JUDGMENT : DIXIT, J. 1. The appellant Ranchhod and Pooran Singh along with Jimipal, Phool Singh and Raghunath were placed on their trial before a Special Court constituted under S. 12, Madhya Bharat public Security Act, 1953, under Ss. 302 and 201 read with S. 34, I.P.C. for the murder of one Subalal. The Special Court was presided over by Mr. S.M. Pagnis, the Sessions Judge of Bhind. At the end of the trial the learned Special Judge acquitted Jimipal, Phool Singh and Raghunath of all the charges framed against them. He, however, found the appellant Pooran Singh guilty under Ss. 302 and 201, I.P.C. and sentenced him to transportation for life for the offence of murder and to two years' rigorous imprisonment under S. 201, I.P.C. He also found the appellant Ranchhod guilty of the above offences read with S. 34, I.P.C. and sentenced him to similar terms of imprisonment. The sentences imposed on the accused persons are to run concurrently. Both Ranchhod and Pooran Singh have filed separate appeals against their convictions and sentences. 2. The case for the prosecution briefly is that Subalal, a resident of village Katha was a man of some means and carried on money-lending business. Subalal was unmarried. His nephew the appellant Ranchhod and his brothers Beejayin P.W. 10 and Lalta used to live with him and were his heirs. Subalal was displeased with Ranchhod on account of his gambling and drinking habits, and profligacy and had for that reason turned Ranchhod out of the house on several occasions and had also taken him back in the house on the pursuasion of his friends. Ranchhod felt that his uncle was harassing him without any reason and not giving him any money to meet his ordinary requirements Ranchhod complained to some persons about the behaviour of his uncle towards him and told Brindawan P.W. 8 that he would set him right. Ranchhod felt that his uncle was harassing him without any reason and not giving him any money to meet his ordinary requirements Ranchhod complained to some persons about the behaviour of his uncle towards him and told Brindawan P.W. 8 that he would set him right. It was further alleged by the prosecution that at one time Pooran Singh was a friend of Subalal and used to tender advice to Subalal in his money-lending business with some profit for himself; that some time before the occurrence Subalal ceased to trust Pooran Singh or to consult him and that this change in the attitude of Subalal annoyed Pooran Singh so much that he used to give shelter to Ranchhod whenever he was turned out of the house by Subalal; that Ranchhod had executed a bond for Rs. 1,120/- in favour of Phool Singh and Raghunath whose only hope of recovery of the money was the inheritance which Ranchhod was to get on the death of Subalal; and that Jimipal was a friend of all these four persons. The prosecution alleged that all these five persons made a common cause against Subalal and decided to murder him. Accordingly at about midnight of 1-6-1954 when Subalal who was on that day unwell, was sleeping inside his house, Pooran, Singh, Jimipal, Phool Singh and Raghunath accompanied by Ranchhod came to the house of Subalal; Ranchhod stood near a cart standing outside the house; Phool Singh and Raghunath posted themselves close to a cot where Devilal P.W. 2, a servant of Subalal was sleeping in the open at a, distance of two paces from the house; Pooran Singh and Jimipal went inside the house, where Subalal was sleeping and then Jimipal sat on him and Pooran Singh caught hold of Subalal's throat and strangulated him to death. Thereafter Pooran Singh and Jimipal carried away the body of the deceased and threw it into a well situated at a distance of nearly three furlongs from the house. Phool Singh and Raghunath followed Pooran Singh and Jimipal, when they took away the body. Ranchhod and Devlal remained at the house. On the next morning at about sunrise Pooran Singh came to the house, asked Ranchhod to wake up the inmates of the house, call the Chowkidar and make a report to the Police. Phool Singh and Raghunath followed Pooran Singh and Jimipal, when they took away the body. Ranchhod and Devlal remained at the house. On the next morning at about sunrise Pooran Singh came to the house, asked Ranchhod to wake up the inmates of the house, call the Chowkidar and make a report to the Police. Thereupon Ranchhod woke up his brother Beejayin P.W. 10 and told him that their uncle Subalal had been abducted by some 'Bad-mashes' and instructed him to go and call Chowkidar Bhujbal P.W. 3, which he did. After the arrival of Chowkidar, Ranchhod, Devlal and Bhujbal went to police station Lahar and there Bhujbal lodged the First Information Report Ex. P. 1, on 2-6-1954 at about 10 A.M. In this report Bhujbal stated that some unknown 'Badmashes' had forcibly taken away Subalal from his house the previous night when a storm was raging that Subalal's whereabouts were not known and that this information was given to him in the morning by Beejayin. Kok Singh, Sub-Inspector of Police, Lahar, who took down the report, observed that Ranchhod and Devlal were in a nervous, agitated and frightened state and were not making a full disclosure of the facts. The Sub-Inspector made a note to this effect in the First Information Report and closely questioned Devlal and Ranchhod, who then gave out the names of Pooran Singh, Raghunath and Phool Singh as the persons involved in the crime. This is also noted by the Sub-Inspector in the First information Report. Kok Singh then took up investigation and on reaching the scene of the occurrence