JUDGMENT Roy, J. - This is a reference by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge of Kanpur u/s 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in a jury trial. Lakshmi Kant, the opposite-party, was prosecuted for an offence alleged to have been committed by him u/s 408 of the Indian Penal Code. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge was of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the jury was perverse and was such that no body of reasonable persons could have arrived at it. And he considered that it was necessary in the ends of justice that the case should be referred to this Court for orders. 2. It was not disputed that Lakshmi Kant was employed as a servant in Firm Kalu Ram Manni Lal, and his duty was to make realisations on behalf of the firm, to cash cheques from the bank, and to pay sums to the constituents of the firm in accordance with the directions of the firm. It was further not disputed that on the 22nd of June, 1950, a cheque in the sum of Rs. 10,000/- was given to him by Firm Kalu Ram Manni Lal for encashment at the Hindustan Commercial Bank, Kanpur, with direction that the amount in question may be paid on the same day to Firm Kalyan Mal Budhoo Lal. It was admitted by the accused that the cheque had been cashed on that very date. It was further admitted by him that he was unable to pay the amount to Firm Kalyan Mal Budhoo Lal, or to return the money back to Firm Kalu Ram Manni Lal. His contention was that he had been pick-pocketed on the way and was deprived of the entire amount and on that account he could not pay the money to the Firm. His contention further was that soon after the occurrence he went to the shop of Kali Ram Manni Lal to report the matter but he could not find the proprietors there and he therefore, communicated the information to Kashi Nath, the Munim of the Firm, who threatened to make him over to the police and on that account he left the place and disappeared until he surrendered himself on the 18th of December, 1950. 3. 3. The charge to the jury and the referring order of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge have been laid before us. We have also been taken through the evidence that was produced in the case, both on the side of the prosecution and on the side of defence, and we are clearly of opinion that the verdict of the jury was distinctly against the weight of evidence on the record and it is a case where it may unhesitatingly be said that the verdict was a perverse verdict and no reasonable body of men could have arrived at it. It is not alleged that the charge to the jury suffered under any defect or infirmity. It is contended on behalf of the accused that when the jury unanimously arrived at a verdict which they were competent to do, that verdict should not be lightly interfered with. 4. Before the Privy Council decision in Ram Anugrah Singh v. Emperor A.W.R. 1946 PC 115 there used to be difference of opinion amongst the various High Courts in India as to the sanctity to be attached to the verdict of a jury which has not been accepted by the Sessions Judge in a jury trial. One line of cases was to the effect that once the verdict of the jury was not accepted by the Sessions Judge and he made the reference to the High Court u/s 307, Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court was absolutely free and untrammelled by the opinion of the jury to come to its own conclusion on facts and to decide the case accordingly. The other view was that even though the High Court has power to decide according to its own views, this power should be exercised only when the verdict of the jury is found to be perverse, or, in other words, when the High Court considers that upon the evidence no reasonable body of men could have reached the conclusion arrived at by the jury. It was also said that the High Court could not interfere unless the verdict was manifestly wrong or clearly against the weight of evidence. The Privy Council set at rest the controvercy in the case of Ram Anugrah Singh v. Emperor A.W.R. 1946 PC 115. 5. It was also said that the High Court could not interfere unless the verdict was manifestly wrong or clearly against the weight of evidence. The Privy Council set at rest the controvercy in the case of Ram Anugrah Singh v. Emperor A.W.R. 1946 PC 115. 5. They held that: The Legislature no doubt realised that the introduction of trail by jury in the Mofussil would be experimental, and might lead to miscarriages of justice through jurors, in their ignorance and inexperience, returning erroneous verdicts. Their Lordships think that the section was intended to guard against this danger, and not to enable the Sessions Judge and the High Court to deprive jurors, acting properly within their powers, of the right to determine the facts conferred upon them by the Code. If the jury have reached a conclusion upon the evidence which a reasonable body of men might reach, it is not necessary for the ends of justice that the Sessions Judge should refer the case to the High Court merely because he himself would have reached a different conclusion upon the facts, since he is not the tribunal to determine the facts. He must go further than that and be of opinion that the verdict is one which no reasonable body of men could have reached upon the evidence. 6. Their Lordships further observed: The powers of the the High Court in dealing with the reference are contained in Sub-section (3). It may exercise any of the powers which it might exercise upon an appeal, and this includes the power to call fresh evidence conferred by Section 428. The Court must consider the whole case and give due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and jury, and then acquit or convict the accused. In their Lordship's view, the paramount consideration in the High Court must be whether the ends of justice require that the verdict of the jury should be set aside. In general, if the evidence is such that it can properly support a verdict either of guilty or not guilty, according to the view taken of it by the trial court, and if the jury take one view of the evidence and the Judge thinks that they should have taken the other, the view of the jury must prevail, since they are the Judges of fact. In such a case a reference is not justified, and it is only by accepting their view that the High Court can give due weight to the opinion of the jury. If, however, the High Court considers that upon the evidence no reasonable body of men could have reached the conclusion arrived at by the jury, then the reference was justified and the ends of justice require that the verdict be disregarded. 