ORDER : 1. The circumstances in which these two revision petitions arise are that on 20-7-1948 the Labour Ministry of Madhya Bharat Government issued a memorandum about the fixation of minimum wages of labourers employed in the Textile Mills of the State and the standard wages payable to the labourers employed on time-work basis and piece-work basis. The memorandum inter alia stated, that the Textile Mills situated in Gwalior and Ujjain would be fixed by the Labour Commissioner and that the wages so fixed would be operative from 1-1-1948 and that the workers should be paid on the basis of the standard wages and that the difference between the wages they were drawing and the standard wages, should be paid to them on or before 15-9-1948. The Government then appointed a Special Committee for the standardization of wages of the textile workers. The Committee recommended that the Head Fancy Jobbers should be paid at the rate of Rs. 125/- per month, and that the fancy jobbers and assistant fancy jobbers should be paid at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month and Rs. 60/- per month respectively. This recommendation of the Committee was accepted by the Government and thereafter on 1-9-1949 the Labour Commissioner addressed a letter No. 3165/XXII/LC to the General Manager J. C. Mills Ltd., drawing his attention to the standard wages fixed for the above class of workers. It appears that subsequently Babu Singh and twenty-three other workers, who were employed by the J.C. Mills Ltd., as head fancy jobbers, fancy jobbers and assistant 'fancy Jobbers, applied to the Mills for the payment of wages to them from 1-1-1948 in accordance with the standard wages fixed by the Government. This claim of the workers was refused by the Mills. Thereupon on 10-11-1949 the Payment of Wages Inspector made an application under S. 15, Payment of Wages Act 1936 before the Legal Authority appointed under the Act, praying that the non-applicant Bagrodia who had been nominated by the Mills as the authority responsible for payment of wages under the Act, be directed to Pay to the said workers the difference between the wages that were actually paid to them and the standard wages fixed from 1-1-1948 to 30-9-1949 and further praying that they be also paid interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum on that amount as compensation. The total amount involved in the claim made by the Payment of Wages Inspector was Rs. 9,053/8/-. The non-applicant resisted the claim firstly on the ground that the sums claimed were neither deductions from the wages nor sums in respect of which there was any delay in payment of the wages; that the workers had been paid wages according to an agreement arrived at between the representative of the employers and the employees and that, therefore, the legal authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim; and secondly that as the claim was made more than six months from the date on which the alleged deductions were made, or the date on which the payment of wages became due, it was barred by time under the first proviso to S. 15(2) of the Act. The Legal Authority held that the claim of the workers for the payment of wages according to standard rate for a period prior to 10-5-1949 i.e., for a period preceding six months before the date of the filing of the application by the Payment of Wages Inspector was barred by time. It further held that as the standard wages were fixed only in September 1949, the omission of the J. C. Mills to pay the workers wages before 1-9-1949 on the basis of the standard rate could be condoned but that the Mills were under an, obligation to pay to the workers wages according 'to the standard rate after 1-9-1949. Accordingly the Legal Authority made a direction on 30-9-1950 for the payment of wages to the aggrieved workers employed in the J. C. Mills as head fancy jobbers, fancy jobbers and assistant; fancy jobbers at the standard rate from 1-9-1949 and for the payment before 30-1-1951 of the difference between the wages actually paid to them during the period from 1-9-1949 to 31-10-1950 and the standard wages payable to them for this period. 2. The Payment of Wages Inspector then filed two separate appeals in the Court of District Judge, Gwalior against the decision of the Legal Authority. One appeal related to the rejection of the claim of the workers for the payment of wages according to standard rate for the period from 1-1-1949 to 9-5-1949 and the other appeal concerned with the wages for the period from 10-5-1949 to 31-8-1949. One appeal related to the rejection of the claim of the workers for the payment of wages according to standard rate for the period from 1-1-1949 to 9-5-1949 and the other appeal concerned with the wages for the period from 10-5-1949 to 31-8-1949. The J. C. Mills Ltd., represented by the non-applicant Bagrodia also filed an appeal against the decision of the Legal Authority directing the payment of standard wages to the workers from 1-9-1949. The learned District Judge agreed with, the decision of the Legal Authority holding the claim for wages for the period prior to 10-5-1949 as barred by time. As to the payment of wages for the period from 10-5-1949 to 31-8-1949 he came to the conclusion, on the basis of the decisions in- khema Nand v. East Indian Rly.', AIR 1943 All 243 (A); 1943 Oudh 283 (sic) and- 'P. Kumar v. Running Shed Foreman, E. I. Rly.', AIR 1946 