ORDER : 1. The applicant in this revision is the defendant against whom a suit was brought for possession and for mesne profits in the Court of Munsiff, Indore. It was in connection with certain document that a dispute arose and the matter reached the High Court in second appeal. This Court remanded the case back for redecision and awarded costs incurred so far to the defendant. The case then began before the City Civil Judge again. In the same Court the defendant filed an application for execution of the decree of costs awarded by the High Court. The opponent filed an application before the Additional City Civil Judge under O. 21 R. 29, Civil P.C. for the stay of execution of the decree of costs pending the decision of the suit. On the condition that security would be furnished, the learned Additional City Civil Judge has allowed the application, and it is against this order that the present petitioner has come in revision. 2. The main point urged in this revision by Mr. Newaskar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that the Additional City Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the application and pass order under O. 21 R. 29, Civil P.C. 3. Order 21 Rule 29, Civil Procedure Code runs as follows : "Where a suit is pending in any Court against the holder of a decree of such Court, on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided." 4. The first objection of Mr. Newaskar is that the Rule applies only if a suit is pending in the Court against the holder of a decree of this Court. But the decree of costs is passed by the High Court and not by the Court before whom the decree is being executed. In my opinion there is no substance in this contention as it overlooks the provisions embodied in S. 37, Civil P.C. which lay down that the expression "Court which passed the decree" or words to that effect, shall be deemed to include, where the decree to be executed has been passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the Court of the first instance. 5. The second objection of Mr. 5. The second objection of Mr. Newaskar is that it was the order of the High Court for awarding costs. It was not a decree for costs and so the defendant cannot be held to be the "holder of a decree." As a reply to this contention Mr. Trivedi has rightly urged the principle embodied in S. 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the provisions of this Code relating to the execution of the decree shall, so far as they are applicable, be deemed to apply to the execution of orders. The principle underlying the provisions of this section is that every Court has an inherent power 'to have its orders carried out, as otherwise the orders would be mere farce. 6. The third objection of Mr. Newaskar seems to be that the suit is pending in the Court of City Civil Judge, Shri Vohra and the order on stay application has been made by the Additional City Civil Judge, Mr. K.S. Lele. Mr. Newaskar thinks that it is the same Court before whom the suit is pending which can stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided. I again do not agree with his view. Order 21 R. 29 simply refers to a Court in which the suit is pending against the holder of a decree of such Court. If there are two or more Judges attached to a Court each one of them exercises the powers and jurisdiction of one and the same Court and not of different Courts. For the purpose of O. 21 R. 29, Civil P.C., it is not necessary that the execution proceedings should be pending before the same Judge in whose Court the suit is pending. It is sufficient if the suit is pending before any Judge of the Court against a decree-holder of a decree of such Court. Order 21 Rule 29, Civil Procedure Code has no reference to the personality of the Judge presiding over such Court- 'Narsidas Nathubhai v. Manharsingh', 1931 Bom 247 (AIR V 18) (A) and- 'Bhawani Sahay v. Mt. Sugandbo', 1953 Madh-B 181 (AIR V 40) (B). Both the Judges being of the same Court, in my opinion, any of the Judges can pass an order for the stay of execution. There will thus be no question of jurisdiction involved within the meaning of Section 115, Civil P.C. 7. Sugandbo', 1953 Madh-B 181 (AIR V 40) (B). Both the Judges being of the same Court, in my opinion, any of the Judges can pass an order for the stay of execution. There will thus be no question of jurisdiction involved within the meaning of Section 115, Civil P.C. 7. Next it is urged that in passing the order, the Additional City Civil Judge acted illegally and with material irregularity in staying the execution. Order 21 R. 29, Civil P.C. clearly gives wide powers and discretion to the Court for passing a stay-order. The Court has ample discretion in passing an order as to the terms on which the execution of the decree can be stayed until the pending suit had been decided. If the plaintiff gets a decree for rent and mesne profits, adjustment can be made by setting off the decree for costs against the decree for mesne profits. 8. Under the circumstances of the case, no question of jurisdiction really arises at all, and I, therefore, think that it is not a matter which will justify the Court in interfering in revision. 9. Mr. Trivedi, on behalf of the non-applicant, thought that a revision is incompetent and as the matter relates to the execution of the decree, the order for the stay of execution would be appealable under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Counsel has drawn my attention to Note 44 to S. 47, Civil P.C., in Chitale's Commentary on Civil Procedure Code. I need not repeat what has been stated there as even taking it as a revision I am disposed to reject it. If my view is necessary on the subject, in that case I would only observe that the second view stated in that note seems to me to be more sound and reasonable that a stay of execution under O. 21 R. 29, Civil P.C. is an order relating to the execution, but the decision cannot be said to be one "on the rights of the parties." The question whether the order staying execution proceedings is order not open to appeal must, in my opinion, be determined with reference to the terms of Section 47, Civil P.C. The crucial point is whether it relates to the execution of the decree and determines a question arising between the parties to the suit. Now the expression "relating to the execution of the decree" is vague and sweeping, and so the definition of the term "decree" as contained in S. 2, Civil P.C. must be read along with the provisions of S. 47, Civil P.C. The words of S. 47 are very wide; if taken in the literal sense will cover every order of an interlocutory nature that may be passed in execution proceedings, such as an order granting or refusing process for examination of witnesses, or an order on an application for adjournment. But the intention of the legislature seems to be that such orders would not be appealable at all. And so in- 'Jogodishury Debea v. Kailash Chandra', 24 Cal 725 (739) (FB) (C) Mr. Justice Banerjee remarked : "It is not every order made in execution of a decree that comes within S. 244. If that were so, every interlocutory order in an execution proceeding, such as an order granting or refusing process for the examination of witnesses would be appealable; and far greater latitude would be given of appealing against orders in such proceedings than is allowed as against orders made in suits before decree- a thing which could hardly have been intended. An order in execution proceedings can come under S. 244 only when it determines some question relating to the rights and liabilities of parties with reference to the relief granted by the decree; not when, as in this case it determines merely an incidental question as to whether the proceedings are to be conducted in a certain way. I may add that the language of S. 244, which enacts that certain questions shall be determined by an order of the Court executing the decree, and not by separate suit' clearly indicates that the questions contemplated by the section must be of a nature such that it is possible to suppose that but for the section they could have formed the subject of determination by a separate suit. But a question of an incidental character can never come under that description, and an order determining such a question cannot, therefore, be a decree as defined in Section 2." This view has been followed in many cases, for example, in- "Ramprasad v. Anukulchandra', 1915 Cal 122 (AIR V 2) (D);- 'Mukhtar Ahmed v. Muqarrab Hussain', 34 All 530 (E);- 'Beharilal v. Badripershad', 1931 All 129 (2) (AIR V 18) (F) etc. As an order staying the execution of decree for some time does not determine any question relating to the rights and liabilities of the parties, I am of opinion that it cannot come within the purview of S. 47, Civil P.C. and such an order cannot be appealable. This revision was, therefore, competent, but for reasons already stated, it must fail. 10. The result is that the revision is dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed.