RAM LABHAYA J. : This petition of revision is directed against an order of Mr. C. N. Bora, Subordinate Judge, L. A. D. dated 8-6-1954 by which he granted plaintiff-opposite party an injunction restraining the defendants who are now petitioners before us from exercising a right of way over a path which had been allowed to them under S. 147, Criminal P. C. by the Additional District Magistrate of Cachar by his order dated 9-10-1953. (2) The facts leading to the suit out of which this petition arises are as follows: There was a dispute between the defendant-petitioners and Rup Chand Lunawat, plaintiff-opposite party in regard to the right of access over the disputed pathway. The defendant in this case instituted a proceeding under S. 147, Criminal P. C. It was found in that proceeding that prior to 10-6-1953 the path was used by the first party (defendant-petitioners) con­sisting of six families. The path was closed by a wooden gate on the front side and bamboo fenc­ing on the back side enclosing both Beat Nos. 17 and 18. The closure of the path was found to be the cause of great inconvenience to the six fami­lies who were compelled to use the longer route to come to the main road. On the basis of these findings, it was ordered that the first party (now petitioners) had the right to use the narrow strip of land in question as a pathway. Interference with this right of way was prohibited. Plaintiff who is the lessee of the land on both sides of the disputed pathway instituted the suit for a permanent injunction restraining the defen­dant petitioners from exercising this right of way over the path in question. He also prayed for a temporary injunction. The trial Judge declined to grant the injunction holding that O. 39, R. 1 did not apply to the facts of the case. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that a temporary injunction could issue under O. 39, j, R. 2 and this aspect of the matter had not been taken into consideration by the learned Munsiff. He, therefore, reversed the order and granted an injunction prayed for without examining the merits of the controversy as to whether on the facts of the case, the order of the trial Judge could be re­versed or not. Defendants have come up on revi­sion. He, therefore, reversed the order and granted an injunction prayed for without examining the merits of the controversy as to whether on the facts of the case, the order of the trial Judge could be re­versed or not. Defendants have come up on revi­sion. The first and the most important question that arises in the case is whether it was competent to the Court acting under O. 39, R. 2, to issue the injunction. The rule provides that in any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of con­tract or other injury of any kind, whether compen­sation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right. Injunction under this rule therefore may issue re­straining the defendant from committing any ap­prehended breach of the contract or any other in­jury that may be complained of. Injury can result from some wrong. A lawful exercise of right can­not be described as an injury. So long as the party is acting in the exercise of a right which the law recognises, it cannot be said that the party is com­mitting any wrong leading to any injury. When as a result of the enquiry in the suit, it is found that the party has not got the particular right, the position would be different but if on the date of the suit, the party has got the legal right to do a cer­tain act, that act cannot be regarded as a wrong in law nor would its result be regarded as injury. The words "other injury of any kind", in rule 2 have been the subject matter of interpretation in several cases. The expression "injury" connotes ac­cording to these decisions an act or omission con­trary to the law involving infringement of any right vested in some person. Instances of such cases are infringement of a copyright or of a trademark, or an obstruction to a right of easement1 or to the exercise of rights of property or of a right of public worship etc. Instances of such cases are infringement of a copyright or of a trademark, or an obstruction to a right of easement1 or to the exercise of rights of property or of a right of public worship etc. All wrongs covered by the expression 'tort' would be within the scope of the expression but there has to be an injury and that injury would necessarily be a result of the wrong. It is not possible to say that a party who has secured an order in his favour under S. 147, Cr. P. C. to use a particular path or to have the right of way over it, commits any wrong or is causing any injury to any one by exercising the right which the order under S. 147, Cr. P. C. recognises. The order is the result of a summary proceeding and he can be deprived of that right only by the decision of a civil court against him on the question of title. Order 39, Rule 2, therefore would not be applicable to a case where such an order exists. The order of the learned Subordinate Judge in these circumstances is not sustainable. The Civil Court will not have jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case to grant a temporary in­junction under O. 39, R. 2, also. It is nobody's case that the injunction in this case could have been issued under O. 39, R. 1. If an injunction is grant­ed under O. 39, R. 2, the effect of the injunction would be to completely nullify the order under S. 147, Cr. P. C. The appellate order therefore cannot stand. The learned Subordinate Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction in granting the injunction. The petition is allowed. The appellate order is set aside and that of the trial court restored. The peti­tioner will recover his cost from the opposite party. Hearing fee Rs. 32/-. (3) SARJOO PROSAD C. J. : I agree. Petition allowed.