Order:- Cr.R.C.Nos.816 to 818 of 1954.: These three revision petitions are by the accused who have been convicted under section 4 (1) (a) of the Madras Prohibition Act read with rules 6 and 10 of the Notification G.O. Mis.No.5452, Development dated 19th December, 1952, framed under sections 4, 16, 18, 18-A, 21 and 54 of the Madras Prohibition Act, whereby the possession of varnish without a licence in excess of 3 quarts is made punishable with imprisonment which may extend to 6 months or fine which may extend to Rs.1000 or both. The petitioners in these cases were found in possession of a large number of four-gallon tins of varnish or French polish. The common defence put forward on the merits by the several accused was that the goods were not found in their premises but had been seized by the police while they were lying on the road-side and the accused had been falsely implicated. Their case was that these goods belonged to one Annamalai Mudaliar, a merchant of Bangalore, who was examined in the cases as D.W. 4, that he was transporting this quantity of French polish in 47 barrels from Bangalore to Madras in July, 1952, before the notification of Government referred to earlier, that these goods were seized by the police for non-payment of duty but were subsequently released after the collection of gallonage fees by the Government. It was stated, that, subsequently after the release, the varnish was transferred from 47 barrels to 247 four-gallon tins as the barrels which originally contained them were in a damaged condition, that as the goods in these tins were being brought back to Madras, the lorry broke down with the result that the goods had to be kept by the road-side, that while they were there, they were seized by the police and that the accused were falsely implicated as having been in possession of these goods. On the other hand, the evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution was that these tins were found in the premises belonging to the accused in the respective cases and that the police seized then from these premises. The prosecution story was accepted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate who rejected the defence version as wholly improbable. The Sessions Judge on appeal confirmed these findings of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The prosecution story was accepted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate who rejected the defence version as wholly improbable. The Sessions Judge on appeal confirmed these findings of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The petitioner in Criminal Revision Case No.816 of 1954, was found in possession of 42 four-gallon tins. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate who found her guilty of the offence sentenced her to a fine of Rs.300 and in default to imprisonment for 6 weeks. On appeal the Sessions Judge upheld the conviction but reduced the fine to Rs.150 and the imprisonment in default to simple imprisonment for 10 days. In Criminal Revision Case No. 817 of 1954, the quantity found in the possession of the accused was 183 four-gallon tins. The sentence passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs.100 and in default to rigorous imprisonment for six weeks. The Sessions Judge on appeal reduced the sentence to a fine of Rs. 250 and in default to rigorous imprisonment for six weeks. In the last of the revision cases Criminal Revision Case No.818 of 1954, there were three accused who were found jointly in possession of 220 gallons in 55 four-gallon tins. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate found them guilty and sentenced each of them to a fine of Rs.200 and in default to rigorous imprisonment for a period of six weeks. The Sessions Judge reduced the sentence to a fine of Rs.100 on each of the accused. In all these three cases the tins of French polish which were seized from the respective accused were ordered to be confiscated to the Government. D.W.4, Annamalai Mudaliar, who claimed the varnish as his, made applications, to the Magistrate under section 517, Criminal Procedure Code, for the delivery of the goods to him on the footing that he was the owner. These applications were dismissed as the main defence of the accused was disbelieved. The claimant filed an application under section 520, Criminal Procedure Code, to the Court of Sessions to set aside this order. The learned Sessions Judge refused to interfere with this order declining to return the goods to the applicant and pointed out that it was open to him to establish his claim, if so advised, in a civil Court. It is from these orders of conviction and sentence that these three criminal revision cases arise. The learned Sessions Judge refused to interfere with this order declining to return the goods to the applicant and pointed out that it was open to him to establish his claim, if so advised, in a civil Court. It is from these orders of conviction and sentence that these three criminal revision cases arise. A subsidiary point is also raised in these cases that on a proper construction of the relevant provisions of the Madras Prohibition Act the order of confiscation passed by the Magistrate and confirmed by the Sessions Judge is illegal. Against the order of refusal to return the goods to the applicant, the claimant has filed Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.1318 of 1954 and Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions Nos.6 and 7 of 1955, before this