JUDGMENT : SAMVATSAR, J. 1. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 2. The petitioner was an employee of the former Holker State and was appointed in the State Service under Huaur Shree Shankar Order No. 353 dated 29-5-1948. After the merger of that State in Madhya Bharat, the petitioner was absorbed in the service of the integrating Mate and was confirmed in the cadre of 75-5-125. In 1954 he was posted at Bhatnagar as a Sub-Inspector in Customs and Excise Department. 3. On 11-1-1954 the petitioner was suspended from service and he was ultimately dismissed under orders of the Commissioner, Customs and Excise, Madhya Bharat, with effect from 7-7-1954. 4. The petitioner contended that his dismissal from service by the Commissioner was illegal. He also complained that he had not been, given reasonable opportunities to explain the circumstances against him, both during the inquiry and before his dismissal. He made a representation to the State Government in which he raised various grounds and requested the Government to reconsider his case and to give him redress by ordering him to be reinstated. 5. On 15-3-1955 the State Government rejected the representation and intimated to his Counsel Mr. Daji, that the Government was unable to reconsider the matter. The petitioner has therefore filed this petition. 6. It is alleged in the petition that the termination of the petitioner's services by the Commissioner, Customs and Excise, was illegal and was in violation of the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution. The validity of the Commissioner's, order was challenged on the following grounds : (1) That the petitioner was appointed by the Holker, but was dismissed from service under orders of the Commissioner, who was a subordinate, authority. (2) That during the inquiry held by the Department, the petitioner was not given any reasonable opportunity to explain the circumstances which are used against him; nor was he given a notice to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. (3) That the inquiry was vitiated because the Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules which prescribe how a departmental inquiry should be conducted, were not duly followed and the inquiry itself was held by the Superintendent, Customs and Excise, who was himself concerned with, subject-matter of the inquiry. (3) That the inquiry was vitiated because the Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules which prescribe how a departmental inquiry should be conducted, were not duly followed and the inquiry itself was held by the Superintendent, Customs and Excise, who was himself concerned with, subject-matter of the inquiry. (4) That no proper charge-sheet was given to the petitioner before he was dismissed from service. The charges against him were the result of an afterthought and were at variance with the facts set out in the suspension order. 7. It was therefore prayed that : (a) appropriate direction or order should be issued by this Court declaring the dismissal of the petitioner illegal and void; (b) a mandamus should be issued to the State Government directing it to reinstate the petitioner or to treat him as still in service; and (c) such other order, direction or writ as may be necessary for protection of the petitioner's constitutional rights, be issued. 8. The petition was opposed by the State of Madhya Bharat. 9. It was not disputed that the petitioner was appointed by the Maharaja Holker in the year 1948, nor was it disputed that his services were terminated under orders of the Commissioner, Customs and Excise, Madhya Bharat. The State justified its action on the grounds set out in the affidavit filed by the Commissioner which may briefly be summarized as follows : (1) That in a surprise inspection by the superintendent, Customs and Excise, the petitioner was found guilty of serious irregularities in accounts and lack of supervision and was suspected of himself being involved in defalcations and implicated in and abetting and aiding abscondence of a person who had misappropriated Government money. It is stated that the matter was inquired into departmentally and the petitioner was further found guilty of insubordination, negligence and defiance of superior officers. He was therefore suspended on 11-1-1954 and was dismissed from service with effect from 7-7-1954. It was contended that this action was not illegal and there was no violation of the provisions of Art. 311 because : (i) on the dates the petitioner was suspended and was removed from service, the Commissioner was the appointing authority for officers drawing a salary not exceeding Rs. 150/- per month. It was contended that this action was not illegal and there was no violation of the provisions of Art. 311 because : (i) on the dates the petitioner was suspended and was removed from service, the Commissioner was the appointing authority for officers drawing a salary not exceeding Rs. 150/- per month. (ii) that the petitioner was given reasonable opportunity to meet the case against him during the stage of the Departmental inquiry and after having found that the petitioner was guilty prima facie, a charge-sheet was given to him to show cause against his dismissal from service. It was submitted that this was in conformity with the provisions of Art. 311 and there was no violation or breach of the said Article. (iii) the allegation of the petitioner that the departmental inquiry was not made according to rules, was denied and it was urged that the petitioner cannot resort to an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the ground that his dismissal was without following the provisions of the Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, Article 311 did not apply to such a case. (2) That the charge-sheet was not at variance with the suspension order. 