Oudh 148 (B and C), that under S. 17 of the Act no appeal was competent inasmuch as the Legal Authority had not made any order of the nature contemplated by S. 15(3). The learned District Judge also observed that even if the decision of fee Legal Authority in so far as it rejected the claim for standard wages for the period from 10-5-1949 to 31-8-1949 was appealable, the claim for standard wages for that period as well as for subsequent period could not be accepted because those wages did not fail within the definition of "wages" given in S. 2(vi) of the Act, and that no application under S. 15 of the Act could lie, except for the payment of the wages as defined in S. 2(vi). He relied on- 'Jogendranath Chatterjee and Sons v. Chandreshwar Singh', AIR 1951 Cal 29 (D). The learned District Judge, therefore rejected the appeals filed by the Payment of Wages Inspector, and accepting the appeal preferred by the J. C. Mills Ltd., set aside the decision of the Legal Authority for the payment of wages to the workers according to standard rate from 1-9-1949. The Payment of Wages Inspector has now preferred these two revision petitions against the decision of the learned District Judge. In Civil Revision No. 177 of 1952, the question involved is about the rejection of the claim for wages for the period from 1-1-1948 to 9-5-1949. The Payment of Wages Inspector has now preferred these two revision petitions against the decision of the learned District Judge. In Civil Revision No. 177 of 1952, the question involved is about the rejection of the claim for wages for the period from 1-1-1948 to 9-5-1949. The other revision petition, namely, Civil Revision No. 193 of 1951 is directed against the decision of the District Judge whereby he held that the decision of the Legal Authority rejecting the claim for standard wages for the period from 10-5-1949 to 31-8-1949 was not appealable and that the standard wages fixed by the Government did not fall within the definition of wages as given in S. 2(vi) of the Act. 3. The principal question raised by these revision petitions is whether the standard wages fixed by the Government come within the purview of the definition of "wages" contained in S. 2 (vi) of the Act. That definition is as follows : ""wages" means all remuneration, capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable, whether conditionally upon the regular attendance, good work or conduct or other behaviour of the person employed or otherwise, to a person employed in respect of his employment or of wok done in such employment, and includes any bonus or other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable and any sum payable to such person by reason of the termination of his employment, but does not include. (a) the value of any house-accommodation, supply of light, water, medical attendance or other amenity, or of any service excluded by general or special order of the State Government; (b) any contribution paid by the employer to any pension fund or provident fund; (c) any travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession; (d) any sum paid to the person employed to defray special expenses entailed on him by the nature of his employment; or (e) any gratuity payable on discharge." 4. The use of the words "means", "includes" and "but does not include" in the definition make it amply clear that the definition is an exhaustive one and no other meaning can be assigned to the term "wages" than is put down in the definition. The first part of the definition relates to substantive remuneration. The use of the words "means", "includes" and "but does not include" in the definition make it amply clear that the definition is an exhaustive one and no other meaning can be assigned to the term "wages" than is put down in the definition. The first part of the definition relates to substantive remuneration. The second part includes in the definition of wages, any bonus or other additional remuneration or any sum payable to an employee by reason of the termination of his employment. The third part excludes from the definition certain matters. We are not concerned with the third part of the definition. Nor are we concerned with the second part of the definition, as the claim of standard wages in the present case is neither a bonus nor an additional remuneration. The relevant part of the definition is the first part; and the point is whether "all remuneration, capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable, whether conditionally upon the regular attendance, good work or conduct or other behaviour of the person employed or otherwise" to an employee or a worker, connotes amounts fixed by a contract between the employer and the employee or whether it is wide enough to cover an amount fixed by the Government, not under a statutory authority, as payable to the workers or employees. If I understood him right, the learned Advocate-General was at first inclined to suggest that the words "if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled" had not the effect of limiting the definition of wages to contractual amounts; and that the said words were only intended to connote fulfilment of the terms of employment under which the wages would be payable. But later on after citing the cases of- 'Divisional Engineer, G. I. P. Rly. v. Mahadeo Raghoo, (S) AIR 1955 SC 295 (E);- 'A. V. D'Costa Divisional Engineer, G. I. P. Rly. v. B. C. Patel', (S) AIR 