption could be made in favour of the genuineness of the original. This decision was followed in the second case. It has to be mentioned that the Travancore High Court declined to follow these rulings in later cases. Apart from this, there is the fact that the copies produced in the two cases referred to above, were copies of registered documents. Such copies stand on a different footing as was pointed out in the decision reported in 34 T.L.J. 235. It may also be mentioned that the two decisions reported in 24 T.L.J. were based on Khetter Chunder Mookherjee v. Khetter Paul (I.L.R. 5 Cal. 666) which was expressly over-ruled by the Privy Council in 57 All. 494. I decline to follow the two decisions reported in 24 T.L.J. Judged in the light of the other decisions mentioned above it cannot be held as proved that the 1st defendant gave a statement before the Settlement authorities acknowledging the mortgage sought to be redeemed. 666) which was expressly over-ruled by the Privy Council in 57 All. 494. I decline to follow the two decisions reported in 24 T.L.J. Judged in the light of the other decisions mentioned above it cannot be held as proved that the 1st defendant gave a statement before the Settlement authorities acknowledging the mortgage sought to be redeemed. Shri Krishnamurthi Iyer, learned counsel for the respondent, brought to my notice the decision in Hans Raj v. Banarai Lal and others (A.I.R. 1937 Lahore 921) where it was held that the execution and contents of a lost ancient document could not be proved merely by the production of a copy which itself is over 30 years old but that such copy considered with the other evidence might give rise to the presumption as to the genuineness of the original. There is not even formal proof in this case that the 1st defendant appeared before the settlement authorities and gave this statement. The plaintiff admitted that he did not know who all gave evidence in the settlement enquiry. In this state of evidence it is impossible to hold that the acknowledgment relied on in the plaint has been proved. It necessarily follows that the plaintiff's suit must fail on the ground of limitation. In the result, the decree of the lower appellate court is reversed and the second appeal is allowed restoring the decree of the trial court. The suit will stand dismissed with costs throughout. Allowed.