10. In the light of the return filed by the State there was a further affidavit given by the petitioner in which the following contentions were raised : (1) It was denied that the Commissioner was an appointing authority empowered to appoint persons upto the grade of Rs. 150/-. (2) That even if it was assumed that the Commissioner was empowered to appoint persons in the petitioner's grade on the date the petitioner was dismissed, he had obviously no such power on 1-4-1952 when the petitioner was appointed and he could not therefore be an appointing authority within the meaning of Art. 311; (3) That even after integration, the petitioner was appointed by the Madhya Bharat Government as a Sub-Inspector with effect from 1-4-1952 and that the Commissioner could not dismiss him from service even if it was assumed that he was an appointing authority for the post which the petitioner held. 11. 11. On these allegations and counter-allegations made by the parties, the following points arise for consideration : (1) Whether the order of the Commissioner dismissing the petitioner from service is illegal because having been appointed by the Ruler of the Holker State, his dismissal by the Commissioner during the year 1954 was in breach of Art. 311 of the Constitution. (2) Whether the petitioner having been absorbed in the Madhya Bharat service under orders of the Government with effect from 1-4-1952 he could not be dismissed under orders of the Commissioner even if it was assumed that the Commissioner had power to appoint a person in the petitioner's grade. (3) Whether on the material placed on record the Commissioner was an authority empowered to appoint parsons upto the grade of Rs. 150/- per month; and if so, from what date ? (4) Whether the petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to explain the circumstances against him during the departmental inquiry and whether the notice to show cause against the proposed action was proper ? 12. The first point raised by the petitioner is concluded by the decision of this Bench in Mangalsingh v. The State, Madh LR 1955 Civil 258 : (AIR 1956 Madh-B 257 (A). It is held in that case that in order to apply Art. 311 of the Constitution, the appointing and dismissing authorities should belong to the same State and provisions of Art. 311 will not be invoked where the initial appointment was made prior to the Constitution by an authority of an Indian State and the dismissal was by an. authority of a newly formed State alter the Constitution. 13. The second point raised however involves consideration of an important aspect. After the integration of states, the petitioner was appointed on his present post by the Government of Madhya Bharat vide Revenue Department Notification No. 2849-7/SR dated 31-7-1953 which was followed by another notification by which effect was given to both these notifications from 1-4-1952. The question therefore is whether the petitioner, who was appointed by the Government, could be dismissed by the Commissioner, assuming that the Commissioner had power to make appointments to the post of the petitioner during the year 1954. 14. In the return, it is stated that the power of making appointments of public servants getting a salary upto Rs. The question therefore is whether the petitioner, who was appointed by the Government, could be dismissed by the Commissioner, assuming that the Commissioner had power to make appointments to the post of the petitioner during the year 1954. 14. In the return, it is stated that the power of making appointments of public servants getting a salary upto Rs. 150/- per month was conferred, on the Commissioner by the Government : vide Madhya Bharat Government Appointments Department Letter dated 28-7-1952. On the basis of this letter it was urged that the Government had delegated its power of making appointments upto Rs. 150/- to the Commissioner and on the date on which the services of the petitioner were terminated the Commissioner was an appointing authority for persons drawing a salary of Rs. 150/- per month. It was further urged that as the authority competent to make the appointment, the Commissioner had power to take disciplinary action against the petitioner and in doing so he had not contravened in any manner the provisions of the Constitution. 15. For a proper appreciation of the position taken up, it is necessary to turn to the relevant provisions relating to the civil services in Arts. 310 and 311 of the Constitution. Article 310 provides that civil servants employed in the service of a State are engaged on statutory condition that they shall hold office during the pleasure of the head of the State. The State is thus empowered by the Constitution to terminate the services of any member of the civil service at any time. There are however restrictions on the exercise of this authority and these are imposed by Art. 311. The material portion of this Article is as follows : "311. (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil Post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him............." 16. