Wanchoc C.J.—These are four applications for a writ of Habeas Corpus under Art. 226 of the Constitution, and arise in the following circumstances. 2. The four applicants were detained by an order of the District Magistrate, Pali, on the 4th August, 1954. They were supplied with detained grounds running into three typed pages in support of the order of detention. The matter was placed before the Advisory Board in due course, and the Advisory Board advised continued detention of the applicants and, thereafter, the order of detention for a period of one year was confirmed by the Government. The present applications were made almost three months later, and the main ground that has been urged in support of them Is that the applicants had requested the Advisory Board to allow them or their counsel to appear before the Board and be heard and that the Board neither heard the applicants counsel nor the applicants themselves. Reliance in this connection was placed on a decision of this Court in writ cases Nos. 114 and115 decided on 6th December, 1954, [Sheria vs. The State (1955 RLW 471).] where it was held that if a detenu prays that he may be heard by an Advisory Board and the Advisory Board does not give him an opportunity of being heard, his further detention is illegal. 3. In the petitions it was said that the applicants wanted to be heard themselves or through counsel but the applications made by the applicants to the Advisory Board are before us and we find that the only prayer in these applications was that the applicants had engaged certain counsel and wanted those counsel to be heard. Shri Murli Manohar appearing for the applicants urges that though the applicants prayer in these applications was only that their counsel be heard, that amounted to a desire on the part of the detenu to be heard personally within the meaning of sec. 10(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (No. IV of 1950), and, therefore, these case are covered by the earlier decision mentioned above as the Advisory Board did not give the applicants any hearing. We may in this connection refer to sec. 10(1) as it now stands after the amendment of 1952. 10(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (No. IV of 1950), and, therefore, these case are covered by the earlier decision mentioned above as the Advisory Board did not give the applicants any hearing. We may in this connection refer to sec. 10(1) as it now stands after the amendment of 1952. The Advisory Board advises the Government after considering the materials placed before it and after Learning the detenu in person, if, in any particular case it considers it essential so to do or if the person concerned desires to be heard. Then sub-sec. (3) provides that the detenu is not entitled to be heard through a legal practitioner. The contention of Shri Murli Manohar is that sec.10(1) lays down two conditions under which the Board is bound to hear the detenu, namely, (1) if the Board itself considers it essential so to do, and (2) if the person concerned desires to be heard. So far as the first condition is concerned, there would never be any trouble, any it is the second condition which calls for consideration before us. It is contended that the words "if the person concerned desires to be heard" are very general, and if the detenu expresses a desire to be heard even through counsel and has never expressed a desire to be heard personally, the pra)er that his counsel be heard must amount to a desire on the part of the detenu to be heard and, therefore, the Board must give him a hearing. It is true that the word "personally does not appear after the words "if the person concerned desires to be heard" in sub-sec. (1); but we have to see what meaning we have to give to sub-sec. (1) in the context of entire sec. 10. We know that in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 10, the detenu is not entitled to be heard through counsel. Therefore went sub-sec. (1) was providing for—if the detenu desired to be heard the Board was bound to give him a hearing—the intention of the legislature, by providing in sub-sec. (3) that the detenu was not entitled to be heard through counsel, could only be that if the detenu desired to be heard personally, the Board was bound to hear him. To say that these words mean a desire to be heard either in person or through counsel would be to overlook sub-sec. (3) that the detenu was not entitled to be heard through counsel, could only be that if the detenu desired to be heard personally, the Board was bound to hear him. To say that these words mean a desire to be heard either in person or through counsel would be to overlook sub-sec. (3) on account of which a detenu can never claim to be heard through counsel. We see no reason why the Advisory Board in a case like the present, where the prayer was only that counsel be heard should presume that the detenus desired to be heard themselves and should be sent for. Reading sub-sec. (1) and (3) together, there is no doubt, in our mind, that the intention behind the use of the words appearing in sub-sec. (1) was that the detenu, if he desired to be heard personally, would be entitled to be heard by the Board. That seems to be the reason why in paragraph 6 of the applications, all the applicants say that they prayed to be heard either personally or through counsel. We now find, however, that their prayer only was that their counsel be heard, and in the circumstances if the Board rejected the prayer, it cannot be said that it failed in carrying out its statutory duty of hearing the detenus in person on their part. 3. It was further urged that we should set aside the order because the District Magistrate had not applied his mind to the facts of the case. In support of this, two points were brought to our notice. It was said firstly that one Shivla or Shivnath had died on the 27th April. 1954, in a police encounter and that the District Magistrate in the grounds had mentioned that the applicants were in touch with Shivla in June or July, 1954. Here again we have examined the record, and the learned Government Advocate states that it was true that at one stage it was thought that Shivla had been shot down in April, 1954, and there was a post-mortem examination of a dead body which was identified as Shivlas. Here again we have examined the record, and the learned Government Advocate states that it was true that at one stage it was thought that Shivla had been shot down in April, 1954, and there was a post-mortem examination of a dead body which was identified as Shivlas. Later, however, it was found to be incorrect and it was only in January, 1955, that Shivla was actually shot down and a second postmortem examination on another body which is now believed to be Shivlas had been conducted In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the District Magistrate was either supplied with false grounds or did not apply his mind to the grounds supplied to him when he passed the order. The second point to which our attention was drawn was that there was some contradiction between paragraphs 2 c) of the grounds in Jawarilals case and 2(e) of the grounds in Lalsinghs case. The contradiction is more apparent than real and we need not consider it in detail. In paragraph 2(c) it was said that Jawarilal had feasted at Lalsinghs house while in paragraph 2(e) of the other case it was said that the dacoits were served with meals prepared at Lalsinghs house but this service took place in the hills in which, we are told, Lalsinghs house was situate. We are of opinion that there is no force in these applications and they are hereby dismissed.