Judgment :- 1. he plaintiff in O.S. No. 8 of 1119 of the District Court of Kottayam is the appellant before us. The suit was for a declaration of title and an injunction restraining the defendant from entering the plaint property. The suit was decreed by the trial court but was dismissed in appeal and the plaintiff was directed to pay the costs of the defendant. During the pendency of the suit the plaintiff was appointed receiver of the plaint property and functioned as such. 2. The defendant filed an execution application for costs and certain amounts stated to be due from the plaintiff in respect of the period of his receivership, and died thereafter. Two of his heirs put in a petition for being impleaded as additional defendants, 2 and 3, and prayed for permission to continue the execution. The plaintiff objected on various grounds to the impleading and the continuance of the execution and his objections were negatived by the Court below. The learned District Judge in the order under appeal said: "the petitioners are permitted to come on record and continue the execution proceedings" 3. The only contention urged before us by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the lower court was wrong in not holding that a succession certificate was essential in view of S.214 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, before the respondents could seek any relief before the court. The relevant portion of S.214 reads: "(a) No court shall pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt to a person claiming on succession to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person or to any part thereof, or (b) proceed, upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled to execute against such a debtor a decree or order of the payment of his debt, except on the production by the person so claiming of (iii) a succession certificate granted under Part X and having the debt specified therein. (2) The word "debt" in sub-s. (1) includes any debt except rent, revenue or profits payable in respect of land used for agricultural purpose:". 4. In Rajammal Marwadi v. Rampyari, A.I.R. 1938 Nagpur 528 a decree-holder applied for execution of his decree dated the 13th March 1933 on the 28th April 1934 and died thereafter on the 12th March 1934. (2) The word "debt" in sub-s. (1) includes any debt except rent, revenue or profits payable in respect of land used for agricultural purpose:". 4. In Rajammal Marwadi v. Rampyari, A.I.R. 1938 Nagpur 528 a decree-holder applied for execution of his decree dated the 13th March 1933 on the 28th April 1934 and died thereafter on the 12th March 1934. His widow applied for her name to be substituted for that of her deceased husband on the 30th June 1934 stating that her husband was dead and that she was his heir. She did not produce any succession certificate and her contention that such a certificate was not necessary was dealt with as follows by Stone, C.J., and Vivian Bose, J: "Now it is said she was not proceeding on her application but on his application and, therefore, S.214(1)(b) does not apply; 26 Cal. 839 and 57 I.C. 902 which simply follows 26 Cal. 839, dissents form a Full Bench judgment reported in 16 All. 259. The latter case however appears to us to be distinguishable, for it was concerned with a suit, not with execution proceedings. Since the new Rule, 0.22, R.12 was made the old question whether execution proceedings abate on death has been set at rest. Abatement does not apply to execution proceedings. The result of that is however that the heirs need not take steps for substitution under 0.22, R.3 but may apply to carry on the proceedings or may file a fresh application. In other words, execution proceedings do not abate but live on land, as some one must take the next step and death terminates all agencies, the person entitled, i.e., the personal representative or heir, can come before the court. That person when he comes will be claiming for himself, at least where he, or she, is heir or beneficially interested. The proper application is for leave to carry on (or proceed with) the pending execution proceedings. Such an application would fall within the words "Upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled:". "To be so entitled" means, as is plain from S.214(1)(a) "to be entitled to any part of the deceased's estate". This widow claims to be so entitled and she makes an application, which is necessary before the court can proceed with a pending execution. "To be so entitled" means, as is plain from S.214(1)(a) "to be entitled to any part of the deceased's estate". This widow claims to be so entitled and she makes an application, which is necessary before the court can proceed with a pending execution. The court cannot, on that application, proceed with the execution unless a succession certificate is produced. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs". The lower court followed 26 Calcutta 839. So did Middleton, J.C., in A.I.R. 1936 Peshawar 17. 5. In the light of the wording of S.214 it is impossible for us to follow 26 Calcutta 839 and like Vakil, J.C., in 1955 Kutch 6 we are inclined to adopt the reasoning and the conclusion in A.I.R. 1938 Nagpur 528 in preference to those adopted in 26 Calcutta 839 and the decisions that follow that judgement. 6. This appeal has hence to be allowed and is hereby allowed with costs. 7. The respondents' learned counsel submitted that even if a succession certificate is required as laid down in 1938 Nagpur 528 it will not be required in respect of all the amounts covered by the application for execution but only in respect of that portion of that application which relates to the costs awarded by the decree. This is not a matter which was agitated before the learned District Judge and in view of that we can only leave it open for determination when as succession certificate in respect of the admitted portion of the amount sought to be recovered is produced and its adequacy is questioned before the court below.