Court seeking the same relief. Regard being had to the concurrent findings of fact that the several accused, were in possession of this quantity of French polish without a licence therefor, that the accused contravened rule 6 of the notification is not open to challenge before us ; but these cases have been placed before a Bench for the consideration of the plea raised by the accused in their respective cases attacking the validity of the notification G.O. Mis. 5452 Development, dated 19th December, 1952, referred to earlier on the ground that it was in contravention of Article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. This argument was put forward before the learned Sessions Judge and it was rejected by him. Before setting out the contentions regarding the invalidity of this notification it would be necessary to state briefly the scheme of the Madras Prohibition Act. The Preamble to the Act recites: “Whereas it is expedient as early as possible to bring about the prohibition except for medicinal, scientific, industrial or such like purposes, of the production, manufacture, possession, export, import, transport, purchase, sale and consumption of intoxicating liquors and drugs in the State of Madras”. Liquor is defined under section 3(9) thus: “‘liquor’ includes toddy, spirits of wine, methylated spirits, spirits, wine, beer and all liquid consisting of or containing alcohol”. At this stage it may be convenient to refer to the composition of the French polish which is the subject-matter of these proceedings. Liquor is defined under section 3(9) thus: “‘liquor’ includes toddy, spirits of wine, methylated spirits, spirits, wine, beer and all liquid consisting of or containing alcohol”. At this stage it may be convenient to refer to the composition of the French polish which is the subject-matter of these proceedings. This is made out of shellac or resin being dissolved in denatured spirit-that is spirit denatured with half a gallon of light caoutchoucine and half a gallon of pyridine to 99 gallons of spirit at a maximum strength of 50 O.P. Section 4 enacts the prohibition in respect of possession, manufacture, sale or consumption etc., of liquor and runs thus: “4. (1) whoever (a) imports, exports, transports, or possesses liquor or any intoxicating drug; or (b) manufactures liquor or any intoxicating drug; or (c) except in accordance with the rules made by the State Government in that behalf cultivates the hemp plant; or collects any portion of such plant from which an intoxicant drug can be manufactured or (d) taps any toddy-producing tree or permits or suffers to be tapped any toddy-producing tree belonging to him or in his possession; or (e) draws toddy from any tree or permits or suffers toddy to be drawn from any tree belonging to him or in his possession; or (f) constructs or works any distillery or brewery; or (g) uses, keeps or has in his possession any materials, still, utensil, implement or apparatus whatsoever for the tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor or any intoxicating drug; or (h) bottles any liquor for purposes of sale; or (i) sells liquor or any intoxicating drug; or (j) consumes or buys liquor or any intoxicating drug; or (k) allows any of the acts aforesaid upon premises in his immediate possession shall be punished (i) in the case of an offence falling under clause (b) clause (f), clause (g), clause (h) or clause (i) or an offence falling under clause (k) in so far as it relates to an act specified in any of the clauses aforesaid with imprisonment which may extend to two years or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees or with both. (ii) In any other case with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. (ii) In any other case with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. In order to carry out the purpose set out in the Preamble that the general prohibition would not apply to the use of liquor as defined under the Act for medicinal, scientific and industrial or such like purposes, section 16 enables the local Government by notification to exempt specified liquors or articles containing liquor from all or any of the provisions of the Act on the ground that such liquor is required for medicinal, scientific or industrial or such like purpose. Section 18 enables the Government to grant licences for possession, etc., of these preparations. Section 16 runs thus: ”16. (1) The State Government may, by notification and “subject to such conditions as they think fit exempt any specified liquor or intoxicating drug or article containing such liquor or drug from the observance of all or any of the provisions of this Act on the ground that such liquor, drug, or article is required for a medicinal, scientific industrial or such like purpose. (2) When issuing a notification under sub-section (1) the State Government shall have power to provide that a breach of any of the conditions subject to which the exemption is notified shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or both.” Section 18 runs thus: “18. The State Government or subject to the control of the State Government, the Collector may issue licences to any person or in respect of any institution, whether under the management of Government or not, for the manufacture, export, import, transport, sale or possession of any liquor, intoxicating drug or article containing such liquor or drug, on the ground that such liquor, drug or article is required by such person or in respect