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him............." 16. A plain reading of this Article shows that there are two statutory safeguards which are provided by the Constitution by enacting this Article. These are : (i) that no civil servant shall be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank by any authority which is subordinate to that by which he was appointed; and (ii) that he shall not be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank without furnishing him an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. 17. Article 311, cl. (1) provides that the order of dismissal of a civil servant shall not be made by an authority which is subordinate in rank to that which had appointed him. The language of this clause does not indicate that the power be determine the services of a civil servant was intended to be conferred on the person who was an appointing authority on the date the order of dismissal of the public servant was passed. The article talks of factual appointment and states in express terms that no person shall be dismissed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. 18. In the case of R.T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State, AIR 1937 PC 27 (B), the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had to consider the effect of somewhat similar provision contained in S. 96-B Government of India Act of 1919. The appellant in that case was a Sub-Inspector of Police in the Presidency of Madras and was appointed to his post by the Inspector General of Police. On 28-2-1928 he was removed from service under orders of the Deputy Inspector General. The appellant challenged the validity of the order of dismissal by a suit Instituted on the original side of the Madras High Court. The suit was dismissed on the ground that at the time when the services of the petitioner were terminated, the Deputy Inspector General was the authority who was invested with powers to dismiss him. The case was taken up in appeal to the Privy Council. The suit was dismissed on the ground that at the time when the services of the petitioner were terminated, the Deputy Inspector General was the authority who was invested with powers to dismiss him. The case was taken up in appeal to the Privy Council. The legality of this delegation of the powers was attacked and it was contended before their Lordships that the order of dismissal was invalid and inoperative inasmuch as it was made by an authority subordinate to that by which the appointment was made. Their Lordships referred to S. 96-B, Government of India Act, 1919, which provided that no person in civil service of the Crown may be dismissed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed and observed : ''It is manifest that the stipulation or proviso as to dismissal is itself of statutory force and stands on a footing quite other than any matters of rule which are of infinite variety and can be changed from time to time. It is plainly necessary that this statutory safeguard should be observed with the utmost care and that a deprivation of pension based upon a dismissal purporting to be made by an official who is prohibited by statute from making it rests upon an illegal and improper foundation." 19. The principle laid down in Rangachari's case (B) was reiterated in North-West Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain Anand, AIR 1949 PC 112 (C). That was also a case of a Sub-Inspector of Police who was appointed by the Inspector General of Police of the North-West Frontier Province during the year 1928. On 29-4-1938 he was dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General on a charge of copying in a departmental examination. After unsuccessful appeals to the Inspector General of Police and the Provincial Government, he instituted a suit in which he claimed a declaration that the order of dismissal was illegal, null and void, invalid and inoperative and that he still retained his office as the Sub-Inspector of Police. The validity of the order was challenged, on the ground that the dismissing authority was subordinate in rank to that by whom the plaintiff was appointed. The order was sought to be justified under the provisions of some rules framed under the Police Act and provisions of S. 243, Government of India Act, 1935. The validity of the order was challenged, on the ground that the dismissing authority was subordinate in rank to that by whom the plaintiff was appointed. The order was sought to be justified under the provisions of some rules framed under the Police Act and provisions of S. 243, Government of India Act, 1935. The suit was dismissed by the High Court, but in appeal the Federal Court granted a decree to the plaintiff declaring that his dismissal was invalid and inoperative. In a further appeal by the Government this decree was maintained by the Privy Council. 20. The Federal Court had held that S. 240(2), Government of India Act of 1935 contained a statutory provision that no office-holder shall be dismissed from service by any authority subordinate in rank to that by which he was appointed. Varadachariar, J. who delivered the judgment of the Federal Court, observed : "In the Act of 1935, Sub-S. (2) of S. 240 has been enacted in unqualified terms and there is accordingly no scope for the contention that this provision can be qualified or taken away by statutory rules. Unless the plaintiff is for any reason precluded from, relying on this declaration, his dismissal by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police must, on the authority of the decision in 64 Ind App 40 : ( AIR 1937 PC 27 ) (B) be held to be inoperative as one 'made by an official who is prohibited by statute from making it'." 