when he further interrogated Devlal and Ranchhod, they added the name of Jimipal and told Kok Singh that Subalal had been murdered by Pooran Singh, Jimipal, Rashunath and Phool Singh. All the accused persons, as well as Devlal, were put under arrest by the investigating officer. Devlal was, however released subsequently when the investigation revealed that he had no hand in the crime. On 3-6-1954 both Pooran Singh and Jimipal gave information to the police which led to the discovery of the body of the deceased from a well. The appellant Pooran Singh gave information to the police also about a bunch of keys belonging to Subalal, which was recovered from Pooran Singh's house in consequence of the information. On 3-6-1954, a post-mortem examination of the body of Subalal was conducted by Dr. The appellant Pooran Singh gave information to the police also about a bunch of keys belonging to Subalal, which was recovered from Pooran Singh's house in consequence of the information. On 3-6-1954, a post-mortem examination of the body of Subalal was conducted by Dr. Rangbiharilal P.W. 12. According to the doctor's report and the medical evidence, Subalal was strangulated to death. 3. Pooran Singh, Jimipal, Phool Singh and Ranchnod all denied their complicity in the crime. They pleaded alibi. The appellant Ranchhod gave a self-exculpatory statement admitting substantially the facts alleged by the prosecution but pleading that on the night of the occurrence he was sleeping outside a cattle shed not far from the house where Subalal was sleeping; that about mid-night Pooran Singh, Jimipal, Phool Singh and Raghunath came to him, caught hold of him and made him stand near a cart outside the house and then Phool Singh and Raghunath kept it watch on him and Devlal; that Pooran Singh and Jimipal went inside the house, where Subalal was sleeping, there Pooran Singh strangled him to death and thereafter Pooran Singh, Jimipal. Phool Singh and Raghunath carried away Subalal's body. 4. The fact that Subalal was strangulated to death on the night of 1-6-1954 is amply established and is not in dispute. At the trial the prosecution sought to prove the guilt of the accused persons by the evidence of (1) Devlal P.W. 2 who deposed to having seen the occurrence; (2) by the evidence of the recovery of the body of Subalal from a well and his keys from Pooran Singh's house on information given by Pooran Singh; (3) by the statements of Brindawan P.W. 8 and Beejayin P.W. 10 who stated that Subalal was not satisfied with the conduct and behaviour of Ranchhod and had turned him out of the house and that Subalal's relations with Pooran Singh had become strained; (4) and by the evidence of Sone P.W. 9 who gave the evidence that he had seen Pooran Singh and Ranchhod together in the evening some hours before the occurrence. 5. The case thus set up against the appellants depends entirely on the evidence of Devlal who was at the time of the murder, sleeping at a distance not far from Subalal and who was Subalal's servant. 5. The case thus set up against the appellants depends entirely on the evidence of Devlal who was at the time of the murder, sleeping at a distance not far from Subalal and who was Subalal's servant. The story told by this witness is that he had been working for Subalal from some years before the murder; that on the night of the occurrence Subalal was unwell and he was sleeping inside the house and he himself was sleeping in the open at a distance of two paces from the house; that Pooran Singh, Jimipal, Phool Singh and Raghunath accompanied by Ranchhod came to the house. Ranchhod stood near a cart which was standing outside the house; Raghunath and Phool Singh, stood near the witness and when he asked them as to what the matter was, they told him that Pooran Singh and Jimipal went to the place where Subalal was sleeping; that Jimipal sat on Subalal and Pooran Singh caught hold of Subalal's throat, pressed it and then tied a dhoty around his neck and thus strangulated him to death; that thereafter Pooran Singh and Jimipal carried away the body, and Raghunath and Phool Singh followed them. The witness proceeded to say that Ranchhod remained standing at the cart and when he asked him Ranchhod replied The witness then spoke to the Pooran Singh's coming to the house nest morning and suggesting them to make a report, to the Chowkidar's arrival to the making of the report by Bhujbal and to the disclosure to the police of the names of Raghunath, Phool Singh, Pooran Singh, and Jimipal when closely questioned by the investigating officer. When questioned as to why he and Ranchhod did not wake up Beejayin immediately after the incident or inform the villagers and the Chowkidar of the incident, the witness only said He added that he had told Ranchhod on the night of the occurrence itself to make some arrangements but Ranchhod did not pay any attention. The witness, was also asked as to why when he gave out the names of Pooran Singh, Raghunath and Phool Singh at the Thana, he did not tell the police that. these persons had murdered Subalal and taken away his body. Devlal's answer was that he did not disclose this fact on account of fear. The witness, was also asked as to why when he gave out the names of Pooran Singh, Raghunath and Phool Singh at the Thana, he did not tell the police that. these persons had murdered Subalal and taken away his body. Devlal's answer was that he did not disclose this fact on account of fear. He was further asked to explain what the fear was and his answer was Devlal also said that at the Thana Ranchhod did not disclose the names of any of the accused persons or the fact that his-uncle had been murdered. 