JUDGMENT : SHINDE, J. 1. This is an appeal by the accused Vijaysingh and Amolsingh who have been convicted by the Sessions Judge, Guna, under S. 302 read with S. 34 and sentenced to transportation for life. 2. The facts as alleged by the prosecution are as follows :- The accused Vijaysingh, younger brother of the deceased Gumansingh, was living separate from his brother Gumansingh for about ten years. A month before the occurrence there was a quarrel between the brothers and Gumansingh had beaten his brother Vijaysingh. Since that incident the brothers were not on good terms and had given up even speaking to each other. On 15-12-1954 at noon Gumansingh was collecting cow-dung in his cattle shed and his son Lachhmansingh, aged about ten, was helping him to remove it from the cattle-shed to a pit. Vijaysingh and his friend Amolsingh came to the spot and Vijaysingh fired his gun at Gumansingh and killed him on the spot. Lachmansingh shouted (Uncle you have done a bad thing in shooting father). Both Vijaysingh and Amolsingh threatened him to keep quiet on pain of killing him. Hearing the sound of the gun Bhamribai wife of Gumansingh came out of the house and saw the accused running away. Sadarsingh, a neighbour, also came out of his house and saw the accused running away. He came to the cattle-shed of Gumansingh and found Lachhmansingh crying. Lachhmansingh told him that Vijaysingh and Amolsingh killed his father. Lachhmansingh went and called Pratapsingh P.W. 9 and Ratanlal P.W. 7. He told both of them that Vajaysingh shot his father. Lachhmansingh also went to the field to call his elder brother Gajrajsingh and related, to him all the facts. Gajrajsingh went to the Police Station, Pachhar, which is sixteen miles from the village Zilla, where the occurrence took place and lodged the First Information Report. In this report both Vijaysingh and Amolsingh have been named. As the accused were absconding, the investigating officer Duryodhansingh P.W. 11 searched for the accused in the surrounding villages and ultimately an informer brought the accused, to the investigating officer who arrested them on 20-12-1954. After committal the accused, were tried and convicted as stated above. Consequently the accused have filed this appeal. 3. We would deal with the case of Vijaysingh first. There is, no doubt, only one witness who saw Vijaysingh fire his gun at Gumansingh deceased. After committal the accused, were tried and convicted as stated above. Consequently the accused have filed this appeal. 3. We would deal with the case of Vijaysingh first. There is, no doubt, only one witness who saw Vijaysingh fire his gun at Gumansingh deceased. This witness is Lachhmansingh P.W. 12. It is tone that Lachhmansingh is a boy of 12 years. Prom his deposition there does not appear to be anything unnatural or inconsistent. His deposition appears to be perfectly straightforward. It is true that Lachhmansingh is the son of the deceased who had had a quarrel with the accused Vijaysingh. But the quarrel between the brothers does not appear to have affected the relationship of Lachhmansingh with his uncle Vijaysingh. In any case there are circumstances in this case which lend assurance to the testimony of this witness. It is now well established that in such cases the corroboration required is not the kind of corroboration necessary in the case of approvers. 'Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab', AIR 1954 S.C. 204 (A). Mst. Bhamri P.W. 14 states in her deposition that hearing the report of the gun when she came out, she saw Vijaysingh and Amolsingh threatening Lachhmansingh. Sardarsingh P.W. 4 also states in his deposition that when he came out hearing the report of the gun he saw Vijaysingh and Amolsingh running away. Besides, Ratanlal P.W. 7 and Pratapsingh P.W. 9 both state that directly after the report of the gun was heard, Lachhmansingh came to the temple and told them that Vijaysingh shot his father Gumansingh. This statement made by Lachhmansingh very soon after the occurrence is relevant under S. 6, Evidence Act. There is no doubt that Lachhmansingh was standing near the cattle-shed when the shooting took place. Therefore as a by-stander, a statement made by him shortly after the occurrence is a relevant fact. Statement made by a by-stander while still under the influence of the principal transaction is admissible as res gestae (vide S. 6 illustration A, Evidence Act). Statement made by Lachhman therefore to Ratanlal P.W. 7 and Pratapsingh P.W. 9 that Vijaysingh shot his father Gumansingh is relevant as it was made soon after the occurrence when the witness was still under the influence of murder. All these circumstances are sufficient to lend assurance to the testimony of Lachhmansingh. Statement made by Lachhman therefore to Ratanlal P.W. 7 and Pratapsingh P.W. 9 that Vijaysingh shot his father Gumansingh is relevant as it was made soon after the occurrence when the witness was still under the influence of murder. All these circumstances are sufficient to lend assurance to the testimony of Lachhmansingh. In our judgment, therefore, there is no doubt whatsoever that Vijaysingh shot his brother Gumansingh and killed him. 4. Now we turn to the case of Amolsingh. The learned counsel for the appellant laid great stress on the fact that Amolsingh did nothing except to stand by when Vijaysingh shot the deceased and argued that as Amolsingh did not participate in the act of murder, he cannot be held guilty by the operation of S. 34, Indian Penal Code. It is true that when Vijaysingh shot his brother Gumansingh, Amolsingh did nothing except to stand by. The question for determination, however, is whether his presence there was by mere accident. Section 34 reads as follows : "When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of common intention of all each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone." The scope and extent of S. 34 has been fully set out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in two recent decisions. In 'Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay, (S) AIR 1955 SC 287 (B), Bose, J. observed as follows : "This is wrong, for it is the essence of the Section (S. 34) that the person must be physically present at the actual commission of the crime. He need not be present in the actual room, he can, for instance, stand guard by a gate outside ready to warn his companions about any approach of danger or wait in a car on a nearby road ready to facilitate their escape, but he must be physically present at the scene of the occurrence and must actually participate in the commission of the offence in some way or other at the time the crime is actually being committed. The antithesis is between the preliminary