Judgment :- 1. The Petitioner was a Head Constable in the Travancore-Cochin Government service who was dismissed with effect from 18.6.1950 as per Ext. B dated 27.9.1950. This petition was filed only on 30.5.1955; and, as we have come to the conclusion that it should be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay, we do not propose to go into the merits of the case. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that his client had filed a series of petitions before the Government on 25.10.1950, 10.4.1951, 10.11.1951, 17.6.1952, 21.4.1954 and 14.8.1954, that the filing of those petitions indicated vigilance on his part and that the delay should hence be condoned. The first petition was rejected on 23.2.1951, the second on 12.6.1951, the third on 25.2.1952, the fourth on 18.10.1952, the fifth on 20.9.1954 and the 6th on 22.12.1954 and the fact that the petitioner chose to file such petitions, one after the other, that he apparently refused to accept any order as final and that the last of the petitions was rejected only on 22.12.1954 cannot possibly provide a valid reason for excusing the delay. 3. In G.M.T. Society v. Bombay State AIR 1954 Bombay 202, a case in which a petition filed on 11.5.1953 challenging an order passed on 15.1.1953 was rejected on the ground of undue delay, Mr. Chagla, C. J. said: "The explanation that is given by Mr. Gamadia on behalf of the petitioners for this delay is that on 19.2.1953, the petitioners made a representation to Government to reconsider their decision and the Minister concerned rejected that representation on 28.3.1953, and the petitioners received the final order of Government on 3.4.53. Now, we have had occasion to point out that the only delay which this court will excuse in presenting a petition is the delay which is caused by the petitioner pursuing a legal remedy which is given to him. In this particular case the petitioner did not pursue a legal remedy. The remedy he pursued was extra-legal or extra judicial. Once the final decision of Government is given, a representation is merely an appeal for mercy or indulgence, but it is not pursuing a remedy which the law gave to the petitioner". 4. In this particular case the petitioner did not pursue a legal remedy. The remedy he pursued was extra-legal or extra judicial. Once the final decision of Government is given, a representation is merely an appeal for mercy or indulgence, but it is not pursuing a remedy which the law gave to the petitioner". 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner seemed to think that the existence of a good case on the merits and the absence of any remedy other than under Art. 226 of the Constitution are matters which should weigh with a court in deciding whether the delay that has occurred in a particular case is fatal or not. We cannot agree. Delay to be excused requires an explanation and such extraneous considerations cannot possibly afford a valid explanation. 5. Various decisions in which varying periods of delay were excused were cited before us. Such is bound to be the case, for, as stated by Ferris (Extraordinary Legal Remedies, Paragraph 176) though the writ will generally be refused in all cases where the petitioner fails to show that he has proceeded expeditiously, "There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine whether the right to bring certiorari is barred by laches, as the issuance of the writ is largely a matter of sound discretion". The same is the view adopted in Abraham v. State 1953 KLT 703 and endorsed in Mahadeva Iyer v. State 1954 KLT 427 (F.B.) 6. In the light of what is stated above this petition must fail and is hereby dismissed; but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Dismissed.