6. If Devlal's evidence is believed as substantially true, then there can be no doubt as to the guilt of the two appellants. The learned Special Judge has held that this witness though possibly not strict in law, yet to all intents and purposes is an accomplice and that, therefore, unless his evidence is corroborated by independent testimony proving not only that the deceased came of his death in the manner described but also directly connecting the accused persons with the murder, the accused persons cannot be convicted on his evidence. The learned Special Judge found the testimony of Devlal corroborated in so far as Pooran, Singh and Ranchhod were concerned by the fact that Subalal's body was found in a well; that his death was caused by strangulation and that Pooran Singh and Ranchhod were not on good terms with the deceased. Mr. Dey learned counsel for the appellant Pooran Singh, while conceding that Devlal was not an accomplice in the strict sense of the term, argued that he was not better than an accomplice and that as his evidence was uncorroborated it would be unsafe to act on his testimony. In my view the learned Special Judge was not right in treating Devlal as one "practically an accomplice", and then judging his credibility on the application of the rule of prudence that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. The Evidence Act does not define the term "accomplice". According to its ordinary meaning it connotes a guilty associate or a partner in the crime. A person cannot be said to be an accomplice unless he has consciously participated in the commission of the crime so that he could along with other accused person or persons be jointly indicted for the criminal act. According to its ordinary meaning it connotes a guilty associate or a partner in the crime. A person cannot be said to be an accomplice unless he has consciously participated in the commission of the crime so that he could along with other accused person or persons be jointly indicted for the criminal act. Where a person is not concerned with the commission of the crime for which the accused is charged, and happens to be merely one cognizant of a crime, or one who has made no attempt to prevent it or disclose its commission, he cannot be said to be an accomplice in the crime. The question as to who is an accomplice has been considered in many cases and it is now well-settled that all accessories before the fact, if they participate in the preparation for the crime are accomplices. but if their participation is limited to the knowledge that a crime is to be committed they are not accomplices and further whether a person is or is not an accomplice depends upon the facts of each particular case considered in connection with the nature of the crime and persons to be accomplices must participate in the commission of the same crime as the accused persons in a trial are charged. See 'Ramaswami Gounden v. Emperor', 27 Mad 271 (A); 'Narain Chandra v. Emperor', AIR 1936 Cal 101 (B) ; and 'Jagannath v. Emperor', AIR 1942 Oudh 221 (C). No doubt the evidence of a witness who was cognizant of the crime and who did not divulge until pressed by the police needs very careful scrutiny, and a Court would be justified in a particular case in not acting upon the evidence of such a witness unless there are circumstances to lend support to his evidence. But this does not mean that the corroboration which the Court requires in such a case is of that kind of corroboration which one requires in the case of the evidence of an approver or an accomplice. As has been pointed out in 'Hafijuddi v. Emperor'. But this does not mean that the corroboration which the Court requires in such a case is of that kind of corroboration which one requires in the case of the evidence of an approver or an accomplice. As has been pointed out in 'Hafijuddi v. Emperor'. AIR 1934 Cal 678 (D) there is nothing in law to justify the proposition that the evidence of a witness who happens to be cognizant of a crime or who made no attempt to prevent it or who did not disclose its commission should only be relied upon to the same extent as that of an accomplice and that the real question in such a case is the degree of credit to be attached to the testimony of such a witness, and that depends on all the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court went on to say that it may not be possible to place much reliance on the evidence coming from persons falling within the description given above, but they are not accomplices and it lends to confusion of thought to treat them as "practically accomplices" and then to apply them the rule as to the credibility of accomplices instead of judging their credibility on a careful consideration of all the particular facts of the case affecting the evidence. The same proposition was laid down by that great Judge Bhashyam Ayyangar in 27 Mad 271 (A) where he observed that "in regard to the testimony of accomplices or 'participes criminis', there is no doubt the maxim that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars and this rests not on any rule of law but only 'on a rule of practice which has so become hallowed as to be deserving of respect.' But there is no authority whatever in English Law which warrants the extension of the maxim to persons who are not accomplices as in the Calcutta cases Ishan Chandra v. Queen Empress', 21 Cal 328 (E) and 'Alimuddin v. Queen Empress', 23 Cal 361 (F); and I do not