Satya Narain Singh v. Kamakshya Narain Singh — 1955 DIGILAW 105 (PAT)

Judgment Rai, J. 1. The petitioner Thakur Satya Narain Singh and others have come up in revision before this court under the circumstances enumerated below. 2. Some waste land in village Gauria Karma was acquired for the purposes of Damodar Valley Corporation under the Land Acquisition Case No. 2/5 of 1950-51. Raja Bahadur Kamakashya Narain Singh of Ramgarh had created a Duwami lease of this village in favour of Mahtha Gouri Charan Singh. The said Raja Bahadur has also dedicated this village for some religious purposes and assigned the management of the trust properties to a board of trustees of which he himself is the chairman and his wife and his minor son are two other members. The present petitioners, Thakur Satya Narain Singh and other members of his family, claimed to be the raiyats of some of the acquired lands on the basis of a settlement from Mahtha Gouri Charan Singh with the consent of the Raja Bahadur aforesaid. There arose a dispute before the Land Acquisition Officer regarding the apportionment of the compensation between the present petitioners, Mahtha Gouri Charan Singh and the present opposite party. According to the contention of the Raja Bahadur, the settlement in favour of the petitioners was collusive and fraudulent and had not been obtained with his consent. It was also contended on. his behalf that the lessee Mahtha Gouri Charan Singh had forfeited the lease. The Land Acquisition Officer by his order date 14-8-1951, upheld the contention of the present petitioners and further held that the settlement with them was a genuine one and hsd been made with the consent of the Raja Bahadur. On 4-4-1952, the Raja Bahadur filed an application before the Special Land Acquisition Officer in Land Acquisition Case No. 2/50 to the effect that the compensation money may not be paid to any of the claimants as he intended to file an application for referring the case to a civil court as soon as the award was prepared and signed. This application was ordered to be put upon the date fixed. On 28-4-1952, the award was prepared and signed, and notices were ordered to be issued under Sec.12 (2), Land Acquisition Act fixing 28-5-1952, as the date for payment. It was further ordered that payment of compensation money to Thakur Satya Narain Singh would be held up until the date for filing reference expires. On 28-4-1952, the award was prepared and signed, and notices were ordered to be issued under Sec.12 (2), Land Acquisition Act fixing 28-5-1952, as the date for payment. It was further ordered that payment of compensation money to Thakur Satya Narain Singh would be held up until the date for filing reference expires. From the records of the land acquisition case it appears that from 16-6-1952, onwards payments were made from time to time to various claimants including the present petitioners. On 27-6-1952, an application was filed on behalf of the opposite party for referring the matter in dispute to the District Judge in accordance with the provisions of Sec.18, Land Acquisition Act which was allowed and the matter is at present pending in the court of the District Judge, Hazaribagh, in Reference Case No. 16 of 1952. 3. On 28-6-1952, an application was filed OK behalf of the opposite party Nos. 1 to 3 before the District Judge, Hazaribagh, for issue of a direction, to the Land Acquisition Officer to get the compensation money refunded from the petitioners and, to deposit the same in court in accordance with the provisions of Sec.31(2), Land Acquisition Act before hearing the reference itself. The present petitioners opposed the above application on various grounds, but the learned District Judge has, by his order dated 8-11-1954, allowed the application of the opposite party Nos. 1 to 3. The petitioners have moved this court in revision against this order of the learned District Judge. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioners urged before us that under the award signed by the special Land Acquisition Officer the compensation was payable to Raja Bahadur Kamakhsya Narain Singh, chairman of the board of trustees, and the service of notice on him under Sec.12, Land Acquisition Act was sufficient compliance of the relevant provisions of the Act. According to him, as no application for referring the matter to the District Judge was filed on his behalf within the time allowed under Sec.18 of the Act, the Land Acquisition Officer was justified in making the payment to the petitioners. He submitted that in making the payment to his client the Land Acquisition Department followed the instructions of the Board of Revenue in such matters (vide Bihar and Orissa Land Acquisition Manual, 1928 Edition, page 123 para 119). He submitted that in making the payment to his client the Land Acquisition Department followed the instructions of the Board of Revenue in such matters (vide Bihar and Orissa Land Acquisition Manual, 1928 Edition, page 123 para 119). He further submitted that there was no jurisdiction either in the Collector or in the District Judge to ask his clients to refund the money until the award given in the Land Acquisition Proceeding had been modified against them. He urged that the learned District Judge has derived jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the reference from the provisions of Part III of the Land Acquisition Act. According to him, there is no provision in this part of the Act by which the petitioners who had been paid the compensation money awarded to them, could be asked to refund the money before even the hearing of the reference. He contended that the order of the learned District Judge is wholly without jurisdiction and is fit to be set aside. 