of such institution for a bona fide medicinal, scientific, industrial or such like purpose.” The other provisions of the Act are not very relevant for the consideration of the question arising in these petitions except section 54 which gives the Government the power to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. In exercise of the powers conferred inter alia by sections 16 and 18, the Government of Madras published a notification on 2nd June, 1950, whereby the preparation known as French varnish containing denatured spirit was exempted from all the provisions of the Act subject to the following conditions: (1) When the preparation was imported into the State by any person or firm it shall be imported under a permit granted by the Board of Revenue on prepayment of a licence fee at 12 annas per imported gallon on its denatured spirit contents. (2) That no attempt shall be made to render the preparation fit for human consumption. A penalty was also imposed for breach of the conditions of this notification. This notification was repealed by G.O. Mis. No. 5452, Development, dated 19th December, 1952 and under its terms the Government introduced a stricter control over the manufacture, importation, possession and sale of French polish. It is the validity of this notification that is challenged in the present revision petitions. The scheme of the notification was this. No person could manufacture varnish except under a licence granted by the Collector of the District on payment of an annual fee of Rs.50 and in accordance with the conditions and restrictions imposed therein. Under rule 3 no person can import varnish except under a permit granted by the Board of Revenue, rule 4 laid an embargo on sales of varnish except under a licence granted by the Collector. Rule 5 enacted that (i) varnish may be sold by a manufacturer or dealer to persons or firms requiring it for bona fide use, (ii) it shall not be sold to any person whom the manufacturer or dealer has reason to believe is likely to misuse it as a substitute for alcohol and (iii) every manufacturer or dealer in varnish and every licensee thereof was directed to maintain a register in a form specified. Rule 6 for contravention of which the accused in these cases were convicted is in these terms: “Possession of varnish for domestic purposes by private persons without a licence shall not exceed 3 quarts at any one time.” Rule 9 makes it an offence for any person to render or attempt to render varnish fit for human consumption and finally rule 10 enacts punishment in these terms: “A breach of all or any of these rules shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both.” The argument advanced against the validity of the notification is this: Article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution guarantees to every citizen ‘the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property.‘Property in this context would comprehend movable property including in this category “liquor.” Under Article 19(5) the State can undoubtedly impose restrictions on the exercise of this right provided they are in the interests of the general public. While no exception could be taken to any embargo or prohibition laid on intoxicating liquors or beverages and their manufacture, import, possession, sale, use or consumption, liquids containing alcohol including medicinal or toilet preparations or preparations intended for industrial uses can only be the subject of regulation and not of prohibition. Up to this stage we do not see any room for controversy. It was however contended that the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Bombay Prohibition case, State of Bombay v. Balsara1, was to restrict this control to guarding against their misuser for human consumption as alcoholic drinks either as they were or after processing and that restrictions for achieving any other purpose were invalid. Judged by these tests it was urged that only rules 5 and 9 could be in order and that all the other rules including rule 6 contravened the Constitution. It was also urged as following from this decision of the Supreme Court that the enactment must first exempt this type of liquors from the operation of the Act and then impose restrictions on their manufacture, possession, sale, etc , but that as the Madras Prohibition Act started with imposing a total ban on them by including them within the definition of liquor and then sought to enact restrictive regulations by rules under section 16, the restrictions imposed by the rules were ultra vires. We do not agree with the above deductions sought to be derived from the decision of the Supreme Court. Fazl Ali, J., with whose judgment the other learned Judges agreed formulated the position thus at page 495: "The question boils down to ascertaining whether the restrictions imposed by the provisions to which reference has been made are reasonable..........That the restrictions imposed by the sections on the right of a citizen to possess or sell or buy or consume or use spirits of wine, methylated spirits, wine, beer, toddy are in view of the aforesaid directive principles of State policy (referring to Article 47 of the Constitution) quite reasonable, has not been disputed before us. The controversy has centred round the words ‘and all liquids consisting of or containing alcohol.