think it will be in furtherance of justice to regard another class of witnesses as quasi accomplices and to extend the maxim to them." Now from Devlal's evidence it is clear that he was in no way privy to the murder of Subalal. He had no concern whatsoever in the perpetration, of the murder. He no doubt witnessed the crime, made no attempt to prevent it and did not disclose its commission, until he was pressed by the police, the next day. It would not, therefore, be right to regard him as an accomplice and to apply to his case the same rule as applies to the evidence of an accomplice. The credibility of his evidence has to be determined, like that of other witnesses, with reference to the circumstances of the case. So considering his evidence, I think what Devlal has said in his deposition is substantially true and must be acted upon. According to Devlal, Pooran Singh, Jimipal, Phool Singh and Raghunath accompanied by Ranchhod came to the house where he and Subalal were sleeping; Jimipal overpowered Subalal and Pooran strangled turn to death and that thereafter they carried away the body of Subalal and Phool Singh and Raghunath followed them. During all this time he was prevented by Phool Singh and Raghunath from getting up; that Ranchhod stood silently near a cart outside the house and that after the murder when he asked. Ranchhod as to what had happened, Ranchhod told him that the four accused persons had forcibly brought him to the house from the cattle shed where he was sleeping and that during the night when he suggested to Ranchhod to make some-arrangements, he did not pay any heed to it. The strongest point that can be made against, the witness is that he made no attempt to prevent the murder and that he did not give information, of the crime to any one at night or when he went with Ranchhod and Bhujbal to make a report to the police, the next morning. But it must be remembered that this witness was in the employment of Subalal for several years and expected to be continued in service after Subalal's death by his heir Ranchhod; Ranchhod stood to him in, 'loco parentis' and did not let him out of sight during the night and even on the next day when. Ranchhod, Devlal and Bhujbal went to make a report to the police. Devlal no doubt said that after Pooran Singh, Jimipal, Phool Singh and Raghunath had left the house, he shouted. Ranchhod, Devlal and Bhujbal went to make a report to the police. Devlal no doubt said that after Pooran Singh, Jimipal, Phool Singh and Raghunath had left the house, he shouted. Having regard to the statement of the witness that he did not divulge the crime on account of fear, it seems to me very improbable that he shouted or raised a hue and cry after the murder. The probability is that Devlal remained a silent and helpless spectator and did nothing to prevent the crime on account of fear of his own safety. Considering all these circumstances I am not prepared to regard Devlal's inaction after the commission of the crime and his failure to report the crime of his would be master Ranchhod and his friends, to the police until he was pressed on to it by the police, as unnatural. In the above circumstances the fact that Devlal made no attempt to prevent the murder or the fact that he did not make a report to the police soon after the occurrence or the following morning, does not to my mind lead to the conclusion that his evidence is false. 7. The statement of Devlal and the evidence of the discovery of the body of Subalal on 3-6-1954 on information given by Pooran Singh leave no doubt as to the guilt of Pooran Singh. The evidence about the discovery of the body is given by the witnesses Jagtap, Sub-Inspector of Police P.W. 1, Kok Singh, Sub-Inspector of Police, P.W. 13, Kashiram P.W. 6 and Ramdayal P.W. 7. The evidence is to the effect that after his arrest on 3-6-1954 Pooran Singh informed Jagtap that Subalal's body had been thrown into a well and he would point out the well; that Jagtap then called the witnesses Kashiram and Ramdayal, told them that the accused was giving information about the body being in a well, made the accused repeat the information in the presence of the witnesses, prepared a memo Ex. P. 3 and then the accused led the party consisting of the two witnesses and Jagtap to a well where the body was found lying; that shortly afterwards the accused Jimipal who was being interrogated by Sub-Inspector Kok Singh, also brought Kok Singh to the well and pointed out to him the body and thereafter the body was taken out of the well. Kok Singh's statement is that when Jimipal gave information to him about the body being hidden in a well, he went over to Jagtap; and informed him of what Jimipal had told him; that thereupon Jagtap told Kok Singh that Pooran Singh was also giving the same information and that he and Pooran Singh would first proceed to the well and then he should bring Jimipal to the well. The comment of Mr. Dey, learned counsel for the appellant Pooran Singh was that the entire evidence with regard to this recovery should be discarded as under S. 27, Evidence Act it was only the information which was first given that was admissible and once a fact had been discovered in consequence of an information received from an accused person, it could not be said to be rediscovered in consequence of information received from another accused person and that in this case all that was proved was that both Pooran Singh and Jimipal simultaneously gave the information. It was also said that the information which was admissible was the one given to Sub-Inspector