5. Learned Counsel for the opposite party contended, on the other hand, that under Sec.31(2), Land Acquisition Act it was incumbent upon the Collector to deposit the amount of compensation in the court to which a reference under Sec.18 of the Act was to be made. He urged that as the Raja Bahadur had already filed an application before the Land Acquisition Officer on 4-4-1952, informing him that he would press for a reference, and also requesting him to withhold payment of the compensation money, the same should not have been paid to the present petitioners. In support of his contention he relied on the decisions in the cases of Ramhit Sahu V/s. Mahadeo Choudhury, 1920 Pat 222 (2) (AIR V 7) (A) and Jogesh Chandra Roy v. Yakub Ali, 17 Cal WN 1057(B). He submitted on the strength of these two decisions that the learned District Judge was justified in asking the Land Acquisition Officer to get the money refunded from the present petitioners. He submitted on the strength of these two decisions that the learned District Judge was justified in asking the Land Acquisition Officer to get the money refunded from the present petitioners. Learned Counsel for the opposite party further submitted that as there is no provision under the Land Acquisition Act under which such an order could have been passed by the learned District Judge, he should be deemed to have passed this order under Sec.151, Civil Procedure Code, which should not be interfered with by this court under Sec.115, Civil Procedure Code, as was held in the case of Keshardeo V/s. Radha Kissen, 1953 SC 23 (AIR V 40) (C). 6. In my opinion, it is not necessary to decide at this stage whether the service of notice on Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narayan Singh, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, was sufficient compliance of the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act or not. But, even if it be presumed that the compensation money should not have been paid to the present petitioners and should have been deposited with the District Judge in accordance with the provisions of Section 31 (2) of the Act, until the award given by the Land Acquisition Officer in favour of the petitioners was modified to their detriment in the present reference neither the Land Acquisition Officer nor the District Judge had any jurisdiction to ask them to refund the money, nor had the District Judge any jurisdiction to ask the Collector to get the money refunded from them. In both the cases relied on by learned Counsel for the opposite party the question of the refund by the person who had withdrawn the compensation money in accordance with the award made by the Collector arose after such award was set aside or modified by the District Judge to whom reference under Sec.18 of the Act had been made, but that stage has not yet arrived in the present case. Learned Counsel for the opposite party, however, has laid great stress on the following passage from the judgment in the case of 1920 Pat 222 (2) (AIR V 7) (A) which was judgment given in a regular first appeal filed before this court. Learned Counsel for the opposite party, however, has laid great stress on the following passage from the judgment in the case of 1920 Pat 222 (2) (AIR V 7) (A) which was judgment given in a regular first appeal filed before this court. This passage runs thus: "We may, however, observe that Sub-section (2) of Sec.31 requires that the Collector shall, when making reference under Sec.18 and when the parties to the acquisition do not receive the amount tendered by him, deposit the amount of the compensation in the court to which the reference is submitted. We fail to find out the circumstance under which the money was paid to the opposite party and why the Collector permitted the money to be withdrawn before the expiry of the term fixed by Sec.18 for objecting to the award and applying for reference. "The District Judge also had a right to demand the deposit of the money in court when the reference was made, and to insist upon its being done and, in our opinion, he ought to have done so before disposing of the reference so that the money could be ready for payment) forthwith in pursuance of the decree made by him," In my opinion, the underlined (herein ) portion of the above-quoted judgment was an obiter dictum. But even if it is not so, it does not certainly mean that the District Judge has power to direct the Collector to realise the compensation money from such of the claimants who had been paid in contravention of Section 31(2), Land Acquisition Act. 7. The relevant facts of the case of 17 Cal WN 1057 (B) were as follows: In a land acquisition proceeding the Collector had made an award in favour of one Yakub Ali, who was a transferee of a non-transferable occupancy holding. After the award was signed, Yakub Ali withdrew the compensation money. In a reference under Sec.18, Land Acquisition Act, the District Judge held that Yakub Ali, being a purchaser of a non-transferable occupancy holding, had no interest in the land acquired, and as his interest had no market value, he was not entitled to any portion of the compensation money. After the award was signed, Yakub Ali withdrew the compensation money. In a reference under Sec.18, Land Acquisition Act, the District Judge held that Yakub Ali, being a purchaser of a non-transferable