‘ It is said that these words include all liquid, toilet or medicinal preparations containing alcohol, and the restrictions imposed upon the ordinary use of such toilet or medicinal preparations are unreasonable and therefore void." The learned Judge then set out an extract from the judgment of the Bombay High Court wherein the conclusion was reached that the Bombay Act in so far as it prevented the possession, use and consumption of non-beverages for legitimate purposes was void as offending against Article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. His Lordship then scrutinised the orders and rules made by the Provincial Government under section 139 of the Bombay Act under which the latter could exempt any intoxicants from all or any of the provisions of the Act. But they were such a medley of notifications which in the words of the learned Judge " An ordinary citizen may find it a perplexing task to attempt to extract information out of the long series of complicated regulations, as to the true nature and extent of the right which the law confers upon him." His Lordship was unable to deduce therefrom any intelligible restrictions which he could characterise as reasonable and so said " Having given my careful consideration to the matter, I am of the opinion that the restrictions imposed by the Act even when read with the above Notifications are not reasonable, and I would affirm the conclusion arrived at by the High Court." There is however no doubt that in his Lordships’ opinion these "liquids containing alcohol " could have been subjected to reasonable restriction in respect of their manufacture, possession or sale. The Madras Prohibition Act is modelled on a basis different from that of the Bombay Act. The intention of the statute to exclude medicinal, toilet and industrial preparations from the general operation of the Act is made clear in the Preamble which we have extracted earlier and this purpose is achieved by the enactment of sections 16 and 18. This Court has held in Nageswara Rao v. State of Madras1, that section 16(1) is mandatory and that it lays a duty on Government to frame rules to regulate this species of "liquor "and it is by virtue of these powers that the present rules are framed. After discussing in detail the judgment of the Supreme Court Venkatarama Ayyar, J., concluded at page 732 of the report: " Having examined the judgment (of the Supreme Court in the Sahara case2 carefully we are unable to see anything in it which compels us to hold that section 18 of the Act and the licences issued thereunder should be held to be void because of the inclusion of Medicinal preparations in the definition of ‘liquor’ under section 3(9) of the Act, even though such licences are reasonable." and "Such a regulation cannot be attacked as an encroachment on the right of a citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of property because its object is not to interfere with those rights but to prevent the evasion of prohibition laws under cover of those rights." There is nothing in the subsequent case of Pesikaka v. State of Bombay3 to qualify the principle which we have set out above as deducible from the Balsara case 2. Incidentally we might mention that the argument that the restrictions are unreasonable and void by reason of these preparations containing alcohol normally intended for industrial use not being exempted in the first instance and then brought within the regulation was also addressed to this Court in Nageswara Rao v. The State of Madras1 and was repelled by the learned Judges. Incidentally we might mention that the argument that the restrictions are unreasonable and void by reason of these preparations containing alcohol normally intended for industrial use not being exempted in the first instance and then brought within the regulation was also addressed to this Court in Nageswara Rao v. The State of Madras1 and was repelled by the learned Judges. At pages 730 and 731 the learned Judges said: “The ground of the attack has no relation to the substance of the provisions; it is rather metaphysical in character having reference to the modus operandi adopted by the State Legislature in including medicinal preparations in the definition of ‘liquor’ and excluding them by a process of exemption instead of excluding them from the definition of ‘liquor’ and bringing them in by a system of regulation. It is difficult to see how this mode of the legislative treatment of the subject could in any way, prejudice the rights of the petitioners. Even if the legislature enacted a law limiting the prohibitions to intoxicating liquor and then providing for the regulation of medicinal preparations, the licences prescribed thereunder must be of the same character as under the impugned legislation ........There is clearly therefore no substance in this attack.” The point that emerges from this discussion is that the mere fact that preparations used for medicinal toilet or industrial purposes are liable to be misused while not a sufficient ground for banning them completely, the Legislature or the rule making authority is entitled to take steps to regulate their manufacture, possession or sale provided the regulation docs not impose any unreasonable restraint or amounts virtually to a prohibition of their possession or use. Proceeding on this basis we are unable to find anything in rule 6 which enacts any prohibition or which exceeds the limits of a reasonable restriction which the State may impose under Article 19(5) of the Constitution. We have heard no argument that if as undoubtedly the State possesses such a right to regulate (the manufacture) possession or (sale, etc.) of these goods for domestic use, the restriction on the quantity to be possessed without a licence being fixed at 3 quarts is unreasonable. We therefore hold that rule 6 of the Notification is valid and that the convictions of the petitioners are legal. We therefore hold that rule 6 of the Notification is valid and that the convictions of the petitioners are legal. