Judgment :- 1. This Civil Revision Petition arises out of an order refusing to set aside the exparte decree against the 3rd defendant. The decree in the case was passed on 27.2.1110. In execution of the decree, immovable property was sold and the sale was confirmed on 26.1.1112. The auction purchaser took delivery of the property on 27.2.1112. The 3rd defendant's application to set aside the exparte decree was made on 2.2.1123. The trial court found that summons could not have been properly served on the 3rd defendant but that the application was barred by limitation. There was controversy as to whether the Cochin Limitation Act II of 1079 or the later Act XII of 1112 applied. It was held by the trial court that the application was barred in either case and it was accordingly dismissed. On appeal by the 3rd defendant it was held that Act II of 1079 governed the matter, as the same was in force till 24.3.1112 on which date the new Act came into force. In view of this, no opinion was expressed on the question whether the 3rd defendant had knowledge of the decree more than 30 days before the date of the application. The 3rd defendant has preferred the civil revision petition from the concurrent orders against him. 2. The main question arising for decision is which as to which of the two Acts should govern the application. Under Art. 145 of Act II of 1079, the period of limitation for making the application was 30 days from the date of executing any process for enforcing the judgment. Since the property was sold and taken delivery of more than 30 days before the date of the application, the same has to be held barred by limitation if Act II of 1079 applies. In a similar case Subbarayan Embrandiri v. Narayana Menon (31 C.L.R. 328) the High Court of Cochin held that the right to make an application was barred on the date when new enactment came into force and that a right barred under the old Act could not be revived by the new Act. This was the view followed by the High Court of Travancore also, Sankaran Madhavan Nair v. Kora Kuryala (19 T.L.J. 383 F.B.) These decisions followed the dictum in Nepal Chandra Roy Chowdhury v. Niroda Sundari Ghose (I.L.R. 39 Cal. 506). This was the view followed by the High Court of Travancore also, Sankaran Madhavan Nair v. Kora Kuryala (19 T.L.J. 383 F.B.) These decisions followed the dictum in Nepal Chandra Roy Chowdhury v. Niroda Sundari Ghose (I.L.R. 39 Cal. 506). In Mathukumalli Ramayya and others v. Uppalapati Lakshmayya (A.I.R. 1942 P.C. 54) it was held: "Ordinarily the suit would be governed by the Limitation Act, 9 of 1908 which is the law in force when the suit was instituted; but if the defendants are able to show that the right of action had become barred under the Act of 1859 then the title that they had acquired could not be defeated by the subsequent Limitation Act." Shri. A.S. Krishna Iyer, counsel for the petitioner, contended that the principle applicable to suits should not be made applicable to applications of this nature since such applications are only matters of procedure and as no vested rights are defeated by applying the new Act. It is true that statutes of limitation are generally retrospective and govern all proceedings from the moment of their enactment even though the cause of action might have accrued before they came into force. But as held in the decisions mentioned above, it is a well settled proposition that whenever a right to sue or to make an application has become barred long before the new Act came into force, the same could not be revived by a later Act of limitation. Cls. B and C of S. 4 of the Cochin General Clauses Act III of 1079 are to the following effect: "Where any Act made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not - (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under any enactment so repealed." It is therefore clear that the 3rd defendant's right to apply for setting aside the exparte decree which was barred on the date of the enactment of the new Act cannot be revived by the new Limitation Act. In this view, it has to be held that the 3rd defendant's application was barred by limitation. In this view, it has to be held that the 3rd defendant's application was barred by limitation. The order of the Court below is confirmed and the civil revision petition is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.