Jagtap and not the information which was repeated before the witnesses Kashiram and Ramdayal. I am disposed to agree with the contention that under S. 27, Evidence Act simultaneous statements made by accused persons which lead to discovery are 'per se' inadmissible in evidence. There is nothing in S. 27, Evidence Act to indicate that the provision restricts the admission of information to that received from only one accused person. The scope of S. 27, Evidence Act has been explained by the Privy Council in 'Kottaya v. Emperor', AIR 1947 PC 67 (G) and by the Supreme Court in 'Ramkishan v. Bombay State', (S) AIR 1955 SC 104 (H). According to those decisions the condition necessary to bring the Section into operation is that discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved; and further S. 27 is based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence. It will thus be seen that what guarantees the truthfulness of the information is not the fact whether the information was given by one accused person or by several accused persons either simultaneously or otherwise but it is the actual discovery in consequence of the information that affords some guarantee about the truth of the information. As observed by the Calcutta High Court in 'Abdul Kader v. Emperor', 1946 Cal 452 (I) "if of course the prosecution are in a position to establish that the statement or the action which led to the discovery was actually made or took place simultaneously, we do not think that evidence in regard to the simultaneous statement or simultaneous action would be entirely shut out by the provisions of S. 27, Evidence Act." There are no doubt some decisions in which it has been held that simultaneous statements made by accused persons are not admissible under S. 27, Evidence Act. But as was said by the Supreme Court in 'Lachhman Singh v. The State', AIR, 1952 SC 167 (J) some of these cases have perhaps gone farther than is warranted by the language of S. 27." In 'Lachhman Singh's case three accused persons, namely, Katha Singh, Massa Singh and Swaran Singh made statements to the police disclosing that the dead bodies of two murdered persons had been thrown in the Sakinala. Thereafter the police party with the three accused went to Sakinala, where each of them pointed out a place where different parts of the dead bodies were discovered. On behalf of the accused persons it was urged before the Supreme Court that under S. 27, Evidence Act it was only the information which was first given that was admissible and that the prosecution did not adduce evidence to prove as to which of the three accused gave the information first and that, therefore, the alleged discoveries could not be proved against any of the accused persons. The Supreme Court did not express any concluded opinion on the question of the admissibility of simultaneous statements under S. 27, Evidence Act. The Supreme Court did not express any concluded opinion on the question of the admissibility of simultaneous statements under S. 27, Evidence Act. But they observed that "as to what should be the rule when there is clear and unimpeachable evidence as to independent and authentic statements of the nature referred to in S. 27, Evidence Act, having been made by several accused persons either simultaneously or otherwise, all that we wish to say is that as at present advised we are inclined to think that some of the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants have perhaps gone farther than is warranted by the language of S. 27, and it may be that on a suitable occasion in future those cases may have to be reviewed." The Supreme Court while holding that the discoveries made at the instance of Swaran Singh could not be ruled out of consideration observed : "It may be that several of the accused gave information to the police that the dead bodies could be recovered in the Sakinala, which is a stream running over several miles, but such an indefinite information could not lead to any discovery unless the accused followed it up by conducting the police to the actual spot where parts of the two bodies were recovered. From the evidence of the head constable as well as that of Bahadur Singh, it is quite clear that Swaran Singh led the police via Salimpura to a particular spot on Sakinala, and it was at his instance that bloodstained earth was recovered from a place outside the village, and he also pointed out the trunk of the body of Durshan Singh. The learned Judges of the High Court were satisfied, as appears from their judgment, that his was "the initial pointing out" and therefore the case was covered by the rule which, according to the counsel for the appellants, is the rule to be applied in the present case." 8. It would, therefore, appear from the above observations of the Supreme Court that even in the case of simultaneous information given by several accused persons, the information given by one of the accused would be admissible if he followed it up by conducting the police to the actual spot where the 'fact' was actually discovered. It would, therefore, appear from the above observations of the Supreme Court that even in the case of simultaneous information given by several accused persons, the information given by one of the accused would be admissible if he followed it up by conducting the police to the actual spot where the 'fact' was actually discovered. A similar view has been taken by the Nagpur High Court in 'State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chhotelal, (S) AIR 1955 Nag 71 (K). Here, it is plain from