1955 SC 412 (P), the learned Advocate-General did not press the argument. But later on after citing the cases of- 'Divisional Engineer, G. I. P. Rly. v. Mahadeo Raghoo, (S) AIR 1955 SC 295 (E);- 'A. V. D'Costa Divisional Engineer, G. I. P. Rly. v. B. C. Patel', (S) AIR 1955 SC 412 (P), the learned Advocate-General did not press the argument. To me it appears that the plain meaning of the expression "remuneration which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable" in S. 2(vi) means no more than the remuneration payable under a contract between the employer and the employees. The matter does not seem to me to admit of any controversy now after the decisions of the Supreme Court in (S) AIR 1955 SC 295 (E) and in (S) AIR 1955 SC 412 (F). In the former case the question was whether a gangman in the employment of Central Railway was entitled to get a house rent allowance under a scheme introduced by the Railway Board under the Ministry of Railways of the Government of India with effect from 1-11-1947. The gangman was not entitled to any house rent when his employment under the railway administration began in April 1945. The railway authorities refused to pay the gangman the allowance on the ground that under the scheme the allowance was not admissible to those to whom accommodation had been offered by the Government and who had refused it and that the gangman had refused to occupy the quarters offered by the Government. The gangman then put up a claim for the payment of allowance before the competent authority under the Payment of Wages Act. The question then arose whether the house rent allowance claimed by the gangman fell within the definition of wages contained in S. 2(vi) of the Act. The Supreme Court after referring to this section observed "Shorn of all verbiage, 'wages' are remuneration payable by an employer to his employee for services rendered according to the terms of the contract between them. The question then arises what are the terms of the contract between cue parties". The Supreme Court after referring to this section observed "Shorn of all verbiage, 'wages' are remuneration payable by an employer to his employee for services rendered according to the terms of the contract between them. The question then arises what are the terms of the contract between cue parties". The Supreme Court further observed that the rule made by the Government in regard to house rent allowance would be included in the terms of contract between the employer and the employee and that "the house rent allowance is admissible only so long as an employee is stationed at one of the specified places and has not been offered. Government quarters. The rules distinctly provide that allowance will not be admissible to those who occupy Government quarters and to those to whom such quarters have been offered but who have re-fused to take advantage of the offer. Once an employee of the description given above has been offered suitable house accommodation and he has refused it he ceases to be. entitled to the house rent allowance and that allowance thus ceases to be "wages" within the meaning of the definition in the Act, because it is no more payable under the terms of the contract". The above observations of the Supreme Court, leave no doubt that under the material portion of the definition of wages in S. 2(vi) of the Act, wages mean only the remuneration fixed by a contract between the employer and the employee. The ether additional remuneration included in the definition of wages also refers to contractual additional remuneration. This is clear from the fact that the other additional remuneration spoken of in the definition is "of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable" that is to say, which is capable of being expressed in terms of money and which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable. In (S) AIR 1955 SC 412 (F), also wages under the Act were taken to be those fixed by a contract between the parties. In (S) AIR 1955 SC 412 (F), also wages under the Act were taken to be those fixed by a contract between the parties. If then wages as defined in S. 2(vi) of the Act mean contractual remuneration, the question arises whether in the instant case the standard wages, which were admittedly not fixed by the Government under any statutory authority, were accepted by the J. C. Mills Ltd.; whether the acceptance had the effect of making those wages, a part of the terms of the contract between the employer and the employee or whether after accepting the standard wages, the Mills by their own act and with the agreement of the employees, included the standard wages in the terms of the contract between them. These questions have not been investigate and determined by the learned District Judge or by the Legal Authority and unless this is done, it is not possible to say whether the standard wages claimed by certain employees of the J. C. Mills do or do not fall within the definition of wages in S. 2(vi) of the Act. These questions must be determined and the case must be remitted to the Legal Authority to give a fresh opportunity to the parties to adduce all the relevant evidence to show whether the standard wages fixed by the Government did or did not become a part of the contract between the Mills and its employees. 