occupancy holding, had no interest in the land acquired, and as his interest had no market value, he was not entitled to any portion of the compensation money. The learned District Judge, however, held that after payment of the compensation money to Yakub Ali, no reference was permissibe under Sec.18 of the Act as he had no jurisdiction to compel the respondent to bring back into court the money paid, out to him. The unsuccessful party went in appeal before the Calcutta High Court where it was held that jurisdiction of the District Judge under Sec.18, Land Acquisition Act was not ousted simply because the successful claimant before the Collector had succeeded in withdrawing One amount before the reference was made. As the District Judge himself had held that Yakub Ali had no right to receive any compensation, the learned Judges who decided that case gave the following direction: "We direct the Respondent to bring back into court the money which he has taken out from the Collectorate, together with interest thereon, at the rate of six per cent per annum from 24-9-1907 (the date when the Appellant made an application under Sec.18) to the date when the money is deposited in court. As soon as the money is deposited it will be paid out to the Appellant. If the Respondent does not deposit the amount within three months from this date, the Appellant will for entitled to recover the amount in execution of the decree of this court." In my opinion, this case has not laid down that the claimant who has withdrawn the money must refund it before the reference is heard by the District Judge. If the Respondent does not deposit the amount within three months from this date, the Appellant will for entitled to recover the amount in execution of the decree of this court." In my opinion, this case has not laid down that the claimant who has withdrawn the money must refund it before the reference is heard by the District Judge. I agree with learned Counsel for the petitioner that the award given by the Land Acquisition Officer has to be presumed to be correct until it is set aside or modified by the District Judge, and, as long as it stands, the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer who himself had given the award can neither in law nor in equity ask the successful party before him to refund the money already paid to him in pursuance of the award which Is final between him and the claimant under Sec.12, Land Acquisition Act. As I have said in. the earlier part of my judgment that no provision of the Land Acquisition Act empowers the District Judge to pass such an order as has been passed in this case I agree with learned Counsel for the petitioners that his order is without jurisdiction. 8. I do not agree with learned Counsel for the opposite party that the District Judge had jurisdiction to pass the order under consideration under Sec.151, Civil Procedure Code, In my opinion this section did not empower the District Judge to pass an order which would go to nullify an award made by the Collector before it is modified or set aside by him. In my view, the decision in the case of 1953 SC 23 (AIR V 40) (C) has no application to the facts and circumstances of this case. In that case the executing court had restored an execution case wrongly dismissed by it. The High Court, at the instance of the judgment-debtor, set aside the order of the executing court by which it had restored the execution case.The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court holding that the executing court had jurisdiction to restore the execution case under Sec.151, Civil Procedure Code. The High Court, at the instance of the judgment-debtor, set aside the order of the executing court by which it had restored the execution case.The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court holding that the executing court had jurisdiction to restore the execution case under Sec.151, Civil Procedure Code. In the present case, however, the award given by the Land Acquisition Officer has not been as yet held to be erroneous, hence its effect cannot be nullified by the District Judge by passing an order under Sec.151, Civil Procedure Code. 9. The result is that the order passed by the District Judge is set aside, this application succeeds and is allowed with costs, hearing fee Rs. 32/-. Raj Kishore Prasad, J. 10 I agree to the order passed in this case by my learned Brother, whose judgment I have had the advantage and privilege of reading before delivery. I say with great respect that I am in substantial agreement with him on the main question regarding the power of the District Judge to pass the order complained of. 11. There are two questions in controversy: (1) whether the Collector, purporting to act under Sec.31(1), Land Acquisition Act, 1894 , had jurisdiction to make payment of the compensation money awarded by him to the petitioners, in the circumstances of the present case; and (2) whether the District Judge, before whom the reference under Sec.18 of the Act is pending, had jurisdiction to request the Collector to get the compensation money paid by him to the petitioners refunded and deposited in court by them. 12. I agree with my learned Brother that it is not necessary for us in the present case to decide the first question, and that this Rule can be disposed of, even on the assumption that the Collector had no jurisdiction to pay the compensation money to the petitioners. I wish, however, to add a few observations of my own on the second question set out above. 