the statements of Jagtap and Kok Singh that the initial pointing out of the body of Subalal was by Pooran Singh. That being so, even if Pooran Singh and Jimipal simultaneously gave information to Jagtap and Kok Singh respectively about the body having been thrown into a well, the information given by Pooran Singh would be admissible under S. 27, Evidence Act. No doubt it is the information given to Jagtap by Pooran Singh that is admissible and not the repeated information before the witnesses Kashiram and Ramdayal. The investigating officer adopted the course of having the information repeated in the presence of Kashiram and Ramdayal and making a record thereof probably because he thought he would not be believed if he were to say that the information was given to him by Pooran Singh on 3-6-1954. The investigating officer was no doubt not right in entertaining such a belief. If he had any such apprehension, he should have taken the precaution of having the information disclosed to him only in the presence of the witnesses. Be that as it may, there is no reason to discard the statement of Jagtap that Pooran Singh gave him the information about the body of Subalal being in a well and there is no room for the suggestion that the discovery was a sham one. The fact that the body was actually taken out of the well alter both Pooran Singh and Jimipal had pointed out, does not, however, alter the effect of the fact that it was initially actually pointed out in the well by the appellant Pooran Singh. Pooran Singh denied having given any information to Jagtap and also the fact of discovery at his instance. He said that Kashiram and Ramdayal were on inimical terms with him. Pooran Singh denied having given any information to Jagtap and also the fact of discovery at his instance. He said that Kashiram and Ramdayal were on inimical terms with him. But they were not asked any question in cross-examination about their enmity with Pooran Singh and there was no suggestion why they should have colluded with the police. In my judgment the evidence on record amply establishes the fact that Pooran Singh gave the information leading to the discovery of the body and it was at his instance that Subalal's body was recovered from the well. No doubt the circumstance that the body was recovered at the instance of Pooran Singh would not necessarily show his direct connection with the offence. But it is an important link in the chain of evidence which taken along with Devlal's statement establishes his guilt for the murder of Subalal. I do not attach much value to the evidence of the recovery from Pooran Singh's house of a bunch of keys belonging to Subalal. For, though the fact of discovery is proved, the evidence on the point that the bunch of keys was with Subalal on 1-6-1954 when he went to sleep is not clear. According to Beejayin P.W. 10, Subalal always carried the bunch of keys in his pocket and that sometimes he used to give the bunch to the witness for playing. Beejayin has not said that the bunch of keys was with Subalal just before the occurrence. Sone's evidence that Ranchhod and Pooran Singh were seen together on the evening of 1-6-1954 proves nothing. 9. Coining now to the question of the guilt of the other appellant Ranchhod, in my opinion, that too is proved. Ranchhod was charged for the murder of Subalal with the aid of S. 34, I.P.C. Ranchhod threw the responsibility for the crime entirely on Pooran Singh, Jimipal, Phool Singh and Raghunath. He admitted that these four persons came to the house of Subalal on the night of 1st June, 1954, that Phool Singh and Raghunath stood guard near Devlal; that Jimipal overpowered Subalal and Pooran Singh strangled Subalal to death and that later on Pooran Singh and Jimipal carried away the body of Subalal and they were followed by Phool Singh and Raghunath. Ranchhod's plea that he was sleeping in a cattle shed not far from the house; that these four persons forcibly brought him from the cattle shed to the house and made him stand near a cart outside the house; and that he helplessly witnessed the commission of the crime, is, in my opinion, false. The incriminating circumstances against Ranchhod are, (1) that he expected to succeed to the property of Subalal who was displeased with his ways and habits and who had turned him out of the house at least once and had also taken him back on the assurance that he would improve his character; (2) that the relations between Subalal and Ranchhod were not happy and cordial as is deposed to by Brindawan P.W. 8, and Ranchhod's brother Beejayin P.W. 10; (3) that some seven or eight days before the occurrence Ranchhod had told the witness Brindawan P.W. 8 that his uncle was harassing him and was neither giving him any money nor allowing him to enter the house and that he would set right his uncle; (4) that when Subalal turned Ranchhod out of the house, Pooran Singh gave him shelter and Pooran Singh had lost the confidence and trust of Subalal and was for that reason annoyed with Subalal; (5) that Ranchhod executed a bond for Rs. 1,120/- in favour of Phool Singh and Raghunath and the only hope of repayment of the money under the bond was out of the property of Subalal; (6) that Ranchhod accompanied the four other accused persons and stood guard near a cart outside the house obviously for the purpose of warning his companions about any approach of danger; (7) that he made no attempt to prevent the commission of the crime or to shout at the time when it was being committed and that even after the commission of the crime when, the other