5. Coming now to the other, questions raised in the revision petitions, there was no controversy, before me as to the rejection of the claim for standard wages for the period from 1-1-1948 to 9-5-1949. Under the first proviso to Sub-S. (2) of S. 15, Payment of Wages Act, an application under the sub-section is required to be presented within six months from the date on which deduction from wages was made or from the date on which the payment of wages was due to be made, as the case may be. Here the Payment of Wages Inspector applied to the Legal Authority on 10-11-1949. It is, therefore, plain that the claim for the period prior to 10-5-1949 that is for the period preceding six months before the date of riling of the application by the Payment of Wages inspector was barred by time. Here the Payment of Wages Inspector applied to the Legal Authority on 10-11-1949. It is, therefore, plain that the claim for the period prior to 10-5-1949 that is for the period preceding six months before the date of riling of the application by the Payment of Wages inspector was barred by time. The Legal Authority did not, however, admit the claim after condoning the delay under the second proviso to S. 15(2). In fact it seems to me that the Legal Authority's order rejecting the claim of the payment of standard wages for the period from 1-1-1949 to 9-5-1949 as barred by time without entering into the merits of the claim was not appealable under S. 17. Under S. 17 an appeal is provided against a direction made under Sub-S. (3) or Sub-S. (4) of S. 15 and not against an order under Sub-S. (2) of S. 15. The decision of the Legal Authority that the claim having been made beyond the statutory period of six months is barred by time or the order of that authority condoning or refusing to condone the delay in filing an application under S. 15 (2) beyond six months, is an order under Sub-S. (2) of S. 15 and no appeal lies from such an order. See- 'Sitaram Ramcharan v. M.N. Nagrashna', AIR 1954 Bom 537 (G) and- 'Prem Narayan v. Divisional Traffic Manager', AIR 1954 Bom 78 (H). In regard to the question whether the decision of the Legal Authority rejecting the claim for standard wages for the period from 10-5-1949 to 31-8-1949, was appealable under S. 17, I think the view of the learned District Judge that no appeal lay was not right. Clause (b) of S. 17(1) gives to an employed person a right of appeal against a direction made under Sub-S. (3) or Sub-S. (4) of S. 15, if the total amount of wages claimed to have been withheld from him or from the unpaid group to which lie belongs exceeds Rs. 50/-. Mr. Clause (b) of S. 17(1) gives to an employed person a right of appeal against a direction made under Sub-S. (3) or Sub-S. (4) of S. 15, if the total amount of wages claimed to have been withheld from him or from the unpaid group to which lie belongs exceeds Rs. 50/-. Mr. Patankar learned counsel for the non-applicant relying on AIR 1943 All 243 (A) and AIR 1946 Oudh 148 (B and C), urged that the language of Sub-S. (3) and Sub-S. (4) indicated that a direction was an order to one side to make a payment to the other side and that where a claim under S. 15 was rejected, there could be no direction and that, therefore, no appeal lay against the order rejecting the claim. I am unable to accede to this contention. The use of the words "direction made" in S. 17 no doubt lends support to the contention that it is only a positive direction made under S. 15(3) or S. 15(4) that is appealable under S. 17. But the point which appears to me to be quite conclusive of the fact that an employed Person has a right of appeal under S. 17(1)(b) even against the order of the Legal Authority rejecting his claim in part or in toto, is that an employed person will have no occasion to appeal if his claim is accepted in toto and a direction is. made in his favour, and that it is only if his claim is rejected wholly or partly that he can have any cause for appeal against the decision of the Legal Authority rejecting his claim. Now if the word "direction" in S. 17(1) with reference to an appeal by an employed person is taken to mean only an order directing the payment of certain wages to the employed person and not an order rejecting the claim and refusing to make a direction, the employee would have a light of appeal only if his claim has been allowed in part and not when it has been rejected in toto. I do not think such a strange result is contemplated by the Legislature. I am supported in this view by the decision in- 'Mahomed Haji Umar v. Divisional Supdt., N. W. Rly.'. AIR 1941 Sind 191 (I). I do not think such a strange result is contemplated by the Legislature. I am supported in this view by the decision in- 'Mahomed Haji Umar v. Divisional Supdt., N. W. Rly.'