13. As regards the second question, whether the District Judge had the power to pass the order, which is the subject matter of the Rule before us, I am definitely of the opinion that his order is without jurisdiction for the reasons I am going to state hereafter. 14. 13. As regards the second question, whether the District Judge had the power to pass the order, which is the subject matter of the Rule before us, I am definitely of the opinion that his order is without jurisdiction for the reasons I am going to state hereafter. 14. The Court of the Land Acquisition Judge, who is called under the Act "Court", that is to say, the Court-designate according to the definition contained in Sec.3(d), is a Court of Special Jurisdiction, the powers and duties of which are defined by the Statute, and it cannot legitimately be invited to exercise inherent powers so as to assume jurisdiction over matters not intended by the Legislature to be comprehended within the Scope of the enquiry before it (see Rule 118 of Executive Insurance, issued by the Board of Revenue, Bihar & Orissa; and British Indian Steam Navigation Co. V/s. Secretary of State, 38 Cal 230 (D). "The District Judge, when exercising powers oJ a Court under the Land Acquisition Act, in that capacity is not entitled to try a regular suit, and his jurisdiction under the Land Acquisition Act is quite different from the jurisdiction he exercises on the regular civil side" (see Raj Lakshmi Dasi V/s. Banamali Sen, 1953 SC 33 (40) (AIR V 40) (E). Sec.18(1) clearly specifies four different grounds of objection, viz.: (1) to the measurement of the land; (2) to the amount of compensation; (3) to the persons to whom it is payable and (4) to the apportionment. The distinctions between objection as to area and to amount of compensation are also borne out by other Sections of the Act; see Sections 9, 11, 19(1)(d), and 20(c). The opposite partys objection was manifestly only to the persons to whom the compensation was payable, and was correctly so described by the Collector in making the reference. The scope of the enquiry before him is by Sec.21 to be "restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection". By Sec.20 the function of the Court upon a reference being made is "to determine the objection", and only persons "interested in the objection" are to be summoned before it. There is therefore, no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Court under this Act is special one, and is strictly limited by the terms of these Sections. By Sec.20 the function of the Court upon a reference being made is "to determine the objection", and only persons "interested in the objection" are to be summoned before it. There is therefore, no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Court under this Act is special one, and is strictly limited by the terms of these Sections. It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collectors award, and it is confined to a consideration of that objection. Once, therefore, it is ascertained that the only objection taken is "as to the title to receive the compensation", that alone is the "matter" referred, and the Court has no power to determine, or consider anything beyond it (see Parmatha Nath Mullick V/s. Secretary of State, 1930 PC 64 (AIR V 17) (F) and Mt. Bhagwati v. Mt. Ramkali, 1939 PC 133 (AIR V 26) (G). 15. Having thus found that the scope of the enquiry before the Court is limited to the consideration of only the matter, referred by the Collector under Section 18(1), restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection, let us now see what is the nature of the enquiry before the Collector; in other words, whether the Collector, as defined in Sec.3 (c) of the Act, is a Court subordinate to the District Judge, and whether the Collector exercises any judicial function. 16. It is well-settled by two decisions -- one, of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ezra V/s. Secretary of State, 32 IA 93 (101) (PC) (H), and, the other, of a Special Bench of this Court in Jagarnath Lall V/s. Land Acquisition Deputy Collector, Patna, 1940 Patna 102 (AIR V 27) (I) that proceedings resulting in an "award" before the Collector "are administrative, and not judicial; that the "award" in which the enquiry results is merely a decision (binding only on the Collector as to what sum shall be tendered to the owner of the lands; and that, if a judicial ascertainment of value is desired by the owner, he can obtain it by requiring the matter to be referred by the Collector to the Court". In the Special Bench case of this Court, referred to above, the question was if the High Court had jurisdiction to revise the Collectors order, making or refusing to make a reference under Sec.18. In the Special Bench case of this Court, referred to above, the question was if the High Court had jurisdiction to revise the Collectors order, making or refusing to make a reference under Sec.18. Their Lordships, relying on the case of the Privy Council, referred to above, held that land acquisition proceedings before the Collector up to the time when the award is made are administrative proceedings, and not judicial proceedings; and that, therefore, the Land Acquisition Officer is not a Court up till the time he makes his award, and he does not act as a Court in these proceedings under Sec.18 of the Act. His Lordship Harries, C. J., who delivered the judgment of the Special Bench, after a review of the decisions of the different High Courts, came to the conclusion that the Land Acquisition Officer, if he was a Court at all; was