stages, the agreement, the preparation, the planning, which is covered by S. 109, and the stage of commission when the plans are put into effect and carried out. Section 34 is concerned with the latter. The antithesis is between the preliminary stages, the agreement, the preparation, the planning, which is covered by S. 109, and the stage of commission when the plans are put into effect and carried out. Section 34 is concerned with the latter. It is true there must be some sort of preliminary planning which may or may not be at the scene of the crime and which may have taken place long beforehand, but there must be added to it the element of physical presence at the scene of occurrence coupled with actual participation which, of course, can be of a passive character such as standing by a door, provided that is done with the intention of assisting in furtherance of the common intention of them all and there is a readiness to play his part in the pre-arranged plan when the time comes for his to act. The emphasis in S. 34 is on the word 'done' : 'When a criminal act is 'done' by several persons . . . .' It is essential that they join in the actual 'doing' of the act and not merely in planning its perpetration. The Section has been elaborately explained by Lord Sumner in 'Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor', AIR 1925 PC 1 (C). At page 7 he explains that 'Participation in action' is the leading feature of S. 34. And at p. 7 in explaining S. 114 I.P.C. he says : "Because participation 'de facto' 'may some times be obscure in detail, it is established by the presumption 'juris et de jure' that 'actual presence' plus prior abetment can mean nothing else but 'participation'. The presumption raised by S. 114 brings the case 'within the ambit of S. 34.' (vide paras 23 and 24)." 5. Again in 'Rishideo Pande v. State of Uttar Pradesh', (S) AIR 1955 SC 331 (D), Das, J. observed as follows : "It is now well settled that the common intention referred to in S. 34 presupposes a prior concert, a pre-arranged plan, i.e., a prior meeting of minds. This does not mean that there must be a long interval of time between the formation of the common intention and the doing of the act. It is not necessary to adduce direct evidence of the common intention. Indeed, in many cases it may be impossible to do so. This does not mean that there must be a long interval of time between the formation of the common intention and the doing of the act. It is not necessary to adduce direct evidence of the common intention. Indeed, in many cases it may be impossible to do so. The common intention may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties." (vide para 2). Again the same learned Judge observes in para 4 as follows : "Shri Umrigar somewhat fervently appealed before us to consider the propriety of inflicting this extreme penalty of law on the appellant. It is true that the appellant did not inflict any blow on the deceased but he shared the common intention to kill him and actually participated in the criminal act by being present on the spot armed with his 'lathi'. In the eye of law, therefore, he is as much guilty of the whole criminal act as was his brother Ram Lochan who actually dealt the fatal blow on the sleeping man". From these decisions it is clear that two elements are necessary to fulfil the requirements of S. 34. One is that the person must be present on the scene of occurrence and the second is that there must be a prior concert or a pre-arranged plan. Unless these two conditions are fulfilled, a person cannot be held guilty of an offence by the operation of S. 34, Indian Penal Code. 6. That Amolsingh was present at the scene of occurrence can hardly be questioned. Lachhmansingh P.W. 12 clearly states in his deposition that Amolsingh came along with Vijaysingh armed with a sword and a gun and that he stood by a date-tree which was about five paces from the cattle-shed. Bhamribai P.W. 14 also states in her deposition that Amolsingh was standing near the cattle-shed and that he was armed with a sword and a gun. Sardarsingh P.W. 4 who came to the spot directly after the gun was fired saw Vijaysingh and Amolsingh running away. In these circumstances there can be no doubt about Amolsingh's presence at the scene of occurrence. That he was not there by mere coincidence is amply proved by his subsequent conduct. Lachhmansingh P.W. 12 states that Amolsingh threatened to kill him if he disclosed their names. This is corroborated by the statement of Mst. Bhamri P.W. 14. In these circumstances there can be no doubt about Amolsingh's presence at the scene of occurrence. That he was not there by mere coincidence is amply proved by his subsequent conduct. Lachhmansingh P.W. 12 states that Amolsingh threatened to kill him if he disclosed their names. This is corroborated by the statement of Mst. Bhamri P.W. 14. If Amolsingh had nothing to do with the act of murder, there is no reason why he should have threatened Lachhmansingh to keep quiet. Another significant circumstance is the fact that directly after the occurrence both Vijaysingh and Amolsingh ran away and remained absent from the village for about five days. This definitely indicates that Amolsingh had a guilty conscience. There are also other circumstances on the record which go to show that Amolsingh was closely connected with the murder. Khumansingh P.W. 3 states in his deposition that on the day previous to the murder, both Vijayasingh and Amolsingh called him to the temple and asked him to join them in killing Gumansingh. Ratanlal P.W. 7 states that both the accused came to the temple on the morning of the occurrence at the time of Arti. There both the accused took a vow to stand by each other and not to let each other down. Then again shortly before the occurrence Babulal P.W. 1 and Kesrichand P.W. 2 saw both the accused standing near the house of Vijaysingh armed with guns. Pratapsingh P.W. 9 saw both the accused loading the guns at the house of Vijaysingh a short while before the shooting took place. All these circumstances clearly indicate that there was a prior concert between the accused and that Amolsingh was standing near the cattle-shed to keep guard. He was not there by accident. He was there to assist Vijaysingh as pre-arranged. There is no doubt that he shared the common intention to kill Gumansingh and actually participated in the criminal act of murder by being present on the spot armed with a gun and a sword. The contention put forward by the counsel, therefore, has no force. In these circumstances we see no reason to differ from the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge. 7. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed. 8. DIXIT, J. :- I agree. Appeal dismissed.