four accused persons had left, he did not wake up the inmates of the house or inform anyone of the incident and did not even pay any attention to Devlal's suggestion to that effect; and (8) that it was when Pooran Singh returned to the house the next day that he woke up his brother Beejayin and at his suggestion after calling the Chowkidar, went with Chowkidar and Devlal to the police station to make a report, and there made a false report that his uncle had been abducted by some unknown persons. The learned Special Judge omitted to question Ranchhod about the return of Pooran Singh to the house the next morning and his having made a report at the suggestion of Pooran Singh. On account of his omission the fact that Pooran Singh returned to the house, the next morning and suggested to Ranchhod to make a report cannot be taken into consideration against Ranchhod. But even if this circumstance is excluded, the fact remains that Ranchhod woke up his brother Beejayin the next morning, asked him to call the Chowkidar and then went with the Chowkidar and Devlal to make a report to the police. These facts have been admitted by Ranchhod. In his examination he no doubt said that while making the report he had disclosed the names of the other four accused persons as those who had taken away his uncle. But both Devlal and Bhujbal have said that at the police station Ranchhod did not mention the name of any accused person nor did he say that his uncle was killed. There does not seem to me any reason to disbelieve this statement of Devlal and Bhujbal. Ranchhod admitted that he was standing near a cart outside the house. But both Devlal and Bhujbal have said that at the police station Ranchhod did not mention the name of any accused person nor did he say that his uncle was killed. There does not seem to me any reason to disbelieve this statement of Devlal and Bhujbal. Ranchhod admitted that he was standing near a cart outside the house. His plea that he was forcibly brought from the cattle shed and made to stand near the cart and that Raghunath also stood near him and kept a watch on him seems to me difficult of acceptance in the face of Devlal's statement that Phool Singh and Raghunath stood near his cot and prevented him from waking up and that Ranchhod went over to the cart and stood there. Devlal's statement about Ranchhod is, As I have before, the evidence given by Devlal is trustworthy and substantially true. If Devlal's statement is accepted, as I think it must be, then Ranchhod's version that he was compelled to stand near the cart and Raghunath stood near him must be rejected. Indeed if Ranchhod was not in the crime, it is difficult to understand the purpose for which the other accused persons brought him from the cattle shed to the house, made him stand near the cart and kept a guard on him. In that event, it would have suited Pooran Singh and the other accused persons to allow Ranchnod to continue to sleep undisturbed in the cattle shed rather than bring him to the house to witness the crime and to keep a watch on him there. Mr. Anand learned counsel appearing for Ranchhod laid stress on Devlal's statement that after the incident Ranchhod told him and said that this indicated that Ranchhod was innocent. I am unable to understand how this statement of Ranchhod to Devlal conclusively shows his innocence. That statement is incompatible with Ranchhod's conduct during the time the murder was being committed and afterwards. It was then said that Ranchhod was a young boy and that he was so scared, frightened and stunned at the murder of his uncle that he could not either shout or inform anyone of the incident immediately after the occurrence. That statement is incompatible with Ranchhod's conduct during the time the murder was being committed and afterwards. It was then said that Ranchhod was a young boy and that he was so scared, frightened and stunned at the murder of his uncle that he could not either shout or inform anyone of the incident immediately after the occurrence. Ranchhod is a boy of about twenty years of age and I am not prepared to believe that he was no stunned at the murder of his uncle that he lost all his senses and did not fully realise what had happened until after the police took up the investigation. Even in the state attributed by the learned counsel Ranchhod could have asked Devlal to wake up the inmates of the house and in-form them of the occurrence immediately after Pooran Singh and his companions had left, but he did nothing of this sort. He did not even pay any heed to the suggestion of Devlal that some arrangement should be made and did not even allow him to go out of his sight. In my view the circumstances that the relations between Ranchhod and his uncle were not happy; that he expressed to Brindawan that he would put right his uncle; that he accompanied the accused persons from the cattle shed to the house and stood guard near a cart outside the house; and that he omitted to take any steps to prevent the crime and did not inform anyone of the incident immediately after and did not make a true disclosure to the police at the time of the making of the report, all unmistakably go to show that he and Pooran Singh had a common intention of murdering Subalal and that it was in furtherance of this common intention that he accompanied Pooran Singh and the other accused persons and stood near the cart to warn his companions about any approach of danger. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of 'Ramayya v. State of Bombay', (S) AIR 1955 SC 287 (LJ) for the application of S. 34, I.P.C. what is essential is that the person must be physically present at the actual commission of the crime and there must be actual participation in the crime. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of 'Ramayya v. State of Bombay', (S) AIR 1955 SC 287 (LJ) for the application of S. 34, I.P.C. what is essential is that the person must be physically present at the actual commission of the crime and there must be actual participation in the crime. The accused person need not be present in the actual room where a crime is being committed; he can for instance stand guard by a gate outside, ready to warn his companions about any approach of danger or wait in a car on a nearby road ready to facilitate their escape. The actual participation can be of a passive character such as standing by a door provided that is done with the intention of assisting in furtherance of the common intention. Here the common intention of Ranchhod and Pooran Singh to get rid of Subalal is proved by their desire to get control of Subalal's property and by Ranchhod's coming to the house on the night of the occurrence in the company of Pooran Singh, Jimipal, Phool Singh and Raghunath. Ranchhod's standing near the cart to warn his companions about the approach of danger constituted his participation in the crime. It was no doubt of a passive character but as laid down in 'Ramayya's case' (L) it is sufficient to attract the provisions of S. 34, I.P.C. In my judgment on the material on record the learned Special Judge was right in finding Ranchhod guilty of the murder of Subalal with the aid of S. 34, I.P.C. 10. The appellants have also been convicted under S. 201, I.P.C. In my opinion, these convictions cannot be maintained. Poorna Singh's conviction under S. 201, I.P.C. is based on the evidence that he and Jimipal carried the body of Subalal from the house where he was murdered and that two days after the body was recovered from a well at the instance of Pooran Singh. It is also in evidence that Phool Singh and Raghunath followed Pooran Singh and Jimipal when they left the house. On this evidence it is clearly impossible to ascribe the actual act of throwing the body of Subalal into a well to Pooran Singh or to any particular person. It is also in evidence that Phool Singh and Raghunath followed Pooran Singh and Jimipal when they left the house. On this evidence it is clearly impossible to ascribe the actual act of throwing the body of Subalal into a well to Pooran Singh or to any particular person. That being so, Pooran Singh cannot be convicted of the offence of causing disappearance of evidence of Subalal's murder simpliciter under S. 201, I.P.C. as the learned Special Judge did. Ranchhod was charged under S. 201 read with S. 34, I.P.C. But there is no evidence to show that he was present at the well when the body was thrown and that in some way he participated in causing the disappearance of the body. On the other hand the prosecution evidence is that after the commission of the murder Ranchhod did not leave the house and follow Pooran Singh and others but remained there. Ranchhod's presence near the cart at the time of the commission of the murder cannot be taken as one of keeping a watch at the time the body was subsequently thrown into the well. The offences under Ss. 302 and 201, I.P.C. are here distinct offences committed at two different times and are separate transactions. It must also be remembered that it is not the carrying of the body out of the house that constitutes an act of causing disappearance of evidence of murder but it is the throwing of the body into the well. Quite apart from this the Supreme Court has now held in the case of 'Kalavati v. The State of Himachal Pradesh', AIR 1953 SC 131 (M) that where a person has been found guilty of the main offence, he should not, as a matter of practice, be convicted both of the main offence and under S. 201, I.P.C. In that case the Supreme Court observed : "Section 201 is not restricted to the case of a person who screens the actual offender. It can be applied even to a person guilty of the main offence, though as a matter of practice, a Court will not convict a person both of the main offence and under S. 201, I.P.C." After this decision of the Supreme Court, the decisions of some of the High Courts holding that a person found guilty under S. 302, I.P.C. cannot be charged and convicted under S. 201, I.P.C. for causing evidence of the murder to disappear, can no longer be of any authority. I would, therefore, set aside the convictions and sentences of each of the appellants under S. 201, I.P.C. 11. In the memo of appeal filed by Pooran Singh, an objection has also been taken to the effect that the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Public Security Act, 1953 under which the Special Court was constituted being repugnant to Art. 14 of the Constitution, are void and that, therefore, the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to try the suit. In view of the decision of this Court in 'Bherulal v. The State', Madh-B LJ (1955) HCR 99 (N) upholding the Constitutional validity of Chapter VI of Madhya Bharat Public Security Act under which the Special Court has been constituted, learned counsel for the appellant did not press the point before us. 12. For the foregoing reasons, I would maintain the convictions and sentences of transportation for life of each of the appellants for the murder of Subalal and set aside their convictions and sentences under S. 201, I.P.C. 13. A. H. KHAN, J. :- I agree. Order accordingly.