a Court subordinate not to the High Court, but to the Board of Revenue; and the latter certainly had powers of superintendence, which the High Court did not possess; and that the mere fact that the Land Acquisition Officer might have been acting judicially gave the High Court no right whatsoever to interfere under Sec.115, Civil Procedure Code, because such power of interference is only given in cases of orders made by Courts subordinate to the High Court. Therefore, although their Lordships, held that the Land Acquisition Officer had no right whatsoever to refuse to refer the matter to the Court under Sec.18 (1), on the ground that the objections to the award were not bona fide, and were frivolous, because the wording of Sec.18(1) gave the Collector no alternative but to refer the matter, if the application was made within the periods prescribed by tine Section, and was not barred by the proviso to Clause (2) of Sec.31 of the Act, they declined to interfere, because the High Court had no jurisdiction to revise the order passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. There can now, therefore, be no doubt that land acquisition proceedings up to the time when an award is made are administrative proceedings, and not judicial proceedings. Rule 62 of Executive Instructions, itself declares that the Collector in making an enquiry and award under Sec.11 is, in no sense of the term, a judicial officer, but acts as the agent of the Government. Rule 62 of Executive Instructions, itself declares that the Collector in making an enquiry and award under Sec.11 is, in no sense of the term, a judicial officer, but acts as the agent of the Government. Throughout the proceedings, the Collector acts as the agent of the Government for the purpose of the acquisition, clothed with certain powers to require the attendance of persons to make statements relevant to the matter which he has to investigate, but he is in, no sense of the term a judicial officer, nor is the, proceeding before him a judicial proceeding. He is not even a Revenue Court within the terms of Sec. 476, Cr. P. C. (see Durga Daa Rakhit V/s. Queen Empress, 27 Cal 820 (J); and 38 Cal 230) (D). Very recently a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in the case of Khetsidas Gangaram V/s. First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, 1946 Cal 508 (AIR V 33) (K), has also held that the Collector in dealing with an application under Sec.18 of the Act does not act as a Court. Chakravarti, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed: "The proceedings before the Collector are not a part of the judicial proceedings before the Court, and are concerned with the question as to whether the latter proceedings will be allowed to be initiated at all. The latter proceedings commence, not with the application made before the Collector, but with the statement submitted by the Collector to the Court under Sec.19. The proceedings before the Collector constitute a chapter by themselves, antecedent to the proceedings in Court ..... where proceedings before a Court depend for their initiation on leave granted, or a reference made by another authority, the proceedings before that authority as to such leave or reference form no part of the subsequent proceedings before the Court. The sanctioning or referring authority cannot, therefore, be held to be a Court on the ground that he deals, with a part of the judicial proceedings, nor to be a component part of some notional Court, composed of himself and the Judge". "Between the Collector and the High Court", in the words of Rankin, C. J. "there is no link, but a gap". 17. Under the scheme of the Act itself, therefore, the Collector is the agent, or mouthpiece of the Government. "Between the Collector and the High Court", in the words of Rankin, C. J. "there is no link, but a gap". 17. Under the scheme of the Act itself, therefore, the Collector is the agent, or mouthpiece of the Government. When he makes the reference to the Court, he makes it on behalf of the Government. The "Court" does not sit on appeal over the Collector; and the Land Acquisition Act does not give any authority to the "Court", either in express terms, or by implication, to go behind the reference, and to see whether the Collector acted. rightly or wrongly. Proceedings are instituted on reference by the Collector. They are not indicated by a plaint, and are not in the strict sense of the word a suit at all. Still less do such proceedings seem to be a suit to set aside an award. Proceedings under part III of the Act, under which Sections 18 to 28 occur, are not by way of appeal, and what is contemplated is a new and fresh enquiry by the Court. Therefore, the following propositions of law are now well established: (i) the court hearing a reference made under Sec.18 of the Act is a Court of special jurisdiction: (ii) that Court acquires jurisdiction only on a reference being made by the Collector; (iii) that the jurisdiction so acquired by the Court extends over the matter referred to it by the Collector under Sec.18, and to no other matters; (iv) that within the sphere of its jurisdiction it must follow the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code unless any one of those provisions is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act--See Sec. 53 (see Province of Bengal V/s. P.L. Nun, 1945 Cal 312 (AIR V32) (L) Secretary of State V/s. Bhagwan Prasad, 1929 All 769 (AIR, V16) (M) and Secy. of State V/s. Bhagwan Prasad, 1932 All 597 (AIR V 19) (N); Special Collector of Rangoon V/s. Kozi Na, 1928 Rang 197 (AIR V 15) (O); and Venkata Narsimha Naidu V/s. Subbarayudu, 36 Mad 395 (P) ). 