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the Magistrate has jurisdiction to pass an order of confiscation of the property which was the subject-matter of the offence. The relevant provisions of the Act bearing on the point are sections 13 and 14 which run thus: “13. In any case in which an offence has been committed against this Act, the liquor, drug, materials, still utensil, implement, or apparatus in respect or by means of which the offence has been committed shall be liable to confiscation along with the receptacles, packages, coverings, animals, vessels, carts or other vehicles used to hold or carry the same. 14. (1): When the offender is convicted or when the person charged with an offence against this Act is acquitted, but the Court decides that anything is liable to confiscation, such confiscation may be ordered by the Court. (2) When an offence against this Act has been committed but the offender is not known, or cannot be found, or when anything liable to confiscation under this Act and not in the possession of any person cannot be satisfactorily accounted for, the case shall be inquired into and determined by the Collector or other Prohibition Officer in charge of the district by any other officer authorized by the State Government in that behalf, who may order such confiscation. Provided that no such order shall be made until the expiration of fifteen days from the date of seizing the things intended to be confiscated or without hearing the persons, if any, claiming any right thereto, and evidence, if any which they produce in support of their claims.” In view of these specific provisions in this Act it would not be open to the Magistrate to invoke the powers of confiscation under section 517, Criminal Procedure Code. There cannot be any doubt that if the offences with which the accused were charged and under which they were convicted were offences against the Act, the order of confiscation would be permissible and legal but the offence committed by the accused in the present case was one which was created by the Notification issued by the Government under section 16. The power of the State Government to provide punishments for breach of the conditions specified in the Notification is to be found in sub-section (2) of section 16 which enacts “..........When issuing a notification under sub-section (1) the State Government shall have power to provide that a breach of any of the conditions subject to which the exemption is notified shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both.” It is by virtue of the power contained in this sub-section that the Government in their Notification dated 19th December, 1952, enacted rule 10 under which for breach of all of any of the rules, the offender was subject to imprisonment upto a period of six months or fine which may extend to Rs.1,000 or with both. The question for consideration is whether when there has been an infringement of the provision of a rule which specifically provides for a particular punishment, the same could be treated also as an offence under the Act so as to enable the Court to impose upon the accused the punishments provided for offences against the Act as distinguished from those provided for the offences against the rules. The basis upon which the Magistrate convicted the accused and ordered confiscation was that they had committed an offence which fell within section 4(1) (a) of the Act read with rules 6 and 10 of the Notification. The argument on behalf of the State in support of this position was that French polish for illegal possession of which the several accused were convicted was ‘liquor ‘as defined in section 3 (9) of the Act as it was a liquid which contained alcohol and as the Proviso to section 4(1) did not exempt the possession by the accused the quantity in their possession being in excess of that which was permitted by the rules, the accused were guilty of an offence under section 4(1) (a). It may be mentioned in passing that the point in this form has not been urged by the accused in the Court below. But as it is purely one of law, we have permitted it to be raised here. It may be mentioned in passing that the point in this form has not been urged by the accused in the Court below. But as it is purely one of law, we have permitted it to be raised here. Though the general principle is that a valid rule made under an enactment has the same force as a provision in a statute and a breach of the rule might in a sense be considered as a contravention of the enactment itself, this would naturally depend upon the language used in the particular statute. In this connection certain decisions which have interpreted the scope of rule 81(4) of the Defence of India Rules might usefully be referred to. The rule as originally framed ran: “If any person contravenes any of the provisions of this rule he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both.” And this was subsequently amended so as to read: “If any person contravenes any order made under this rule he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both.” A question