7. We think that there can be no doubt about the meaning of their Lordships. They have clearly laid down that the verdict of the jury is to be disregarded only when it can be said that upon the evidence no reasonable body of men could have reached the conclusion arrived at by it, and it is in this light that the expression "perverse" or "manifestly wrong" or "against the weight of evidence", which have been used by the Courts in the line, of cases approved of by the Privy Council, should be interpreted. 8. The Privy Council decision was followed by the Supreme Court in Akhlakali Hayatalli v. State of Bombay 1954 A.W.R. (H.C.) 382 where the same standards were laid down on the principle underlying Section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We have, therefore, to see whether upon the evidence that was produced in the case it can be said that the verdict was perverse or was such as could not have been arrived at by a reasonable body of men on the facts and the circumstances of the case. 9. The prosecution examined Purshottam Das, son of Manni Lal, who lodged the first information report, and Manni Lal, the Proprietor of Firm Kalu Ram Manni Lal, and Kashi Narh the Munim of that Firm, as also Shivnath a clerk of the Hindustan Commercial Bank and Puttu Lal the Proprietor of Firm Kalyan Mal Budlioo Lal. The prosecution further examined one Patrokhan. The last named witness proved that proceedings under Sections 87 and 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were taken against the accused by issue of the warrant of attachment on the 27th of June, 1950, and that the accused surrendered six months later, namely, on the 18th of December, 1950. Puttu Lal swore that the accused did not pay any amount to him and that he actually received a sum of Rs. Puttu Lal swore that the accused did not pay any amount to him and that he actually received a sum of Rs. 10,125/- from Kalu Ram Manni Lal on the 22nd of June, 1950, through another employee of that Firm since that was the due date of payment. Shivnath stated that the accused cashed the cheque Ex. P. 1 on the 22nd of June, 1950, from the Hindustan Commercial Bank, General-ganj. Manni Lal deposed that he gave the cheque Ex P.l to the accused with the direction that he should cash it and pay its amount to Firm Kalyan Mai Budhoo Lal. He was corroborated on that point by his son Purshottam Das and by his Munim Kashi Nath. The accused admitted all these facts in his statement Ex. P. 6 that had been made by him before the Committing Magistrate. The fact that he did not dispose of the money entrusted to him in accordance with the directions given to him was admitted by him. His contention, as we have already observed, was that when he was going with the money to Firm Kalyan Mai Budhoo Lal he stopped on the way near a panwala's shop and he had been pick-pocketed and it was on that account that he could not apply the money in accordance with the directions given to him. In support of his version he examined one Durga Prasad. 10. On a close scrutiny of the statement of the accused (Ex. P6), made before the Committing Magistrate, as compared, with the statement of Durga Prasad there can be no doubt whatsoever that the version which the accused had given was not consistent with the statement of Durga Prasad. According to the accused he came to know of the loss of the money just as he was on the way to the shop of Kalyan Mai Budhoo Lal at a place when he was at a distance of about 10 paces from the shop of Kalyan Mai Budhoo Lal. According to Durga Prasad, he found the accused weeping by the side of a beetle shop at a distance of about one furlong from the shop of Kalyan Mai Budhoo Lal and on inquiry he learnt from him that he had lost a sum of Rs. 10,200/- just then by some pick-pocket. According to Durga Prasad, he found the accused weeping by the side of a beetle shop at a distance of about one furlong from the shop of Kalyan Mai Budhoo Lal and on inquiry he learnt from him that he had lost a sum of Rs. 10,200/- just then by some pick-pocket. Durga Prasad further stated that there were others as well at that place and the accused had shown him the pocket of his sadri or jacket which was cut. Apart from the inconsistency which cropt in the statement of the accused as compared with the statement of Durga Prasad, we find that nowhere in his statement did the accused say that he brought the matter to the notice of Durga Prasad at that place or that he had shown him his pocket which had been cut. The story told by the accused was an improbable story. In the first place, if he was in the good books of his masters, a threat given to him by the Munim that he would hand him over the police (which of course has been emphatically denied by the Munim) should not have dissuaded him from contacting his master directly in order to apprise them of the correct state of affairs and should not further have dissuaded him from reporting the matter to the police with a view to bring the real culprit to book. He adopted neither of those two courses of conduct. Instead, we find that he absconded and he remained a fugitive from law for about six months when he surrendered himself on the 18th of December, 1950. 11. The Proprietor of Firm Kalyan Mai Budhoo Lal, namely, Puttu Lal P.W. 3, swore that on the day in question he was at his shop from 11 in the day and was there till about the evening, and that during all that time the accused never came there. The evidence of Puttu Lal negatived the suggestion put forward on behalf of the accused, namely that he had taken the money to Firm Kalyan Mai Budhoo Lal and that when he did not find anyone there he came back and when he was in front of the shop of the panwala he had been pick-pocketed. The evidence of Puttu Lal negatived the suggestion put forward on behalf of the accused, namely that he had taken the money to Firm Kalyan Mai Budhoo Lal and that when he did not find anyone there he came back and when he was in front of the shop of the panwala he had been pick-pocketed. Puttu Lal's evidence disclosed beyond any shadow of doubt that the accused had never been to the shop of Kalyan Mai Budhdo Lal on the day in question. 