18. of State V/s. Bhagwan Prasad, 1932 All 597 (AIR V 19) (N); Special Collector of Rangoon V/s. Kozi Na, 1928 Rang 197 (AIR V 15) (O); and Venkata Narsimha Naidu V/s. Subbarayudu, 36 Mad 395 (P) ). 18. If that is the position in law, the Court acting under the Land Acquisition Act will have no jurisdiction to make any order on the Land Acquisition Officer, however erroneously or illegally he may have acted, except in respect of the award itself, but that also within the limits provided by Sections 20 to 28 of the Act. The Court, as stated before, is not an appellate authority over the Collector, and it is not competent to it to go behind the reference. The Act does not empower the Court even to remand the case to the Collector for a" fresh enquiry, or for a further award. The Collector does not exercise any judicial function at all, and as such he is not a Court subordinate to the District Judge even within the meaning of Sec.3 of the Civil Procedure Code, although Sec.3 of the Code has no reference to any Court, other than the Civil Courts established under the Civil Courts Act. "It is not easy to see how inferiority of the Collectors Court to the District Court can be established. In its relation to the Collector, the District Court is, by virtue of the definition of Court in Sec.3(d) of the Act, a Court of original jurisdiction. No appeal lies from the Court of the Collector to the District Judge, and if the latter can interfere with the award on a reference, that power does not establish the subordination of the Collector, acting as a Court under Sec.18, but only of the Collector, acting as an administrative officer in making the award" (per Chakravartti, J. in 1946 Cal 508 (516-517) (AIR V 33) (FB) (K). The Court, as such, does not exercise any supervisory, or an appellate jurisdiction, over the Collector. The course which the learned District Judge was invited (Jo pursue was never contemplated by the framers of the Statute, and is not authorised by any provision thereof; and none has been pointed out to us. The Court, as such, does not exercise any supervisory, or an appellate jurisdiction, over the Collector. The course which the learned District Judge was invited (Jo pursue was never contemplated by the framers of the Statute, and is not authorised by any provision thereof; and none has been pointed out to us. On this ground I hold that the order of the District Judge requesting the Land Acquisition Officer to get the money refunded and deposited in Court by the present petitioners, is without jurisdiction, 19. There is another ground for holding that the order of the District Judge is without jurisdiction. The Collector cannot be deemed to be a party to the proceeding before the Court, inasmuch as Sec.20(c) provides that a notice on the Collector has to be served by Court, if the objection is in regard to the area of the land, or to the amount of the compensation money, otherwise not. In the present case there was no such objection, and, therefore, the Court sent notices only to the parties before this Court, but sent no notice to the Collector, as it was not necessary to do so in the present case. The dispute was only as to the title to receive the compensation money, which was the only dispute between the parties to the present application, and in this dispute the Collector was not at all interested. It is a settled law that Civil Court has no jurisdiction to pass any order on a Revenue Court in a civil suit, to which such Revenue Court is not a party. A Court has no jurisdiction to pass any order against a person, who is not a party to the proceeding before it. In a suit the Court has jurisdiction only over the parties to the suit, and none else. In this view of the matter also, the District Judge had no power to make the order, which he did. 20. The view of the Court that it could make such an order under Sec.151, Civil Procedure Code, is clearly wrong, because Sec.151, Civil Procedure Code, is not intended to empower a Court to do a thing, which it is forbidden, or it has no jurisdiction, to do. 20. The view of the Court that it could make such an order under Sec.151, Civil Procedure Code, is clearly wrong, because Sec.151, Civil Procedure Code, is not intended to empower a Court to do a thing, which it is forbidden, or it has no jurisdiction, to do. Sectiion 151 does not authorise a Court to circumvent the law, and under the guise and cover of its inherent powers to pass an order, which it has no jurisdiction to pass. The opposite party have not cited any authority before us, nor drawn our attention to any provision in the Code of Civil Procedure, nor have we ourselves been able to discover any, which could authorise the learned District Judge to pass an order like the present one. I agree with my learned brother that the two cases relied upon, namely, 1920 Pat 222(2) (AIR V 7) (A) and 17 Cal WN 1057 (B), have no application, for the reasons given by him, to the present case, I, therefore, agree with my learned Brother that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order under Sec.151, Civil P. C. The view we have taken gets some support also from the observation of Mookerji, J., in Mrinalini Dasi V/s. Abinash Chandra Dutt, 11 Cal LJ 533 (538) (Q). 21. For the reasons given above, I agree with my learned Brother that the application in revision be allowed with costs, and the order of the learned District Judge dated 8-11-54 be set aside.