was raised before the amendment whether when an accused person contravened an order made under the rules, he could be punished, on the basis of his having contravened the rule itself. In In re Chokkalingam Chetty and others1, Byers, J., answered it in favour of the accused saying “No discussion is necessary to make it clear that in its original form rule 81(4) provided no punishment for an infringement of an order framed under rule 81(2)(b)(which enabled orders to be made)........The learned Public Prosecutor has argued that although there is this defect in the sub-rule, the intention in framing it was to make penal the infringement of these orders and therefore, the rule should be construed in a liberal sense otherwise rule 81(4) becomes meaningless. This argument is no doubt plausible but it offends against all recognised principles in the construction of penal statutes,” This decision was followed by this Court in Ademma v. Satyadhyana Thirtha Swamivaru2 and a similar view was expressed by Rowland, J., in Krishnachandra v. Emperor3 and by Meredith, J., in Jugal Singh v. Emperor4. This argument is no doubt plausible but it offends against all recognised principles in the construction of penal statutes,” This decision was followed by this Court in Ademma v. Satyadhyana Thirtha Swamivaru2 and a similar view was expressed by Rowland, J., in Krishnachandra v. Emperor3 and by Meredith, J., in Jugal Singh v. Emperor4. We are clearly of the opinion that on a proper construction of the provisions of the Madras Prohibition Act the expression “the offence committed against the Act” in sections 13 and 14 cannot comprehend the contravention of a notification issued under section 16. Any other construction would in our opinion lead to glaring anomalies in the application of the Act. To test the correctness of the argument on behalf of the State, we might take the case of a sale of varnish in contravention of rule 4 of the Notification. Under this rule a person is forbidden to sell varnish except under a licence in the prescribed form which he might get on payment of an annual licence fee. If a sale were effected in contravention thereof rule 10 provides punishment which is imprisonment which may extend to six months or fine which may extend to Rs.1,000. Now if the argument of the learned Advocate-General that a sale of varnish in contravention of rule 4 would also be an offence which falls within section 4(1) of the Act were accepted, the accused can be sentenced to imprisonment which may extend to two years and fine which may extend to Rs.5,000 or with both under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the punishment portion. This would clearly establish that a breach of the rule enacted under section 16(1) was not contemplated by the framers of the Act to fall within section 4(1) also. Though this test if applied to the present case might not yield a positive result, as the maximum punishment both under the Act and under the rules is the same it is a wholly irrelevant consideration. We are clearly of the opinion that the Act has drawn a clear distinction between the offences in regard to liquor and intoxicating drugs pure and simple in respect of which a prohibition was being enforced and those preparations containing alcohol used for medicinal and toilet or industrial purposes in regard to which a restriction only was being enacted. We are clearly of the opinion that the Act has drawn a clear distinction between the offences in regard to liquor and intoxicating drugs pure and simple in respect of which a prohibition was being enforced and those preparations containing alcohol used for medicinal and toilet or industrial purposes in regard to which a restriction only was being enacted. We, therefore, hold that a breach of the rule is not an offence against the Act within the meaning of sections 13 and 14 of the Prohibition Act. It therefore follows that there was no power in the Magistrate to direct confiscation of these goods and the order is therefore set aside. Crl.M.Ps.No. 1318 of 1954, etc.: This leads us to the consideration of Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions No.1318 of 1954, etc., in which a claim has been made by the petitioner for the return of the goods to him. The goods were seized from the accused-petitioners in the criminal revision cases we have dealt with. Normally if the order of confiscation is set aside the goods might have to be returned to them. But the accused in all these cases disclaimed ownership to these goods and therefore there is no question of any order being passed directing the return of the goods to them. In regard to the claimant, both the Sub-Divisional Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge on appeal have disbelieved his case as regards ownership. We do not see any justification for interfering with the order of the Sessions Judge declining to set aside the order of the Magistrate under section 520, Criminal Procedure Code and direct the goods to be delivered to the claimant. The goods cannot be directed to be delivered to him and will accordingly be treated as unclaimed property and dealt with accordingly by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The Sessions Judge had made it clear that it was open to the claimant to establish his right to the goods by civil action and this sufficiently safeguards his property rights if any to them. The Criminal Miscellaneous petitions are therefore dismissed. R.M. ----- Order accordingly.