. AIR 1941 Sind 191 (I). The decision in AIR 1943 All 243 (A), is distinguishable by the fact that in that case an application of the employee under Sec. 15 was rejected as time barred without, even entering into the merits and it was held that no appeal lay against that order. As I have pointed out earlier, an order rejecting an application under S. 15 as time barred without entering into the merits of the application, is an order under Sub-S. (2) of S. 15 and not an order under Sub-S. (3) or Sub-S. (4) and that S. 17 (1) does not provide any appeal against an order made under Sub-S. (2) of S. 15. It must be noted that in the Allahabad case Hamilton, J., who decided it, expressing some doubt left open the question as to whether an appeal would lie under S. 17 where on an application under S. 15 there had been a trial on the merits and no one had been directed to mate any payment to the other side. My attention was drawn to the following observations of the Supreme Court in (S) AIR 195a SC 412 (F) : "Section 22 lays down that no Court shall entertain any suit in respect of wages or of deduction from wages in so far as the claim forms the subject-matter of a pending proceeding under the Act or has formed the subject of a direction in favour of or against the plaintiff under S. 15, or which could have been recovered by the application under that section." It is suggested that the words "has formed the subject of a direction in favour of or against the plaintiff under S. 15" in the observations supported the conclusion that a direction under S. 17(1) included a refusal to make a direction. I am, however, unable to agree with this reading of the observation of the Supreme Court. The question whether under S. 17(1) an appeal lies from a decision of the Legal Authority rejecting a claim and refusing to make a direction, was not before the Supreme Court. I am, however, unable to agree with this reading of the observation of the Supreme Court. The question whether under S. 17(1) an appeal lies from a decision of the Legal Authority rejecting a claim and refusing to make a direction, was not before the Supreme Court. The observations reproduced above only show that under S. 15 a direction can be made either in favour of or against the claimant and that when the claim has formed the subject-matter of a direction whether in favour of or against the claimant under S. 15, then that claim cannot form the subject-matter of any suit for the recovery of wages or deductions in a Civil Court. The fact that a direction in favour of or against the claimant can be made under S. 15 and that a claim which has formed the subject-matter of a proceeding under S. 15 cannot be entertainment in a Civil Court would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that an order rejecting an application under S. 15 and refusing to make a direction is appealable under S. 17. An appeal is always a creature of a statute and if S. 17(1) prohibits an appeal from an order refusing to make a direction, then no appeal would lie. But as I have pointed out above, the word "direction" in S. 17(1) with reference to an appeal by an employed person must be construed as including a refusal to make a direction. With respect, I do not agree with the view taken in AIR 1946 Oudh 143 (C), that no appeal is competent against an order rejecting on merits an application of the employee under S. 15. 6. There is another point which was argued at the Bar. It arises in this way. Before the Legal Authority the non-applicant took the objection that the sums claimed were neither deductions from the wages nor sums in respect of which there was delay in payment of the wages; that the workers had been paid their contractual wages; and that therefore, the Legal Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. The precise point raised by the objection was whether the Legal Authority had jurisdiction to determine what the wages of the employed person were according to the contract between them and the employer. Neither the Legal Authority nor the District Judge considered this point. Mr. The precise point raised by the objection was whether the Legal Authority had jurisdiction to determine what the wages of the employed person were according to the contract between them and the employer. Neither the Legal Authority nor the District Judge considered this point. Mr. Patankar learned counsel for the non-applicant urged that under S. 15, the jurisdiction of the Legal Authority was limited to those cases in which the dispute was about deduction from admitted wages or delay in the payment of those wages; and that, here, the controversy was as to the amount of wages payable to the employees under a contract between them and the employer. In support of this argument learned counsel relied on- 'Rajkumar Mills Ltd., Indore v. inspector, Payment of Wages Madhya Bharat', AIR 1955 Madh-B 60 (J). That was a case in which the dispute was whether the minimum basic wage of certain chowkidars of the Rajkumar Mills Ltd., was Rs. 25/- or Rs. 31/- per month. The Chowkidars claimed that they were entitled to be paid' at the rate of Rs. 31/- and applied to the Legal Authority under the Payment of Wages Act for a direction for the payment of the extra amount that ought to have been paid to them. The Authority held that the minimum basic wage of a Chowkidar was Rs. 31/- per month and it directed the Mills to pay the extra amount to the Chowkidars. The Mills then riled a petition under S. 115, Civil P.C., and Art. 227 of the Constitution of India in this Court contending that under S. 15, the Legal Authority had no jurisdiction to determine a dispute regarding wages. This contention was accepted by a Division Bench of this Court and it was held "that the authority appointed under S. 15 can only decide claims regarding deductions alleged to have been made contrary to the provisions of the Act and delay in payment of wages. This contention was accepted by a Division Bench of this Court and it was held "that the authority appointed under S. 15 can only decide claims regarding deductions alleged to have been made contrary to the provisions of the Act and delay in payment of wages. This