JUDGMENT Mootham, C.J. - This petition came before us on the 22nd February last when we directed that the further hearing should stand over for one month to enable Learned Counsel for the Petitioners to obtain certified copies of certain orders which had been made by the revenue authorities and to apply to this Court, if he though fit, for amendment of the prayer to his petition. The requisite copies have now been obtained and on the 21st March, last the Petitioners filed an application for amendment of the prayer to their petition. That prayer we have allowed. 2. We referred to the facts so far as they were known to in our order of the 21st February last. The position has been clarified by the further material which is now before us, and it is in the circumstances desirable to restate briefly the relevant facts. 3. In the year 1935 Respondents Nos. 3 to 6, who are zamindars, filed a suit against one Ram Lakhan u/s 79 of the Agra Tenancy Act for his ejectment from 18 plots bearing the numbers 105, 273, 340, 360, 369, 798, 813, 829, 863, 973, 745, 753, 747, 912, 643, 878, 674 and 923. This suit was decreed on the 18th November, 1935, and on the 22nd November, 1936, these Respondents obtained possession of the 18 plots in suit is execution of their decree. 4. After possession of these plots had be n obtained an objection to its legality was filed before the Tehsildar by Ram Lakhan, and this objection was upheld by the Tahsildar. Respondents Nos. 3 to 6 thereupon filed a petition in revision before the Additional Commissioner who referred the application to the Board of Revenue which, on the 20th November, 1941, allowed the application and set aside the order of the Tehsildar. In the meantime two things had happened. After Respondents Nos. 3 to 6 had obtained possession of the 18 plots they settled these plots with the present Petitioners, and secondly on the 19th December, 1939, they filed a second suit against Ram Lakhan for his ejectment, this time u/s 44 of the Agra Tenancy Act. This suit was decreed on the 26th March, 1940, but no proceedings in execution were instituted. 5. On the 14th July, 1947, the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment,) Act, 1947, (Act X of 1947) came into force. This suit was decreed on the 26th March, 1940, but no proceedings in execution were instituted. 5. On the 14th July, 1947, the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment,) Act, 1947, (Act X of 1947) came into force. Under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 27 of this Act any person who was ejected from his holding on or after the 1st January, 1940, u/s 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, was given the right to apply within a specified period to the court which passed the decree for his ejectment for reinstatement in such holding. Within the time so allowed Ram Lakhan applied to be reinstated in the 18 plots in respect of which Respondents Nos. 3 to 6 had obtained decrees for his ejectment on the 18th November, 1935, and on the 26th March, 1940, and also in respect of certain other plots; and his application was allowed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on the 12th March, 1949. To this application the present Petitioners as well as Respondents 3 to 6 were parties. An appeal from the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer was dismissed in the 19th March, 1951, and an application for the revision of that order was dismissed by the Board of Revenue on the 18th October, 1951. The Petitioners then made an application to the Board for the review of its order of the 18th October, 1951, but this also was dismissed on the 30th October, 1952. Undeterred by their previous lack of success the Petitioners filed a second review application before the Board of Revenue, and on this occasion their application was partially successful in that the Board, by an order dated the 16th December, 1952, set aside the order of reinstatement in so far as it applied to plots other than the 18 plots which had been the subject matter of the decrees in favour of Respondents Nos. 3 to 6. In respect of those plots the application was dismissed. 6. The Petitioners thereupon filed this petition in which by their amended prayer they seek the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the orders of the Board of Revenue dated the 18th October, 1951, the 30th October, 1952, and so much of the order of the 16th December, 1952 as related to the 18 plots. 6. The Petitioners thereupon filed this petition in which by their amended prayer they seek the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the orders of the Board of Revenue dated the 18th October, 1951, the 30th October, 1952, and so much of the order of the 16th December, 1952 as related to the 18 plots. The Petitioners can only succeed if they can satisfy the Court that there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record of the proceedings of the Board of Revenue. Their contention is that Ram Lakhan (who died after the filing of the petition) was in fact ejected from the 18 plots in November, 1936 in execution of the decree obtained by Respondents Nos. 3 to 6 in November, 1935, that Ram Lakhan was not therefore a person who was ejected from his holding on or after the 1st day of January, 1940, and that therefore Section 27 of the U.P. Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947, had no application. I think it is to be sufficiently clear that the view of the facts taken by the Board was that notwithstanding the proceedings taken by Respondents Nos. 3 to 6 in execution of their decree of 1935 Ram Lakhan either remained in possession of the 18 plots or subsequently regained possession of those plots, and that it was for this reason that Respondents Nos. 3 to 6 were compelled to file a subsequent suit for his ejectment in December, 1939. That suit was u/s 44 of the Agra Tenancy Act which, with effect from the 1st January, 1940, was replaced by the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. It is common ground in this case that u/s 296 of the latter Act the decree which was passed in favour of Respondents Nos. 3 to 6 on the 26th March, 1940, was a decree u/s 180 of the Tenancy Act. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has sought to argue that the Board's view of the facts was wrong, and that the Petitioners have been in uninterrupted possession of the plots from the date upon which they became the subtenants of Respondents 3 to 6. In my opinion he cannot be permitted to do so. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has sought to argue that the Board's view of the facts was wrong, and that the Petitioners have been in uninterrupted possession of the plots from the date upon which they became the subtenants of Respondents 3 to 6. In my opinion he cannot be permitted to do so. this Court is not a Court of appeal and so long as there is some evidence to support the finding of the Board on a question of fact that finding must be accepted; the decision of the Board can be challenged only on a question of law. 7. The Board has undoubtedly taken the view that as a consequence of the decree passed against him on the 26th March, 1940, Ram Lakhan was a person who was ejected from his holding within the meaning of Section 27 of the Amending Act. The Petitioners contend that the phrase "was ejected" means ejected by the court in the course of execution proceedings, and as it is again common ground that no steps were taken by Respondents 3 to 6 to execute this decree, the decision of the Board, it is said, is wrong in law. 8. The word "eject" is defined in Murray's Dictionary as meaning "to expel, drive out (by force or with indignation) from any place or position", or "to turn out, evict (a person) from property or possessions", but in my opinion an examination of the provisions of the Tenancy Act of 1939 and of the Amending Act of 1947 shots that the word 'ejected' has not been used exclusively in the restricted sense of eviction by a court in execution of a decree or order of ejectment. For example, Section 159(1) of the principal Act refers to a court "deciding any proceeding by which a tenant is ejected from his holding", and it is clear that the court there referred to is not the execution court but the trial court, for not only does this Sub-section place upon the court the duty of assessing the amount of compensation due to the tenant on account of any improvement made by him, but Sub-section (2) provides that in certain circumstances therein mentioned the decree or order for ejectment shall be conditional on the payment by the land holder of the balance due to the tenant. 9. 9. A person cannot apply for reinstatement u/s 27 of the Amending Act unless he was ejected from his holding or any part thereof-- (a) u/s 165, or (b) u/s 171, or (c) u/s 180 of the Tenancy Act. Now, Section 165 provides both for the making of an order of ejectment and for the ejectment of a tenant, but Sections 171 and 180 provide only that in the circumstances mentioned in those sections the tenant shall be liable to ejectment, and it is Section 181 which makes provision for the enforcement of a decree or order for ejectment. When therefore the Amending Act speaks of a person being "ejected" u/s 171 or Section 180 it must mean, in my opinion, that the person was dispossessed of his holding as a consequence of a decree or an order passed under either of those sections. 10. The consequence of placing upon the word 'ejected' the narrow construction for which the Petitioners contend would be very inequitable, for a tenant who voluntarily gives up possession of his holding upon a decree being passed against him u/s 180 would be deprived of the benefit of the provisions of Section 27 of the Amending Act, although that benefit would accrue to the tenant who in like circumstances offers resistence or obstruction to the delivery of possession and thereby compels the decree-holder to enforce his decree by proceedings in execution. Such a view would also I think lead to practical difficulties. Would, for example, a tenant against whom a decree for ejectment has been passed u/s 180 and who by refusing to vacate the holding compels the Plaintiff to institute execution proceedings, be said to have been "ejected" from his holding if he delivers up possession immediately upon hearing of the institution of such proceedings and without until he is forcibly dispossessed? Although it is true that in construing an Act the argument as to the results is entitled to little weight, the Court is nevertheless entitled to consider the consequences which will follow upon alternative constructions of the language used in order to assist it in determining the intention of the legislature. 11. Although it is true that in construing an Act the argument as to the results is entitled to little weight, the Court is nevertheless entitled to consider the consequences which will follow upon alternative constructions of the language used in order to assist it in determining the intention of the legislature. 11. In my judgment it was the intention of the legislature that the provisions of Section 27 of Act X of 1947 should apply to any person dispossessed of his holding or any part thereof in the circumstances mentioned in that section, and I think that effect can be given to that intention without putting a forced meaning on the language used. 12. The result therefore, in my opinion, is that the orders of the Board of Revenue are not vitiated by any error of law and that this petition should be dismissed with costs. Mukerji, J. 13. I have had the advantage of reading the opinion of my Lord the Chief Justice in this case. When the petition was argued before us I entertained a doubt in regard to the meaning that should be, given to the words 'was ejected' appearing in Section 27 of Act X of 1947, but after considering the reasons given by my Lord the Chief Justice in his opinion I have come to the conclusion that the view expressed by him is the right view to take in regard to the meaning of the words 'was ejected'. The word 'eject' conveys the idea of putting out of possession or expelling by force or by some coercive process: ordinarily the word 'eject' does not convey the sense of a person going out of possession voluntarily. On the facts of this particular case, as placed before us in the affidavits, it cannot be said that Ram Lakhan voluntarily went out of possession. There was a decree for ejectment against him by a competent court and if he chose to go out of possession because of that decree for ejectment having been made against him, then it can be said that he was ejected from the holding. As has been pointed out by my Lord the Chief Justice in his opinion, the word 'eject' has not been used in the Tenancy Act in its restricted dictionary meaning. As has been pointed out by my Lord the Chief Justice in his opinion, the word 'eject' has not been used in the Tenancy Act in its restricted dictionary meaning. This, again, is a reason which has impelled me to take the view that we can say, in this case, that though Ram Lakhan may have left the property without resort having been taken to execution proceedings, yet he was ejected within the meaning of Section 27 of the Amending Act and as such he had the right to apply for reinstatement. 14. For the reasons given above I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice in the order which has been proposed by him. 15. The petition is dismissed with costs.