21. Reliance was placed on behalf of the Government in that case on the provisions of S. 243, Government of India Act of 1935, and it was urged that the dismissal of the plaintiff by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police was in pursuance of the powers conferred on him under the rules framed under that Section. The Federal Court overruled this contention and held that the rules did not have the effect of excluding or modifying the general words contained in S. 240 and that the words 'conditions of service' though very comprehensive, had in the context of Ss. 240 to 242 a restricted meaning and were not intended to apply to fundamental matters such as duration of office and the authority by which the Crown's pleasure to terminate the service is to be signified. 240 to 242 a restricted meaning and were not intended to apply to fundamental matters such as duration of office and the authority by which the Crown's pleasure to terminate the service is to be signified. The learned Judges observed; "This interpretation will be consistent with, the grounds of the decision in 64 Ind App 40 : ( AIR 1937 PC 27 ) (B). It seems to us clear that in Ss. 241 and 242, the 'conditions of service' left to be provided for by rules could not have been intended to comprise the matters dealt with in Sub-Ss. (1) and (2) of S. 240. It seems to us reasonable to hold that the same restricted meaning should have been intended when the same expression was used in S. 243." 22. This view of the Federal Court was assailed in appeal before the Privy Council and though their Lordships did not agree with the Federal Court in its interpretation of the provisions of S. 243 they upheld and confirmed the decree passed by the Federal Court as they found that the rules framed by the Government under S. 243 had not come into force on the date of plaintiff's dismissal from service. 23. Following the principle enunciated in 'Rangachari's case' (B) their Lordships held that the dismissal of the plaintiff by the Deputy Inspector-General was invalid. Their Lordships in this connection went on to observe : "It is equally clear that Sub-S. (2) of S. 240, though it obviously does not apply in the case of dismissal by the Crown itself, is a statutory term of the service of the Crown, and is mandatory and not permissive. It follows that the dismissal of the respondent by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed would be unlawful and inoperative under that Section." Their Lordships further held that the right of dismissal was a condition of service and if an employee's service was terminated otherwise than pursuant to this condition it was invalid and ineffectual. 24. The provisions of Art. 311, cl. (1) are similar to those contained in S. 96-B, Government of India Act of 1919 and S. 240(2) of the Act of 1935. There is no provision in the present Constitution of India analogous to that contained in S. 243, Government of India Act of 1935. 24. The provisions of Art. 311, cl. (1) are similar to those contained in S. 96-B, Government of India Act of 1919 and S. 240(2) of the Act of 1935. There is no provision in the present Constitution of India analogous to that contained in S. 243, Government of India Act of 1935. Hence the Government cannot by delegation of the power of dismissal of a civil servant to an authority subordinate to that which appointed him, deprive the Civil servant of the statutory safeguards contained In Art. 311. Clause (1) of Art. 311 makes it imperative that the order of dismissal of a civil servant should be made by the authority not subordinate in rank to that which appointed him. 25. In view of the Privy Council decisions referred to above and the language of the Article itself, the position seems to be indisputable that if a civil servant is dismissed from service by an authority which is inferior in rank to that by which lie was in fact appointed the dismissal is invalid and inoperative. The question in such a case is not as to who was the appointing authority or who had the power to dismiss the civil servant concerned on the date the order of dismissal is passed, but is, whether the authority who dismissed the civil servant was subordinate in rank to the authority by which he was appointed. 26. The petitioner in this case was admittedly appointed by the Government of Madhya Bharat with effect from 1-4-1952 and was dismissed by the Commissioner who is an authority subordinate to the Government. The order of dismissal passed by the Commissioner cannot under the circumstances be upheld as a valid and operative order. The dismissal of the petitioner from service is clearly in contravention of the provisions of Art. 311(1) of the Constitution and is therefore Invalid and inoperative. 27. In the view that I have taken, it is unnecessary to consider the various other contentions raised by the petitioner. 28. The result is that the petition is allowed, the order dated 7-7-1954 dismissing the petitioner from service is declared illegal and in operative and is hereby quashed. 29. Under the circumstances of this case I leave parties to bear their respective costs. 30. NEVASKAR, J. :- I agree. Petition allowed.