section, nowhere lays down that the Authority appointed under S. 15 of the Act can also adjudicate upon any dispute in respect of wages." Rejecting the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the Payment of Wages Inspector that if S. 15 were so construed as to confine the jurisdiction of the Authority in cases where wages were admitted, it would be easy for the employee to oust the jurisdiction of the Authority by merely saying that there was a dispute regarding wages, the Division Bench observed : "This argument has very little force. As already pointed out the rules made under the Payment of Wages Act, make it obligatory for every factory owner to display a notice specifying rates of wages; consequently if the rates of wages are displayed on the premises, it would be well nigh impossible for the factory owner to contend that there is a dispute regarding wages". The decision in 'Rajkumar Mills Ltd. (J)', no doubt supports the contention of Mr. Patankar and sitting singly I would be bound to follow it. But as the learned Advocate-General points out in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in (S) AIR 1955 SC 412 (F), it can no longer be regarded of any authority. In (S) AIR 1955 SC 412 (F), a carpenter, who had been employed by the Central Railway as a daily rated casual labourer on specified daily wages, made a claim that under a scheme introduced by the Railway Authorities for making staff working under I.O.W. permanent with a prescribed scale of monthly wages, he was entitled to be paid, wages according to the prescribed scale for skilled workmen. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act held that the carpenter was a temporary employee and under the scheme he was entitled to be on the scale of Rs. 55-150 plus the allowances admissible. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act held that the carpenter was a temporary employee and under the scheme he was entitled to be on the scale of Rs. 55-150 plus the allowances admissible. The Supreme Court held that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act had the jurisdiction to decide what actually the terms of the contract between the parties were that is to say, to determine the actual wages; but that it had no jurisdiction to determine the question of potential wages or to direct the employer to pay the employee higher wages after finding that the employee should have been placed on the monthly wage scheme. Sinha, J. who delivered the majority judgment said : "The allegations made by the respondent only amount to saying that he had been paid his actual wages as fixed by the railway administration but that after the introduction of the scheme of upgrading of persons employed under the daily wages scheme, others who were junior to him had been placed on the monthly wages scheme Whereas his claim to be so placed had been ignored. The respondent's main grievance, therefore, appears to be that he had not been paid wages on the scale to which he would have been entitled if he had been placed on the monthly wages scheme. In our opinion, the scheme of the Act as set forth above shows that if an employee were to state that his wages were, say Rs. 100/- per month, and that Rs. 10 had been wrongly deducted by the authority responsible for the payment of wages, that is to say, that the deductions could not come under any one of the categories laid down in S. 7(2), that would be a straight case within the purview of the Act and the Authority appointed under S. 15 could entertain the dispute. But it is said on behalf of the respondent that the authority has the jurisdiction not only to make directions contemplated by Sub-S. (3) of S. 15 to refund to the employed person any amount unlawfully deducted but also to find, out what the terms of the contract were so as to determine what the wages of the employed person were. There is no difficulty in accepting that proposition. There is no difficulty in accepting that proposition. If the parties entered into the contract of service, say by correspondence and the contract is to be determined with reference to the letters that passed between them, it may be open to the authority to decide the controversy and find out what the terms of the contract with reference to those letters were. But if an employee were to say that his wages were Rs. 100 per month, which he actually received as and when they fell due but that lie would be entitled to higher wages if his claims to be placed on the higher wages scheme had been recognized and given effect to, that would not, in our opinion, be a matter within the ambit of his jurisdiction. The authority has the jurisdiction to decide what actually the terms of the contract between the parties were, that is to say, to determine the actual wages; but the authority has no jurisdiction to determine the question of potential wages. The respondent's complaint in the present case comes within the latter illustration." 