12. The evidence of Kashi Nath P.W. 3, the Munim of Firm Kalu Ram Manni Lal, also established beyond any shadow of doubt that the accused after encashing the cheque ne er came to him to inform him that he had been pick-pocketed. He further swore that he did not give any threat to the accused that he would hand him over to the police. 13. On the face of the overwhelming evidence that was produced on behalf of the prosecution to establish the charge u/s 408, I.P.C., the evidence of Durga Prasad D.W.1, which was not consistent with the statement of the accused made in court, could never have been believed in order to sustain the plea that the accused had been pick-pocketed and that it was on that account that he had lost the money. The weight which is to be attached to the testimony of the witness depends in a large measure upon various considerations, some of which are that on the face of it his evidence should be in consonance with probabilities and consistent with other evidence and should generally so fit in with material details of the case as to carry conviction of truth to a prudent mind. These elements were completely wanting in the evidence of Durga Prasad, the defence witness. 14. The evidence led on behalf of the prosecution was so clear and convincing that we are fully satisfied with the truth of it. It admits of no surmises, forced consequences or harsh constructions nor anything else to be offered as evidence but that is real and substantial according to the rules of natural justice and equity. It may, therefore, be unhesitatingly said that the verdict of the jury was perverse. It is clearly established that the jurors were wholly led astrey in their conclusion upon the case. 15. It may, therefore, be unhesitatingly said that the verdict of the jury was perverse. It is clearly established that the jurors were wholly led astrey in their conclusion upon the case. 15. It has been urged on behalf of the accused, relying upon certain observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1936 283 (Privy Council) that in effect a verdict of conviction would amount to coming to that view merely upon the conduct of the accused and that such a conclusion would not be possible. The facts on which the Privy Council decision in AIR 1936 PC 289 were based were entirely different. And here there is other evidence besides that can be inferred from the conduct of the accused. 16. Reliance has also been placed upon certain observations made by a learned Judge of this Court in Saraswati Prasad Vs. Rex, AIR 1949 All 412 where certain passages from Phipson's Law of Evidence were quoted. Those passages were as follows: When the burden of the issue is on the prosecution the case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.... When, however, the burden of an issue is upon the accused he is not in general called on to prove it beyond reasonable doubt, or in default to incur a verdict of guilty; it is sufficient if he succeeds in proving a prima facie case, for then the burden of such issue is shifted to the prosecution which has still to discharge its original and major onus that never shifts, that is, that of establishing on the whole case, guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 17. And again: It is not, however, for the accused to prove honest dealing with the property but for the prosecution to prove the reverse, and if an explanation be given which the jury think may be true though they are not convinced that it is, they must acquit for the main burden of proof (that is beyond reasonable doubt) rests throughout upon the prosecution, and in this case will not have been discharged. 18. 18. In applying these principles to the facts of the case in Saraswati Prasad v. Rex, referred to above, the learned Judge observed that there was a misdirection to the jury, inasmuch as the jury ought to have been told that the burden of proving the case lay entirely on the prosecution and that if the explanation given by the accused was in their opinion reasonably true even though they were not convinced that it was, they ought to have given the benefit of doubt to the accused. It appears that in that case the accused had taken the plea that the money that was with him had been robbed by some person. It further appears that he had intimated the higher authorities of what had happened. It also appears that he had adduced evidence in support of that plea. Under these circumstances when it was not brought; out in the charge that it was for the prosecution to prove the case to the hilt and that the explanation given by the accused, if reasonably true, may give the accused the right to the benefit of doubt, the case stood on quite a different footing. 19. Here in the present case we find that in the charge to the jury the Judge clearly stated that it was for the prosecution to establish its case by affirmative evidence, and that if there was any reasonable doubt the benefit of that doubt should go to the accused. Consequently in the present case the charge did not suffer under any misdirection. The present case is also not similar on facts to the case in Saraswati Prasad v. Rex cited above, because there the accused had intimated the fact of robbery to the higher authorities immediately after the event. In the present case the accused never brought the matter to the notice of any authority, nor did he inform the alleged loss to the Firm in question or to the Munim of that Firm. 20. In view of all these circumstances we are of opinion that upon the evidence that was produced in the case no reasonable body of men could have reached the conclusion arrived at by the jury. Consequently the reference is justified and the ends of justice require that the verdict of the jury should be disregarded. 20. In view of all these circumstances we are of opinion that upon the evidence that was produced in the case no reasonable body of men could have reached the conclusion arrived at by the jury. Consequently the reference is justified and the ends of justice require that the verdict of the jury should be disregarded. Accordingly we accept the reference, set aside the verdict of the jury, find that the accused Lakshmi Kant is guilty u/s 408, I.P.C. and we convict him under that section. We sentence him to undergo three years' rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 or in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year. He should be taken into custody at once in order to serve out the sentence. 21. We do not certify this to be a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court.