7. The observation of the Supreme Court that there is no difficulty in accepting the proposition advanced on behalf of the carpenter that "the authority had jurisdiction not only to make directions contemplated by Sub-S. (3) of S. 15 to refund to the employed person any amount unlawfully deducted but also to find out what the terms of the contract were so as to determine what the wages of the employed person were", supports the view that the inquiry under S. 15 is not limited to questions of deductions or delay in the payment of wages only in cases of admitted wages and that there is unquestionably jurisdiction in the Legal Authority to construe the terms of the contract and to determine whether under the contract an amount X or an amount Y is payable to the employee as wages. The decision in AIR 1955 Madh-B 60 (J) cannot, therefore, be regarded as laying down good law. The decision in AIR 1955 Madh-B 60 (J) cannot, therefore, be regarded as laying down good law. I frankly cannot see how when the question is whether there has been a deduction or delay in the payment of wages due under the terms of a contract between an employer and an employee, it can be said for a moment that the Legal Authority has no jurisdiction to construe the terms of the contract of employment in order to determine what wages are to be paid or that when an employer has displayed a notice specifying the rates of wages, a dispute between the employer and the employee as to the wages payable under the contract of employment between them is not likely to arise. In this connection it would be pertinent and helpful to refer to the case of- 'A.R. Sarin v. B.C. Patil', AIR 1951 Bom 423 (K) cited by the learned Advocate-General, where the learned Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court has, if I may say so with respect, very lucidly explained the scope of the jurisdiction of the legal authority under S. 15. He observed : "We would like to make it clear, as the matter is of considerable importance, as to what we think is the jurisdiction of the Authority under the statute. It is certainly competent to the Authority to construe the terms of the contract of employment in order to determine what wages are to be paid, and even if the contract of employment has been terminated, it is open to him to construe its terms in order to determine whether any sums are payable by reason of the termination. It would also be open to him to determine whether a person has been employed or not, because the question of contract of employment and the terms of the contract can only arise provided the person seeking relief was employed. The mere denial of the factum of employment cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Authority. If the employer denies or disputes the fact that the servant was employed by him, it will be for the Authority to decide that question, and it is only after the question of employment has been decided that the question would arise as to what are the terms of the contract and what is the liability of the master under the terms with regard to wages. It has been suggested by Mr. Seervai that this construction of the statute really confines the jurisdiction of the Authority only to cases where wages are admitted, and Mr. Seervai says that if the Legislature intended that the Authority should only try cases of admitted wages, there was nothing easier than for the Legislature to have so stated. It is not correct that our decision leads to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Authority is so limited or restricted because there may be various cases within its jurisdiction where the liability to wages is denied or disputed and which the Authority would still be competent to decide. The question as to whether X amount or Y amount is due under the terms of the contract is a case-where wages may not be admitted. The employer may say that X amount is due and the servant might say that Y amount is due, and the Authority would have to decide on a true construction of the terms of the contract as to what is the amount due. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Authority really is to determine the terms of the contract in so far as he has to decide the liability of the employer to pay wages under the terms of the contract." 8. The decision of the Bombay High Court was followed by the Nagpur High. Court in- 'Bhagwat Rai v. Union of India'. AIR 1953 Nag 136 (L). On the facts of the present case, it is indisputable that the dispute here is as to the construction of the terms of the contract of employment and whether the standard wages fixed by the Government became a part of the contract and as such payable to the employees. That being so, on the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court in (S) AIR 1955 SC 412 (P) there can be no doubt that the Legal Authority is competent to entertain the claim made by the employed persons. 9. That being so, on the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court in (S) AIR 1955 SC 412 (P) there can be no doubt that the Legal Authority is competent to entertain the claim made by the employed persons. 9. For the foregoing reasons, I allow the revision petition No. 193 of 1951, quash orders of the Legal Authority and of the District Judge and remit the case to the Legal Authority to record the evidence the parties may produce on the question whether the standard wages fixed by the Government were accepted by the Mills and became a part of the contract between the Mills and the employees, and then adjudicate on the claim of the employed persons for the payment of standard? wages from 10-5-1949. The claim of the employed persons for standard wages from 1-1-1948 to 9-5-1949 must be rejected as barred by time and the revision petition No. 177 of 1952 concerning the claim is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. Order accordingly.